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ABSTRACT 
The increasing flow of international and Western cultural and information input into 
Iran, via satellite technologies, has affected the traditional, cultural and religious 
heritage of the country. Considering the political, cultural and economic realities of 
Iran and the history of its media, this research intends to examine the uneven flow of 
information and entertainment of global media via satellite in Iran within the context 
of the international communication and cultural imperialism theory. 
This study attempts to revise the cultural imperialism theory through a case study and 
identifies its limitations and the areas that could be developed within its infrastructure 
such that it will be applicable to the current situation and contemporary arguments of 
the media flow. It reviews the cultural imperialism theory in the light of the active 
audience's perspective and analyses the mixed and contradictory dynamics of 
reconstruction, adoption and resistance of international media. 
This research analyses the emergence of Persian language satellite television news 
and entertainment in Iran. A mixture of political, cultural and economic pressures 
dominates the editorial conduct of those expatriate and Persian language satellite 
channels. Political pressures, however, seem to be playing the most apparent role in 
that process. 
This study critically analyses the activities of Jaam-e-Jam and VOA Persian language 
satellite channels and examines the factors that affect the editorial policies and 
practice of the studied channels. It addresses these issues by studying the evolution, 
style of ownership, organisational structure, and content as well as editorial and 
managerial power hierarchy of those channels. In order to asses the attitudes, and en- 
coded messages of these stations, a combination of content and discourse analysis is 
used. This research also empirically examines the audience's response in a detailed 
focus group investigation to see how they perceive and interpret the encoded 
messages. 
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Outline of Thesis 
In the global flow of communication and information, each country plays a 
different role and displays different characteristics. Therefore, in order to understand 
the existing situation, there seems to be a need for individual flow studies. The 
primary concern of this study is to adopt a theoretical construct which acknowledges 
both the international domination and internal forces in the process of cultural flow. 
It also aims to adopt a framework to study the uneven flow of information and 
entertainment of global media programmes via satellite in Iran and examine their 
cross-cultural impacts. In this study, the question of how Iran is tied into the global 
system of domination through satellite broadcasting is analysed within the context of 
the international communication debates and theory of cultural imperialism. 
Chapter one tries to revise the cultural imperialism theory and identify its weaknesses 
and limitations and to identify the areas that could be developed within its 
infrastructure. It assesses the existing media flow between nations and focuses on the 
transfer of technology and the importation of programmes to establish the theoretical 
and methodological framework for the study. 
Chapter two examines the process of cultural imperialism through the emergence of 
modernity and advent of capitalism in Iran and also examines the local dynamics and 
resistance of people demonstrated in anti-imperialism movements throughout the 
country's history. It is concerned with the cultural homogenisation and the way that 
this issue has been responded to and rejected in Iran. The relevance of this chapter is 
to contribute to the body of knowledge analysing the character of cultural imperialism 
through modernisation process and capitalist development in Iran and the role of 
Islam. It focuses on how Iran has been engaged with the West and cultural 
imperialism throughout its history and how people have resisted the Western 
domination. 
Chapter three demonstrates the historical and contemporary elements and internal 
forces that have worked alongside with the external forces of cultural imperialism, 
both of which have had a great impact on the socio-cultural patterns of Iranian 
society. It outlines the historical background of television in Iran, its recent 
development and the framework of IRIB. It analyses the technical and programme 
structure of Iranian television and discusses the technical dependency accompanied by 
imported programmes both before and after the revolution. It also looks into general 
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features of the Iranian television after the 1979 Revolution and analyses the 
ideological and political infrastructure and examines the Islamisation of the media in 
Iran, in both content and operation. In this, it looks into the internal forces behind 
Western cultural imperialism both before and after the revolution and studies the main 
factors underlying the huge popularity of satellite television in Iran. 
Chapter four, through investigating the political propaganda, tries to examine the 
relationship between international politics and international satellite broadcasting and 
tries to demonstrate the active role played by the state in its engagement of ideological 
warfare. In order to achieve this objective, this chapter will focus on the activities of 
the Jaam-e-Jam expatriate satellite television and the Voice of America and their 
relationship to propaganda. 
Chapter five examines the agenda and the attitudes of the programme contents of the 
two studied satellite channels. Content analysis will be conducted to ascertain the 
news agenda and type of production in both Jaam-e-Jam and VOA, and also to 
identify the main differences in news stories, and the way in which the bulletin and 
news periods are constructed, i. e. presenters, running sequence, duration, the stories 
and how they are covered on the two television stations. The emphasis will be put on 
the location of a news story, its subject matter, source, duration, the type of visual 
material used and its main character. 
Chapter six focuses on the representation of the news stories, as well as the 
ideological functions which they may serve. It builds the case for a discourse study by 
trying to discover deeper levels of the creation of meaning, which in traditional 
content analysis cannot be adopted. The main purpose of this analysis is to 
investigate the portrayed images and the language used in news reporting in both 
stations. The intention of this investigation is to, within a discourse analytical 
framework, make these images explicit. 
Chapter seven, by undertaking focus group investigation, examines the audience's 
interaction in a process in which the media messages are interpreted. It attempts to 
study the potential effects of satellite programming in Iran. It tries to draw a picture of 
the current cultural situation in Iran and the reasons for viewing satellite televisions 
by people. It specifically tries to point out the cultural and social problems, which 
competing ideology and politics of the state may pose for people, and therefore 
increase desire amongst them to watch material different from that on Iranian TV. It 
examines the effects of the studied satellite televisions and the impacts of their 
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propaganda on Iranian audience. This study uses the encoding-decoding model to 
analyse the focus group results which, as a structured model, facilitates identification 
of different orientations towards the interpretation of responses and the audience's 
perception of the media messages. 
In the conclusion, the results of field studies will be analysed. 
Part One 
Cultural Imperialism and Mass Media 
10 
Chapter One 
Cultural Imperialism 
1.1 Introduction 
We have reached an era in which television plays a crucial role in giving a 
hew dimension to the possibility for interchange of ideas and information between 
people. Its contents affect the people's socio-economic life, politics, cultures, 
National systems and international relationships in different levels. The demand for 
'the modem technologies and ready-made programmes increased rapidly with the 
development of television and satellite channels. As the broadcasting time has 
increased, so has the need for advanced television infrastructures. 
The flow of Western culture via television programmes has arguably undermined the 
indigenous culture of developing countries. These cultural products may have great 
impact upon the feelings, thoughts and cultural values of people. It can be argued that 
although the emergence of advanced technologies have brought a degree of 
development to the broadcasting structure of developing countries, the creative uses 
for technology have yet to be carried out. In this respect, the existing unequal and 
imbalanced flow of cultural materials between North and South seems to be 
reinforced by these new communication technologies. 
1.2 Theoretical Framework 
Many assessments and rejections were directed towards the earlier Western 
modelled modernisation theory by the Third World countries in the last two decades. 
The rise of the debate over the New International Information Order as an essential 
part of the New International Economic Order also continued with these criticisms. 
The growth of the cultural imperialism approach can be seen in this framework. In 
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addition, the developments in communications technology, such as cable network, 
and Direct Broadcast Satellites, have also caused an increasing gulf between 
developed and developing countries in terms of access to technology. Under these 
circumstances, cultural imperialism and dependency theory have gained a new 
dimension. 
The Modernisation theory describes the media as a tool for development and focuses 
on the national level of modernisation and on socio-psychological factors to 
determine the ways in which modem communications media could help accelerate the 
process of development and modernisation. The media imperialism perspective, 
however, emphasises the global structure of dependency and dominance relationships 
and international socio-political system, which decisively determines the course of 
media development within the ambit of each nation. 
Fred Fejes uses media imperialism in a broad and general manner to describe "the 
process by which modem communication media has operated to create, maintain and 
expand systems of domination and dependence on a world scale" (Fred Fejes, 1981, 
P. 281). Transnational corporation activities, internal factors in each nation state, and 
their impact on the culture, are the major concerns of the cultural imperialism 
approach. What is cultural imperialism, if it still exists, and how might this 
phenomenon be understood? This chapter attempts to explore the notion of cultural 
imperialism, and its many definitions within communication studies. Through a 
critical review of the notion, it will examine how the theorists of cultural imperialism 
explain the uneven flow of information and cultural products, and the unification of 
culture. Since the cultural imperialism perspective was developed in order to 
challenge the modernisation theory through the emergence of the dependency model, 
the cultural imperialism argument could best be understood by presenting some 
underlying points of the dependency model, and together, briefly, briefly examine the 
suggestions made by modernisation and diffusion models to improve socio-economic 
systems of developing countries. 
1.3 Modernisation Theory and Dependency 
Modernisation theory is based on spreading economic wealth to different, less 
affluent, social structures, thereby encouraging economic development and 
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improvement. Thus, development was thought of as an economic growth package, 
functioning as both a set of Western economic aims in developing countries together 
with the cultural, political, social and economic development of the so-called Third 
World nations. Modernisation theorists mainly attempted to convert a traditional 
society into a modem society based on Western-modelled industrial economic 
infrastructures, which in the end would only serve the economic and commercial 
interests of the advanced capitalist countries (Servaes, 1986, p. 205). Manuel Castells 
also, by regarding the gap between North and South and the coexistence of societies 
with different levels of modernisation, argued that: "Indeed we observe the parallel 
unleashing of formidable productive forces of the informational revolution, and the 
consolidation of black holes of human misery in the global economy" (Castells, 1998, 
p. 2). Since most of these black holes are located in the south, Kagarlitsky argues that 
"the problem is not that some countries are less modernised than others, but 
capitalism, which proclaims a global modernisation, is incapable of ensuring that it is 
carried out" (Kagarlitsky, 2000, p. 115). 
The economic 'analysis of 74 Third World countries in 1973 by Adelman and Morris 
reveals that economic growth has not improved the distribution of wealth and welfare 
either among social groups or among lower income groups in those countries (cited in 
Lee, 1979, p. 18). It seems that the gap between the rich and poor, in other words, 
widened in developing countries as a result of some implications advocated by the 
modernisation. Therefore, the existing pattern of economic and technological 
domination and dependency was merely deepened. Golding and Elliot criticised the 
historical view of the modernisation approach with respect to developing countries 
that needed an `external stimulus', such as advanced countries, to help bring them into 
the twentieth century. This view ignores the history of underdeveloped countries, 
many which have still not progressed because of the external domination of developed 
countries (Elliott and Golding, 1974, P. 237). The role and function of communication 
as an energising tool of development and modernisation was also discussed by 
modernisation theorists. Since the United Nation's Declaration on Freedom of 
Information in 1948, which was rooted in the free-trade doctrine, most research on 
international mass media was influenced by the modernisation view (Schement, 1984, 
pp. 163-165). According to this perspective, exportations of Western media and the 
distribution of communication technologies would enable the Third World to create 
the necessary conditions of economic and social growth needed to improve their 
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situation (Herman and Mosco, 1980, p. 352). However, this view has been criticised 
by Sreberny-Mohammadi, as she argues that "Export of highly developed and 
sophisticated technologies to the Third World, often controlled by transnational 
corporations, brings environmental problems, and economic and other 'ties' without 
the basic scientific knowledge to build on and expand such technologies" (In Golding, 
1996, p. 65). More importantly, there is a cultural component attached to all 
technological issues, especially the acceptance of the superiority of Western values 
and practices. In this respect, as Hveem points out, the transfer of technology is often 
reflected in a deep loss of confidence in one's own culture (Hveem, 1983). 
The role of mass media in national development was initially conceived by 
modernisation theory scholars such as Lerner, Schramm and Rogers, for whom 
sharing communication technologies was the most fundamental and important aspect 
for the diffusion of new ideas (cited in Lee, 1979, p. 19). Lerner's studies in the Middle 
East focused on psychological changes in the `modernised individual'. Rogers 
concerned himself with the psychological responses to the diffusion of the 
technological innovations, while Wilbur Schramm discussed the adoption of Western 
media systems in the Third World countries in a widely influential book distributed 
under the U. S. and UNESCO sponsorship. Media infusionists contended that the 
initial dependence of developing countries would be followed by a corresponding 
growth of domestic capabilities. In this way, the Third World could learn, adopt and 
borrow advanced technology and culture in order to improve their indigenous cultural 
forms of expression. Moreover, they insisted on an open interaction with core 
countries as they believed that culture does not need protection (Lee, 1979, pp. 50-52). 
However, it has been argued that even economically developed countries such as 
South Korea and Japan have been influenced negatively by Anglo-American culture 
and media. By 1976, the dominant paradigm of modernisation had passed, although in 
fact, this theory still survives in a greatly modified form (Sinclair, 1990, p. 286). 
The developmentalist modernisation perspective, which tried to achieve Third World 
development by transferring massive capital and technology, was challenged by the 
dependency theory. In contrast to the modernisation paradigm, some critical empirical 
work on international communication (Schiller 1969, Tunsall 1978, Nordenstreng 
1974, Varis 1983, and Mattelart 1979) indicated that mass media exports from 
technologies to programmes flowing freely from developed countries to the Third 
World have merely reinforced overall dependency and domination. This challenge 
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can be seen as a part of a broader movement among Latin American scholars during 
the 1960s, which sought to account for the increased social inequality, national 
indebtedness, technological dependency and economic domination by rapidly 
expanding transnational corporations allegedly caused by economic development 
politics (Sinclair, in Martin and Hiebert, 1990, p. 207). By the end of 1950, with a 
subsequent attempt to reveal the reasons for regression, theories of imperialism began 
to consider the common effects of imperialism and capitalist development on overseas 
territories. 
The dependency approach was also outlined by Paul Baran. He pointed out that 
development and underdevelopment is a two-way process in which advanced 
capitalist countries develop through the transfer of economic surplus value from 
overseas countries, while the overseas countries remain underdeveloped because of 
continuing exploitation caused by the Western ascendancy (Hoogvelt, 1982, p. 166). 
Frank's work on Latin America was an elaboration of Baran's perspective, defining 
dependency as a body of neo-colonial international relations between "the centre and 
periphery" throughout the global system. The centre and periphery are structurally 
joined together and development in the former dominantly determines 
underdevelopment in the latter (cited in Servaes, 1986, p. 208). 
Wallerstein (1979) took Frank's concept of the "development of underdevelopment" 
as a starting point for his work. He stated that the world economy has been a capitalist 
economy since at least the sixteenth century, and that it has remained virtually 
unchanged. The power of transnational companies, which dominate international 
trade by controlling the price of basic materials, has further maintained the system of 
dependency between centre and periphery even after the colonial period. On the other 
hand, structuralist dependency writers, such as Cardoso and Flatto, also discussed the 
assumptions of imperialism, arguing that capitalist systems both exploit and develop 
the Third World. According to them, dependency does not necessarily only create a 
negative impact, as well as that internal factors are not as `lifeless and stagnant' as 
Frank argued (cited in Hoogvelt, 1982, p. 185). 
The common arguments about the dependency theory can therefore be summarised as 
follows: 
1. Dependency causes underdevelopment in terms of a global network of 
exploitation between `metropolis and satellite' societies. External factors, 
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mainly developments in the metropolitan centres, determine and maintain the 
underdevelopment in the periphery. 
2. Western metropolitan centres tend to perpetuate this dependency of the Third 
World to ensure favourable conditions for the export of their commodities. 
3. Dependency is regarded as the central feature of the international economic 
system, both under colonialism and neo-colonialism. 
4. A remedy for this dependency is suggested to be a `severance of ties to the 
external capitalist powers' and `socialist radical. break' (Lee, 1979, p. 32). 
Criticisms directed towards the dependency perspective also can be summarised as 
follows: 
1. It overemphasises economic determination and neglects cultural changes in 
dependent societies. 
2. It incorrectly evaluates the internationalisation of capital and production. 
3. It analyses internal classes and states within the periphery as passive factors of 
dependency and also neglects demographic and physical locations in the 
countries concerned. 
4. It does not show how socialist societies fit into the world system. 
1.4 Cultural Imperialism Theory 
Since the 1970s, mass media scholars and researchers such as Schiller, 
Mattelart, Varis and Lee, have investigated global mass communication problems 
within the broader context of the dependency model and within the media imperialism 
approach. Schement and Rogers distinguish between economic imperialism and 
cultural imperialism in the case of the media flows. The former refers to the financial 
dependency that is created by the sale of, for example, television series, films and 
news services to a developing country. This perspective proposes that national 
cultures, weakened by historical and economic circumstances, have been eroded by 
Western media dominance. Cultural imperialism is much more pervasive than 
economic imperialism, as it includes the importation of ideology that is inherent in all 
media flows (Schemert and Rogers, 1984, p. 308). They argue that sometimes media 
flows do not involve economic imperialism at all. For instance, the French 
government follows a policy of promoting French culture through assisting the 
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development of television and other media in former French colonies. This is cultural 
imperialism, but not necessarily economic imperialism. Although in most cases the 
two go together, Schement and Rogers' view is to analyse them separately in order to 
gain greater opportunities for a better understanding of the media flow (Schemert and 
Rogers, 1984, p. 308). Consequently, in their opinion, the motivation for economic 
imperialism is mainly a desire for profits rather than a desire to change another 
nation's culture. On the other hand, as McPhail stresses, the most recent manifestation 
of colonialism is electronic colonialism, which targets the mind. It aims to influence 
attitudes, desires, beliefs, lifestyles, consumer opinions or purchasing patterns of 
consumers in the developing world (McPhail, 1981). It can be argued that although 
economic interests are more important to exporters of communication hardware and 
software, the way for the survival of their dominant position is to produce new 
cultural patterns and values, which will make people consume more and more. As a 
result, these patterns created by metropolitan media centres are absorbed into recipient 
countries, bringing fundamental changes to their indigenous culture and lifestyles, 
ranging from tastes in food, clothing and music to native customs, artistic 
manifestation and even moral values. Cultural imperialism explains that Western 
dominance has perpetuated and increased inequalities in social, political, and 
economic systems that were inherent in the colonial system of Third World countries. 
The domination of a country's media activities by another are frequently described by 
the terms "cultural imperialism" (Golding), "communication imperialism" (Lee), 
"media imperialism" (Boyed-Barrett), and even more narrowly and specifically, 
"television imperialism" (Tunstall). Cultural imperialism is the one-way spread of a 
social system from the West across the globe. It leads to the decline of local 
traditional values in favour of Western capitalist values. Despite the freedom of many 
formerly colonised counties, their social systems remain heavily influenced by 
cultural, social, and economic facets of life in Western countries. 
Petras defines cultural imperialism as: 
"the systematic penetration and domination of the cultural life of the popular 
classes by the ruling classes of the West in order to reorder the values, 
behaviour, institutions, and identity of the oppressed peoples to conform to the 
interests of the imperial classes... United States cultural imperialism has two 
major goals, one economic and the other political: to capture markets for its 
cultural commodities and to establish hegemony by shaping popular 
consciousness... The principal target of cultural imperialism is the political and 
economic exploitation of youth" (Petras, 1993, P. 139). 
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Annabelle Srebemy-Mohammadi views imperialism as a `double-edged sword', 
which "must be seen as the major global diffuser of modernity, its cross-cultural 
carrier", pointing out that "they (Westerners) brought Western patterns of child- 
rearing and family life; of cuisine -- from dried baby milk to packaged Western foods 
- and of leisure pursuits, such as cricket, now quite indigenised in the way it is played 
in Bombay or Barbados, and many other cultural habits and tastes" (Sreberny- 
Mohammadi, in Golding and Harris, 1997, p. 66). She acknowledges the historical 
dimension of imperialism, in the areas of cultural impacts and argues that: 
"It is relatively easy to discuss the `cocacolization' of the world, even the 
`seikoization' of global time; this ... as a reminder of the many, varied and deeply integrated structures of modernity that were in place long before these 
others, more superficial cultural changes. Many Southern cultures had already 
been irrevocably changed long before any electronic media arrived" 
(Serbemy-Mohammadi, in Golding and Harris, 1997, p. 67). 
Srebemy-Mohammadi, from a historical perspective, traces the roots of modernity, 
seeing it as the seeds which were sown centuries ago by Western imperialism. She 
outlines the impact of imperialism and its multi-faced cultural role in Third World 
countries. For her, this complex cultural role contains the elements of modernity that 
have negatively influenced the economic, social and psychological situation in 
developing countries. She criticises the various definitions and research of cultural 
imperialism, stressing that these documented studies have not adequately represented 
the historical dynamics of Western cultural penetration that continue to prevail within 
the modern infrastructure of Third World nations. She argues, "Yet, from the 
beginning, the concept was broad and ill-defined, operating as evocative metaphor 
rather than precise construct, and has gradually lost much of its critical bite and 
historic validity" (Sreberny Mohammadi, in Golding and Harris, 1997, p. 49). She 
points out that these studies are `either a discourse analyses on the global spread of 
modernity that focus on the textual or attribute this modernisation to the post WWII 
economic developments'. Srebemy Mohammadi categorises the major colonial 
influences of modernity in education, administration, language, etc. in the Third 
World, providing under each category a historical elaboration of the influences of the 
Western colonial powers and their economic, cultural, professional and socio-political 
impacts on the colonised countries. 
Samir Amin (2001), by emphasising the historical dimension of imperialism, also 
indicates that imperialism is not a stage of capitalism; it is inherent in capitalism's 
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expansion. He argues that the imperialist conquest of the planet by the Europeans and 
North Americans was carried out in two phases and is currently entering a third one. 
Amin stresses that the first phase of this enterprise was marked by the destruction of 
the Indian civilisation by the United States. The second phase of imperialism, as 
argued by Amin, was based on the industrial revolution that manifested itself in 
colonial subjection of Asia and Africa in order to open their markets and to seize the 
natural resources of the globe. This phase of imperialism and the polarisation of the 
world, as Amin states, have increased the inequality between the North and the South. 
He argues that by the end of eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, 
by the political independence of the Asian and African nations, and also by the 
independence of the Americas, capitalism had adjusted itself to the new situation. 
Amin pointed out `we have entered a third wave of imperialism expansion' (Amin, 
2001, Available at: www. monthlyreview. org/0601amin. htm). He also argues that: 
"although the objectives of dominant capital are still the same - the control of 
the expansion of markets, the looting of the earth's natural resources, the super 
exploitation of the labour reserves in the periphery - they are being pursued in 
conditions that are new and in some respect very different from those that 
characterised the preceding phase of imperialism" (Ibid). 
Amin points out that in this new version of imperialism, the ideological discourse 
designed to secure the assent of the peoples of the central Triad (the United States, 
Western European, and Japan) has been refurbished and is now founded on the `duty 
to intervene' that is justified by the defence of `democracy', the `rights of peoples', 
and `humanitarianism' (Samir Amin, 2001, Available at: 
www. monthlyreview. org/0601amin. htm). 
According to the cultural imperialism argument, global cultural flows are not part of a 
civilising or development process, but involve cultural imposition and dominance. 
Neo-Marxist radical communication researchers have used the concept of cultural 
imperialism, which is placed in the framework of the economic dependency theory, to 
explain international media activities between rich and poor nations. This perspective 
also concerns the relationship between ownership and control of the media and power 
structures in society; the ideological signification of meaning in media messages and 
its effects in reproducing the class system (Curran, 1977, p. 9). Nordenstreng and 
Varis suggest that mass communication in capitalist societies fulfils the functions of 
marketing profit as a branch of commercial industry, controlling consciousness inside 
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society in order to maintain the continuity of the socio-economic status quo. 
Furthermore, these functions are completed through the maintenance of an alliance 
between developing countries' governments and international capitalist corporations. 
Therefore, the flow of mass media products seems to be not only a commercial 
exchange, but also part of the Third World's communication structure which is under 
the influence of external powerful capitalist communication systems (Vans, in Lee, 
1979, p. 35). They claim that there is a link between international capitalism and the 
domestic elite, a view which Lee argues is over-simplistic. According to Lee's study 
in 1979, for example, in Taiwan the government elite and media commercial elite 
coalesced to diminish foreign dependence of television products because local 
programming found greater market acceptability, despite many intellectuals' demand 
for more slick foreign programmes (Lee, 1979, p. 40). In addition, Murdock and 
Golding examined how transnational conglomerates control "the production and 
distribution of ideas of their age" (In Curran, 1977, p. 28). Another definition given by 
Schiller points out that `the term of cultural imperialism is the sum of process by 
which a society is brought into the modem world system and the manner in which its 
dominating structure is attracted, pressured, and forced into shaping social institutions 
to correspond to, or even to promote the values and structures of the dominant centre 
of the system' (Schiller, 1976). 
Herbert Schiller was concerned with the issue of power in the cultural industries. In 
1976, he wrote Communication and Cultural Domination, in which he outlines the 
growth of multinational and transnational corporations and their influence around the 
world. Schiller's (1991) concept of cultural imperialism is based on a feeling of 
injustice with the way the communication industry has become a means for 
international domination. The cultural imperialism perspective was developed in the 
late 1960's, as Schiller's book criticised American cultural exports for representing an 
imperialistic institutional policy to subjugate the world. In his analysis of the mass 
media in the U. S., Schiller argues that the major engine of American media's 
dominant position is a product of its military industrial complex. Schiller asserts that 
the U. S. mass media has served to present American control of the world 
communications system, for example by creating a global consumer society and 
promoting the concept of good life at home and abroad. Communication imperialism 
is, to him, a conscious and organised effort adopted by the U. S. military- 
communication conglomerates to maintain a commercial, political and military 
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superiority (Schiller, 1969). Schiller compared the Northern control of media systems 
to "economic measures of domination-control of capital and markets and of the 
infrastructure of international finance" (Schiller, 1976, p. 1). He explained that those 
who control a nation's media control the minds of that nation's citizens because the 
media represents, expands, and creates social reality. Media content influences 
audience goals, perceptions, and expectations in life. Schiller explains that cultural 
imperialism can be attributed to three main causes. The first is the current domination 
of the world market by the North, particularly the United States. The features of the 
market are determined by the core power, for the benefit of the core power and its 
allies, who maintain that the rest of the countries in the world must conform to the 
dictates of a country whose needs are much different than their own. He calls this the 
one-dimensional flow of information. The second cause is the existence of the class 
structures within nations. These also extend across nations, placing some nations 
subordinate to others. The third cause is that the cultural products of a country are 
imbued with its values, norms, and philosophies. This serves to bombard the world, 
whose cultural information flow is dominated by Northern products, with capitalist 
ideas. The constant repetition and continuous consumption of Western media 
reinforces capitalist ideologies and aids multinational corporations in "securing 
world-wide markets and unimpeded profitability and ... 
[domination of] every 
cultural space that separates them from total control of their global or national 
environment" (Schiller, 1976, p. 7). In Schiller's eyes, the rising popularity of 
television was responsible for much of this cultural assimilation. Communication 
technology, marketing, and techniques of persuasion, manipulation, and cultural 
penetration combine to further Northern goals of domination (Schiller, 1976). Due to 
cultural domination, Third World nations are forced to conform to the status quo, to 
accept the one-dimensional flow of information, and adopt the customs of the West. 
Media perpetuates this relationship because it defines social reality; it is the teacher 
from which Third World countries learn to assimilate (Schiller, 1976). 
Faced with the rising popularity of the concept of globalisation, Schiller updated his 
cultural imperialism thesis in `Not Yet the Post-Imperialist Era', explaining that while 
most of the theory remains the same, the centre of power has shifted and national 
powers have a less important position than transnational corporations (1991). 
Western, particularly American, production of cultural products was still seen as 
serving to eradicate local culture, but as time passed, the institutional power had 
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shifted. While American influence was waning, "transnational corporate cultural 
domination" had maintained the imperialist cultural practices (Schiller, 1991, p. 120). 
Another change Schiller notes is that television, once the prime means of cultural 
transmission, is now part of a package of cultural products. Maintaining that cultural 
imperialism still exists, Schiller refutes claims of cultural diversity, the emergence of 
a global community, and the concept of an active audience capable of mediating 
media messages. Schiller described imperialism as the state in which Western 
(primarily American) media products dominate culturally, alongside and often in 
conjunction with TNC's. According to Schiller, cultural imperialism is a purposeful 
project in which media networks become vehicles for the cultivation of a dominant 
Western ideology in Third World nations. 
Golding stresses that the media in developing countries have been transplanted from 
`metropolitan centres'. He notes that this can be interpreted through two theoretical 
assumptions. The first is `the transfer of technology' and the second is `the problem of 
cultural imperialism', which is a more `inclusive' term than `media imperialism' since 
it embraces international media, educational and cultural systems (In Curran, 1977, 
p. 291). Particularly, `media professionalism' is an ideology which has been 
transferred in parallel to the transfer of technology and is part of the general stream of 
cultural dependence. Media professionalism arrives at developing countries by means 
of their acquirements of modem technology together with the necessary professional 
operational skills and attitudes. Professionalism is integrated into a dominant culture 
and it has been carried through three mechanisms as Golding puts forward: 
`Institutional Transfer', `Training and Education', and `The Diffusion of Occupational 
Ideologies' (In Curran, 1977, p. 288). Like Golding, O'Brien also deals with `transfer 
and cultural imperialism'. Her study involves the nature and extensions of Third 
World countries, including `the transfer of institutional forms and professional 
practice in broadcasting', and the `taste transfer' of demand for advertised products 
and orientation to Western life styles shown in imported programmes (cited in 
Sinclair, 1990, p. 288). 
Non-Marxist media researchers have mainly focused on the economic scale of 
Americanisation, different individual-national dynamics and the positive, as well as 
negative effects, of international communication flow on indigenous cultures. Internal 
factors were granted more attention by non-Marxist authors. They claimed that each 
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country is able to move its internal forces to counteract external media influences in 
the process of development (Lee, 1979, p. 43). 
Boyd-Barrett defines media imperialism as "the process whereby the ownership, 
structure, distribution or content of the media in one country are singly or together 
subject to substantial external pressures from the media interests of any other country 
or countries without proportionate reciprocation of influence by the country so 
affected" (Boyd-Barrett, in Curran, 1977, p. 117). He argues that media imperialism, 
as term, includes a `much more specific range of phenomena' than the term of 
`cultural imperialism'. He distinguishes the modes of media imperialism; `the 
exportation' of international media influence as a deliberate commercial or political 
strategy, or `the dissemination' of this influence unintentionally or without 
deliberation in a more general process of political, social or economic influence. After 
this comes the adoption of this influence as a deliberate commercial or political 
strategy, or the absorption of this influence, which is unreflective, and the result of 
contact (cited in Curran, 1977, p. 1 19). For him, the various kinds of transfer could be 
organised under the general concept of `media imperialism', which relate to the 
classic theories of imperialism. The four components of media imperialism are 
specified by Boyd-Barrett as: 
1. `The shape of communication vehicle', involving a specific technology at the 
consumer end and a typical range and balance of communication contents 
2. A `set of industrial arrangements' for the continuation flow of media 
production, involving a given structural relationship and financial facilities 
3. `A body of values' about ideal practice 
4. `Specific media content and market penetration' (In Curran, 1977, p. 120). 
According to Galtung, `communication imperialism' is different from cultural or 
media imperialism because `the word of communication' includes not only media 
activation but also transportation and communication technologies as well (Galtung, 
1971). Similarly, Lee prefers the term of `communication imperialism', which is 
based on Boyd-Barrett's definition of `media imperialism'. According to Lee, 
communication imperialism is "the process in which the ownership and control over 
the hardware and software of mass media as well as other forms of communication in 
one country or together subjugated to the domination of another country with 
deleterious effects on the indigenous values, norms and culture" (Pall S. Lee, 1987, 
p. 74). Although different concepts are used to explain the domination of a country's 
23 
mass media activities by another, there are three basic concerns commonly shared 
amongst authors, as Lee concludes: 1) exportation of both the hardware and software 
of mass media; 2) apart from normal media, other forms of communication such as 
satellites, computers, data bank service and transportation are also concerned; 3) the 
need for examining the cultural impact of the international communication activities 
on the developing countries. He also suggests that three further dimensions should be 
given attention in order to build the theory for the study of unbalanced international 
communication activities; "the role of interacting states", "the nature of the 
dependency of peripheral state", and "the effect of the unbalanced communication 
pattern on the dependent state" (Pall S. Lee, 1987, p. 81). 
Katz and Wedell, who reject any strong television imperialism, confirm the 
importance of broadcasting technology, emphasising the heavy commercial 
advertising, the predominance of American entertainment series and the relative 
absence of high quality educational and cultural television programmes in studied 
countries (Katz and Wedell, 1977). Like Boyd-Barrett they examined the structure of 
international communication activities from the process of export to the process of 
adoption and absorption of this influence. Critics and active audience theorists have 
also argued that the cultural imperialism theory does not acknowledge the active 
media audience member. Active audience theorists, such as Tamar Liebes and Ien 
Ang, have conducted research illustrating how domestic audiences respond to 
Western media in an attempt to prove that cultural imperialism does not exist. Liebes 
studied the impact of the popular TV programme "Dallas" in Israel. Applying the 
active-audience frame of analysis, the study included four groups of Israeli viewers: 
Israeli Arabs, Moroccan immigrants, Kibbutz members, and new Russian immigrants. 
Liebes found that the message imported by "Dallas" depended on the viewers' values 
that varied according to the experiences of the particular group to which the viewers 
belonged. The audiences therefore, actively produced meaning while consuming the 
media product. Another academic, len Ang, has also supported this finding through 
studying the impact of "Dallas" to confront what she termed "a stubborn fixation on 
that of American cultural imperialism" (cited in Schiller, 1989, P. 150). 
John Tomlinson also criticises the cultural imperialism thesis for its inability to 
recognise the creative power of audiences to resist domination of global media. He 
argues that cultural imperialism is defined by its discourse and that typical definitions 
of cultural imperialism limit its analysis. He describes the concept as the process by 
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which cultural products aid in transmitting economic messages and maintains 
political-economic dominance, providing several reasons for its rejection. He 
proposes that the contexts in which cultural imperialism exists and the structures that 
maintain it are often not as premeditated as they seem. Throughout his work he 
stresses that cultural imperialism is a complex and ill-defined concept because while 
some theorists explain cultural imperialism as intended domination, imperialism can 
be the result of efforts without being the intent of those efforts. For example, while 
Tomlinson wrote his book in English, he did not do so with the underlying intention 
of promoting English as the language of the literate. Rather, he wrote his book in 
English because that is the only language in which he can write (Tomlinson, 1991). 
Another argument he presents is that the effects of media messages are mediated by 
other modes of cultural experience, by the people who use them, and by the purpose 
for which they are used (Tomlinson, 1991). Tomlinson states that progress in 
analysing cultural imperialism can only be made by closely examining the 
relationship between media texts and the audience. This is because the influence of 
media on culture results from a discursive process. He argues that the conflict 
presented by the concept of intentional cultural domination can be reconciled by 
considering the process to be the spread of modernity and as a process of cultural loss, 
not of cultural imposition (Tomlinson, 1991). Further, he explains that "if culture is 
seen as the resource through which people generate narratives of individual and social 
meaning and purpose", then cultural imperialism is really a capitalist modernity and 
cultural loss is a side effect (Tomlinson, 1991, p. 173). The modernity he describes is 
called globalisation and is a more complex concept than cultural imperialism. The 
latter contains "the notion of a purposeful project: the intended spread of a social 
system from the centre of one power across the globe, " while globalisation is the 
process of interdependence and interconnectedness that produces integration as the 
result of economic and cultural practices (Tomlinson, 1991, p. 175). Globalisation is a 
less threatening concept because it explains that the culture of every participant in the 
global market is diluted, not just the culture of Third World nations. Tomlinson offers 
a glimpse into the cyclical nature of society by stating that the "processes of 
globalisation [are linked] with the cultural demands for localisation" (Tomlinson, 
1991, p. 178). 
Having examined "cultural imperialism" in different perspectives the following 
section tries to place its theoretical and methodological framework within the forms 
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adopted in the context of cultural imperialism and analyses the transfer of technology 
and the importation of programmes as the major components of cultural imperialism. 
1.5 The Components of Cultural Imperialism 
The purpose of this section is to examine the major components of cultural 
imperialism; the transferring of communication technologies; and the importation of 
cultural products. The following tries to explain how these factors work together to 
promote different levels of cultural dependency in developing countries. However, 
one of these may have a greater impact than the others and may show different 
characteristics depending on the time or the country under investigation. 
Transfer of Technology 
Published materials, computer hardware and databases, with international 
consultant and management fees, often follow the flow of technological goods and 
services to developing countries. Training courses and the importation of Western 
methods are also common aspects of the transfer of technology (Gunter, 1978, p. 151). 
Technology has played a crucial role in the economic, social and political 
developments of different countries for the past two centuries. Since the development 
of semiconductor technology producing the transistor for commercial use in the early 
1950's, the integrated circuit in 1961, and the microprocessor in 1971, communication 
technologies have shown continuous proliferation and development (Dimmick, 1986, 
pp. 473-508). With these technological improvements, at least three different areas of 
inequality have appeared which according to Sieghart are: `the distribution of 
scientific and technological capabilities', `industrial capability' and `the information 
structures of societies' (Sieghart, 1982). 
After the Second World War, the United States emerged as a global power. This 
situation brought new conditions, such as the alliance of peripheral nation states, to 
the metropolitan centres and more importantly, new forms of dependency - 
technological and industrial dependency - which tied developing economies to the 
developed centre, primarily the U. S., and later Japan. On the other hand, the social 
history of television in Britain and the U. S. illustrate that neither the invention nor 
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development of television as a technology, nor its institutional forms, were accidental 
(Williams, 1984). Williams argues that unlike all previous communication 
technologies, radio and television were the systems primarily devised for transmission 
and reception as abstract processes, with little or no definition of proceeding content. 
The technology of broadcasting developed before the content and has remained a `by- 
product of the technology' rather than an independent enterprise. Consequently, in 
William's view, the current forms of broadcasting are determined by technology and 
are, in fact, a manifestation of the ideology. 
Communications technology is seen to have a direct impact on economic 
development and political organisation, and to some extent, on lifestyles and culture 
throughout the world. Marxist dependency writers have come to recognise that the 
transfer of technology represents "the extension of capitalist production relationship 
and value appropriation" into the underdeveloped world (Sussman, 1984, p. 296). 
According to Pavlic and Hamelink, the essence of the transfer of information is the 
transfer of technology. Technology is information represented by "models, diagrams, 
plans and formulae, embodied in studies, training programmes and equipment and 
transferred through sales and licensing of patterns and via technical experts"(Pavlic 
and Hamelink, 1985, p. 54). Mowlana also distinguishes communication technology as 
can be broken down into two components: communication hardware, which is the 
actual physical carrier of messages (such as satellites, broadcasting and receiving 
equipment and microwave relay stations), and the communication software, which is 
the know-how and the means of utilising the hardware such as programme 
production, manpower skills and education (Mowlana, 1985, p. 13). 
The advancement of the international communication technologies, developed largely 
by the U. S., was most beneficial to its economy, as it exports much of the important 
technological equipments to other countries. This, in turn, brought about the 
dependency of the Third World on the importation of production and distribution of 
communication technologies. Thus, the one-way flow of communications technology 
(the process of export and dissemination) from the economically strong nations to the 
weaker nations is visible. Boyd-Barrett states that developing countries prefer, or are 
forced `to adopt or absorb', the existing models rather than establish their own 
developmental activities (cited in Curran, 1977, p. 121). In addition, most Third World 
countries do not have the expertise and resources to institute domestic communication 
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systems that could genuinely reflect their history, needs, concerns, values and culture 
(McPhail, 1981, p. 55). 
Although some of the developing countries have produced their own broadcast 
receiver sets, they are-dependent on the importation of cultural products. Also, most 
of the international communications industry is owned and controlled by giant 
Japanese and Western transnational media and telecommunications conglomerates. 
Optimistically, even if the Third World countries could begin to produce their own 
communication software and hardware, they will always lag behind more 
technologically advanced countries in the race for development. Even for some 
industrialised countries, it is difficult to catch up with technologically developed 
countries such as the U. S. and Japan. 
New technologies often create new occupations and new professional opportunities. 
Technological change, however, requires the constant adaptation of old professional 
routines and practices, as well as the ideology and the self-image of profession 
(Gurevitch and Elliott, 1973, p. 505). O'Brien notes that `the professionalisation of 
broadcasting which is based on exclusiveness and control and reflects transnational 
patterns of socialisation has been detrimental to initiative and adoption' (O'Brien, 
cited in Gerbner, 1973). Third World countries have relied on training schemes to fill 
the gap between their own broadcasting systems and those of the developed world. 
However, the training schemes of engineers, technicians, producers, operators, 
directors and so on are also dependent upon the same forces which are mainly former 
colonialist powers and are currently among economically strong nations (McPhail, 
1981). According to Golding, the training of media professionals has taken on three 
forms: "the attachment of experts from the industrialised countries to media in the 
Third World", "courses and attachments in industrialised countries" and "training 
centres in the Third World" (cited in Curran, 1977, p. 295). Similarly, Schiller points 
out that the training of the Third World broadcasters, since the very beginning of the 
broadcasting, has always been concerned with `how to run French, British or 
American style broadcast empires'. However, the real obstacles appear subsequently 
as they further establish the cultural patterns of broadcasting which are `endlessly 
persistent' (Schiller, 1976, p. 110). American companies, such as RCA, have been 
active in supplying technical and vocational training, especially for new television 
services in the Middle East and elsewhere. The British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC) provides technical and programming courses in addition to sending its experts 
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abroad. The French too, have their own extremely vigorous training schemes, 
especially in former French colonies. The United States however, has strived to 
dominate the prevalent pattern in Latin America, Middle East and Southeast Asia, and 
has retained its worldwide leadership (Tunstall, 1977, p. 217). 
The economic and political dependence of the Third World since colonialism, and 
even long after their national independence was secured, has continued and deepened 
as a result of cultural-media dependency. It has been very difficult to break from the 
chain of dependency, as the transfer of broadcasting models, along with the transfer of 
technology and skills to the Third World, strengthens this dependency. For instance, 
Iran since the early days of the introduction of the television to the country has 
purchased all of its broadcasting technical equipments from abroad. As it will be 
discussed in relevant chapters, the country's dependency on technologically advanced 
countries not only continued after the 1979 Revolution, but also has deepened due to 
the dramatic increase of Iranian television channels. Moreover, Western interests have 
also encouraged the adaptation of educational television in developing countries. It is 
evident in Latin America that `telenovelas' resemble Western products in many ways. 
Basically, three models of broadcasting organisations have been transferred to 
developing countries; 1) the BBC model; 2) the French model, which has been 
exported largely to their former colonies; 3) and less centralised, yet more commercial 
organisations developed in North America and transferred to Latin America, Canada 
and other developing countries. While the public service British television system 
intends to inform, entertain and educate, the commercial system is designed mainly to 
entertain and to inform rather than to educate. The American broadcasting system is 
based on private enterprise and rationalised by individualism and freedom from 
political interference by the government. On the other hand, the BBC model is 
responsible for performing social tasks such as promoting national culture and the 
need to project ethnic or cultural minorities (Tunstall, 1977, p. 217). The American 
modelled media system seems to be more influential not only in Third World 
countries, but also in small industrialised nations and more recently, Eastern European 
countries. The spread of new technologies reinforces and alters some of the existing 
social and economic structures in the world. 
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The Importation of Programmes 
Along with the transfer of TV broadcasting technology, professional skills and 
organisational models, developing countries also import Western TV programme 
material and content. The need for continuous broadcasting, the increasing demands 
among different audience groups and the cost of production have led to further 
cultural dependency of Third World countries on imported media products. Basically, 
there are several determining factors in the flow of TV programming from one 
country to another. Shortage of capital to provide the back-up material as well as lack 
of trained technicians, script writers, actors, translators, producers and other essential 
staff are among those factors. Apart from the governments of the Third World 
countries that play an important role in the flow of TV programming, other relevant 
factors that can be listed are: competition, commercial motivation, ethnocentrism, 
language barriers and degree of cultural similarity between the producing and 
receiving countries (Pavlic and Hamelink, 1985, p. 37). 
It has been argued that imported communication technology also ensures the transfer 
of models, skills and forms. Mowlana asserts that some countries have not transferred 
the means for production of software programming while they have set the hardware 
for distribution of programmes. In most Third World countries, domestic television 
products find themselves competing with `slick foreign imports and Western 
established standards of professionalism' (Mowlana, 1985, p. 37). Although new 
technologies have brought about new production skills throughout the world, many 
countries simply do not have the sufficient production-making capabilities to produce 
local entertainment and other types of programmes that can compete with Western 
programmes. In this situation, even technologically advanced countries may not be 
able to compete. For example, although Japan has been successful in building TV 
broadcasting hardware industries that are exported to many countries in the world 
including the U. S. Japan has not been able to do the same with TV programming. 
The early studies of international media flow, such as the study of Nordenstreng and 
Varis' about international TV programme flow revealed that most of the world's 
television programmes originate in the U. S. (Nordenstreng and Varis, 1974). Their 
research for UNESCO in 1974 documented the dominance of the U. S. in world 
television programme exports at that time. According to Mirus and Hosking, the 
reason for U. S. domination in the international trade of TV programming is due to 
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tie their broadcasting systems to foreign programming and foreign financial 
sponsorship (Schiller, 1976, p. 107). 
Economic profit seeking is the main motivation for international flows, although 
political and cultural intentions cannot be dismissed. Even in entertainment 
programmes, which do not have the direct aim of influencing people's attitudes and 
beliefs, can increase `unconsciousness consumption patterns' and create false social 
consciousness. Therefore, imported programme material can distort the shared 
symbolic meaning in society at the expense of the traditional and elite cultures and 
arts. The modernisation and social change process, as some scholars argue, can result 
in a decline of traditional values by fostering new middle class and mass-popular 
culture (Lee, 1979, p. 102). Golding stresses that, for example, African producers 
imitate the Western products in style, philosophy and format. While local 
broadcasters make their own programmes, they adopt imported material styles and 
models. However, it is a discussible concern as to whether these styles and patterns 
are universal since they have originated from just a few countries. Moreover, 
performers, producers, announcers, writers, technicians and directors all have 
examples of the correct practice with respect to selecting appropriate producers and 
attitudes (Golding, cited in Curran, 1977, p. 300). Katz also asserts that authors, 
musicians, producers and directors often know too little about their own culture, 
which leaves them unable to produce the material for indigenous programming. Since 
the introduction of new technologies it seems that it becomes even more difficult to 
create indigenous and original programme patterns in developing countries. For 
example, in Iran, when broadcasting technology was first transferred from the West, 
the Iranian television programme policy also appeared to be characterised by 
increasing adoption and absorption of Western programmes, models, style and ideas. 
In 1976, for every show produced domestically, there were three imported shows 
being broadcast on television. Moreover, 99 out of 100 movies shown on Iranian 
television were imported mainly from West and the U. S. in particular. After the 1979 
Revolution, although the government tried to increase its domestic production, the 
country still remained dependent on the importation of foreign products, especially 
Western movies and series to meet people's demand. The dependency of Iranian 
television on cultural products will be discussed in more detail in the relevant chapter. 
The U. S. established the norms for global culture through its long-established 
dominance of the international markets in both feature films and TV programming. 
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`Cultural Discount', which means that `a particular programme which is rooted in one 
culture, is attractive in that environment, however, it will have diminished appeal 
elsewhere as viewers find it difficult to identify with the style, values and behaviour 
patterns of the material in question' (Hosking and Mirus, 1988, pp. 499-515). They 
believe that while Japan's talents are culture-bound and have been developed over the 
centuries for a closed and uni-cultural society, the U. S. has been producing 
entertainment programming for a multicultural society. However, they ignore the fact 
that although the U. S. is the major media production exporter, it imports very few 
programmes (less than two percent) from abroad. In capitalist societies, the media 
productions are usually sustained by advertising revenues, which reflect the industrial 
and commercial structure of the economy and its ties with the economies of other 
countries (Cardona, 1975, pp. 122-127). Audience maximisation is necessary to sell 
the products and services via advertising messages in the media. This allows 
advertising agencies to buy the airtime before popular programmes have even been 
produced (Boyd-Barrett, in Curran, p. 127). Therefore, if a programme is rooted in one 
particular culture it may have a lesser chance of commercial success. 
In addition, due to the high cost of making programmes, most developing countries 
cannot afford it, whereas foreign products can be purchased at a fraction of the 
minimum cost of domestic products (Golding in Curran, p. 300). The most expensive 
programming from United States become available to broadcasters abroad at low 
prices due to the demand of the imported market. For example, by 1985 the maximum 
prices paid per for half an hour American serial by different countries were: Italy 
$48,000, Canada $20,000, UK $14,000, Sweden $2,500, Chile $375, Bermuda $45. 
Therefore, with such low prices, producers in many countries, especially in the Third 
World, cannot compete on an equal economic basis. Even in Canada, it costs a 
broadcaster about ten times more to produce a domestic drama than to import an 
American one (Hoskins and Mirus, 1988, p. 51 1). Katz and Wedell also point out that 
in most countries the basic decision to broadcast even five hours of programme per 
day is enough to create the need to buy programmes from abroad. Most developing 
countries are forced to buy foreign products simply because they cannot budget to 
produce 2000 hours of programmes of reasonable quality per year (Katz and Wedell, 
1977, p. 162). Additionally, many developing countries can afford the new 
communication complexes only by accepting commercial packages, which as a result, 
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This, of course, affects the supply of non- U. S. drama available to compete with 
American products, both on the international and domestic market. Moreover, a 
narrow view of the world presented by many programmes, especially those coming 
from the U. S. led the local people to question their own values and culture. The 
dominance of entertainment programmes is one of the most important and remarkable 
points in global media flow. Katz argues that the adoption of Western programmes is 
the result of a situation where native people (as trainees) are sent to the West or are 
educated according to the 
forms of Western programming. They impose these 
programmes on audiences who 
have had little or no opportunity to make a choice 
about the format or content of 
Western programming (Katz and Wedell, 1977, p. 226). 
There seems to be little doubt that the existing communication technologies and its 
product flow is largely 
determined by the economic, cultural and communication 
policy of developed countries, especially the 
United States. Today, advanced 
countries control the global standardisation of communication technology practices 
and its content within the world 
information order. Particularly, the U. S. has an 
immense position in the world-wide transfer of telecommunication technology, TV 
programmes, film and other cultural production. 
Globally, the cultural material still 
flows between nations according to the "one-way street" principle. 
Having examined "cultural imperialism and its measure components", the following 
section focuses on 
laying the groundwork for the cultural imperialism debate through 
an examination of globalisation and current 
trends of media activities. In order to 
understand the contemporary 
face of cultural imperialism, this section attempts to 
examine that what the 
term globalisation actually means and then assesses the 
globalisation of culture within 
the framework of cultural imperialism. 
1.6 Cultural Imperialism and the Concept of Globalisation 
Some scholars; such as Latouche (1996), Amin (1997), Herman and 
McChesney (1997), see "globalisation as a new version of Western cultural 
imperialism, given the concentration of international communication hardware and 
software power among a 
few dominant actors in the global arena who want an 'open' 
international order, created by their own national power and by the power of 
transnational media and communication corporations" (in Thussu, 2000, p. 78). 
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Robertson believes that 'the process of globalisation has predated modernity and the 
rise of capitalism. However, modernisation tends to accelerate globalisation and the 
process has indeed shifted up to high gear during the past 100 years. Moreover, 
European civilisation is the central focus and also the origin of the development 
(Robertson, 1992, pp. 58-60). Tomlinson describes modernity as globalisation, 
accepting it as a more accurate explanation of world events than cultural imperialism, 
but explains that the true problem of both concepts is the way in which "human 
cultural goals become defined and enacted" (Tomlinson, 1991, p. 178). In Tomlinson's 
Globalisation and Culture, he expands upon the discursive nature of culture and the 
"complex connectivity" of the modern world (Tomlinson, 1999, p. 2). He proposes the 
idea that globalisation is a means by which to culturally imitate the time-space 
compression brought about by new technology. He proposes that global modernity is 
characterised by increased connectivity and "global-spatial proximity" that results in 
"cultural compression, " not cultural homogenisation (Tomlinson, 1999, pp. 3-7). 
For Amin, globalisation is a process that began with the colonisation of the world by 
the old European colonial countries, which has now become more expanded and is 
also encouraged by the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to Amin, 
globalisation is not a recent phenomenon. 
It is a process that has passed through 
several stages and 
is in its latest stage. He views globalisation as a Western 
phenomenon that began with colonisation. 
He states that the colonised were given the 
culture of the coloniser, 
but that the coloniser took from the culture of the colonised in 
a discrete way. The coloniser took only those parts of the other cultures that were 
beneficial to him while giving the colonised all aspects of the coloniser culture 
irrespective of the wishes of the colonised. This is assumed to be the beginning of 
cultural imperialism, as stated 
by Amin. He adds that in the case of cultural 
colonialism or cultural 
imperialism, these two alternatives are ruled out. The 
colonised is forced to adopt the culture of the colonisers irrespective of the wish of the 
former (Amin, 2001). 
European colonialism was associated with the advent of capitalism and also 
modernity. Capitalism, 
however, followed colonisation and evolved as a part of 
Western Modernisation. During this time the nation states also grew in strength, both 
politically and economically. 
Lenin identified imperialism as the highest stage of 
capitalism. However, this was not the case as capitalism continued to evolve. During 
the stage that was identified by Lenin as imperialism, the political and economic 
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components of colonialism were prominent. Yet, with subsequent evolution the 
cultural and economic components became stronger than the political component. 
In criticising global domination, cultural imperialism theorists argue that the media 
operates within a single world market organised by the global imperatives of the 
mainly American and Western European-controlled multinational corporations. 
Central to the process of economic domination is the role played by the 
communications-cultural corporations. Media products are largely determined by the 
same market imperatives that govern the overall system's production of goods and 
services. Their role is not only informational, but also ideological in that they promote 
and develop popular support for the values and artefacts of the capitalism system. As 
Schiller argues, "media cultural imperialism is a subset of the general system of 
imperialism. It is not freestanding; the media-cultural component in a developed, 
corporate economy supports the economic objectives of the decisive industrial- 
financial sectors". He also indicates that `it is the imagery and cultural perspectives of 
the ruling sector in the centre that shape and structure consciousness throughout the 
system at large (Schiller, 
1976). 
At the economic level, there are profound changes characterised by the consolidation 
of media providers 
into the hands of a small number of transnational conglomerates, 
for whom economic considerations are the primary determinants in what meaning 
should be produced and 
distributed across the globe. This increasing monopolisation 
and comodification of culture 
by a small number of primarily Western media 
providers raises questions and concerns about the nature of the 
images and meanings 
that are distributed around the world. Globalisation in this perspective is seen as 
characteristic of world 
imperialism, which attempts to enforce a common culture and 
economy for the entire world. 
1.7 Globalisation of Western Culture 
The focus of this section is to draw the contour for the discussion on the so 
called global culture. 
Basically the word Globalisation mostly refers to the growing 
inter-dependence between nations as they are drawn into a global economy, the main 
agents being transnational corporations. 
Apart from those with well known names, 
such as Coca-Cola and 
McDonalds, many of these corporations are involved with 
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media, communications and information technologies. For this reason, globalisation 
has also come to mean the threat of cultural homogenisation. 
Thussu, by referring to the general patterns of media ownership, indicates that the 
West, the U. S. in particular, dominates the international flow of information and 
entertainment in all major media sectors, which could lead to the homogenisation of 
culture (Thussu, 2000). UNESCO also reported that the world trade for goods with 
cultural content almost tripled between 1980 and 1991: from 67 billion dollars to 200 
billion dollars. According to UNESCO, there has been a significant increase in 
cultural imports, from $47.8 billion in 1980 to $213.7 billion in 1997, showing a jump 
from $12 per capita in 1980 to $44.7 per capita in 1997. Moreover, according to 
UNESCO, of the total films shown worldwide, 85 per cent are produced in 
Hollywood. This shows that the U. S. is located as the core of the entertainment 
industry and indicates the dominance of U. S. products. The World Trade Organisation 
rules do not allow countries to 
block imports on cultural grounds. Therefore, a direct 
consequence of globalisation might 
be the end of cultural diversity, and the triumph of 
a homogeneous Anglo-culture, which serves the needs of transnational corporations. 
From the sociological point of view, the notion of culture is of primary importance in 
the globalisation process. There are two major perspectives on the notion of global 
culture: 1) the 'globalisation of culture 
in general' and 2) the 'globalisation of cultural 
industries'. The former focuses on the contra flow of cultural products and people 
between different regions, whereas the later is based on the convergence of 
consumerism and mainly 
focuses on the cultural projection of global capitalism that is 
dominated by the U. S. and other Western countries. Global culture theorists see 
culture as an autonomous process and argue that "cultural pluralism is itself a 
constitutive feature of the contemporary global circumstance" (Robertson, 1992, 
p. 61). For Robertson, the autonomy of the cultural globalisation process is the 
outcome of inter-state processes that operate independently from conventional 
designated social and socio-cultural processes. Featherstone refers to the global 
culture as the 'third culture, which 
is oriented beyond national boundaries' 
(Featherstone, 1990, p. 6). Accordingly, Hannerz sees this as "a scenario of global 
homogenisation of culture"(Hannerz, 1993, p. 108). However, the theory of global 
culture has been criticised, as the main problem seems to concern the tension between 
cultural homogenisation and 
heterogenisation. Crane, by emphasising the autonomy 
of local culture against global culture, argues that: 
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"The globalisation of culture is not the same as the homogenisation of culture. 
Not only do national cultures modify global cultures but national governments 
also act as gatekeepers mediating cultural flows. Within a particular country 
there may be both acceptance and antagonism towards some elements of 
global culture" (Crane, 1992, p. 162). 
Moreover, as global culture requires global systems for distribution and marketing of 
culture, it is important to examine who stands to lose or gain - materially, politically, 
or culturally - if powerful nation-states and corporations promote global culture as a 
profitable pursuit. 
The global pluralists of the media theory maintain "an optimistic voice regarding the 
diversity of media producers and locales and the many loops of cultural flows that 
have merged" (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1991, pp. 121-2). This contra-flow in global 
media activities has led some scholars to question the cultural imperialism theory. 
Rogers and Antola argue that Latin America telenovelas shown in the U. S. Spanish 
networks are an example of some form of `reverse cultural imperialism' (Rogers and 
Antola, 1985, p. 33). Moreover, Australian scholars, Sinclair, Jacka, and Cunningham 
(1996), have published a book that presents scholarly writings on. the television 
industries of periphery nations such as Brazil, Mexico, the Middle East, Canada and 
Australia to prove that the cultural imperialism theory does not hold true in all 
situations. For example, the Mexican based television, which produces 78% of all its 
programming, and the 
Brazilian Globo Network, which produces much of its 
programmes, has managed to secure and dominate their domestic markets to a degree 
unmatched by the English-speaking market. These new patterns in global television 
have been explained by scholars such as Straubhaar who assesses the global 
movement of cultural products as asymmetrical interdependence. The approach of 
asymmetrical interdependence 
is a "flexible and complex" way to look at the uneven 
global relationships that 
lead to the development of media systems that range on a 
continuum from interdependent to completely dependent (Straubhaar, 1991,43). He 
discusses the issue of production, which had previously slowed media development in 
the Third World, but due to the increased affordability of technology, is no longer a 
large problem. In addition, he supports the idea of an active audience that prefers local 
media fare and actively constructs 
its own meanings from media messages. He cites 
Brazil as an area that has taken Western media products and technologies and adapted 
them to fit their own needs, which has enabled them to produce programs with 
national and international appeal (Straubhaar, 1991). The resulting relationship is 
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unequal, but a give and take does exist. Through this example, Straubhaar explains 
that the international distribution of Western media products has begun to decline in 
the last ten to twenty years for a variety of reasons, while local media production has 
increased. This supports the idea of asymmetrical interdependency-a worldwide 
phenomenon characterised by the existence and demand for regional media products 
alongside the consumption of imported media products. 
Thussu also argues that: "... their activities are regarded as a cultural revival, acting as 
a barrier to the flow of Western media products. They have emerged partly as a 
reaction to perceived Westernisation of the cultures and partly as a reaction to the 
alleged distortion in representations of non-Western cultures in the global media" 
(Thussu, 2000, p. 204). This however, ignores the recent trends of the 
transnationalisation of cultural industries, as well as the growing U. S. dominance in 
the global cultural market. Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi points out that: 
"... there were and are many more carriers of Western culture to the Third 
World than the corporate channels of the culture industries, and the cultural 
milieu of many developing countries were already `contaminated', deeply and 
perhaps irreversibly altered by Western cultural penetration" (in Golding and 
Harris, 1997, p. 51). 
She (1997), states that the undermining of domestic media production via U. S. 
television programs and films that reinforced one-way flows is only one component of 
cultural imperialism, as she contends: 
"Cultural imperialism is not maintaining its rule merely through the export of 
cultural products, but through institutionalisation of Western ways of life, 
organisational structures, values and interpersonal relations, language and 
cultural products... Cultural imperialism should be considered a multi-faceted 
cultural process since imperialism laid the ground for the ready acceptance 
and adoption of mediated cultural products which came much, much later" (in 
Golding and Harris, 1997, p. 49). 
According to Sreberny-Mohammadi, in media research we need to consider the nature 
of the transnationalisation of the cultural 
industries, as well as the flow of cultural 
products from the North to the 
South. In addition, Schiller (1976) and Guback (1984) 
have also emphasised the rise of U. S. corporate power and the U. S. worldwide 
ideological expansion in their interpretation of cultural imperialism. The organisation 
of the world market system 
by transnational capital has encouraged massive capital 
flows into many developing countries, maintaining and ensuring the U. S. 's global 
cultural domination. It seems that the U. 
S. cultural industry, instead of solely focusing 
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on exporting their cultural goods, have invested in cultural industries in developing 
countries. Through this, they are still able to dominate the world cultural market and 
also penetrate commercial ideologies of Western countries. It can be argued that the 
rise of cable and satellite television channels, as well as terrestrial television channels 
in Europe, Latin America, and Asia, has expedited the opening of their national 
markets to foreign producers and distributors, particularly those of the United States. 
Despite the rise of domestic products in developing countries, the global media 
industry is still very much overwhelmed by Western products (Tomlinson, 1991). For 
example, the U. S. film industry still dominates the domestic and international 
markets, accounting for 93 to 58 percent of the market in various Western European 
countries (Hesmondhalgh, 2002, p. 188). According to the U. S. Department of 
Commerce (2002), U. S. exports of film and television programmes exceeded $1 
billion in 1985, increasing to $2 billion in 1990. This has increased from $7.5 billion 
in 1999 to $9.17 billion worth of film and television programmes exports to the world 
in 2001. U. S. cultural exports have increased as many as nine times between 1985 and 
2001. On the other hand, U. S. imports of film and television programmes decreased 
to $129 million in 2001 from $228 million in 1994 (U. S. Department of Commerce 
1994; 2002). The U. S. net profit from the export of cultural products was estimated to 
be over $9 billion in 2001, making it one of the largest U. S. industries to yield great 
benefits to the country in the last several decades. Moreover, in 2001, Europe was the 
largest audiovisual market for the U. S., accounting for 62.8 per cent of imports, 
followed by Asia at 17.1 per cent. The Asian audiovisual market has shown a 12.8 per 
cent increase since 1992 due to the increasing number of broadcasting channels (U. S. 
Department of Commerce, 2002). What remains clear is that the world imports far 
more cultural products from the U. S. than it sells to it. It seems that the Western 
TNCs have focused on domestic cultural markets through their capital as well as their 
cultural goods in the globalisation era. They want deregulation, privatisation, and 
commercialisation of the media 
industry in developing countries for easy penetration. 
Realizing that people prefer to watch programs in their own languages (Thussu, 2000, 
p. 184), the U. S. media giants 
have adopted a strategy known as "think globally, act 
locally". For instance, the U. S. manages some of the international agencies including 
IMF. On a general level, the IMF seeks to reduce government involvement in 
business decisions to support capitalism and so-called free markets (Schiller, 1999, 
p. 190). In this light, Schiller points out that: 
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"American cultural imperialism is not dead. Rather, the older form of cultural 
imperialism no longer adequately describes the global cultural condition. 
Today it is more useful to view transnational corporate culture as the central 
force, with a continuing heavy flavour of U. S. media know-how, skills and 
practices which are derived from the long experience in marketing and 
entertainment industry" (Schiller, 1992, pp. 14-15). 
Furthermore, although a non-American television market has emerged in recent years 
(such as Japan with its productions of cartoon films, and Brazilin television `Globo' in 
producing telenovelas), the marketing policy adopted by those countries is similar to 
the North American marketing policy. The content of these programmes, especially 
Brazilian telenovelas, tend to adopt and imitate American soap operas (Melo, 1990, 
p. 94). Oliveria investigated Brazilian telenovelas and notes that Brazilian television 
programming is "the creolisation of U. S. cultural products. It is the spiced up Third 
World copy of Western values, norms, patterns of behaviour and models of social 
relations. His findings indicate that the overwhelming majority of Brazilian soaps 
have the same purpose as their U. S. counterparts, i. e. sell products (Oliveria, 1990). It 
seems that since telenovelas concentrate their stories on a glamorised version of 
Brazilian reality they have a greater chance to capture a large domestic audience than 
an imported show. Therefore, since selling products, is above all, the role of popular 
culture in the era of transnational corporate market domination, it appears that those 
programmes have been used as an advertising and sales platform for transnational 
corporation products. Especially among the local sponsors for Brazilian programmes 
are familiar brand names such as Coca-Cola, Volkswagen, General Motors, Levi's 
and so on. This indicates that although the availability of satellite platforms and 
digital technologies, as well as the deregulation of broadcasting, have enabled 
developing countries to develop their own original broadcasting systems and to export 
their media products, most of their products seem to be merely domestic adaptations 
of Western, mainly American, programmes promoting Western values and products. 
Different from the theory of global culture, the notion of the global cultural industry 
concentrates on the economic 
importance of global culture or consumer culture. As 
Robins argues, "... development of capitalist economies has always had profound 
implications for cultures, identities and ways of life. The globalisation of economic 
activity is now associated with further cultural transformation. Now we can talk of the 
process of cultural globalisation" (Robins, 1989, p. 23). However the process of 
cultural globalisation concentrates on the convergence of culture and lifestyle across 
40 
the world and the manufacture of global cultural products, which are mainly produced 
in Hollywood. According to Sklair (1991), the actors of this global cultural space are 
the global cultural corporations and therefore the global culture is dominated by the 
transnational mass media and communication industries. Thussu, by referring to the 
general patterns of media ownership, indicates that the West, the U. S. in particular, 
dominate the international flow of information and entertainment in all major media 
sectors, which could lead to the homogenisation of culture (Thussu, 2000). 
With respect to the fear of the McDonaldisation of society, the uneven direction of the 
flow has been pointed out by scholars such as Ritzer, as he prefers the term 
'Americanisation' rather than globalisation, since the latter implies more of a 
'multidimensional relationship among many nations' (Ritzer, 1999, p. 44). Among the 
media critics, Douglas Kellner (1990) stresses the emergence of anew form of global 
culture', that with its globally produced images, sounds and spectacles, produce a 
basis that shapes people's lives and identities. With Kellner's view we observe a 
claim for the spread of a homogeneous culture, which is underpinned by a notion of a 
media powerful enough to shape our self-identities and our views of the world. 
Moreover, according to some media and cultural critics, the notion of 'global culture' 
is obliterating local cultures, creating in its wake mirrors of American consumer 
society. The unequal relation of cultural power existing between the West and the rest 
of the world through global media and global television in particular has 'created a 
space of its own as a unique merger of entertainment and information technologies' 
(Schneider and Wallis, 1988, p. 7). Therefore, global television is seen as 'global mass 
culture', one that is dominated by the image, imagery, and styles of mass advertising' 
(Hall, 1991, p. 27). "This mass culture may be influencing the way people think about 
their regional or national identities, as they are increasingly exposed to global, which 
in most part are American, messages" (Thussu, 2000, p. 168). 
It appears that the global market has been supplied by global TNCs in the forms of 
economic and cultural organisation, production, and distribution. These giant 
enterprises pursue historical capitalist objectives of profit-making within continuously 
changing market and geopolitical conditions. In particular, the global economic 
expansion has sped ahead, with the triad of the U. S. European and Japanese 
transnationals buying their way into new markets through mergers, acquisitions, and 
joint ventures. It appears that such international relations are still more strongly based 
on inequality and dependence than on interconnectedness and interdependence. 
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So far this chapter has examined the cultural imperialism thesis, the cultural 
industries, and the free flow of media products as factors influencing cultural 
identities around the world. In addition, several ideas related to the globalisation 
phenomenon and charges of cultural imperialism have also been explored. While 
these are valuable discussions in and of themselves, it is important to draw together 
specific aspects and evaluate some of the 
basic assumptions and areas for criticism in 
the cultural imperialism argument. It is true that although the international media flow 
is far more complex than that which is described by the cultural imperialism model of 
the 1970's, international relations are still nonetheless based on inequality and 
dependence rather than on interconnectedness and interdependence. However, the 
present cultural imperialism theory also 
has its weaknesses and limitations. Basically, 
theorists of communication have stressed that consumer choice is impacted, globally 
and regionally, by cross-cultural media exchange 
(or lack of exchange). Despite these 
common points, the theorists 
do not agree on the outcome and effects of this cross- 
cultural flow of media products. 
The question that is raised here is: which of these 
theorists are correct? Can any one concept fully explain such a complex issue? When 
applied to current media practices, aspects of each of these concepts 
describe various 
levels of cultural exchange. In an attempt to sort out the complexities of these 
arguments, this small 
investigation will try to revise the cultural imperialism thesis 
through a case study so that it is applicable to the current situation and contemporary 
arguments. In order to achieve 
this objective, this study will critically analyse the 
historical emergence and the contemporary phase of cultural imperialism in Iran. It is 
hypothesised that the outcome of cultural imperialism is not the homogenisation of 
culture, but it creates conflict and resistance within a society. 
This thesis 
acknowledges the 
following criticisms towards the cultural imperialism perspective 
and the case study that 
follows this chapter will be based on an analysis of these 
points: 
1- The cultural imperialism theory does not acknowledge 
the concept of the active media audience and does not 
explain anti-imperialist phenomenons such as local 
dynamics, and resistance within dependent societies. 
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With regards to media power, the cultural imperialism argument offers an almost 
omnipotent view of the media that cannot be thoroughly justified. What it offers in 
terms of the media's power to affect cultural change is a dominance and transmission- 
based model, which seems to fail in theorising the power of audiences to creatively 
subvert the power of global media. What makes sense in regards to certain aspects of 
the debate, such as the conglomeration of ownership, reutilised production, and 
possibly formatted content, does not apply in terms of the audience and its effects. 
Adopting such a dominating image of the media creates an environment of co- 
dependency (which is borrowed from psychology) that casts the audiences as the 
victims of an all-powerful media system and its messages. Even under the assumption 
of the homogenisation of media messages due to concentrated ownership and Western 
bias, cultural imperialism denies the power of the audience to interpret the message 
and to decipher possible encoded meanings. This study, by undertaking focus group 
investigations, will examine the audience's interaction in a process in which the 
media messages are interpreted. Cultural imperialism also makes a definite 
assumption of the media's role and its influence on society. What emerges is a view of 
media and technology that is highly deterministic and devalues the role and 
importance of the cultural aspects of this argument. Cultural imperialism scholars, 
such as Schiller (1981) and Hamelink (1990), have rightfully argued that despite the 
advances in communication technologies, information itself and its technology have 
remained in the hands of the economically elite. This criticism is expressed in terms 
of the core and periphery theory which maintains that global imbalances exist 
between "core" (i. e. rich, industrialised nations of the First World) and "periphery" 
nations (i. e. poorer, rural countries of the Third World) in both the flow of media 
products and information. In this view, information and its technology are controlled 
by the core nations, and its flow is seen as uni-directional from the core to the 
periphery with little opportunity for peripheral nations to participate in the process 
(Hamelink 1990). The outcome of this uneven balance, according to the cultural 
imperialism thesis, is the homogenisation of culture. However, as stated earlier in this 
chapter, the process of culture is much more complex than the cultural imperialism 
argument credits. What is evident is that current global cultural flows produce both 
cultural homogeneity and socio-cultural conflicts that is demonstrated in the social 
and cultural crisis and the generational gap in affected societies. These socio-cultural 
conflicts emerge as result of the penetration of cultural imperialism. This is evident in 
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the current situation in Iran, as the uneven flow of information and entertainment of 
global media programmes via satellite has exacerbated socio-cultural conflicts. In the 
relevant chapter, the cross-cultural impacts of the heavy flow of cultural products into 
Iran will be examined. This small investigation in a historical perspective will 
examine the process of cultural imperialism through the emergence of modernity and 
advent of capitalism in Iran and examine the resistance of its people as demonstrated 
in anti-imperialist movements throughout the country's history. 
2- The cultural imperialism perspective does not fully take 
into account the role of the national elites and the 
internal factors in the process of cultural imperialism, 
especially in developing countries. 
As stated earlier in this chapter the process of cultural transfer is much more 
complicated than the cultural imperialism argument credits. What the imperialist 
argument seems to ignore is that apart from the external factors, there are some 
internal elements that can determine the role and structure of television in a country. 
Among them are: socio-political structure, economic system, historical background, 
and ideological and cultural environment. For instance, blaming the West and the U. S. 
alone for the spread of Western culture in Iran is overly-simplistic. Throughout Iran's 
history, internal forces have always interacted with external factors and have had a 
great impact on the formation of the structure of television in the country. 
3- The cultural imperialism thesis appears to be placing 
too much emphasis on the economic factors, 
underestimating the role of political power in the 
process of cultural transfer. 
Another possible criticism for the cultural imperialism argument lies in its 
overestimating of economic factors of global conglomerates and undermining the 
political power of state in the process of cultural transfer. The traditional cultural 
imperialism theory evidentially fails to actively acknowledge the role played by 
political powers as a force behind the cultural imperialism. It is important to note that 
power is never exerted only through military and technological control, but always 
through discursive control as well. The U. S. 's leading position in cultural sales 
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throughout the world which is achieved through its economic and political power 
indicates a complex relationship between economics, culture and politics. With the 
Cold War and the expansion of a governmental apparatus for spreading American 
culture, the use of political propaganda in the process of cultural imperialism becomes 
more complicated. The study of propaganda surrounding consumption suggests that 
economic achievements were seen in cultural terms. Since the main purpose of 
propaganda is to change beliefs and attitudes, as well as affect the value system of the 
audience, it therefore seems that economic success and political power have been 
exercised in the battle for the hearts and minds of individuals around the world. This 
provides a basis for chapter seven of this thesis, which investigates the potential 
effects of Western and mostly American satellite programming in Iran. In the relevant 
chapters, through investigating the political propaganda this study examines the 
relationship between politics and cultural power within the context of imperialism. To 
ensure that the broad objectives of this study may be achieved it will focus on (i) the 
Jaam-e-Jam expatriate satellite television and the Voice of America, (ii) their 
relationship to propaganda (iii) how this combination works as an instrument of 
cultural imperialism. 
1.8 Conclusion 
The cultural imperialism theory in its traditional form seems to adequately fail to 
theories the power of active audiences to creatively subvert the power of global media 
and ignores internal factors within a developing country. The cultural imperialism 
approach also tends to stress the economic sphere as a detriment to that of the political 
power. 
The main objective of this chapter was to revise the cultural imperialism theory and 
identify areas that could be developed within its infrastructure. It also aims to 
demonstrate that there is an identifiable relationship between the global flows of 
cultural products, the global transnational media industries and the political power of 
the state. Today, a few advanced countries control the global standardisation of 
television practices and contents within the new world information order. In the 
global arena, the U. S. still has a very strong position in the worldwide transfer of 
telecommunication technologies, television programmes, films and dramas. In spite of 
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the emergence of the new sub-centres in exportations of television material such as 
Japan, Germany, and Brazil, television material flow between nations is still governed 
according to the "one-way street" principle. It is important to point out that the 
political power of Western countries, and the U. S. in particular, has been a 
fundamental factor in the process of cultural transfer. It can be argued that although 
the cultural imperialism perspective views the transnational corporations as being 
amongst the main factors in the transfer of culture, the political power of the state also 
plays a fundamental role in the process of cultural transfer. This is evident in the U. S. 
propaganda transmitted from its radio and television stations to all corners of the 
world. This indicates that with advanced communication technology, propaganda 
remains the key instrument of cultural imperialism. 
There are also some internal elements that can determine the role and structure of 
television in a country. Among them are: socio-political structure, economic system, 
historical background, and ideological and cultural environment. For example, this 
thesis will demonstrate that to blame the West and the U. S. alone for the corrosive 
spread of Western culture 
in Iran is to fall into an easy category of traditional cultural 
imperialism. The internal factors interact with the external factors and have a great 
impact on forming the structure of television in a country. It can be argued that so far 
the expansion of telecommunication technologies such as satellite has not resulted in a 
more balanced flow of information between the North and the South and it seems that 
this pattern will continue to affect television flow, maintaining the future dependency 
of developing countries. This however, militates against the emergence of the new 
sub-centre production and exportation of television programmes. In this light, cultural 
imperialism still seems to be a very useful tool in interpreting the current cultural 
market. 
In sum, the (broadly-defined) cultural imperialism thesis still remains a useful theory 
and plays an important role 
in interpreting the world cultural and media system. It has 
risen from a situation whereby the media of advanced capitalist countries were able to 
substantially influence production and consumption of cultural goods in Third World 
countries (Chadha and Kavoori, 2000). Cultural imperialism acts as a means of 
cultural transformation through the flow of cultural products, capital, and industries in 
the globalisation era. This study confirms that any progress made in analysing cultural 
imperialism can only be achieved through detailed case studies. The main objective of 
this thesis therefore, is to examine how the theory of cultural imperialism fits in with 
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the Iranian case. Therefore, in order to ensure that the broad objectives of this study 
may be achieved, the following chapter, through a more historical perspective, will 
examine the emergence of modernity in Iran and investigate the roots of imperialism 
through the development of capitalism and modernity. 
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Part Two 
Local Conditions: National Policies and 
Everyday 
`Lives in Iran', a Case Study 
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Chapter Two 
Historical Approach 
2.1 Introduction 
As it has been discussed in chapter one, according to theories of imperialism, 
the imperialist relationship is maintained not only through suppression, but also 
through the expert and institutionalisation of Western, especially American, 
organisational structures. It has been stressed that "the dominant capitalist economic 
and social system led by the United States and a number of industrial countries tries to 
preserve its own global interests under the pretence of a new world order" (Mowlana, 
1992, p. 35). In this respect, Luxemburg argues that when developing countries 
undertake capitalist modes of production retain their pre-capitalist structures and serve 
as a source of cheap raw materials, providing additional markets for capitalists' 
countries. This will result in the backwardness of the periphery system. In the case of 
Iran, what the modernisation theory put forward, and what was followed by the 
Shah's regime, was the idea that Third World societies can become more developed 
or modern by being exposed to the values and norms of advanced Western countries 
through communication, and trade. This chapter attempts to demonstrate the clashes 
between modernity and indigenous values and examines how the paradigms of 
modernisation and cultural imperialism apply to local circumstances and life in Iran. 
Chapter one tried to revise the cultural imperialism theory and identify its weaknesses 
and limitations, as well as the areas that could be developed within its infrastructure. 
It demonstrated that international relations are still based on inequality and 
dependence rather than interconnectedness and interdependence. As it was discussed 
in chapter one, the outcome of this uneven balance, according to the cultural 
imperialism thesis, is the homogenisation of culture. However, as it was stated in 
previous chapter, the cultural imperialism argument seems to ignore the complexity of 
culture and fails to explain anti-imperialism movements, local dynamics and 
resistance within dependent societies. This chapter examines the process of cultural 
imperialism through the emergence of modernity and advent of capitalism in Iran and 
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examines the local dynamics and resistance of people as demonstrated through anti- 
imperialism movements throughout the country's history. It is concerned with cultural 
homogenisation and the response and rejection of this issue in Iran. The relevance of 
this chapter is that it aims to contribute to the body of knowledge by analysing the 
character of cultural imperialism through the modernisation process and capitalist 
development in Iran, as well as the role of Islam. It focuses on how Iran, throughout 
its history, has been engaged with the West and how the Iranian anti-imperialist 
struggle dates back to the emergence of modernity a process by which the capitalist 
ideology was maintained in the country. 
2.2 Iran in Transition 
The term modernisation is used to describe the development of capitalism in 
Iran. It is characterised by showing the changes in the economy and society under the 
capitalist modes of production, as compared to pre-capitalism. This transition, from 
pre-capitalism to capitalism, began in the West and later influenced the rest of the 
world, including Iran, as a broader process of global capitalism and global production 
systems that have affected local circumstances and people's lives throughout the 
world. Basically, pre-capitalism was characterised by an overwhelmingly rural society 
in which feudal lords had political and judicial power. The mass of peasants were tied 
to the land and towns were few as peddlers carried out trades. The aim of production 
was consumption, not accumulation. Modernisation, which in this case can be equated 
with capitalism, in contrast, is a system in which urban life is dominant and the 
majority of population work in industry or services where money plays an important 
role. The development of capitalism as accompanied by industrialisation, 
consequently leads to the emergence of the modem bourgeoisie and working classes. 
The capitalist class, the bourgeoisie, owns and controls the means of production. They 
are involved in the hiring and firing of the labour force, or wage labourers in capitalist 
societies, and also oversee the choice of modem techniques, output, work 
environment and sale of output. The crucial distinction of capitalism is that there are 
no limits to wealth accumulation and what drives the system forward is not 
consumption, but self-expansion of capital (Hilton, 1976). 
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The nature and development of global capitalism in the world, and in the so-called 
Third World in particular, has been the subject of much debate. Although, the 
development of capitalism and its impact on the Third World was experienced long 
before WWII, the rapid transformation in these countries came during the post-1945 
period. Many features, including the expansion of productive forces, accompany the 
transition from pre-capitalism to modern capitalism. The process of industrialisation 
has taken place in the Third World and utilises modem technologies and complex 
machinery to create a relatively large-scale of production, technical divisions of 
labour within these units of production, and a diverse range of skills within the 
workforce (Wield, 1983). However, these types of economic development, which 
were based on Western modelled industrial economic infrastructures, could only serve 
the economic interests of the advanced capitalist countries. 
Iran was integrated into this capitalist system. The emergence of the modem state in 
the 1920's, under Reza Shah, the intensification of capitalist development in the post- 
WWII period, and integration of the country to the world market all transformed the 
Iranian economy and society. The nature of capitalist development in Iran has been 
the subject of some debate. Jazani describes the process of development in Iran as a 
Third World country and argues that the post-war period coincided with the end of 
feudalism and rapid growth of capitalism. He postulates that the development of 
`dependent' capitalism in Iran since WWII increased the level of production, 
particularly in the industrial sector, and that this has resulted in real economic and 
social improvements. He pointed out that the character of dependency is inseparable 
from the capitalist system, foreign exploitation and imperialist domination in Iran. 
The dependent capitalist is found in the form of the `comprador bourgeoisie', the 
agents of imperialism who are cooperating together to exploit Iran (Jazani, 1980). The 
changes in the economy and society have emerged as a result of capitalist influence 
over time. This was recognised 
by Marx in his analysis of the impact of capitalism on 
India: 
"English millocracy intended to endow India with railways with the exclusive view of 
extracting at diminished expenses the cotton and other raw materials for their 
manufactures. But when you have introduced machinery into the locomotion of a 
country, which possesses iron and coal you are unable to withhold it from fabrication. 
You can not maintain a net of railways over an immense country without introducing 
all those industrial processes necessary to meet the immediate and current needs of 
railway locomotion, and out of which there must grow the application of machinery in 
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those branches of industry not immediately connected with railways. The railway 
system will become, in India, truly the forerunner of modem industry" (Marx, 1976, 
P. 84). 
The development of capitalism has been an uneven process. This development occurs 
at different times and often with a different dynamic which inevitably creates 
contradictions in the economic, political and cultural areas of society. Trotsky argues 
that capitalism reacts in both a positive and negative fashion within the less developed 
countries. He indicates that "by drawing countries economically closer to one another 
and levelling out their stages of development, capitalism operates by methods of its 
own, ... sets one country against another, one 
branch of industry against another, 
developing some part of the world economy while hampering and throwing back 
development of others" (Trotsky, 1970, P. 20). The analysis of underdevelopment in 
Iran cannot start from the premise that it is due only to the external forces of 
imperialism, nor can it be attributed to the internal character of the society. The 
expansion of capitalism in Iran in the 19th and early 20th centuries and the 
implantation of the Western model of political institutions, economy and culture by 
the Shah was an effort to bring Iran closer to Western societies. The impact of 
Europe's capitalist modes of production in Iran in the late 19th century was initially a 
slow advance. The subsequent changes in the economy and society have emerged as a 
result of capitalist influence over time. 
The major characteristic of the modernisation process and the development of 
capitalism in Iran is its uneven development. The uneven development of the 
productive forces, the concentration of wealth, capital and power in particular regions 
and classes were among the major characteristics of modernisation development in 
Iran. The incorporation of aspects of the old modes of production into modem 
capitalism is a feature which continues even today. Basically, the uneven 
development has expressed itself not only on a global level, but also on a national and 
regional level and is reflected in the cultural, economic and political contradictions 
and imperialist conflicts of the modem period. This uneven development left Iran on 
the peripheral formation of the world economy, importing most of its capital goods, 
leaving it dependent on foreign exchange mainly earned through exports of oil. The 
uneven impact of modernisation and capitalism on Iran was apparent as early as the 
19th century, which witnessed the emergence of Islamic reformists such as Amir 
Kabir. He did not reject modernity, but rather, wanted to appropriate it in a different 
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term which was compatible with the indigenous needs of Iranian society. He 
succeeded in establishing a few industries and a secular school in a largely traditional 
society. He began his attempt towards modernisation with military reforms. He started 
to reorganise the army and tried to centralise and strengthen the military forces. 
Therefore, in examining the assumptions surrounding the homogenisation effects of 
globalisation, the example of the Islamic reformists, which integrates the Western 
modernisation model with a traditional and indigenous model, is notable. Such ideas 
however, gained influence amongst sections of the population, as these views came to 
be expressed in the form of national independence and anti-imperialism sentiments 
against Britain, which at the time had major interest in the oil-rich south of Iran. The 
struggle for national independence against global convergence and imperialism was a 
phenomenon that expressed itself in the Tobacco Movements, the Constitutional 
Revolution (1905-1911), and later on, in the nationalisation of Iran's oil industry 
(1951-53), and finally in the 1979 Revolution. 
2.3 Historical Background of Iranian Anti-Imperialism 
Movements before the 1979 Revolution 
Before the impact of the West and Western capitalism, Iran was 
predominantly an agrarian society; the majority of the population lived in the 
countryside, with 90 per cent of the work force dependent on the agricultural or a 
nomadic life style. Absentee 
landowners held most of the lands whilst industries were 
not very developed. The `bazaar' was an important place not just for merchant 
activities, but also for landowners and craftsmen who made and sold their goods 
there. It was a workshop, bank, religious centre and a place where merchants, 
craftsmen, moneylenders, peddlers and religious figures organised themselves 
(Abrahamian, 1985, P. 128). The rise of `Safavid' dynasty to power (1501-1736) 
opened a new chapter in Iran's history. Before this period Iranian people mostly 
believed in Sunni Islam and the country was either part of some larger empire or 
divided into a number of dynasties. The Safavid proclaimed Shia Islam as the new 
state religion and brought relative centralisation to the country and some order to the 
economy (Minorsky, 1980). 
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The 19th and early 20th centuries witnessed an important transformation in Iran's 
culture, economy and society, under the impact of the West and Westernisation 
process. The foundations of the traditional state were undermined and a modem state 
with new institutions was established. The growth of the Westernisation process and 
capitalist development began in this period and continued rapidly in the late 20th 
century. The most profound factor in this process was the integration of the Iranian 
economy into the world market, which radically affected the positions of different 
social classes. In the economical aspect, the impact of the West on Iran's political 
economy was part of integration towards global capitalism as a wider process of 
change in the world economy. European capital 
increased its domination of world 
trade through expansionist commercial policies (Wallerstein, 1979). 
Generally, the unique geographical location of Iran at the crossroads of the East and 
West and the ice-free waters of the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and the Arabian 
Sea to the south, provide a basic explanation for centuries of migrations, warfare, 
depredation, and imperialist conquests on the Iranian plateau. Moreover, the growing 
expansion of the imperialist countries, particularly 
Britain, in the regions such as 
India, contributed to Iran's strategic position as a buffer against the Russian advance 
towards India. The rivalry between Britain and Russia helped Iran to maintain its 
independence, as Iran was never colonised in the sense of being formally ruled from 
abroad and never had white 
immigrant settlers transform a substantial part of their 
economy to meet the economic requirements of the colonial countries 
(Tabari, 1983, 
P. 53). Capitalist development in Iran was shaped by the political, economic and 
strategic requirements of 
Europe and not according to the needs of Iranian society. 
The influence of Westernisation and Western capitalism coincided with the weak and 
fragmented rule of the Qajar dynasty (1796-1925) and as result, Iran became more 
open to the influence of 
European capitalism in its imperialist form. This impact was 
a negative influence as some 
industries were destroyed through trade and imports of 
foreign goods. This imperialistic relationship was maintained through the expert, 
institutionalisation of Western organisational structures, values and cultural products 
that assured the continuous impact of the West on Iran. 
By the 1850s, Britain was one of the leading trade partners of Iran and accounted for 
over 50 per cent of exports and even more of Iran's imports (Issawi, 1971, P. 71). 
From the mid 19`h to the beginning of the 20"' century a number of concessions were 
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made, which enabled foreign subjects to exploit raw materials and carry out 
infrastructure development in Iran. In 1872, Shah agreed to give a 70 year concession 
to a British subject, Baron Paul Julis de Reuter, to build railroads, install telegraph 
lines, exploit mines, construct irrigation works, regulate river navigation, open a bank 
and build roads, mills and factories in return for a £40,000 payment to the Shah. Other 
important concessions were also made to the British subject for the exploitation of 
tobacco and oil. The Russians also increased their commercial and political hegemony 
after the 1850's, which generated further demand for agricultural goods. Russia, like 
Britain, gained concessions in fisheries, road building, telegraphs, railroads, and 
banking. In the late 1850's and 1860's, some private entrepreneurs constructed small 
factories, producing items such as paper, glass, gunpowder, sugar refining and cotton 
spinning. That many of these industries were not profitable is hardly surprising given 
the small size of the market, insufficiency of the infrastructure, competition from 
outside and failure of the state to protect these factories from outside competition 
(Floor, 1984). The effect of Western capitalism as a modem system was thus very 
limited and uneven, not just economically but also in the slow growth of the working 
class and bourgeoisie. However, these limited changes also generated demands for 
change in the economy and society. 
On the whole, the influence of Western imperialism on Iran and the U. S. in particular 
was producing an engine for cultural transfusion as well as political domination over 
Iran. A growing sense of urgency was being expressed amongst some of the Iranian 
state bureaucrats, who came to resent both the insecurity of private property and 
foreign domination. Other social forces, such as religious establishment, also did not 
welcome the Western model of modernisation. Most of the Iranian `ulama' had 
already gone through a major change in the late 18th century, namely the division 
between `Usuli' and `Akhbari' (two different schools in Shia Islam). The latter school 
argued that there was no need 
for religious scholars to exercise independent judgment 
of religious interpretation 
in the absence of the hidden Imam. In contrast, the `Usuli' 
used their increasingly dominant position to grant extra legitimacy to the role of 
`Mojtaheds' in exercising independent judgment. This laid the foundation for the 
enhanced authority of the highest ranking `ulama' that were independent of the state, 
a development whose political repercussions became evident in the 19th and 20th 
centuries. In the context of these changes, both locally and globally the role of the 
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`Mojtaheds' become vital to their response against the impact of Westernisation 
process, Western capitalism and global homogenisation. They were not united in their 
response to the capitalist reforms but the one factor uniting them was their concern 
about their declining position under the impact of modernisation and imperialist 
forces. They felt that the global capitalist system posed a certain global ideology that 
acted as an engine for modernisation and creating an ideal structural base for the 
global imperialism. 
The struggle for national independence against the imperialism was a phenomenon, 
which expressed itself in the Tobacco Movements (1891-92), the Constitutional 
Revolution (1905-1911), and later on, in the nationalisation of Iran's oil industry 
(1951-53), and finally in the 1979 Revolution. 
2.4 The Tobacco Movement 
Foreign intrusion and interference during the century and a half before the 
1979 Revolution was experienced by the Iranians as a continuous unfolding process. 
However, it can be divided in two periods: before and after World War II. In the 
earlier period there were separate national 
imperialisms, mainly British and Russian, 
and in the later period, the United 
States became a new superpower. 
However, the pattern for both periods, which manifested itself in the mounting 
conflict between the 
imperialist's interests and Iran's religious class as a mobilising 
force of mass political action, was set quite clearly in 1891. This was a confrontation 
triggered by the action of the Shah selling the monopoly for the cultivation and 
marketing of tobacco to a British company called Regei. The Tobacco Movement is 
the first instance of significant political intervention against the imperialists, which 
influenced the whole national and international relations of the country and became 
one of the peak points of the socio-political 
history of Iran. In explaining the general 
social circumstances at the 
beginning of this movement, it is helpful to look at the 
social stratification of the 
Iranian society during this time. Sjoberg notes that the 
social stratification of the pre-industrial societies generally consisted of two classes: 
the upper class and the lower class. According to him, in most of the pre-industrial 
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cities there was also a third group called the `out-casts' (Sjoberg, 1960, p. 110). In the 
late nineteenth century, Persia as a pre-industrial society, although did not follow the 
exact pattern explained by Sjoberg, the social stratification of the country, was not too 
far from his classification. The Shah, as the head of the state and his family were at 
the top of the social hierarchy. People who were attached to his government were a 
part of the upper class. Also the religious leaders appointed by the government as 
Friday Prayer Leader or head of religious jurisdiction court (Shar'a court; responsible 
for the social and economic affairs of the people) were classified as upper class as 
well. The rest of the people, excluding out-casts, were the lower class. At the time of 
the Tobacco Movement, Shah, as the head of the state, was responsible for national 
security, as well as for conducting foreign policy and foreign relations. The `Urf 
courts, responsible for criminal matters such as robbery and the military apparatus 
were under the direct control of the Shah. The clergies, as the head of the people's 
community, were the representatives of the lower class and the socio-economic 
relations of this class were supervised by them. The bazaar, as the main economic 
sector of the society, was under their rule along with the educational system. 
At the time, although the Shah was responsible for international affairs and 
concessions with other nations, those contracts directly affected the economic 
institutions of the country. And since the socio-economic matters of society were 
under the clergies' responsibility, those contracts and concessions therefore had an 
impact on the dominant authority of the clergies in the society. 
In 1890, Naser-ed-Din Shah signed a contract with Major Talbot from England. All 
rights concerning the sale and distribution of tobacco inside Iran and the export of all 
tobacco produced in Iran were vested in the Imperial Tobacco Corporation (Algar, 
1969, P. 206). The agreement was for fifty years, during which the company was 
supposed to give £15000 annually, plus one fourth of its annual profits, to the Iranian 
government. Its income was free of taxation and its imports and exports were exempt 
from any customs tariffs and limitations. The estimated profit of the company was 
about £335,900 per year (Lambton, 1987, P. 230). The Regie Company built fortress- 
like centres in Iran and imported soldiers and armaments. It removed authority of 
trade and business from almost one fifth of the active population. The behaviour of 
the company's agents, such as drinking in public places, offended people's cultural 
and ideological values. Also, an increase in the number of Christian missionaries was 
57 
perceived by clergies and the majority of population as another threat to the culture 
and religion of the country. In such a social context the Tobacco movement took 
shape. In these circumstances, people, especially tobacco merchants who lost control 
of the trade, expressed their disagreement by writing to the Shah and complaining to 
the religious leaders. But Shah rejected all forms of protest and forbade people from 
acting against the covenant. Gradually, under the leadership of the religious 
authorities, people protested against the contract. 
Shirazi the religious leader (Maria) of the time objected to the Shah and warned him 
of the colonial dangers of the contract. In 1891-92, a mass movement arose against 
the monopoly on tobacco growth, which led to the cancellation of the concession. 
Shirazi promptly issued an order prohibiting the use of tobacco, which was instantly 
obeyed by people throughout the country. Appalled by this demonstration of strength, 
the Shah backed down and cancelled the contract with British company. The Tobacco 
Movement occurred as a result of the impact of capitalist penetration in Iran and its 
effect on local crafts and 
industry. The domestic merchants suffered from the 
competition of foreign goods and resented their domination. The leading role of the 
clergy during The Tobacco Movement increased their influence in the society. They 
represented a force to be reckoned with that could be manipulated, even combated, 
but never ignored (Keddie, 1962). The people continued to demonstrate their hostility 
towards foreign intrusions. Years later, the alliance between bazaar merchants and the 
clergy became an important force during the Constitutional Revolution. 
2.5 Constitutional Revolution 
The Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911) was born out of a combination of 
different factors including, an economic crisis in the country, the increase in prices, 
the inability of the Qajar to maintain their role, a growing nationalist movement 
against imperialist countries, and the change in the international political economy. 
Revolution began with protests by merchants against the involvement of foreign 
officials in the government administration. An alliance was forged between the 
bazaar, as some of the high ranking clergies, secular intellectuals, landlords and tribal 
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leaders, who despite their different economic and political interests, all united against 
the monarchy and foreign powers. The impact of the West on the economy, political 
order and cultural values had intensified the conflict in Iranian society. The 
imperialist powers had heavily influenced the country's international affairs to suit 
their own global economic and strategic interests without any regards to the opinion 
and interests of the people. In part it had brought cultural imperialism, including the 
imported ideology and patterns of thought, which were in contradiction to the socially 
accepted norms. As a result, almost all of the social forces rejected Western cultural, 
economic and political domination in Iran. The clergies accused the Shah of being 
corrupt and of being a means of foreign control of Iran. Some of them, such as Nuri, 
argued strongly against the Shah's reforms and believed that Sharia (Islamic law) 
should not be watered down. Ayatollah Tabatabai (1841-1918), on the other hand, 
believed in adaptation, even in the context of religion. In this context the message was 
clear: there could be no security for the cultural, economic and political domination in 
Iran unless the religious class could be broken. The tactic was approved by the British 
and the Russians. The Shah, in 1905, yielded to revolutionary demands for 
representative government, hoping that party politics could be used to undermine the 
power of the clergies. A parliament was set up, and in 1906, Shah became, nominally 
at least, a constitutional monarch. However, the rise of Western ideas worked like a 
double-edged sword. For instance, the idea of parliament, which although was a 
Western ideas in the first place, came to be used not just against the authority of the 
Shah but against the Western domination of Iran. The clergies accepted the idea of 
parliament, in accordance with the Shia law and believed that this could be used to 
defend Islam. Competing groups such as secular intellectuals recognised the power of 
the clergies and gave them recognition in order to maintain the support of the majority 
of the population. Some of the ulama called for the adoption of Sharia as the law of 
state instead of a Western-style constitution. Contradictions within the class alliance 
supporting constitutional reform were highlighted by the fact that when the secular 
reformers called for land reform, the ulama and the land deputies refused to accept it. 
This infighting amongst the intellectuals and the traditionalists encouraged the Shah 
to withdraw his position and dissolve the National Assembly in 1911. The weak 
character of internal forces and the intervention of external forces of imperialism, 
namely the Russians, saved the Qajar regime. The Constitutional Revolution ended in 
defeat but stands out as a revolutionary movement that attempted to challenge 
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imperialism and the ruling authority and changed the balance of power inside the 
country. It created new institutions such as parliament and trade unions, which were 
all new in the history of Iran. 
In summarising the impact of the West on the Constitutional Revolution it is 
necessary to identify major changes in the political economy of the country. Capitalist 
development had a contradictory impact on Iran and it certainly opened up the 
country to the world market while weakening the traditional ways of producing 
wealth. Furthermore, during the Constitutional Revolution, Western capitalism was 
able to impose its cultural, economic and political will through military power. During 
this period Iran witnessed the consolidation of Western hegemony and the beginning 
of the classical age of imperialism. Many Non-Western countries found themselves 
coming under the direct control of European imperialist powers. At the same time in 
the name of modernisation, and under the system of European colonialism, a great 
deal of social, political, and economic transformation took place. However, the 
situation of this transformation was different from country to country. For example, 
although Iran did not face any direct Western military colonialism in its history, it 
was, in many respects, under the influence of Western ideological and political 
hegemony. 
2.6 The Pahlavi Dynasty and Westernisation Process 
The Qajar dynasty came to an end when the imperialist powers of Britain and 
Russia occupied Iran during WWII. Until 1921, Iran was subject to a situation of 
immense political and economic crisis. This period also witnessed the Revolution of 
1917 in Russia as well as the development of the oil industry in Iran, both of which 
had a major impact on the political economy of Iran. Reza Shah came to power after a 
coup d'etat in 1921 by British imperialism, starting fifty years of Westernisation in a 
highly traditional and religious country. Reza Shah believed that the religious classes 
were the only real obstacle to progress. Reza Shah, backed by the imperialism of 
Britain, transformed the traditional monarchy into a modem dictatorship armed with 
all the expertise and appurtenances of modem totalitarianism, including a ruthless 
secret police. 
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During World War II the Soviets tried to create independent republics in the northern 
provinces of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in order to incorporate them later into the 
USSR. The British also tried to create conditions favourable to their future interests in 
the oil-rich region of Khozistan in the south and hoped to detach it from Iran after the 
war. Once Reza Shah had established his power, he stressed the idea of nationalism 
and promoted the idea of pre-Islam as a way of bringing Iran under the Western 
modernisation process and countering the influence of the clergies. He promoted the 
Westernisation process and the development of the economy through the framework 
of the global capitalism ideology. He did not have any consideration for the 
theoretical views of Shia Islam regarding theology and politics, which is rested on the 
basic principle of the `Imamat' (the institution of rule by the Imams) and the role of 
Mojtahed. The Shah became directly involved in the development of roads, 
infrastructure and industries through some larger levels of investment. Financial 
services were unified resulting in the establishment of the National Bank in 1927. The 
government set up its own monopolistic control of essential imports - tea, cotton, rice 
and sugar - and used quotas to restrict other imports. Under Reza Shah's regime the 
army and bureaucracy expanded enormously as the two important pillars of the state. 
Another major change was the discovery of oil in 1908 and its control became a major 
political issue between the oil companies and the state. 
In cultural terms, Reza Shah tried to enforce the Western ideology, values and 
lifestyle in society. As an attempt towards the Westernisation of society, a law passed 
in 1928 decreed that all men had to wear European-style hats and later on encouraged 
the uniformity of Western-style dress. In 1935, Reza Shah forced people to abandon 
national and traditional forms of dress for a foreign one, prohibiting women from 
wearing the Islamic covering. Reza Shah, in 1926, also restricted the `Sharia' law to 
now deal only with cases of marriage, divorce and guardianship. The Shah tried to 
maintain his role through the imported Western cultural products and institutions 
resembling European ways of life, values and interpersonal relations. 
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2.7 Superpowers and the Nationalisation of Oil Industry 
By the end of WWII, the U. S. replaced Britain as a major superpower in the 
world. The rise of the USSR against the U. S. resulted in the Cold War, as the two 
imperialist powers competed over geographical, strategic, economic and political 
spheres of influence. Oil was a key factor behind the allied occupation of Iran, which 
began in 1941 and lasted for sixteen years. Iran's location in the Persian Gulf and its 
huge oil reserves were vital to imperialist countries. Iran was occupied by British, 
Soviet and American forces, as throughout the war the country became an important 
bridge to supply food and ammunition to Soviet troops. 
From 1951 to 1953, the second anti-imperialism social movement took place in Iran, 
which struggled for oil nationalisation, challenged the power of both the monarchy 
and imperialist powers in Iran, and after its initial success, faced both internal 
difficulties and external intervention. Basically, the impact of the West in the 19th 
century led to changes in the political economy, notably the emergence of political 
movements against the tobacco concession given to a British company in 1890, and 
the Constitutional Revolution 1905-1911. It is in the context of these events that the 
oil concession was granted 
by the regime to a British subject, William Darcy, in 1901, 
giving him the right to 
develop, explore, produce and refine oil in an area of about 
480,000 square miles of land (which was four fifths of the country, excluding the five 
northern provinces) for sixty years. In return, the Iranian state received £20,000 in 
cash, an additional £20,000 worth of paid up shares and 16 per cent of the company's 
annual net profits (Sampson, 1975, P. 70). It was a part of imperialistic plane by the 
Imperialist power of the time to loot Iran's oil. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
(AIOC) shareholders invested £21,656,252 (£5m of which came from the British 
government) and received an average of £16m profit per year over fifty years of 
operation (Amuzegar and Fekrat, 1971, P. 13). The oil company appropriated most of 
the wealth and only a small percentage went towards improving the standard of living 
for local workers. The company's policies were typically colonialist. For example 
while the foreign employees were provided with hospital facilities, the local workers 
were not (Elwell-Suton, 1955, PP. 96-100). The minimum wage stayed constant for 
over four decades whilst many of the workers lived in shantytowns. The result of this 
was tension between the oil companies and the local workers. When workers 
protested for an improvement in their conditions, including a wage increase, the oil 
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company responded by using foreign British troops against the local workers to 
silence them. At the same time, Reza Shah tried to suppress the independent power of 
the clergies, the landlords, urban classes and political organisations (Abrahamian, 
1983). Although the Shah needed the support of the ulama when he took over power, 
he later on stripped them of their position in society by introducing some economic 
and social reforms. With the advent of WWII, the competition between the major 
imperialist powers over hegemony in the region increased. As it was mentioned 
before in this chapter, oil was a key factor behind the allied occupation of Iran, which 
began in 1941. Therefore, Iran's location in the Persian Gulf and its huge oil reserves 
were vital to the imperialist countries. Iran was occupied by British, Soviet and 
American forces and throughout the war the country became an important bridge for 
the supply of food and ammunition to Soviet troops. The U. S. already had a foothold 
in the region since the 1920's when their oil companies first started to seek 
concessions. The U. S. aimed to penetrate Iran's oilfields while the Soviet Union was 
interested in the north of the country and the British intended to keep both out of Iran. 
After the abdication of Reza Shah by the British imperialist, he placed his son, 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi on the throne in 1941. The new Shah then allowed them to 
use the railway and to keep troops in Iran until the end of the war. The Westernisation 
of the culture under Mohammad Reza Shah's regime began in a new form and began 
to gather speed. Also, the growing importance of oil in the world market, marked the 
beginning of a new era in oil-related economics and politics, both nationally and 
internationally. 
In the 1940's, Iran entered the age of mass politics. Development of the oil industry 
and the modernisation initiatives of Reza Shah led to the growth of different social 
classes (working class, and capitalists) who became more conscious of their collective 
class interests. Whilst each had different interests, they were united against imperialist 
control and foreign domination of the country, especially of imperialist domination of 
oil industry. Resentment against the imperialist powers, especially Britain, helped to 
open up Iran politically and accelerated the growth of different political parties such 
as the `Tudeh' (left wing pro-Soviet communist) organisation, as well as other secular 
and religious organisations which were mainly confined to urban areas (Zabih, 1966). 
The rise in anti-imperialist sentiments amongst the bourgeoisie, working class and 
merchants in the country persuaded some of the clergies to respond. In 1951, the 
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ulama issued a `fatwa' supporting the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company (Dihnavi, 1984). They joined the National Front, established in 1949, which 
was a coalition of nationalist groups and parties from a broad spectrum of political 
points of view. The single issue of the nationalisation of oil was key to maintaining 
the unity of both the secular and religious establishments. Oil became a symbol of 
resistance against Western imperialism. The regime's Westernisation of the country 
and the struggle to nationalise the oil industry helped to create new forms for the 
expression of Islamic faith in different eras. The presence of British imperialist troops 
in Iran during the war stirred up mass movements. In 1951, Mossadeq, the leader of 
the oil protest movement became Prime Minister. The National Front eventually 
managed to nationalise the Iranian oil industry in 1951, but this was met with an 
angry reaction from the British who led a boycott of the oil (Odell, 1986). Britain 
continued to pressure Iran and the organised boycott of Iranian oil had worked very 
effectively, as the consuming countries were able to import oil from other Gulf 
countries instead of Iran. Britain therefore imposed severe economic pressure on Iran, 
leading to a standstill in Iran's oil operations and exports. They also refused to pay 
any royalties owed to Iran prior to nationalisation whilst the freezing of Iran's sterling 
facilities led to massive economic hardship (Katouzian, 1981). As a result, the Iranian 
government's oil revenues declined from £16m in 1950 to £7m in 1951. Exports of oil 
declined from 242 million barrels (m/b) a year in 1950 to only 10 m/b in 1953. Also 
an increased in exports of non-oil sectors did not help the country to overcome its 
economic and political difficulties. The impact of the loss of oil revenues on Iran's 
economy was very harsh. It meant a drop in foreign exchange and a rise in economic 
hardship, which posed a political threat to Mossadeq's government. Mossadeq tried to 
take every political avenue in order to overcome these economic difficulties, 
attempting to gain U. S. support against Britain and the Soviet Union. However the 
U. S. never actively supported Mossadeq and believed that Mossadeq's persistence of 
the policy of nationalisation would adversely affect Western interests in the oil-rich 
Persian Gulf and beyond. The result of these political considerations was that they 
went along with the British boycott of Iranian oil (Bill and Louis, 1988). By the early 
1953, Britain and the U. S. capitalized on the disintegration of the National Front and 
attempted to oust Mossadeq. Alarmed by his anti-imperialist policy they launched a 
coup against Mossadeq. The leading coup organisers -Norman Schwarzskopf, then 
American New Jersey Police Chief and Roy Henderson, the American ambassador to 
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Iran- acted together with the head of the CIA to overthrow Mossadeq's government 
(Milani, 1988). Finally, on the 19th August 1953, Mossadeq was removed from office 
and arrested and the Mohammad Reza Shah returned to power (Cottam, 1979; Azimi, 
1989). 
More than four decades after the Constitutional Revolution, imperialist powers once 
again brought a halt to the national movement. The result was the return to monarchy, 
planed and assisted by Western imperialism. The Westernisation of the culture under 
Shah's regime started in a new form and began to gather speed. 
2.8 The Impact of Modernisation on Society 
The return of the Shah on the 29th of October, 1954 marked an end to the 
relative openness in the political life of Iran. The Shah was both supported by and in 
close contact with the U. S. (Milani, 1989). He, like his father, tried to Westernise 
Iranian society, especially during the 1960's and 1970's. The dominant view was to 
rapidly modernise and secularise society with U. S. values and policy objectives. The 
increase in oil prices in late 1960's and early 1970's provided the country with 
financial assets. On the other hand the oil boom made Iran's economy almost totally 
dependent on oil revenues. In 1967, oil constituted 17 per cent of the country's GNP 
and by 1977 this figure raised to 38 per cent. Oil accounted for 77 per cent of the 
government's budget in 1977 and 87 per cent of its foreign exchange (Central Bank of 
Iran, 1959-1977). This enabled the state to receive enormous sums of money. The oil 
income provided Shah with economic power to control most parts of the economy and 
society, maintaining his political position, which included banning all independent 
political activities, as well as playing a major role in the cultural and ideological life 
of the country in promoting the Western lifestyle, ideology and cultural products. 
The great concentration of wealth, capital and power in the hands of a few elites was 
at the expense of the relative impoverishment of the rest of people throughout the 
country. The Shah's regime on the other hand, could see the need for modernisation 
of the country in order to prevent political unrest. The increase in oil revenues after 
1954 and military and economic aid from the U. S. enabled the state to promote 
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modernisation through a series of development plans known as the `White 
Revolution', which aimed to change the country's old land relations and break 
political links between the landlords and clergies. 
The modernisation process was mainly depended on oil revenues. The low level of 
direct taxes in state revenues reduced the distributional power of fiscal policy and 
prevented the development of a regular taxation system. This resulted in the uneven 
income distribution throughout the society and aggravated existing inequaliteis 
between rich and poor. Whilst the Iranian economy transformed, this took place on 
the back of oil revenues, as much of the country's' technological needs had to be 
imported and paid by the oil revenues. This was in turn, dependent on the world 
market both in terms of its production and price. In early 1970's, the economic 
modernisation, which was concentrated in a few cities, encouraged rural migration to 
the major cities (Kazemi, 1980). The majority of the population, around 90 per cent, 
accounted for only 60 per cent of expenditure in the society, whilst the urban poor 
sometimes had to spend more than 70 per cent of their income on rent (Halliday, 
1979, P. 43). The Shah relied on the army to put down any political challenge to his 
regime and tried to secularise the society, but he failed to diminished the power of the 
`ulama' in the society altogether. 
Although the state tried to repress and where possible, eliminate both religious and 
secular opposition, the former, by operating through the network of mosques, 
continued to maintain a degree of strength against the encroaching power of the state. 
Westernisation of the country and state brutality did not lead to the end of religion as 
an influential social force. The Westernisation process and the adaptation of the 
Western form of lifestyle, which started with Reza Shah, gained new dimensions later 
on in Mohammed Reza Shah's regime, as Western music, imported films and TV 
programmes caused a great deal of cultural tension, struggle and protests against the 
regime in the late 1970's. At the same time, the importation of communication 
hardware and software promoted the dominating position of the West, especially the 
U. S., and created a base in which people became consumers of Western commercial 
and cultural goods. The regime also used professional experts, mainly from the U. S., 
in providing access and services. These experts worked with the intention of 
integrating the ideological system of the West into the dominant culture in Iran. In 
this process, Schiller offers a model for understanding and argues that: 
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"U. S. media imperialism in terms of its functions of selling media-related U. S. 
hardware and software, promoted an image of the U. S. and of the world that 
was favourable to American interests, and of advertising American goods and 
services - directly through the provision of more channels for advertising, and 
indirectly through the display of consumer lifestyles (Schiller, 1976, cited in 
Thussu, 1998, p. 158). 
The Western cultural domination and repressive measures taken by the state however, 
created a favourable situation for religious thinkers in which certain members of 
clergies, such as Khomeinie and Taleqani, presented themselves as anti-imperialist 
and guardians of the religion of Iranian society. They equated the Shah with Western 
imperialism and corruption in society as being an enemy of Iranian society and Islam 
(Khomeinie, 1981). Many of the clergies, such as Khomeinie, expressed their 
opposition to the Shah in defence of both the nation and the values of Islam. 
Khomeinie focused his criticism of the regime on the corruption, inequalities, and 
squandering of oil resources created by the state. The culture and religious beliefs of 
the society had evolved under specific cultural, socio-economic and political 
conditions and found new 
dimensions with the development of nationalism, anti- 
imperialism and capitalist development. 
2.9 Moving Towards Revolution 
In the 1960's and 1970's, the increasing Westernisation of the society in tastes 
and habits, whether through clothing, music, American fast-food and drinks and 
especially Western cultural products, were rejected by many scholars and thinkers. 
The majority of the clergies and religious thinkers argued that the traditional hold of 
Islam over the people was losing out to the influence of the West. They also protested 
against the Western cultural products especially the TV programme contents 
portrayed in the media. In this respect majority of cleargies rejected the influence of 
the West, as some of them banned watching TV or going to the cinema. This act was 
followed by many people. 
In this situation, although many Iranians were benefiting from the Western lifestyle 
that was taking over the streets, the masses did not have access to it, nor did they feel 
as if they were represented 
by it. In addition, there was no form of democracy, no 
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elections, no variations in news coverage of the Iranian radio and television. 
Moreover, a CIA-trained secret police, SAVAK, patrolled and eliminated any signs of 
dissent. It was inevitable that the exclusive nature of the uneven Western-style 
development and its distance from Iranian culture would finally lead the people to 
revolt. Basically, Iran is a predominantly Muslim country with its own history of 
civilisation, philosophy, and art. Although Iran was never physically colonised like 
Vietnam, India, or Algeria, at that time the cultural invasion was very thorough and 
very apparent. Discos and bars were plentiful in the big cities. French and American 
music became the norm, while traditional Persian music was neglected. In a matter of 
40 years (1939-1979), people's lives had drastically changed with a leap towards 
modernisation, but one that was neither accompanied by democracy nor easily 
accessible by different social classes. Generally, because the Shah could not imagine 
any future for Iran except one that was modelled on the industrialised West, and 
because he, too, regarded his country's religious class as the great obstacle to 
progress, he allowed himself to become, in every way, the main instrument of 
imperialist power. 
On the other hand, reliance on oil created basic problems as Iran became totally 
dependent on the world market. The economy could only function at the same rate so 
long as the inflow of oil income continued. The oil-led economic expansion increased 
the wealth of the upper echelon of industrial owners, comprising of 150 families. 
These elites owned 67 per cent of all industries and financial institutions (Bashiriyeh, 
1984, P. 40). In 1974,47 wealthy families controlled 85 per cent of all firms with a 
turnover of more than 10m Rials (Halliday, 1979, P. 151). This was in the light of 
rapid changes in society in many areas, including an increase in population and 
migration to cities, which created a huge demand for housing in urban areas. 
In the political arena, the state continued to use repressive measures in order to 
maintain its rule. The government's strategy of increasing taxation and cutting social 
spending created a political crisis for the regime and strong discontent amongst the 
population at large, causing a rift between the state and the people. Meanwhile, the 
opposition groups mobilised dissatisfied people, and with an effective organisation 
and leadership, tried to exploit the opportunity to replace the existing political power. 
The main opposition to the Shah were centred around clergies, guerrilla organisations 
and members of the intelligentsia. The Shah's Westernisation and his autocratic 
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regime gave little space for open activity on the part of the opposition. The 
maximisation of the power of Shah to enforce his will on the population was being 
met in two ways. First, there was an increase in the amount of money at his disposal 
from the boost in oil revenue, and secondly, the use of secret police and prisons as 
instruments of terror and compulsion. Therefore, even moderate opposition after 1963 
was suppressed with exile, imprisonment, torture and murder. The army was brought 
in to crush mass demonstrations (1978) mounted by the clergies in Tehran and other 
cities, where thousands of people were killed. This sharp edge of power that Shah was 
willing to bear on his opponent was enabled by the imperialism of United States, as 
his main supporter. 
Through the process of unrestrained personal ambition, the Shah became completely 
separated from his own people; it was the corruption of leadership in its ultimate 
form. He relied on money from oil revenue and on the support of the greatest 
imperialist power. At the same time, under the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine, Iran was 
seen as the regional power that would defend Western interests and act as a policeman 
in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. 
After 1963, in the face of state repression the oppositional organisation became 
involved in underground activities. They gained the support of the new generation, 
mainly university students, who they involved in the organisation of activities against 
the regime. The state response was very harsh and included imprisonment, torture and 
executions. The secret police, SAVAK, had rigorously enforced the rule that not even 
the name of Israel should be mentioned in a public discussion nor tolerated any 
criticism of the United States. New oppositional organisations also developed in the 
wake of the defeat of the 1963 Uprising. Among these were the Mojahedin-e Khalq 
and Fedayyan guerrilla organisation, former members of the Tudeh Party and leftist 
supporters of the National Front. Both Mojahedin-e Khalq and Fedayyan had great 
appeal to university students and the younger generation. However, they 
overestimated the propaganda value of armed action by an elite group, and therefore 
their organisations were unable to influence the wider social movement, which 
opposed the Shah. The social basis for the two groups remained exclusively 
comprised of students and some members of the middle-class with little working class 
membership, despite their theoretical recognition of the importance of worker's 
struggle. The failure of organisations such as Fedayyan and Mojahedin-e Khalq 
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provided a big opportunity for other social groups, notably Khomeinie, to exert his 
hegemony in the struggle for the leadership of the revolution. 
In the 1970's Khomeinie, an exiled clergy, in a series of statements and recorded 
speeches (sent to Iran and distributed inside the country by his followers), blamed 
imperialist intervention for Iran's lack of independence and called for an overthrow of 
the Shah. He accused the Shah for his subordination to imperialist powers, especially 
to the U. S. and Israel. His ideological presentation of Islam was very different from 
those of the clergies who either co-operated with the Shah or kept quiet. He employed 
anti-imperialist rhetoric and demanded the violent overthrow of the regime. 
Khomeinie's ideology emphasised fundamental Islam in a new sense. He opposed 
gambling, alcohol, and the corruption of luxury and stood for the full implementation 
of Islamic law. He argued that Islam was not against industrialisation, development or 
modernisation, but against imperialism and Western domination. He regarded the 
"Western influence in Iran as a form of cultural imperialism, for example disliking the 
kind of music being played on the radio, and complained that not enough was done to 
promote Iran's independent Muslim culture" (Martin, 2000, p. 1 15). He strongly 
criticised the state's media, arguing that the mass media was biased to serve Western 
powers and promote a global adoption of Western cultural values, undermining 
indigenous culture. He called for the Islamisation of the Iranian media and believed 
that the advanced communication technology, especially the global mass media, were 
characterised to promote cultural 
homogenisation in the form of cultural imperialism 
or Americanisation. 
In order to widen his appeal, Khomeinie combined religion, nationalism and anti- 
imperialism sentiments. For him, imperialism was a blanket-term used to equate 
everything bad with perceived 
Western values. Religious organisations and the ulama 
used religion as a mobilising 
force and presented it as a symbol of resistance against 
the Shah and imperialism. Khomeinie tri ed to extend his support from the traditional 
sectors of society by arguing 
for an end to class society under Islam, for free elections 
and free speech for everyone, even Marxists (Parsa, 1989). Therefore, all the classes 
and social groups involved 
in the revolution gradually started to back the clergies and 
embraced Khomeinie as their 
leader. The clergies thus managed to win over a 
significant sector of the society. In this sense, the religious community formed a new 
organisation, led by clergies with collaboration from the bazaar and the modern- 
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educated Muslims. Thus, Khomeinie succeeded in attracting the support of the lower 
class as well as the middle class. These alliances permitted him to win the perpetual 
confrontation, making the authority of clergies dominant over the nation by finally 
excluding the authority of the monarch. 
2.10 The 1979 Revolution 
With the economic and political crisis in 1976-77 throughout the country and 
the violent demonstration, the clergy started to communicate their revolutionary 
propaganda in a way that was accessible to the Iranian people at a time of revolt and 
became involved in organising demonstrations and protests. In mid-1978, the situation 
started to intensify, particularly with the arson of the Rex Cinema in the southern 
town of Abadan where four-hundred people died. The government blamed the 
religious opposition for the incident (whilst the opposition blamed the Shah), but the 
consequences were costly for the regime. It was followed by street protests and strikes 
in urban areas, which marked a vital turn in the course of events. The regime used 
armed forces to quell street disturbances, killing hundreds of demonstrators, which 
merely fuelled the people's anger and led to further mobilisation. Finally, on 
November 6, the Shah replaced the Prime Minister with his military commander, 
General Azhari, and delivered a nationally televised speech apologising for his past 
mistakes. However it was too late for him to placate people's anger as many of his 
close supporters had already left the country or were on their way abroad. By the end 
of 1987, the Shah's family had left Iran, transferring as much as $2bn from Iran only 
between November and December (Madani, 1983, p. 345). 
With the collapse of the Shah's political authority, the movement was growing in 
strength and Khomeinie was beginning to play a more prominent role. He finally went 
from Iraq to Paris, where the focus became for his establishment to formulate 
themselves as the leaders of the revolution. In this situation, the military government 
relied on the army, which opened fire on demonstrators. The strikes paralysed the 
economy and the number of street demonstrations was growing very rapidly. The 
soldiers began to desert the army and join the people. 
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On the 16th of January 1979, the Shah fled the country for Cairo, and on the ist of 
February, Khomeinie came back to Iran and announced the establishment of the 
Provisional Revolutionary Council (PRC). Eventually the military leaders realised 
they could no longer maintain control over the army and thus declared neutrality. 
Fighting continued between what was left of the Shah's supporters and the 
revolutionaries, but only for a few days, as the monarchy's state was replaced by the 
new state with a clergy as the head of state. This raised the question of whether or not 
theocratic rulers could survive in the modem world. The following will examine the 
character of the state and society under the new regime. It will show the extent to 
which uneven development continues to shape Iran's political economy and its socio- 
cultural sphere. 
2.11 After the 1979 Revolution 
The revolution in Iran marked a fundamental change in its political history. 
One of the most seemingly stable and pro-Western regimes in the world was 
overthrown and replaced by an Islamic Republic. This appeared to be one of the most 
virulent anti-imperialist nations, declaring itself as being against Westernisation, 
which viewed as the main principle cause for social and economic deprivation. At the 
time the various areas of the world were divided between the two prevailing powers 
of the East and West, as NATO and the Warsaw military organisation were protectors 
of this new order. The movement not only directly challenged American imperialism, 
but also disarmed the Communists in their anti-imperialism claims. With Iran, the 
U. S. not only lost a most favourable geographic, economic and military position in 
one of the most sensitive areas of the world, but the waves of this anti-imperialistic 
outburst also severely demoralised the Western-affiliated regimes in Islamic and Arab 
countries. The essential message of the Islamic revolution was of a cultural nature 
based on religious thought and moral values. The two issues that required much 
attention from the new ruling elite were: the regime's ability to handle the domestic 
economy and its future relations with the rest of the world and the West in particular. 
The post revolutionary government however, with its hard-line approach believed that 
social justice was only possible by reverting back to pure Islamic heritage as achieved 
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through a strict Islamic regime. The state proclaimed its aims as: re-introduction of 
the values of Islamic culture, reducing Iran's cultural dependency on the Western 
media products, reducing the economic dependence on oil revenues, raising the living 
standards of people, and reducing inequalities. With the economy relatively integrated 
with global capitalism, the state was faced with the legacy of the old regime's socio- 
economic and political programmes. 
One of the striking features of the Iranian political economy before the revolution was 
its uneven development along the concentration of industries and wealth in a few 
areas, mainly major cities, where most of it was held by a very small section of the 
population. Against this background, the new regime was faced with difficulties 
regarding instability in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, half completed 
projects, under-capacity in many key industries, and unemployment. Moreover, the 
lack of raw materials and decline in markets left firms heavily in debt or even 
bankrupt. Under these conditions imports of intermediate and capital goods declined, 
and as a result, the GNP declined by 18 per cent between 1979 to1980. In the 
following years, the country's economy continued to experience a relatively sharp 
decline in real output, a decline in GDP by 47 per cent between 1979 and 1987 at an 
average rate of 5.2 per cent per year, and drastic reduction in average living standards. 
This was followed by a decline in oil revenues and capacity utilisation, along with the 
intensification of the war with Iraq (1981-1989), as well as an increase in 
unemployment figures. The economic crisis was aggravated by the corruption and 
inefficiency of the ruling clergies. The oil-dependent character of the state did not 
change after The 1979 Revolution and oil continued to play a vital economic and 
political factor for the new ruling authority, as it did for the previous regime. The state 
continued to receive a 
large amount of oil money and, like the previous regime, 
planned a large expenditure programme without relying on effective taxation. Thus, 
as before the revolution, the country's economy continued to rely on oil, with the state 
as the major actor. Uneven development within the political economy continued, i. e. 
the oil revenues provided the state with a dominant role in the economy and society. 
In short, the deterioration of country's economic conditions was due to internal 
factors such as corruption and mismanagement, as well as external factors, including a 
prolonged and costly war with Iraq, turbulence in world oil markets, the freezing of 
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Iranian foreign exchange assets around $11 billion following the hostage crisis of the 
U. S. embassy, and the embargo imposed by the United States. 
After WWII, the importance of the Middle East for imperialists was enhanced by its 
oil resources, as three-quarter of the world's known oil reserves are concentrated in 
this region. American imperialism and the Middle East ruling classes were very 
anxiously watching the unfolding process of the revolution in Iran, which had serious 
repercussions throughout the Middle East. Multinationals such as Exxon and Mobil, 
which had made billions of dollars in the Gulf oil fields, were especially anxious 
about the situation. The American imperialists thus incited Saddam Hussein to attack 
Iran and equipped the Iraqi army with the latest weapons. They even supplied the 
chemical weapons used in the attack. Saddam then, with the support of the U. S. and 
its Arab allies, invaded Iran on 22nd of September, 1980. 
Politically, the war helped the Islamic Republic regime to silence any challenge from 
the opposition and provided a nationalist and religious focus for people to rally 
around. The U. S. 's backing for Iraq's attack presented hard-line clergies with a 
golden opportunity to consolidate their position even more and to mobilise the masses 
behind the regime. The war also strengthened the militant clergy who could use the 
war to justify suppressing any opposition to the government, labelling them as 
`traitors' and `infidels'. This was clearly stated by Rafsanjani in 1985, as he stressed 
that, "We have been able to use the war to awaken the people and to fight the 
problems that threaten the revolution" 
(Chubin and Tripp, 1988, p. 71). Military power 
also served as a symbol of national 
independence and presented the regime as the 
defender of Islam against the `infidels'. As the war went on, Iran was finally able to 
regain its loss of land and even captured part of Iraqi territory. However, the U. S. and 
its allies in the region were not prepared to accept Iran's political dominace in the 
region. The common reaction to potential Iranian military success was summed up at 
the time by Los Angeles Times, which wrote that: "the global equilibrium would be 
fundamentally tilted against Western interests" (Gurdian, 29 Jul, 1988). These kinds 
of prospects much alarmed 
both the West and its regional allies. The reduction in oil 
prices as well as the U. S. military presence in the Gulf put huge pressure on Iran to 
end the war. By 1987, the U. S. came to openly support Iraq in an effort to make sure 
that Iran wouldn't harm U. S. interests and those of its friendly allies, such as Saudi 
Arabia. The external pressure mounted with the shooting down of an Iranian Airbus 
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by the U. S. Navy, killing 290 civilian passengers in July, 1988. Therefore, the 
economic crisis caused by imperialism and foreign pressure led the Iranian regime to 
finally accept UN resolution number 598 on 18th July, 1988. 
Since the revolution, the regime's attitude has altered and a more moderate line has 
been developed towards regional economic and political developments, mainly due to 
the unavoidable forces of globalisation and the new global economic and political 
conditions. Rapid changes were emerging as a response to social and cultural issues, 
such as the allowance of the broadcast of Western TV films and serials in Iranian TV. 
2.12 Society and the State under the Islamic Republic 
The revolution, and eight years of war with Iraq, resulted in huge sacrifices, 
both physically and financially, for the majority of the Iranian population. In return, 
they expected material rewards rather than false promises. This dissatisfaction has 
been voiced by the people. One of the striking elements of Iran's capitalist 
development under monarchical rule, was the uneven development of the productive 
forces, the concentration of wealth, capital and power in particular regions and 
classes. This continued under the 
Islamic Republic and the dependency of the Iranian 
economy on the world market continued through 
both its exports of oil and imports of 
raw materials and consumer goods. 
There was, however, decline in these imports, 
which had a negative effect on 
Iranian society, especially on the most impoverished 
sections. According to the regime's own 
figures, per capita GDP declined from 
133,000 Rials in 1977 to 54,000 Rials in 1987 (Statistical Centre of Iran, various 
reports). The widening gap 
between the rich and poor in the country made the 
situation worse, as the 
impact of the crisis was fell most acutely on the lower income 
earners. During the 1990s, 
Iran's economy continued to be characterised by low 
growth and high inflation, which reached a peak of nearly 50 per cent in 1995. The 
regime may have promised equal 
distribution of wealth on the eve of the revolution, 
but during these years after the revolution, growth was almost nil, with GDP declining 
by 7 per cent. Unemployment was estimated at 30 per cent for 1993, and as a result 
many people were living 
below the poverty line. The uneven development has not 
been just between the rich and poor. In the cultural sphere, since 1979, people have 
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been under a new form of cultural pressure coming from within the country. The 
Islamic revolution was a cultural revolution as much as a political revolution, 
imposing dress-codes and new laws banning alcohol, certain books, music, films, etc. 
These changes affected different people on different levels. The backlash against 
Western styles and habits was very violent for those who resisted or were open 
advocates of life under the monarchy. By the eve of the revolution, a large part of the 
population chose to reject the cultural invasion brought by global media imperialism. 
However, the younger generation had been exposed to the Western media products 
through either satellite or Internet. In Iran, Internet is commonly used by the youth, 
which enables them to obtain news, music and other forms of cultural goods from 
outside sources and to engage in other international, mainly English, language 
exchanges. They also continue to watch satellite television and have resisted the 
governmental ban on possessing and viewing satellite. 
The social arena's demands for reforms became united under the movement led by 
Khatami, whom people selected as their third president on May 23,1997. Khatami 
claimed to give priority to civil society, rule of law, greater political freedom, and 
respect for pluralism. While he did not describe freedom as anti-religious, he 
emphasised that institutions that 
did not appreciate the importance of freedom would 
be destined to fail and disappear. Khatami sought to establish an institutionalised 
freedom in the public sphere and attempted to draw boundaries that would allow for 
the necessary constitutional amendments. However, society was still denied a social 
contract based on openness, civil society, pluralism, and freedom. Iran still faced 
severe economic and political problems as well as a cultural crisis. 
Since 2004, the political fractions opposing reformist demands have been gathered in 
the conservative camp. The main point of reference for conservative groups is the 
institution of Velayat-e faqih. Other references are the call for continued Islamisation 
of the state and the reflection of this religious character in all matters of state, absolute 
obedience to state authority, and absolute state hegemony in the political realm. In the 
last few years (2002-05) unsolved murders, increasing political pressures and arrests 
have served to maintain high levels of tension between the two groups. Moreover, 
Khatami's vague policies created great dissatisfaction and disappointment amongst 
the people. These sentiments were manipulated by the Conservatives in the 
Presidential election in 2005, in which the hard-line Conservatives won and gained 
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total control over the executive, legislative and judiciary powers. The Iranian 
economy is now in a state of crisis as the hardliners control all of the government 
sections. The state's currency has dropped in value and people are demanding social 
welfare and reforms. 
2.13 Conclusion 
The process of the development of capitalism and adaptation of modernisation 
has resulted in a cultural crisis, inequality and great dependency on the West. 
According to the theories of imperialism, this imperialist relationship is maintained 
not only through suppression, but also through the expert institutionalisation of 
Western, especially American, organisational structures. It has been stressed that "the 
dominant capitalist economic and social system led by United States and a number of 
industrial countries, try to preserve its own global interests under the pretence of a 
new world order" (Mowlana, 1992, p. 35). With regard to the uneven development of 
capitalism, what we witnessed in Iran is the inadequacy of its economy and its great 
dependency in a way that follows the overall structure of the global capitalism which 
has formed to serve the interests of the West. This study confirms Luxemburg's 
statement, as she argues that when 
developing countries undertake capitalist modes of 
production, they retain their pre-capitalist structures as they serve as a source of cheap 
raw materials providing additional markets, which will result in backwardness of the 
periphery system. As 
it was mentined before, the present cultural imperialism theory 
cannot explain the internal forces, the anti-imperialist movements, or the resistance of 
local people in the general process of imperialism. The analyses of the Iranian social 
movements demonstrate the revolt against 
dictatorship, colonialism, and imperialism. 
This chapter demonstrated the resistance of people and the internal forces working 
together as two great factors, which the cultural imperialism thesis seemingly fails to 
take into full account. The present cultural condition of Iran will be closely examined 
in the next chapter through the analysis of the Television in Iran. The following will 
examine the evolution of Iranian television from its historical background to more 
contemporary developments. 
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Chapter Three 
Iranian Television 
3.1 Introduction 
As it was shown in previous chapter, Iranian society was heavily exposed to 
Western values, ways of life and tastes as a result of Shah's modernisation process 
and his socio-economic policies. The driving force behind this exposition was the 
media and the television in particular. Before the 1979 Revolution, mass media in Iran 
was considered to be a platform for Western cultural products. Through the 
emergence of communication technology, the 
indigenous culture of Iran has been 
under the influence of Western culture, which flowed to their society through media 
products, particularly TV programmes and 
films. These cultural products had great 
impact upon the feelings, thoughts and cultural values of people, causing conflict and 
creating inflation throughout recent Iranian 
history. On the other hand, in Iran, the 
mass media have also been used as a tool 
for people's movements in a way such that 
the anti-imperialism movements and anti-Westernisation sprit became articulated 
through the journalism and literature. Historically there exists a close relationship 
between the mass media and political reforms in Iran. By the end of the nineteenth 
century and throughout the twentieth century there has always been a close 
relationship between mass media and the state, providing certain technical 
information for the ruling class. Therefore, the media in Iran throughout its history 
has worked as instrument that provided the basis for the governmental control both 
before and after the 1979 Revolution. 
In the early part of the twentieth century radio and television began to develop under 
state control, which was run 
by those who were indifferent to indigenous Iranian and 
Islamic cultural values. The states in the Qajar dynasty, and then in Pahlavi, have 
been generally supported by Western imperialist powers and ideologically rely on 
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Western beliefs, values, ideas, and the media to legitimise their existence. In this 
context, even though the broadcasting technologies brought some degree of 
development to the broadcasting structure of the country, the proper accessibility and 
creative use of these technologies did not develop. The unequal and imbalanced flow 
of cultural materials, technical hardware and software from the West and the U. S. in 
particular brought more conflict and instability to the country. During the early 
twentieth century, under the monarchy the state and political system in Iran was 
incompatible with the Islamic and indigenous cultural system and values. The 
ideological discipline practiced by the media had its impacts on the growing sector of 
industrial and transnational infrastructure, which developed through the attempt to 
change the cultural, political and economic systems to meet the requirements for a 
global market system. The state used the power of the media for their own interests 
with disregard to society. The Shah, with disregard to the historical process of 
political development, saw modernisation along Western lines. Introduction and 
adoption of the Western-style modernisation by Reza Shah made way for foreign 
intervention in Iran and concealed their control over the country. Therefore, due to the 
contradiction between Islamic domination and secular power, each step towards 
Western-style modernisation was overtaken by a new socio-political and economic 
crisis. Among the most dramatic ones were the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 and 
the Islamic Revolution in 1979. 
The introduction of modern communication technologies and the emergence of the 
mass media system at the beginning of the twentieth century enhanced cultural 
conflict and social crisis within Iranian society. This was because under the slogans of 
modernisation and economic development, Iranian society was deprived of the right 
to recognise its own unique and distinct social system and culture. In developing 
countries, the Western-style modernisation process became a one-way flow from the 
West to those countries. It paved the way for the worldwide diffusion of 
modernisation. Therefore, the modernisation process and economic development were 
only instruments used to dominate world economic and political systems while using 
the natural resources of developing countries for their needs. 
In Iran, the industrialisation of society, which began in Reza Shah's regime and 
continued by Mohammed Reza Shah, and Westernisation of thought and lifestyle, 
especially through the media production, had not only loosened traditional values but 
had also devitalised the foundation of the political community in Iran. Therefore, the 
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1979 Revolution can be seen as a drastic reaction towards this imposition of the 
Weestern socio-cultural system on Iranian society. As stated in chapter one, the 
process of cultural transfer is much more complicated than the cultural imperialism 
argument credits. What the cultural imperialism argument seems to ignore is the role 
of internal factors and elites in developing countries in the process of cultural 
imperialism. These internal elements can determine the role and structure of television 
in a country. Among these elements are: socio-political structure, economic system, 
historical background and ideological and cultural environment. 
Chapter two examined the historical phase of cultural imperialism through the 
emergence of modernisation and capitalist development in Iran. It demonstrated that 
how Iran has been engaged with the West and cultural imperialism throughout its 
history and how people resisted the Western domination. 
This chapter tries to demonstrate the historical and contemporary elements and 
internal forces that have worked alongside the external forces of cultural imperialism 
and have had a great impact on the socio-cultural patterns of Iranian society. It 
outlines the historical background of television in Iran, its recent development and the 
framework of IRIB. It analyses the technical and programme structure of Iranian 
television and discusses the technical dependency accompanied by imported 
programmes both before and after the revolution. It looks into the general features of 
Iranian television after the 1979 Revolution and analyses the ideological and political 
infrastructure, examining the Islamisation of the media in Iran in both content and 
operation. In this, it looks into the internal forces behind Western cultural imperialism 
both before and after the 1979 Revolution and studies the main factors underlying the 
huge popularity of satellite televisions in Iran. It evaluates how the regime's 
censorship and strict control, along with the imposition of a hard line ideological and 
political perception, have driven people towards viewing satellite acting as a medium 
for the return of cultural imperialism. 
3.2 The Emergence of Television in Iran 
Television in Iran was first introduced in 1958 by private enterprise. 
"Television in Iran was established as two low-power stations using ten- and three- 
kilowatt transmitters in Tehran and then in Abadan in 1960. These two stations were 
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privately owned, commercial ventures of a wealthy Harvard-educated Iranian, Iraj 
Sabet, who had also introduced Pepsi-Cola to the country and later an RCA (Radio 
Corporation of America) television manufacturing industry" (Mowlana, 1989, in 
Kamalipour, and Mowlana, 1994, p. 83). Before the organisation of Iranian Television 
(ITV), a technical agreement was signed between France and Iran in 1964 for a 
television training studio centre in Tehran. In the following years, this studio turned to 
be a centre for telecasting by a small television transmitter. 
With the expansion of communication networks and microwaves in 1969, the 
National Television was gradually able to link the central station with various 
peripheral stations. In June 1970, the stations and installations pertaining to the 
private sector were purchased by the government and merged into that of the National 
Iranian Radio and Television (NIRT). With this merging of the two stations, 
television programmes were transmitted from two channels and in 1971, the Iranian 
Television was nationalised by the government, ending commercial television 
operation in the country. Its programme structure consisted of diverse programmes 
from music, entertainment, education to drama and cultural programmes, mostly 
imported from West and from the U. S. in particular. 
According to the agreement signed in 1964, France would provide the establishment 
of a television education centre 
but not a television broadcasting centre. This 
educational centre would 
be used to train programme and technical personnel for 
future broadcasting purposes. It is clear that the technical side and infrastructure of 
television which, in fact, was given much more consideration than the social, 
economic and cultural sides of television, was not adequate and that the programme 
structure was not given any serious planning or research. As with the transmission and 
production technology, television reception technology was predominantly imported 
from developed countries. In addition, regular television broadcasting caused a 
massive demand for television sets, which were not manufactured in Iran and had to 
be imported from developed countries. Thus, Iran became a strong case of technical 
dependency on the West. Years later, although the domestic production of the 
receivers began through local production, it was mainly from assembly plants reliant 
upon imported parts. In sum, the 
initial transfer of broadcasting technology was 
realised in connected phases. In the subsequent stages of NIRT's technological 
dependency, first came the transfer of transmission, production equipment and 
training of personnel by France at early stages, followed by the direct importation of 
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television sets to meet consumer demands. Later on the establishment of assembly 
plants for television receivers were used as a substitute for direct importation. When 
broadcasting technology was transferred from the West, NIRT's programming policy 
also appeared to be characterised by increasing adoption and absorption of Western 
programmes, models, styles, and ideas. It is striking that in spite of insufficient 
numbers of essential programme and technical staff, television broadcasting was 
about to begin. 
Since the emergence of television in Iran until the 1979 Revolution, the NIRT 
programme structure was dominated by imported programmes from the West, 
especially from the United States. In addition to this, Western soaps and movies were 
the main constituents of prime time television every night. In the meantime, Iranian 
viewers started to become exposed to rapidly increasing numbers of American 
programmes. With the development of broadcasting time, the foreign-made 
programmes were extended. Although there were a few domestic programmes, they 
were mainly based on Western formats and content rather than on those of the 
indigenous culture. This was mainly due to the state's censorship such that all 
programmes with controversial and critical social issues were banned, with the 
producer fired and arrested by the regime. In 1976, for every show produced 
domestically there were three imported shows being broadcast on television. Ninety- 
nine out of 100 movies shown on television were imported and dubbed. The 
organisational and programme structure of NIRT television was influenced by the 
political situation of Iran. "There were no religious programmes on television and the 
Shah's so-called `White Revolution' was designed to make Iran a secular society 
modelled on Europe and United States" (Mowlana, 1989, p. 17). The organisational 
and programme structure of NIRT was under the strict control of the state. Western 
programmes, especially American series and films, increased remarkably, while 
home-produced programmes remained confined to light entertainment, music and 
variety shows, quiz shows and documentaries. While American programmes were the 
most popular programmes amongst the viewers of developed urbanised centres in 
Tehran and a few big cities, Iranian films, folk music and local programmes were 
more attractive in less urban areas. 
However at the end of 1960's and beginning of the 197'0s, Western, especially 
American programmes, were strongly criticised by leftist intelligentsia, nationalists 
and Islamic circles due to their ideological and cultural differences that had 
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undermined cultural and moral values of Iranian society. It was argued that the 
emergence of television caused unnecessary consumptions, loss of foreign exchange 
and the increase of dependency on foreign imported goods through its commercials. 
3.3 The 1979 Revolution and the Islamisation of the Media 
in Iran 
Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran, the Islamisation of mass media 
in both content and operation has taken place. Basically, Iran is a complex society that 
is differentiated on political, social, economics and ethno-linguistics lines; neither 
capitalism nor- nationalism has been able to reduce the gaps. Therefore, in such a 
geographically and linguistically diverse country, mass media, and television in 
particular, are treated as a means by which to unite people. Towards this aim the 
theocratic regime since the early days has employed the mass media in order to 
revaluate the Islamic ideas and values. This is particularly relevant in a society that 
has previously been deprived of its ideological and cultural identity under the 
pressures of imperialism 
from foreign forces and secularisation, and later on from the 
Westernisation of the elites from within. Therefore, after the revolution the regime 
tried to rearrange the country's institutions, including the mass media, and frame them 
within its own perception of Islamic culture. Apart from the obvious political changes, 
the changes in media content were of utmost importance to the state. Under the 
Islamisation process, the state tried to spread values of the revolution through mass 
media and also other socialising agencies, especially television, in order to create a 
new normative structure that could replace the value structure of the Shah regime. 
Through the Islamisation of the society mass media was considered to be one of the 
most important vehicles 
in the development of these new norms and values. 
Therefore, the contents of media programming were seen as a major means of 
informing and re-educating people. In short, after the 1979 Revolution, the main 
characteristic of the Iranian media 
has been the internalisation of a hard-line 
perception of religious 
beliefs throughout society. In this context, the media, and 
television in particular, have been the subject of Islamisation and have been integrated 
within the existing traditional channels of communication. This has also resulted in 
the creation of a state-controlled system of public broadcasting. 
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After the revolution, mass media has been working under the direct control of the 
state and in a close relationship with religious institutions. Through this combination 
the state has tried to overcome Western domination of the media and has tried to 
obtain a degree of autonomy through production within the framework of its hard-line 
political and ideological values. The state has tried to combine its version of Islamic 
culture with the modern media system in order to create an ideological culture which 
is in accordance with the regime's strict religious point of view that ignores Iran's 
national culture, especially its pre-Islamic cultural heritage. The implicit and explicit 
policies in mass media, particularly in Iranian television, underline the importance 
given to these media by the leader and the regime. These policies are utilised as a 
major means of ushering in the idea of the state echoing the regime's belief that the 
Islamic Revolution is the answer to the secularism, corruption. The Islamisation is 
viewed by the regime as a process of re-socialising public society to adopt a version 
of Islamic ideals which are in accordance with the regime's socio-political and 
ideological beliefs. 
The government refuses to recognise secular parties or even other Islamic groups as 
participants in the media. To the Islamic Republic, no other parties or individuals can 
have the best interestsof humanity as their priority. The recognition and visibility of 
the media within the regime's setting is seen to be based on two concepts; 
`commanding to the right and prohibiting from the wrong', and the concept of 
`Ummah'. The former is the notion of the responsibility of individuals to guide others 
and show them the correct path of goodness. Implicit and explicit in this principle is 
the notion that individuals and groups are responsible for instructing people towards 
the truth and preparing the generations to accept Islamic principles. This guiding is a 
responsibility for leadership, government, every Muslim individual and all social 
institutions, which include the mass media. 
The second concept that has an important impact on political life of the individual and 
whole society is the notion of `Ummah', as it transcends national borders and political 
boundaries. Therefore, intercultural and international communication is necessary for 
preceding the Islamic Ummah. These two principles have become the guideline of the 
post-revolutionary Iranian media and the doctrines of radio and television's contents. 
In short, after the revolution, and throughout the Islamisation process, the regime's 
version of Islam and its hard-line approach integrated with modern communication 
media resulting in the diffusion of a strict religious culture through the media. The 
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contribution of mass media is used to legitimise the clergy's total control and 
hegemony, helping to sustain political and social changes by the regime in society. 
3.4 IRIB 
With the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1 Ith of February in 
1979, the National Iranian Radio and Television was replaced by Islamic Republic of 
Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). It is the only broadcasting organisation in the country. It 
conducts television and radio broadcasting with the entire country as its service area. 
In 2005, IRIB carried daily broadcasts of programmes over 10 television channels and 
6 radio channels as well as local stations in different provinces all over the country. In 
addition to its domestic television and radio services, IRIB conducts overseas 
broadcasting services on short wave in 32 different languages and dialogues for more 
than 142 hours daily. 
3.5 Iranian Television after the Revolution 
Since the 1979 Revolution the current government applied a policy that moved 
all Iranian institutions towards Islamisation in all sectors of society. The Islamisation 
of television has been on the top of the agenda. There has been a restriction on foreign 
materials permitted in the Iranian broadcasting system. For an institution like NIRT, 
in order to implement the regime's values, they needed time, organisation and most 
importantly, human resources. Therefore, after the revolution there was a reduction in 
the broadcasting hours of television, which continued until the appropriate 
programmes were produced. In 1991,85.3 percent of all television programmes were 
produced locally (Ravabete 
Omoomieh Seda va Symaye Iran, 1991, p. 62). According 
to Kamalipour and Mowlana, "this change is significant in the orientation of 
broadcasting in the country. Before the revolution, the trend was reversed, with an 
imported to domestic programmed ratio of 3: 1" (Mowlana, 1994, p. 84). As Mowlana 
points out, "It was precisely this sort of programme that was contributing, among 
other things to the alienation of the Iranians, thereby, sowing the seeds of the 
revolution" (Mowlana, 1989, p. 37). Table 1 shows the increase in production of 
domestic programmes in Iranian television. 
85 
Table 1 
Domestic Iranian TV Programme productions, 1990 
Programmed Type Percentage 
Children and adolescents 16.4 
Social and cultural 14.9 
News 14.4 
General education 10.4 
Islamic education 8.7 
Sports 8.4 
Skill and how to do 5.1 
Koran and call for prayer 
Entertainment 
4.9 
3.7 
Arts and literature 3.4 
Political 2.1 
Defence 1.3 
Economics 1.1 
Advertising 1.0 
Historical .4 
Others 3.8 
source: tcavaucm %jinuvmmt, acua va , 3ymaye Iran, 1991 
The government had made a conscious effort to make television compatible with its 
ideological value structure. In order to do so, from the early days they tried to increase 
the amount of domestic media products and limit the importation of foreign products. 
As a result "the United States has almost completely disappeared as a major provider 
and source of programming for Iranian television" (Kamalipour, Mowlana, 1994, 
p. 86). 
At present (2005), IRIB has ten television channels. The major channels include the 
television networks 1, TV 2, TV 3, TV 4, Koran network, and News network, which 
in 2004, produced 15645.04 hour programmes. In the same year, local networks 
channels also produced 21340.18 hour programmes and the two external channel 
networks: Sahar and Jame-Jam both produced 7409.44 programmes in eight different 
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languages including English, Arabic, French, Turkish, Azeri, Kurdish, Urdu, and 
Bosnian. 
Television network 1 is the first television channel and can be viewed by almost the 
whole country. Television network I aims to reach a larger number of audience so its 
programme structure consists of diverse programmes from music, entertainment, 
religious, education to cultural, film and drama programmes. The number of live 
programmes is also higher on this channel than on the others. The programmes in 
TV2 are mostly local and regional. It covers 93.9 percent of the population. 
According to the most recent figures (2005), 91 percent of the programmes are 
domestic and the remaining 9 percent are foreign productions. The third television 
channel of IRIB covers 87.8 percent of the population. TV 3 aims at younger 
audiences so its programme structure is mainly based on entertainment and 
amusement. It has broadcasted 8731.31 hours of programmes in 2004, of which 58 
percent were domestic products and 42 percent were foreign produced. 
Table 2 
Total duration proportions of different programmed categories on TV 3 in 2004 
Programmed Categories Duration (hour) Percentages in Total 
Islamic Education 395.52 5 
Social Issues 1744.41 22 
Economic 
Historical 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Political 38.32 1 
Cultural 265.39 3 
Sport & entertainment 5073.09 65 
Common Knowledge 257.5 3 
Iran and Iraq War 
Total 
44.24 
7819.22 
1 
100 
JoUrCe. 1tuD b -ciiuv i VI ýý. ýaý ýýý, ýaºýil a, lu . vowuon of rrogrammed, 2004. 
TV 4 broadcasts mostly educational, scientific and social programmes and covers 
69.59 percent of the population. This channel has broadcasted the amount of 4286.51 
hours in 2004, of which 76.48 percent of them were produced domestically. 
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Table 3 
Total duration proportions of different programmed categories on TV 4, in 2004 
Programmes Categories Duration (hour) Percentage in Total 
Sport and Entertainment 9.15 0.4 
Common Knowledge 458.3 19.88 
Iran, Iraq War 4.14 0.18 
Cultural 384.53 16.72 
Science and Technology 258.43 11.23 
Economic 39.16 13.27 
Political 305.43 13.27 
Historical 4.56 0.21 
Social 143.39 6.24 
Islamic Education 694.52 30.17 
Total 2303.33 100 
Source: IRIB, Centre for Social Research, 2004. 
The government has expanded its news sources to cover news happening inside and 
outside the country. This policy, as an infrastructural goal, is presented in the 
performance of IRIB in news contribution and broadcast. IRIB's Central News 
Bureau gathers news from inside the country and all around the world, mainly through 
different sources such as communication satellites, foreign press, and IRIB's bureaus 
overseas. 
TV channels have increased their news broadcasts by 19.7 percent in 2001 compared 
to the previous year's figure. Moreover, domestically-aired news programmes 
amounted to 60 percent, from which 29 percent are broadcasted by the nation-wide 
networks and 31 percent by provincial networks. Also, in 2001, the total of 2008.36 
hours of news commentaries and political programmes were broadcasted on different 
IRIB Radio and TV networks. The below figures represent a concerted effort by the 
regime to display its political ideology by providing the Iranian audiences and 
international community with propaganda that reflects and defends the regime on 
different positions. 
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Table 4 
IRIB's News Broadcast Amount in 2000 and 2001 (in hours) 
Medium 2000 2001 Increase 
Percentage 
Radio 21384.55 24140.41 12.9 
Television 11152.19 13017.37 16.7 
Total 32537.14 37158.18 14.2 
3.6 Recent Developments 
Over 2003, various TV channels of IRIB produced 44395.06 and broadcasted 
109667.45 hours of programmes. Moreover, more than 83 percent of the productions 
aired on Iranian television channels were 
for domestic viewers while some 7409.44 
hours were produced for those living abroad. A more recent figure shows that 48 
percent of the total TV productions of 
IRIB in 2003 were produced by the provincial 
networks, 35 percent by the nation wide channels and 17 percent 
by Jaam-e-Jam and 
Sahar channels that are aired globally. 
By looking at the state's TV productions, it can be stated that over half of its 
programmes are 
informative and educational, 28.1 percent to guide and publicise, and 
21 percent to entertain. The subjects of these productions are mainly socio- 
ideological, sports and general knowledge and have been designed to portray the 
regime's point of view on every aspect and to 
influence audiences with their 
ideological, political and propagandistic messages. For the Iranian who live abroad as 
well as for foreign viewers, the state 
has expanded its service and has established a 
number of free-air satellite 
TV channels including Jame-Jam in Persian and Sahar in 
different languages of Arabic, Azeri, Kurdish, Bosnian, English, French, Turkish, and 
Urdu with 24 hours news and programmes for maximum propagandistic impact. 
In 2003, the Sahar Universal Network produced and/or imported 3339.11 hours of 
programmes in eight 
different languages. The productions of this network have been 
mainly informative on political and 
ideological themes. This network also aired 
8706.43 hours of broadcasting, 67 percent programmes, 23 percent news and 8 
percent trailer/commercials 
in 2003. 
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Table 5 
TV Production and Broadcasting Figures in 2002 and 2003 for Hour Duration 
Coverage Centre/networks Production Broadcast 
Nation- 2000 2001 2000 2001 
Wide Channel 1 4268.59 4458.08 8784.00 8760.00 
Channels Channel 2 2299.12 2234.55 7162.54 7339.16 
Channel 3 5043.46 4330.12 8731.33 8760.00 
Channel 4 1485.42 1405.22 4286.51 4246.10 
Channel Koran 1252.00 
News channel 1767.39 1964.27 6689.08 7485.03 
Total 14865.18 15645.04 35654.26 36590.29 
Provincial Channel Tehran 2004.51 2325.06 5203.47 5941.31 
Provincial 
Capitals 
15709.25 19015.12 31837.57 40909.02 
Total 17714.16 21340.18 37041.44 46850.34 
Global Jaam-e-Jam 3176.34 4070.33 17348.55 17520.00 
Sahar 2531.57 3339.11 7656.55 8706.43 
Total 5708.31 7409.44 25005.50 26226.43 
Grand 
Total 
38288.05 44395.06 97702.00 109667.46 
Source: IKit3 Annual iceporL, Lvu3. 
Over half of the TV productions made in recent years have been aimed at portraying 
the state's ideological values, 28 percent at guiding and publicising the state's 
developmental plans and reflecting its policies and its short and long-run programmes, 
and 21 percent at entertaining. On the whole, the themes of IRIB television 
production in recent years have mainly been socio-political (28 percent), sports and 
recreational (14 percent), ideological (16 percent), and cultural programmes (11 
percent). 
Table 6 shows the proportion and duration of different programmes in Iranian 
television in 2003. 
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Table 6 
Total Duration and Proportions of Different Programme Categories on TV in 
2003 
Coverage Centre/network Guiding 
And 
Publicizing 
Programmes 
(Hour) 
Informing 
And 
Socio- 
political 
Programmes 
(Hour) 
Entertaining 
Programmes 
(Hour) 
Total 
Nation- Channel 1 1647.15 2051.43 759.10 4458.08 
Wide Channel 2 604.16 1380.43 249.56 2234.55 
Channels Channel 3 759.34 1305.43 2264.55 4330.12 
Channel 4 202.00 1182.53 20.29 1405.22 
Channel Koran 1252.00 1252.00 
News Channel 86.29 1722.52 155.06 1964.27 
Total 4551.34 7643.54 3449.36 15645.04 
Provincial 
Channels 
Channel 
Tehran 
400.20 1422.28 502.18 2325.06 
Provincial 
Capitals 
6543.02 8178.19 4293.51 19015.12 
Total 6943.32 9600.47 4796.09 21340.18 
Global Jaam-e-Jam 721.38 2165.59 1182.56 4070.33 
Channels Sahar 280.03 3043.00 16.08 3339.11 
Total 1001.41 5209.59 1199.04 7409.44 
Grand 
Total 
12496.37 22453.40 9444.49 44395.06 
Source: IRIB, Annual Keport, ZUU3. 
In Iran children and young adults make up one-fourth of the population. That is why 
IRIB's has targeted this age-group of the population with a total of 6988.47 hours 
programmes, which mainly aims to educate them within the ideological and socio- 
cultural structure of the regime. 
The major themes of these productions have been 
socio-ideological (36 percent), cultural 
(33 percent), sports and recreations (11 
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percent), and general knowledge (10 percent). Moreover, 54 percent of the 
productions have been domestic and 46 percent foreign-made. 
Table 7 
Productions for Children and Young Adults in 2002 and 2003 in Hours 
Medium Year 2000 (Hour) Year 2001 (Hour) 
Radio 3743.27 3896.36 
Television 2548.28 3092.11 
Grand Total 6291.55 6988.47 
source: 1KW t11111Um r. pVll, LVV. ý. 
The impact of television as the most popular and cheapest means of entertainment and 
information is likely to be much greater than that of any other medium in Iran. 
Therefore, the regime is well aware of the value and possible effects of its 
propagandistic potential. In this respect the regime has tried to improve IRIS 
technical capabilities in planning and expansion, as well as in TV productions. 
Table 8 
Number of Radio and Television Transmitters in 2003 
Coverage Type Stations Transmitters 
Short Wave (SW), Radio 5 34 
Medium Wave (MW), 92 224 
Radio 
Frequency Modulation 639 926 
(FM) 
Television 3546 7509 
Source: mu) 5 tUJUlual 1. Vpui L, LV VJ. 
The government, in order to expand its control over the media, has established a 
specific university to train the manpower and technical staff for TV and radio. This 
organisation has enrolled a substantial number of students, all of who have undergone 
a severe examination process to ensure their ideological and political point of views. 
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The college of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting is a higher educational 
institution aiming at training specialists in technical, production and artistic fields. 
3.7 Legal Framework of IRIB 
The legal framework of Iranian television has always been drawn by the 
relationship between the broadcasting organisation and the state. At the beginning of 
the emergence of television in Iran, although television broadcasting was franchised 
to a private company between 1958 and 1966, direct government control was 
maintained in 1971 when Iranian television was nationalised by the Shah regime. 
After the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979, the National Iranian 
Radio and Television was replaced by the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting 
(IRIB). According to Article 175 of the Constitutional Law, IRIB is directly 
controlled and responsive to the three Judiciary, Legislative and Executive powers. 
Hence, under the law passed on 29`h of December, 1980 through the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly, a representative from each of the three powers administers its 
organisation, acting as 
Supervising Councils. This council also elects a fourth person 
as the Managing Director. 
The latter is directly in charge of the current affairs of the 
organisation and the execution of the 
decisions made by the Supervising Council. In 
the 1990's, the revised and supplementary constitution adopted that IRIB would 
remain under the supervision of the 
Supervising Council and the power of the Leader 
of the Revolution to appoint the 
director of the organisatio. Also all newspapers, 
magazines, and cinemas are regulated and 
in some cases licensed through the 
Ministry of Culture and Guidance. 
IRIB, with its current structure, has been under the direct control of the state. Putting 
the corporation under the control of the Supervising Council meant that IRIB could be 
brought under the hierarchical controls of the government without serious 
constitutional reservations. 
Moreover, the existence of this council does not guarantee 
the principle of independency and 
impartiality because in fact, the selection of the 
members and the other administrative 
bodies of the IRIB is totally dependent upon the 
decisions of ruling circle. The members of the Council cannot therefore be expected 
to reflect the pluralism of political 
ideas and alternative views in the country as a 
whole. The administration of 
IRIB appears to approve the decisions of the Velayat 
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Faqih and conservative party. It is debatable whether IRIB is able to become an 
organisation which meets the various needs and interests of the Iranian public equally 
and accurately. In order to reach that level of equality and accuracy, IRIB needs to be 
in an autonomous body free from any direct government control. 
3.8 Transfer of Technology 
At the beginning of the establishment of television and radio broadcasting in 
1958, the broadcasting corporation purchased nearly 90 percent of its equipment from 
developed countries. As with transmission and production technology, television 
reception technology was predominantly imported from developed countries. In the 
late 1960's and early 1970's the domestic production of receivers was founded. 
However, local production came mainly from assembly plants reliant upon on 
imported parts. Therefore, Iran shared the same fate as other technologically 
dependent countries. Also the distribution of television sets was concentrated in the 
metropolitan centres and the availability of transmission was very low in distant areas. 
In sum, three complementary and connected phases enabled the realisation of the 
transfer of broadcasting technology. First, the transfer of transmission and production 
equipment and the training of the personnel; secondly, the direct importation of 
television sets to meet consumer demands, and finally, the establishment of assembly 
plants for television receivers as a substitute for direct importation. 
After the revolution, IRIB's reliance on technologically advanced countries has 
continued in one 
form or another as the country still imports broadcasting 
technologies and maintenance equipment from developed countries. 
3.9 Transfer of Programmes 
As it has been mentioned before in relation to the establishment of Iranian 
radio and television, when broadcasting technology was transferred from the West, 
NIRT's programming policy also appeared to be characterised by the importing of 
Western, and especially American, programmes. Although some domestic 
programmes were made, they were nonetheless based on Western formats and 
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contents. In the meantime, Iranian television viewers were exposed to an increasing 
number of Western and American programmes. After the revolution IRIB tried to 
increase its domestic productions. The most recent IRIB annual report shows an 
increase in the production of domestic programmes including drama, series, cultural, 
and entertainment programmes. Table below shows the total duration and proportion 
of domestic produced programmes in different IRIB television channels in 1998 and 
1999. 
Table 9 
Total Duration and Proportion of Domestic Produced Programmes in different 
IRIB Television Channels in 1998-1999 
Television Amount Total Amount Percentage of 
Channels (hour) in Percentage (hour) in increase/decrease 
1999 1998 Between 1998- 
1999 
Channel 1 3583.34 12 3171.23 +13 
Channel2 2341.53 8 2542.25 -8 
Channel3 433339 14 3914.44 +11 
Channel4 1264.30 4 1580.59 -20 
Channel 1979.0 6 1714.35 +15 
Tehran 
Jaam-e-Jam 2231.04 7 1450.16 +54 
Universal 
network 
Total 15733.40 51 14374.22 +10 
Provincials 12766.40.50 42 11081.43 +15 
Capitals 
Total 28500.20.50 93 25456.05 +12 
Sahar 2170.45 7 1773.11 +22 
Universal 
network 
Grand Total 30671.05.50 100 27229.16 +13 
Source: Huts Annuai repon, wvi. 
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The programme structure of IRIB Television in 2000 illustrates that 89 percent of the 
amount of total transmission hours are domestically produced programmes. On the 
other hand, 11 percent of IRIB broadcasted programmes were from imported 
programmes. 
Table 10 
Total Duration and Proportion of both Domestic and Foreign Programmes of 
IRIB Television Channels in 2003 
Television Domestic Foreign Total (hour) 
Channels Programmes Programmes 
(hour) (hour) 
Channell 7572.43.00 1187.17.00 8760.00.00 
Channel2 6197.34.00 1141.42.00 7339.16.00 
Channel3 6010.06.15 2749.53.45 8760.00.00 
Channe14 4246.10.00 - 4246.10.00 
Channel Tehran 5281.23.17 660.6.49 5941.30.06 
Jaam-e-Jam 8760.00 - 8760.00 
Universal network 
for Europe 
Jaam-e-Jam 8737.48.00 22.12.00 8760.00 
Universal network 
for America 
------------- Total 46805.44.32 5761.11.34 52566.56.06 
Source: IRIB Annual Keport, zuui. 
The current television programmes can be categorised as follows: 
1- Ideological, educational and cultural programmes. 
2- Serials. 
3- Documentaries programmes, which aims primarily to portray the regime's 
views on political, economic, scientific, cultural and social matters, history 
and special national and religious events and ceremonies etc. 
4- Children's programmes. 
5- Sports and entertainment programmes. 
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6- Islamic education. 
7- Cultural programmes. 
8- Dramas, which are usually produced as theatrical plays or serials. 
Regarding programme-making policy, political, social and cultural factors all very 
much affect the nature of programmes in Iran and strict policies are adapted to the 
content, types and time devoted to them. The contents of local products and imported 
programmes are subject to strict guidelines and censorship. All local products are seen 
as having to reflect the ideological and political philosophy of the government. In 
order to implement the ideological and political philosophy of the regime, a policy has 
been adopted in order to supervise the content of programmes and a censorship 
department has been established to monitor all programmes before telecasting. In this 
respect, the programme content is monitored carefully to ensure that it conforms to 
the political and ideological morality of the state. The domestic television products 
have a high content of religious, political and cultural nature, establishing a trend 
towards an imposition of a very strict condition. This has resulted in the total control 
of the government over the content of the programmes. The content of all domestic 
and foreign television programmes undergoes a severe content censorship process. 
Some of the basic adopted policies for censorship, according to IRIB's regulation 
policy, are as follows: 
" Any Islamic, political, and socio-cultural content that contradicts the presented 
ideological beliefs by the ruling class and the conservative leadership 
" Materials that expose the state of any wrongdoing or question government policy 
" Woman who appear 
in athletic games or sports 
" Women who appear indecently dressed and in dance scenes 
" Scenes which arouse sexual excitement 
" Derogatory references to the Religion 
" References to betting, gambling or alcoholic drinks 
" Excessive violence 
3.10 Conclusion 
The main objective of this chapter was to examine the historical and the 
current television industry in Iran and identify the internal elements that interact with 
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external forces of cultural Imperialism in shaping the socio-cultural patterns of the 
country. Another objective of this chapter was to demonstrate the dependency of 
Iranian television on foreign broadcasting technologies and programmes both before 
and after the 1979 Revolution. 
The examination of Iranian television before the revolution clearly reveals a pattern of 
media dependency on broadcasting technology and the cultural products of the U. S. 
and a few other developed countries. The industrialisation of society which began in 
Reza Shah's regime and was continued by Mohammed Reza Shah, encouraged the 
Westernisation of thought and lifestyle, especially through media production and 
television programmes, which not only loosened traditional values but also reinforced 
and sustained the cultural imperialism process. 
After the 1979 Revolution although some developments in the technical infrastructure 
of television have been made, Iran still is dependent on developing countries for its 
broadcasting technology. There have been great improvements in the production of 
domestic programmes however; their content does not seem to meet the viewers' 
needs and wants. In TV programmes, emphasis is placed on religious and political 
content in order to meet broadcasting criteria and satisfy the government. The 
adaptation of a strict censorship policy in Iranian television seems to be one of the 
crucial factors that had 
driven the viewers towards satellite and video for their main 
source of entertainment and news. Television in Iran has always acted as a 
government-owned propaganda vehicle that works to homogenise public opinion and 
sustains the status quo. The 
law in Iran does not allow private ownership of broadcast 
media. The Iranian government 
has considered the media in general and the broadcast 
media in particular, as sovereignty-establishing sources that work to enhance the 
government's rule and control rather than to serve the public. In other words, 
broadcast media in Iran is considered as a tool to relay messages from the government 
to the people and therefore, private ownership of such tools has insofar been denied 
and is considered a potential threat to the national security and national sovereignty 
principles. These internal 
laws prohibiting private ownership of broadcast media 
inside the country have led private investors, mainly from Iranian political exiles, to 
establish such organisations outside 
Iran. As Barraclough points out, television in Iran 
"is cast in the role of a disseminator of pro-government views" and "as long as this 
practice endures, satellite television will continue to have an inordinately important 
role not only in broadcasting, 
but in other issues pertaining to the public life of the 
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country" (Barraclough, 2001, p. 25). It seems that the regime's direct effort to 
implement its ideological and political perception- through television programmes, 
along with the strict control and censorship that apply to the content of news, are 
among the main factors that have driven people towards obtaining foreign news and 
cultural products via satellite. This effort by the regime seems to work as an internal 
factor which has accelerated the process of cultural imperialism. Next chapter will 
address the satellite televisions broadcast to Iran and through investigating the 
political propaganda; it will try to examine the relationship between international 
politics and international satellite broadcasting. It will focus on the activities of the 
jaam-e-Jam expatriate satellite television and the Voice of America and their 
relationship to propaganda. 
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Chapter Four 
Whose System, Whose Culture? 
4.1 Introduction 
As it was examined in chapter one, the cultural imperialism perspective argues 
that the media operates within a single world market that is organised by a small 
number of transnational corporations mainly 
from the United States and the West. For 
these transnational conglomerates, economic considerations are the primary 
determinants in what meanings get produced and distributed on a global scale. In this 
sense, media products are not only 
informational but also ideological in that they 
promote the values and artefacts of 
the capitalist system. However, as it was 
mentioned in chapter one, 
this approach seems to stress the economic realm at the 
expense of the political sphere. 
It appears that the cultural imperialism argument tends 
to overestimate the economic 
factors of global conglomerates and undermines the 
political power of state 
in the process of cultural transfer. It does not seem to actively 
acknowledge the 
important role of political power as a force behind cultural 
imperialism. The U. S. 's leading position in the transfer of cultural sales throughout 
the world through its economic and political power seem to 
indicate a meaningful and 
complex relationship 
between economic, cultural, and political powers in the process 
of cultural 
imperialism. Basically, with the Cold War and the expansion of a 
governmental apparatus 
for spreading American culture, the process of cultural 
imperialism becomes more complicated. It seems that economic success and political 
power have 
been deployed in the battle for the hearts and minds of individuals around 
the world. The study of consumption propaganda suggests that economic 
achievements were seen 
in cultural terms. Through investigating the political 
propaganda, this chapter 
tries to examine the relationship between international 
politics and international satellite 
broadcasting. In order to achieve this objective this 
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chapter will focus on the activities of the Jaam-e-Jam expatriate satellite television 
and the Voice of America and their relationship to propaganda. The following section 
will discuss propaganda and its definition in the context of imperialism. 
4.2 Propaganda and Cultural Imperialism 
The emergence of new communication technologies has opened up new 
opportunities for propaganda. Jowett and O'Donnell define propaganda as the 
"deliberate systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct 
behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist" 
(Jowett and O'Donnell, 2006, p. 7). Pratkanis also described the function of 
propaganda as "attempts to move a recipient to a predetermined point of view by 
using simple images and slogans that truncate thought by playing on prejudices and 
emotions" (Pratkanis and 
Turner, 1996, p. 190). Propaganda is a highly emotive, often 
ambiguous subject with many volumes already 
devoted to its understanding. As used 
in this study, propaganda refers to the attempt by the sender to influence its audience 
to act or think in ways conducive to the interests of the source. Alternatively, 
propaganda may reinforce existing convictions and attitudes, again conforming to the 
interests of the transmitting station. The success of this is not coincidental; if 
international broadcasts are politically motivated, their content and style will then be 
the result of extensive research 
into the target audience. This thesis, in the relevant 
chapter, will 
demonstrate that for example, during the field study people's 
dissatisfaction with the regime's economic system was the primary focus of attention 
for the studied broadcasting stations. 
Such a definition of propaganda was readily accepted by Robert Holt, who believed 
that the basic purpose of the 
United States Information Agency (USIA), the parent 
agency of the 
Voice of America, was `to spread a proper image of the U. S. ', `express 
a point of view', or 
to make the meaning of our actions unmistakably clear to citizens 
and leaders in other countries' 
(Holt, in Whitton, 1984, p. 44). Parenti also stressed 
that , to the American public and 
to the world ... U. S. policy has been represented in 
the most glowing -and most 
deceptive- terms. Peace, prosperity, and democracy have 
become coded propaganda terms" (In Snow, 1998, p. 10). Jowett and O'Donnell 
described the main purpose of propaganda as to "achieve acceptance of the 
101 
propagandist's ideology by people" (Jowett and O'Donnell, 2006, p. 272). They 
asserted that: 
"When the use of propaganda emphasizes purpose, the term is associated 
with control and is regarded as a deliberate attempt to alter or maintain a 
balance of power that is advantageous to the propagandist. Deliberate 
attempt is linked with a clear institutional ideology and objective. In 
fact, the purpose of propaganda is to send out an ideology to an audience 
with a related objective" (Jowett and O'Donnell, 2006, p. 3). 
Their examination of propaganda as a purposeful and ideological method of influence 
highlights the relationship between journalism and propaganda. In this way, cultural 
imperialism can be considered as the end result of propaganda. The ability of 
propaganda to actually change 
beliefs, attitudes and value systems is questionable 
since the manipulation of opinions, attitudes and understanding 
is not easily 
quantified. What 
is certain is that to be effective, the targeted audience must first be 
vulnerable to a message - either positive about 
the source or negative about the target 
- such as, 
for example, being politically alienated from a particular regime. This, in 
turn, motivates them to seek out 
foreign propaganda which reinforces their 
convictions. 
Lester Markel, writing in 1958 
for the New York Times Magazine, ascribed to 
propaganda a neutral status, 
describing it as `a method, a technique, neither moral nor 
immoral with indispensable uses 
if employed skilfully and for good ends' (Markel, 
1958, p. 46). In contrast, the French sociologist, Jacques Ellul, judged transnational 
propaganda to 
be exclusively a weapon of war, one which actually helped to sustain 
the Cold War as a permanent and endemic state. 
Ellul published his thesis in 1965 
therefore his perception of propaganda as an 
instrument of conflict is contextualised 
by the period he had experienced. 
So while his rejection of the neutrality of 
propaganda 
is contestable, Ellul offered some pertinent comments on `democratic 
propaganda' which 
he described as `ineffectual': 
"Precisely to the extent that the propagandist retains his respect for the individual 
denies himself the very penetration that 
is the ultimate aim of propaganda; that of 
provoking action without prior 
thought. By respecting nuances he neglects the major 
law of propaganda; every assertion must 
be trenchant and total. To the extent that he 
remains partial, 
he fails to use the mystique. But that mystique is indispensable for 
well-made propaganda. 
To the extent that a democratic propagandist has a bad 
conscience he cannot 
do good work" (Ellul, 1965, pp. 240-241). 
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K. J Holsti described the motive of propaganda as stimulating support and action, but 
asserted that the key to this is how the source of information is evaluated by the 
audience. The higher the evaluation, the more 
likely it is that the described objectives 
of the propaganda will be realised. 
In this context Holsti believed the BBC to be the 
most respected and trusted of 
international broadcasting stations (Holsti, cit, Ellul, 
1965, pp. 196-7). However, this raises some questions concerning the genuine 
complexion of the BBC, since such a progression of thought 
leads to the conclusion 
that the BBC is engaged in indirect propaganda. If it is the most effective in the terms 
established by Holsti, 
it follows that it will then be the most successful in its 
propaganda activities, which contradicts 
Ellul's criticisms of `democratic 
propaganda'. In this method what matters 
is the appearance of objectivity. Pratkanis 
and Turner similarly to 
Ellul's, stated that "the volume and sophistication of the new 
propaganda is so vast, and growing, 
that we increasingly take it for granted as natural 
and, thereby, we 
find it exceedingly difficult to distinguish what is propaganda from 
what is not" (Pratkanis and 
Turner, 1996, p. 16). In other words, credibility, balance 
and truth are used to sell a political message 
in much the same way as one would use 
overt propaganda techniques. 
For the propagandist the most advantageous feature of 
operating in this way 
is that it can neither be proved nor disproved as being 
propaganda. 
For these reasons - its function to manipulate, if not change opinions; the subtle way 
it is often used; and, of course, 
its ability to permeate international boundaries - 
controlling the 
flow of propaganda has been an anxiety for practitioners of 
international relations. The first attempt to establish the ground-rules by which the 
content of broadcasts could 
be regulated was made by League of Nations, whose 
members were encouraged 
to use radio for peaceful means, or in its own words, to 
`create better mutual understanding 
between peoples' (quoted in Philip M. Taylor, 
1981, p. 190). To this end the 
league formulated in 1936 at an International 
Convention concerning the use of 
Broadcasting in the cause of peace. This bound its 
signatories to prevent 
the transmission of material, "which to the detriment of good 
international understanding, 
is of such a character as to incite the population of any 
territory to acts incompatible with 
the internal order or the security of a territory of a 
High Contracting Party" 
(quoted in Taylor, 19881, p. 190). This was certainly a grand 
objective. The problem, 
however, was that only three great powers agreed to be 
signatories - Britain, 
France and the Soviet Union. 
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After WWII, another attempt was made to control international propaganda. In this 
quest for a peaceful world order, the Charter of the United Nations decrees `refrain 
from spreading subversive propaganda hostile to the government of a foreign country 
in times of peace to be a state's legal duty' (Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, 
Paragraph 4). In addition, the General Assembly adopted in 1949 the so-called 
`Essentials for Peace' Resolution, which called on all nations "to refrain from any 
threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or 
integrity of any state, or at fomenting civil strife and vetting the will of the people in 
any state" (Charter of the 
United Nations, Resolution 290). Regarding these 
statements Gerhard von 
Glahn (1967) wrote that hostile or provocative propaganda is 
a violation of territorial sovereignty. 
Under such conditions, he asserted, "an 
international delinquency has taken place and the activities of the interfering state 
must be regarded as 
being violation of international law" (von Glahn, 1967, p. 119). 
He added, however, that the various UN resolutions and provisions on propaganda 
and incitement 
have either `condemned' or `called for', and have thus avoided 
framing their wishes in strict prohibitory language (von Glahn, 1967, p. 132). In other 
words, propaganda and 
incitement have not been completely outlawed, but instead 
their regulation has been placed at the 
discretion of the individual member states 
themselves; they are not enforceable 
by the collective will of the UN. This reflects the 
inefficiency that has characterised both the League of Nations and the UN and 
practices that 
have guided their activities, as well as alludes to possible explanations 
for their failure to regulate the flow of international propaganda. Despite assertions to 
the contrary, self-interest 
is important in international politics. When states considered 
the League or UN to be operating 
in their favour they would gladly work through 
their framework, but readily 
ignored it when it suited them to do so. Now when they 
wish to object to 
broadcasts targeted at them, states have a whole body of 
international legislation they can refer to. For example, should they wish to declare 
the legality of the 
free flow of information across international frontiers, they can cite 
the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948), the decisions of the International 
Telecommunications Union, and the 
Helsinki Accords (quoted in Browne, 1982, 
p. 24). In short a state can 
find in international law whatever it may require to justify 
its actions, and this 
has often happened in practice. During the 1950's, the U. S. 
invoked the Declaration of Human Rights when it appealed to the UN against the 
Soviet jamming of the Voice of 
America. But the Soviet Union also protested against 
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American broadcasts, referring to both a 1936 Geneva resolution and Resolution 841 
passed by the UN General Assembly in 1954, which condemned broadcasts designed 
to "incite the population of any territory to acts incompatible with internal order" (in 
Erik Barnouw, 1970, p. 121). 
Such legal ambiguity has inevitably promoted states to find other means of controlling 
the flow of propaganda, with jamming of incoming signals being the most common. 
This, as it will be discussed in the relevant chapters of this thesis, is recognised and 
applied by the U. S. and some of the 
Iranian expatriate satellite televisions in their 
propaganda war against the 
Iranian regime. In addition to conducting an intensive 
propaganda effort themselves, 
the U. S. and a number of the expatriate satellite 
television persuaded a number of students 
in Iran to mount their own campaign, 
protesting against the regime. 
Yet despite all of these problems associated with the control of international 
propaganda, broadcasting remains a most powerful medium 
in transferring culture 
and ideology, which 
in turns remains the key instrument of cultural imperialism. So 
many of the 
broadcasts quoted in this thesis (in chapters six and seven), can be 
labelled propaganda, however, the line between what is and what is not propaganda is 
a very fine one 
indeed and is largely academic; determining criteria are often 
subjective and 
inevitably clouded by one's own political colouring. Moreover they are 
wholly dependent on 
both the intention of the broadcaster and the interpretation of the 
message by the recipient. 
This is vividly demonstrated by the Iran's nuclear crises 
when repeated threats were 
broadcasted about the imminence danger of developing 
atomic bomb 
by Iran. Whether these are intended merely as propaganda or are 
intended to be serious threats that are supported 
by a political willingness to carry 
them out is a subject 
for debate is addressed in the relevant chapters of this thesis. 
Therefore, in order that the 
broad objectives of this study may be achieved, the 
following will focus on (i) the 
Jaam-e-Jam expatriate satellite television and the Voice 
of America, 
(ii) their relationship to propaganda, (iii) and how this combination works 
as an instrument of cultural 
imperialism. 
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4.3 Satellite-Televisions Broadcast to Iran 
The historical debates on the unbalanced international news flow, the 
innovation of satellite technology and satellite television, stems from the fear of 
`cultural imperialism' through its media contents. This was due to the apprehension 
that the audience would gradually lose their cultural identity due to prolonged and 
unmatched exposure to primarily 
Western media. Also the growing fear of the 
governments of losing their propagate power 
in the ever-growing media competitions 
have been among the reasons for launching more `Geolinguistic' satellite television 
channels among some 
Third World countries such as `MBC' in the Arab world and 
Globo in the Latin America. However, in some countries, such as Iran, the trade and 
usage of satellite 
dishes has been prohibited. Attempts to block the flow of 
international and mainly Western cultural and political programmes brought in by 
technological developments 
in satellites are rather futile, and the Iranian government 
has tried to block this flow by prohibiting the sale of reception dishes. But the current 
situation in Iran proves 
that prohibition, on the one hand, is very difficult and costly 
and on the other 
hand; the restrictions have somehow promoted satellite viewing 
amongst the people, especially amongst 
the younger generation who are "fed up with 
constant diet of religious sermon 
and homily in Islamic Republic" (Mohammadi, 
2002, P. 31). 
Basically, cable and satellite technologies 
became available to Western societies as 
early as the 
1970's but Iranian households were introduced to these technologies in 
the early 1990's. 
The recent expansion in the television entertainment and news 
industries in many developing countries 
like Iran has created a new regional 
dimension to news and entertainment values. 
It has been more than a decade since 
Iranian viewers were first able to receive 
directly at home international television 
programme transmission 
that was not intercepted or controlled by their government. 
The introduction of the 
Direct Broadcast Satellites (DBSs) and Direct-To-Home 
satellite (DTHs) 
into the country has opened a controversially new international 
television window to 
Iranian viewers, exposing them to different cultural settings and 
values, also offering 
them news and entertainment that is not controlled by the state. 
As it was discussed in previous chapter, 
the regime's direct effort to implement its 
ideological and political perception 
through television programmes, along with the 
strict control and censorship 
that apply to the content of news, are among the main 
106 
factors that have driven people towards obtaining foreign news and cultural products 
via satellite. The past few years 
have witnessed a rapid parting from local and 
distinctive culture and great transformation in the consumption habits of the Iranian 
viewers through the repetitive waves of commercials and cultural commodities 
due to 
exposure to satellite programming. 
Mohammadi states that: 
"as a consequence of the bankruptcy of cultural policy on the one hand, and 
boring and monotonous domestic programming on the other, people from all 
walks of life have become the victims of smugglers, paying high prices.. . to 
have access to programmes such as Baywatch, Neighbours and a few talk 
shows" (Mohammadi, 2003, P. 3 1). 
Given the dull programmes and biased nature of the state television news and despite 
the state's harsh restrictions, people continue to watch satellite programmes, 
especially Persian 
language satellite broadcasts. It is very hard to provide accurate 
statistics of satellite reception 
dishes currently available in Iran mainly because the 
governmental 
ban on possessing and viewing satellite has caused people to hide their 
reception dishes. 
Also the rapid increase in the numbers of satellite reception dishes 
makes any statistical 
figure seem obsolete. A recent estimation declared that "there 
are over two million pirate satellite receivers 
throughout Iran" (Mohammadi, 2003, 
P. 31), though unofficial 
figures show a huge increase in the numbers of satellite 
reception dishes even 
in rural areas of the country. These figures now estimate that 
between 40 to 60 per cent of 
Iranian households have accesses to satellite television. 
As it was mentioned in a previous chapter, media 
in Iran has always been considered 
as government-owned propaganda 
vehicles that worked to homogenise public opinion 
and sustain the status quo. 
The law in Iran does not allow for private ownership of 
broadcast media. These 
internal laws prohibiting private ownership of broadcast 
media inside the country 
have led private investors, mainly from Iranian political 
exiles, to establish such 
organisations outside Iran and mainly in the United States. In 
1994, the Interior Ministry 
declared satellite dishes illegal and the law banning 
satellite dishes was put 
into effect by 1995. In January 2003, the Guardians Council, 
which must approve all 
legislation on constitutional and Islamic grounds, rejected the 
legislature that would legalise private ownership of satellite receiving equipment. The 
legislature was approved and supported 
by the majority of parliamentarians in 
December 2002. 
During the last few years, along the 
lines of CNN, Euronews, and some other 
hundreds of satellite channels available 
in Iran, some Iranian language television 
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stations were launched providing entertainment and news content. As of this writing 
(2005), 21 Persian satellite channels are in operation, of which 19 of them are based 
in the United States. The U. S. based channels are Appadana International, Rang-a- 
Rang, Jaam-e-Jam International, Pars TV, Tapesh TV, IPN (International Persian 
Network or Tamasha), ITV (Iran TV), Channel One, Melli TV, Azadi TV, NITV 
(National Iranian Television), AFN Farsi Net (American Farsi Net link), Lahse TV, 
ICC, Omid-e Iran, Didar TV, and VOA. All of these stations transmit their signals 
from the United States. PEN TV is based in Germany and PMC (Persian Music 
Company), transmits its signal from Dubai. VOA is a Persian-language television 
satellite channel of Voice of America which was launched in 2003 and is operated by 
the U. S. government. The rest of above channels are all privately owned channels that 
are operated mainly by 
Iranian political exiles. 
According to the researcher's observation, all U. S. -based satellite channels broadcast 
their programmes live for 12 hours. The live broadcasts are recorded and are then 
repeated for another 
12 hours, therefore qualifying them as 24-hour broadcast 
channels. To categorise the existing satellite channels, they seem to fall mainly within 
three different categories: six of them, including NITV, Azadi TV, Pars TV, Channel 
One, Melli TV, and Jaam-e-Jam International, all basically seem to be in favour of the 
monarchy in Iran. 
Eight of them namely, Tapesh, PEN TV, Didar TV, ICC, Iran TV, 
pMC (Persian Music Channel), Lahse TV, and IPN, are commercial. Rang-A-Rang 
tends to challenge the monarchists, and finally, Appadana and AFN TV (American 
Farsi Net link) are commercial-political operations. However, most of them oppose 
the clerical regime in Iran and some of them such as Azadi and NITV are quite 
forceful in this. It appears that all of those channels, except Azadi, air a significant 
number of commercials and 
this includes Lahse TV, which is basically a 24-hour 
home shopping channel that features music as well. Due to the ever-growing 
popularity of satellite 
TV viewing in Iran, the state has been trying to electronically 
disturb the signals, which have reportedly caused interference in the country's 
telecommunication networks. 
Currently, numerous radios, TV, and satellite signals that originated from United 
States and other countries around the world have occupied Iran's air space. At the 
moment there are around 
20 Persian exile radio stations that are not affiliated with the 
government, including 
the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), China Radio 
International, Deutsch Welle, Kol Yisrael (voice of Israel), NHK Radio Japan, Radio 
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Farda, Radio France International, Voice of America, and voice of Russia all 
broadcasted in Persian to Iran. For instance, in December 2002, Radio Farda (Radio 
Tomorrow), financed by the U. S. government, inaugurated its 24-hour music and 
news programming in Persian aimed at the youth, which apparently 
has been 
successful in capturing the attention of a sizeable audience 
in Iran. These radio 
stations, alongside television satellite channels, offer a mixture of news and 
entertainment programmes with 
different degrees of political involvement. The 
Iranian government blamed these exile Iranian satellite channels for the student's 
antigovernment demonstrations 
in June 2003 and for encouraging Iranian people to 
rise up against the clerical regime. 
Therefore, the government has tried to jam several 
Persian-speaking satellite TV channels including Pars TV, Azadi TV, VOA, and 
NITV, by transmitting powerful jamming signals. 
Although these satellite TV channels have the potential to facilitate constructive 
dialogue and enhance the viewers' knowledge and awareness, as well as protect the 
cultural heritage of 
Iran, my observation of their programmes indicates that this is 
something yet to 
be achieved. It is obvious that broadcasting is a very expensive, 
competitive and time-consuming 
business. None of these Iranian satellite channels 
clearly state their 
finances; even on their website there is no information about their 
sources of 
income, mission, philosophy, or affiliation. However, on the air, a few 
channels claim to 
be totally supported through private and public funds as donations 
or contributions. 
But the owners and operators of the channels sometimes accuse one 
another of having ties and/or 
being supported by the CIA, Reza Pahlavi, or even the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. 
On the web site of VOA, it 
is clearly stated that it "is a service of U. S. International 
Broadcasting, which is funded 
by the United States congress and operated by the 
Broadcasting Board of 
Governors (BBG), an agency of the U. S. government". 
Moreover, in 2003 abcnews. com reported that "following a demonstration of Iranian- 
Americans in Washington, 
D. C., Senator Sam Brownback addressed the gathering 
and expressed 
his support for `young people fighting the mullah minority'. He 
previously had proposed 
the Iran Democracy Act, with a $50 million grant to promote 
democracy in Iran and 
fund Iranian opposition groups abroad. He stressed that, 
similar in scope to the 
Iraq Liberation Act passed by U. S. Congress in 1998, the Iran 
Democracy Act would make regime change 
in Iran the official U. S. policy and 
provide funds 
to expand pro-democracy broadcasting into Iran" 
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(http: //abcnews. go. com). This demonstrates the active role played by the U. S. 
government in transmitting cultural values and political intentions through cultural 
products and propaganda. In addition although, satellite TV owners have not clearly 
and openly revealed their financial resources, considering the fact that those channels 
played a crucial role in the student's demonstration in July 2003, and that some 
members of US government were advocates for regime change in Iran, many 
suspicions have been aroused about sources of these channels finances. 
In any enterprise the financiers influence the overall agenda of a given entity, 
including radio, television, newspaper, or magazine. Therefore, it raises the question: 
to what extent can private and/or government funded broadcast operations serve 
viewers' interests through unbiased, balanced and multifaceted programmes? And to 
what extent can the Iranian satellite channels practice and tolerate democracy and 
freedom by respecting the rights of their competitors and viewers opinions? 
Generally speaking, Iranian satellite TV channels have the potential to be an open 
medium for the Iranian audience. They certainly have the potential to inform, 
entertain, educate and serve 
Iranians throughout the world. However, their routine 
programmes indicate that satellite TV owners and operators lack the clear vision and 
professional skills to 
do so. These channels instead of focusing on the contents, scope, 
and quality of programmes, seem to focus on quantity. Considering budget 
restrictions and the 
limitated production facilities and expertise, they could do much 
better. Generally, the programmes shown on Iranian satellite channels are more 
entertaining than 
informative and rather shallow in terms of meaningful content. The 
general patterns of their programmes consist of. 
" talking host and call-in programmes 
" Music videos 
" Panel discussions which normally 
involves two individuals 
Commercials 
" Movies 
" Selling Persian rugs and paintings 
Short sketches 
" News and information 
" Expert advice, involving physicians, realtors, and attorneys 
" Music and poetry 
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" Game shows 
In addition, however, there are a number of useful and informative programmes, but 
there is little, if any, educational programming for children and adolescents. 
Considering the political, cultural and economic realities of Iran and the history of its 
news and entertainment media 
(which was discussed in previous chapter), the 
followings aim at analysing the factors that affect the editorial policies and the actual 
practice of two of the Persian language satellite channels. It addresses these issues by 
studying the evolution, style of ownership, organisational structure, and editorial 
content as well as managerial power 
hierarchy of Jaam-e-Jam International and VOA, 
Persian TV service. 
Each of these Persian language channels: VOA and Jaam-E Jam International 
represent a different 
form of ownership, operational styles and organisational 
objectives. A closer 
look at their operations and their editorial content shows that their 
editorial and managerial conduct 
is not a straightforward reflection of their declared 
operational and ownership structures. 
The examination of the above channels shows that a mixture of political, cultural and 
economic pressures 
dominates the contents and editorial conduct of the two satellite 
channels. Political pressures, 
however, seem to be playing the most apparent role in 
that process. Although in each of these cases the political forces have proven to be 
more influential in shaping the way 
the stations function and address issues, the 
patterns and styles of 
influence appear to act differently in each case. 
4.4 Research Objectives 
Editorial managerial policies are supposed to reflect the types of forces that 
influence the conduct of media organisations, as well as their political, social and 
economic position within 
their media markets. Studying the editorial and managerial 
policies, therefore, would provide a clearer vision and understanding of the hidden 
pressures determining 
the editorial practices, hidden agenda, and aims and targets of 
certain organisations. 
Bourdieu sees an invisible political, economic and social censorship guiding the 
journalists and news business in general. He claims that it can be clearly seen "in the 
case of hiring for top positions" 
(Bourdieu, 1998, p. 15-16). The managers and 
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editorial decision-makers of any media organisation are usually hired either by the 
government, adopting its positions, or by the owner(s) to represent and consider their 
economic and political interests. This kind of pressure is experienced within the 
media regardless of the degree of autonomy, independence or impartiality they would 
claim. Utter independence from political, cultural or economic pressures is an almost 
impossible situation, but the extent to which these variables can pressure media 
institutions varies from one social and political setting to another. By examining the 
operations and strategies of these channels, as well as analysing sample content of 
their programmes, the following will examine the forces and pressures that shape their 
policies and control the editorial conduct and practices of these Persian language 
satellite channels. In the process of 
identifying these forces, the following issues also 
will be addressed: 
_ Tracing the political, cultural, and economic goals and objectives behind 
launching these channels. This could provide a deeper perspective of the 
operational policies and strategies. 
_ Understanding 
the operational and organisational structures of the channels, 
which will assist in establishing the power hierarchy and hence the decision- 
making process inside the channels. 
- Assessing the political and economic orientations of the channels and studying 
the type of programmes used and issues addressed in each of the channels. 
To address these issues, and because of the novelty of the studied channels, a 
combination of content analysis and 
discourse analysis will be applied. The channels 
studied are Jaam-E 
Jam International and VOA, which are based in the United States. 
4.5 Methodologies Applied 
For a single investigator with a limited period of time, a practical method to 
obtain a great 
deal of information is an interview where the individuals can be asked 
their opinions, questioned about their attitudes towards satellite channels and their 
evaluations and perceptions about 
the cultural impacts of satellite viewing. However, 
for the purposes of this research, a combination of focus groups, content analysis and 
discourse analysis will be applied. 
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1. Focus Group: 
For this investigation, which attempts to analyse the cultural impacts of satellite 
viewing, focus group discussion will be applied. 
2. Content Analysis: 
Content analysis will be applied to examine the general on-screen performance of 
each channel and to test if the kind of coverage patterns conform to the officially 
declared editorial policies. This analysis will also evaluate the programming contents 
in relation to cultural and political orientation. The recording schedules will be 
developed for non-participant observation. A composite week will be designed to 
cover the news programmes 
broadcasted in both stations between the period of April 
20,2004 and May 4,2004. The schedules will develop in a way that covers time 
stretches throughout the composite weeks 
in which samples from most features, 
current affairs and news oriented programmes. 
3. Discourse Analysis: 
News stories will also be analysed within a discourse analytic framework. The 
purpose of this analysis 
is to investigate the portrayed images and the language used 
in the reporting of crises in both stations. The intention of this investigation will be to 
examine the usage of 
language in recorded programmes and expose the underlying 
ideologies that produce them, and, within a discourse analytical framework, make 
those portrayed images explicit. 
4.6 Problems with Research 
This combination of three methodologies was chosen as the most appropriate 
approach to study 
the media and their effects. Trying to assess the managerial and 
editorial conduct and practice 
of the two channels has proved to be a rather 
complicated procedure. 
In some cases, there is not any written editorial policy to start 
with and operations mainly seem 
to follow an unwritten common agreement or 
guidelines that would conform 
to the general orientation of the management of the 
channels. It 
is up to the researcher, therefore, to examine the actual operational 
policies or guidelines on one 
hand, and the variations between policy and practice on 
the other. These deductions are 
based on the research and observations of the 
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mentioned satellite channels. In addition, content analysis will be used to deduce 
those results about realities of editorial content and policies in both channels. 
4.7 News and Entertainment of Satellite Television in Iran 
Several cultural and social scholars consider the presence of transnational 
television services as a self-defence mechanism against what is known as cultural 
imperialism from the West. Setareh Ghaffari-Farhangi discusses the importance of the 
presence of broadcast channels that address audiences that share a similar cultural 
background from a religious point of view. According to her, these channels provide 
appropriate cultural vehicles to the 
Muslim population in the West. 
Ghaffari-Farhangi argues that: 
"Various cultural areas of the Muslim world (Persian, Arab, Turkish, Malaysia 
etc. ) are perfectly capable of taking over a part of this gigantic market of 
cultural products... It must be recalled that during the era when only major 
press agencies had monopoly of news and where television was limited to just 
a few channels, Muslim societies were only passive consumers of programmes 
coming mainly from the west. Today, they can pride themselves on their 
specialised channels of news, education, sport and on disseminating their 
culture throughout the world, among the Muslim Diaspora" (Ghaffari- 
Farhangi, 1998, p. 270). 
Despite this optimistic view of the role of such regional and "Geolinguistic" channels, 
the fact is that inter-Iranian conflicts and 
differences in their political views do not 
affect the flow of 
television programmes through international television networks. 
Broadcast media that cater 
for the needs and wants (determined through demographic 
and audience research) of 
the Iranian audience, rather than serving any government's 
propaganda policies, 
has been long awaited in Iran. But it is still to be seen whether 
these media services 
have achieved such objectives or not. 
By the mid 1990's, the number of regional and 
international television channels 
offered to the 
Iranian audience via satellite was large enough to undermine the state- 
run Iranian media. 
The government, instead of responding to the new demands of the 
audience in this 
highly competitive media environment, just banned it altogether. 
These satellite channels proved 
to be quite influential within Iran where entertainment 
is mainly a household activity. 
As discussed earlier, legislations inside Iran have so 
far prohibited private ownership 
of broadcast media; therefore, choosing the United 
States as a base for exile 
televised media could partly be due to the fact that there is a 
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large community of Iranian exiles living in the U. S. since the 1979 Revolution and is 
partly attributed to cultural, political and 
legal issues inside Iran. All of those satellite 
channels apply a cultural standard of operations 
that cannot be applied within Iran. 
For example, female presenters appear on these channels unveiled, something which 
is not allowed in Iran. 
The emergence of satellite broadcasting could raise concerns about programming 
content, particularly 
from non-Iranian sources. This main concern could be 
contributed to the 
heavy flow of international and mainly Western specialised 
channels, bringing along an 
increasing fear of Western cultural penetration within the 
country. These concerns are 
broadly cultural, religious and inescapably political. 
However, these cultural and religious concerns regarding the programming content of 
Western satellite channels are not translated into the authenticity of Iranian satellite 
channels and programming content. 
Therefore, although the field of entertainment and 
news broadcasting 
has attracted a large audience in Iran, they have not managed to 
offer an alternative 
to calm down the fear of cultural imperialism. They not only did 
not succeed 
in eliminating the influence and attractiveness of Western entertainment 
channels, but they 
themselves are also very much influenced by the contents and 
presentation styles of 
Western channels. It seems that the fear of cultural imperialism 
in Iranian households has taken a 
different angle with the introduction of these Iranian 
satellite channels working 
alongside of other specialised international and Western 
channels such as 
CNN. 
The operational style of these 
Iranian channels does not suggest an impartial and an 
objective coverage. 
Their programme contents are at best driven by imitating Western 
and mainly American programmes 
and their presentations, and newsroom staffs come 
from secular and Westernised sections of society. 
The lack of diversity among the 
working staff, editorial 
policy, and sources of advertisers has made their news and 
programmes 
inherently imbalanced, subjective, and with little or no consideration to 
the respect of others as well 
as to each other. Iranian satellite channels seem to have a 
tendency to avoid approaching 
any controversial issues related to the United States, 
and for that matter also 
avoid dealing with any U. S. opposition. The American style 
programmes, the 
lack of diversity in their newsroom members, and the fact that they 
are operating mainly 
from United States and their support for the U. S. government 
and/or monarchy are 
elements that put their politics under question. 
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4.8 Jaam-E-Jam International Satellite Television 
Two years after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Jaam-e-Jam International 
satellite television channel began transmission in August 1981. Its news and 
programme productions and its twenty-four hour transmissions are carried out from 
its station in California. Jaam-e-Jam TV Corporation is a privately-owned satellite 
channel, broadcasting programmes such as news, sport coverage, music videos, 
medical advice and excessive advertisements. The main owner and producer of the 
station is Manouchehr Bibiyan, Iran's 
biggest music producer from 1954 untill the 
1979 Iranian Revolution. For twenty-five years Bibiyan produced eighty per cent of 
Iran's music with his music company, Apollon. 
According to the Jaam-e-Jam station's website, the main objective behind launching 
this satellite TV channel was to `enlighten the Iranians as well as the international 
community about the cause and consequences of major social, economic and political 
upheavals around 
the Iranian Revolution and its aftermath' 
(http: //Www. jaamejam. com). Addressing Iranian audiences living inside and outside 
the country, the channel claims to work with a dual purpose: first, eliminating the 
information gap caused by the government-run media; second, providing accurate 
information about Iran to those living abroad. Jaam-e-Jam TV Corporation produces 
and transmits three 
different programmes. The first is Jaam-e-Jam International, 
which airs via the 
International Channel (IC), and covers most of the United States, 
Europe, and Middle East. Secondly is Jaam-e-Jam Sunday that airs via KSCI Channel 
18 and covers the 
Southern California region. And finally, Jaam-e-Jam Shabaneh 
(nightly) transmitting via various cable channels, covering the Los Angeles area, the 
San Fernando Valley, and Glendale. 
During its start-up phases, the channel 
has managed to gather up some Iranian writers, 
artists, journalists who 
took refuge in the U. S. after the revolution. Amongst them are 
the Oscar nominated actress 
Shohreh Aghdashlu and Parviz Kardaan, who was the 
producer and 
director of the most watched sitcom in Iranian television history called 
`Morad Barghi', which was on screen 
before the revolution. The station, by benefiting 
from these talented individuals, 
has therefore managed to gain a high degree of 
popularity among 
Iranian audience. The programme content varies from socio- 
political round tables and 
interviews with key political personalities, to entertainment 
programmes, 
interactive talk shows, medical advice, and music videos as well as 
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adverts. In many programmes the content seems to be rather superficial, although 
there are some meaningful talk shows as well. 
Despite the initial declared objective of portraying the political realities of Iran and 
world regardless of whatever the political regimes might claim, the channel, which 
is 
in favour of monarchy, has been following a friendly policy with regards to U. S. 
policies. There is also no clear official statement of 
the station's financial resources. 
4.9 VOA Persian Language Satellite Television Service 
It was in July of 2003 that the US government launched its nightly Persian 
language satellite television, news broadcasting and political programmes to Iran. To 
do the job, VOA contracted a number of expatriate Iranian television professionals. 
The station relies largely on 
both its radio correspondents already working for its 
world services and on 
dubbing already produced English-language reports into 
Persian. The VOA produces programmes such as news and views and features 
original news reporting aimed at 
Iran's younger population. It was after the student 
protests against the government 
that BBG (Broadcasting Board of Governors), which 
is responsible for all 
U. S. non-military international broadcasting, decided to launch 
the Persian television service. 
The chairman of the BBG, Kenneth Tomlinson, has 
claimed that 
`the new programme would bring an alternative to government 
controlled newscast providing 
Iranian with sound and factual reporting on their 
country' (Tomlinson, 
American Public Diplomacy in the Islamic World, February 27, 
2003). 
Claiming to be impartial and objective, 
VOA tries to influence the Iranian audience 
particularly the youth. 
Tomlinson, in the press statement released in July, 2003 
asserted that 
`by reporting what's happening in Iran today, we can help further the 
struggle for 
freedom and self-determination in Iran'. Tomlinson also argues that "our 
task now is to draw upon our previous success 
in the Cold War, to go forward with 
the new war of 
ideas as we offer democracy, tolerance, and self-government as the 
positive alternative 
to tyranny, fanaticism, and terror" (Tomlinson, American Public 
Diplomacy in the Islamic 
World, February 27,2003, p. 7). However, as Kamalipour 
pointed out, 
`the validity of these claims for democracy and openness has been 
undermined 
by the fact that `fear' and `anti-terrorism' have been used by the Bush 
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Administration not only to restrict individual freedoms in the US but also to justify 
the need for war against Iraq or any other nation deemed potentially dangerous' 
(Yahya Kamalipour, 2003). 
The television service was added to the already existing U. S. 24-hour youth-oriented 
radio programmes 
in the Persian language, such as Radio Farda (Tomorrow), also 
funded by BBG, broadcasting a mixture of pop music, news, and cultural 
programmes, aimed at around the 
67 million people under the age of thirty. The TV 
station programmes 
include world news summaries, political analysis of issues and 
events, and cultural 
features, which according to the BBG press release of November 
2003 by the U. S. Broadcasting Board of Governors, citing a nationwide telephone 
survey of 1,000 people, claims 
that these programmes reach 12 per cent of Iranians 
over the age of 
18. The content of the news, however, is skewed towards the political 
orientation of the 
U. S. government and in general, does not give much consideration 
to the political and cultural set-up of the 
Iranian audience. 
4.10 Editorial Policies, Practices, Functions and Purposes 
Up until the emergence of private and expatriate forms of satellite television to 
Iran, the state television has always reflected the policies and performance of the 
government. 
However, operating in a larger and more competitive market where 
international influence 
is largely felt, perhaps these expatriate satellite channels could 
have the potential to work under 
less biased regional and international editorial 
policies. The 
following will put these expectations to the test by examining the 
declared policies versus the actual editorial practices and the programming contents of 
these channels 
(Jaam-e-Jam International and VOA). A closer look will be taken at 
the organisational structure and editorial power 
hierarchy in the two channels: VOA 
for News, a U. S. government operated channel, and in Jaam-e-Jam a private- 
expatriate satellite channel. 
It is essential for news related operations 
to have their own set of editorial policies or 
guidelines. 
These policies are the parameters that would ensure a certain degree of 
conformity amongst 
all staff members within that operation. In some cases, media 
operations and organisations 
tend to clearly outline these editorial rules, policies or 
guidelines in the 
form of written policies. Some organisations tend to apply their 
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`unidentified' policies by adopting a certain organisational structure that ensures a 
firm control over the editorial decision making powers and procedures. 
Schlesinger indicates that: 
"The existence of such policies implies that each news organisation constructs 
news in identifiable ways, in terms not only of selection of stories, but also 
their angling and mode of presentation. To put a construction on the news, 
impose a meaning on it, is inescapable, since the production process is one 
that at all stages involves the making of value judgement" (Schlesinger, 1987, 
P. 135). 
What primarily affects the structuring of editorial policies of television organisations 
is the interplay between economic and socio-political forces of the addressed 
audience. Operating 
in a regional setting can impose some other factors as well, 
including how does the television station set its operational objectives and in the case 
of commercial television, where 
does it fit amongst other competition in its regional 
media markets? 
According to Bennett, an editorial policy or `review' stands as the 
basis of operation of the media organisation. It usually presents the organisation's 
professional and operational standards and guidelines to 
its own staff as well as to 
other competitors. 
Bennett argues that: 
"The review policies of most news organisations are represented as insurance 
that the professional practices... will be used in reporting the news... Editorial 
reviews also exert its own influence on the political content of the news. 
Editors are not just overseers of news production; they are accountable to 
management of the competitive market position of their news product. As a 
result of this accountability, editors and owners (or managers) typically 
formulate implicit criteria that their news product must satisfy in order to be 
successful and professionally respectable in their eyes. Studies of internal 
workings of news organisations make it clear that these implicit criteria are 
major factors in socialising reporters and shaping the political content of 
news" (Bennett, 1983, p. 68). 
The socio-political forces are most 
influential in defining a certain editorial policy in 
media operations. 
The power of such forces - although existing in all socio-political 
system - vary according 
to the degree of democracy or openness of the surrounding 
environment. 
In democratic settings, Bennett argues that the combination of the 
political forces and economic 
factors lead to higher tendencies to standardise the 
editorial contents. 
According to Bennett, this is done in a way such that the economies 
working in a competitive 
field would dictate some sort of standardised news operation 
in which the key determinant of 
the news agendas and news content becomes the 
content of international 
news services. With respect to Iranian satellite television news 
119 
contexts, this argument can only stand true 
in addressing news stories. When dealing 
with regional news, these stations tend to use their own resources for coverage and 
analysis of news events. On the other 
hand, interpretations of events about Iran 
sometimes result in different versions of news report, which 
depend on the political 
viewpoint of each station. 
However, both stations use similar language in dealing with 
international news. For example, Islamic groups are referred to in the context of 
`terrorist groups', exactly as they are so labelled by the U. S. government. It appears 
that the channel's position and strategies towards covering major issues, and the way 
that they approach certain issues, is in congruence with U. S. governmental policy. 
These channels use the stereotypical and propagandistic naming and labelling of 
opposition groups that 
U. S. government uses. During the composition week, the war 
in Iraq was a priority item in the news' top stories in both stations. Both channels for 
instance, referred to `Al Sader', one of the Iraqi opposition leaders, as `Rohaniy-e 
efrati' (extremist mulla), and 
in dealing with the Iraqi conflict they both used the same 
style of language and coverage. 
The competition element 
in the Iranian expatriate satellite television context seems to 
have more of a political than economic angle. A closer look at those channels 
confirms that 
in the absence of any kind of democratic media in Iran they try to 
establish alternative media 
dominance in the name of freedom and democracy among 
the people. This is explained as 
being one of signs of the ongoing competition 
amongst the exiles' satellite 
televisions: to create and establish their cultural and 
political dominance 
in the country. Here, the factors influencing the prioritising of 
news events and angle of 
coverage come as direct results of the editorial policies of 
the stations, which in turn are primarily affected 
by its political and in case of VOA, 
national orientation. 
As it was mentioned earlier, the economies of operation in 
Iranian exile broadcast media organisations, theoretically speaking, do play a certain 
role in determining what 
goes on the screen, but just so long that it does not conflict 
with the major political and 
cultural set up of the organisation. This is especially the 
case with VOA, which 
is primarily a U. S. government controlled channel, addressing 
Iranian audiences mainly 
inside Iran. The main operational guidelines in this case 
coincide with the national 
interests and nationality of the organisation and the political 
and social stance 
that the United States government adopts in dealing with Iranian 
issues. The two studied stations presented 
in this research demonstrate different styles 
and strategies of editorial 
and managerial operation. In one case, there is not a 
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specifically outlined editorial policy, but rather, general guiding rules that are 
followed by the station. The other case presents a very tight editorial system that 
follows a clearly spelled out policy with a power structure and referral system that 
ensures the execution of that policy. 
The patterns of institutional behaviour and operation in VOA Persian channel for 
news and Jaam-e-Jam International are completely different. While Jaam-e-Jam is an 
independent, expatriate company, closely run by its owner, VOA Persian channel for 
news is yet another department within a larger sector of the sole broadcast media 
provider in the United States. The size and type of either channel suggest two 
different editorial strategies and different styles of management and decision-making 
hierarchies. 
4.11 Editorial policies and Practices in Jaam-e-Jam 
International Satellite Channel 
Apart from VOA, all Iranian exile satellite channels, including Jaam-e-Jam 
International, operate alone and outside the framework of a larger organisation. 
Operating from a studio in one of the Los Angeles neighbourhoods, the Jaam-e-Jam 
organisational structure reflects a rather small net of managerial and editorial 
functions. The main structures and hierarchies of the organisation are as follows: 
_ At the very 
top of the organisation is the owner of the channel, Manouchehr 
Bibiyan, an exile Iranian who is also the producer of Jaam-e-Jam International 
TV and the president of Jaam-e-Jam cooperation. 
The Managing Director, who oversees the general operation of the channel. 
Reporting to the managing director are: 
- News 
Department 
- Features 
Department 
- Film Department 
_ Art, 
Music and Entertainment Department 
- Marketing 
Department 
- Personnel 
Department 
- Financial 
Department 
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The programming policy is closely connected to the political nature of the station. 
According to the researcher's observation, the station broadcasts variety of music 
video clips, talk shows, political 
discussions and round tables, and programmes that 
discuss films and cinema productions and broadcast Iranian films, mainly nostalgic 
films from the Shah regime. The channel broadcasts a number of talk shows where 
more controversial issues are 
discussed and a chance for audience participation is 
provided. These discussions seem to 
draw in more audiences, even when these 
programmes do not give any news and when the audience would only see people who 
are in disagreement. This 
is when the audience would intervene and give their 
opinions, and this participation comes as an 
important factor. Another programme 
with a controversial nature 
is called `Kelisaaye Khanegi Iranian' (Iranian Home 
Church), which promotes the Christian religion. This programme is broadcasted 
everyday for two to two and 
half hours' duration. In this programme, a few Iranians, 
and one American Priest 
discuss the Bible and encourage people, especially the youth, 
to convert to Christianity. 
It tries to portray Christianity as the superior religion and 
ultimate truth. It 
is important to note that the channel does not broadcast any Islamic 
and religious programmes. 
Like some other Iranian exile satellite channels, Jaam-e-Jam allocates considerable 
time to the promotional material of the channel. Fillers are used extensively as well. 
Promotions and fillers run between 15 to 20 minutes per hour. 
4.11.1 Editorial Policies, Guidelines and Referral Systems in Jaam-e- 
Jam 
There is not any written or verbal editorial policy that employees are officially 
instructed to abide by. However, there seem to be some kinds of unwritten codes of 
operation and editorial conduct within 
the station. The station seems to follow a 
friendly policy towards the U. S., Europe and rich Gulf Countries. This non-offending 
policy also extends to minority groups and oppositions. 
For example, in the news 
programme, Kurd oppositions 
have never been referred to as `Separatists', the name 
which the Iranian regime uses 
for them. In dealing with issues directly related to Iran, 
the station expresses a striking anti-regime position, 
harshly criticising its policy and 
leadership. 
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During the fieldwork, the news about abusing Iraqi prisoners by the U. S. forces was 
on top of the news agenda of every TV station. This channel, in dealing with this 
particular issue, stuck to news and 
interpretations offered by international and mainly 
U. S. government official sources. Even when dealing with the conflict in Iraq and the 
abuse of Iraqi prisoners 
in news-oriented programmes, it was presented and analysed 
based on the news and pictures provided by the U. S. official news agencies. American 
news agencies provide most of the news materials 
for the channel. Observing the 
channel's programmes and their contents shows a very positive reporting style in 
favour of the U. S. and its national and international policies. 
4.11.2 Financial Challenges and Constraints in Jaam-e-Jam 
The channel is privately owned and managed. Its annual budget is not stated 
clearly and the station claims 
that advertising and programme sponsorship are the 
only sources of 
income for the channel. Advertising time averaged about 10 minutes 
per hour, reaching about 
20 minutes per hour during prime-time programmes. 
It seems that the administrators of the 
Jaam-e-Jam have approached rich Gulf 
countries governments and private enterprisers 
in an early stage of its launching. 
From the nature of advertising on the Jaam-e-Jam screen, it is apparent that some of 
them have responded to this approach and are represented either by advertising 
messages of their national companies, or 
by advertisements put in as part of general 
tourist attraction campaigns. 
The main country represented in the advertising sample 
is the United Arab Emirates. In addition to this, advertisements coming from private 
companies are also substantial. 
Observations of the channel also show advertisements 
coming from private companies 
and are products of multinational companies, in 
addition to some 
home-made shopping advertisements. 
4.11.3 The Way It Is On the Screen 
The channel presents a main news bulletin and daily current affairs 
programme at 
17: 00 GMT. The main news bulletins include Iran's current events, 
business and sports news. 
Most of the programmes presented on Jaam-e-Jam are 
locally produced. However, they 
depend on materials either received or purchased 
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from other sources or interviews with one or more guests. Politically, most of the 
issues addressed in the current affairs programmes deal with the U. S. and Iran, with 
greater concentration on the 
Iranian oriented issues. The presentation-style of these 
current affairs programmes and roundtables 
depend mainly on guest speakers. The 
main current affairs programmes that 
deal with political and cultural issues use the 
same style of guests, audience telephone participation, occasionally 
having a direct 
satellite transmission with yet another guest. 
Features and entertainment programmes on the other hand, tend to follow a speedier 
style of presentation and contain more visually appealing contents. 
The editorial 
content, however, 
deals rarely with regional or Muslim events and topics. The 
political agenda of the channel 
is focused mainly on Iran with very little focus on 
regional or international 
issues. A large time slot is dedicated to promotion 
programmes, 
but some of the general promotions tend, however, to carry political 
messages. 
4.12 VOA Persian Language Satellite Channel for News 
Organisational Structures and Power Hierarchy 
The nature of the channel, as part of a larger administrative sector, including 
some other thematic or specialised channels 
in at least forty-four different languages, 
implies that its organisational and operational frameworks follow a strict structure. 
This fact is more apparent 
in the administrative functions and operations of the 
channel, which 
follow a central scheme or pattern leading up to the head of the sector. 
The Persian language news channel 
is yet another department for thematic channels 
within the Voice of 
America (VOA), an international multimedia broadcasting service 
for the U. S. government. 
The sector is one among several other sectors operating 
under the general or central 
framework of the Broadcasting Broad of Governors, 
BBG, which oversees the 
five U. S. non-military international broadcast services. The 
organisational structure 
of the channel is a reflection of the size and the nature of the 
BBG as an institution. 
At the highest level of VOA operation is the BBG, which 
consists of nine members 
who are appointed by the U. S. President and confirmed by 
the US Senate. The 
board sets the guidelines, objectives and policies of all sectors and 
departments within the VOA. 
The chairman of the board in this case acts as the 
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highest executive authority. Any changes, alternations or restructuring of any basic 
elements within a department have to be approved by the Board of Governors. 
Reporting to Board are the Presidents of Radio and Television as well as the head of 
the sectors. The Sector of "VOA Persian Language Satellite News Channel" was 
officially established and launched in June 2003. 
The head of the channel, Mr. Ahmed Baharlou, (an Iranian expatriate) is responsible 
for the execution of the operational guidelines and fulfilling the objectives set forth by 
the Board of Governors. He supervises the general administrative, editorial and 
production operations. The head of the channel oversees the operations of all the other 
divisions within the channel. This division of responsibilities should indicate a high 
degree of decentralisation and power delegation. In practice, however, this kind of 
power hierarchy works more towards ensuring full adherence to the objectives and 
policies of the channel as part of the 
larger institution. The channel uses a rather 
traditional style of news presentation, which is news briefs and main news bulletins 
that include reports, interviews, and sports sections. Both the editorial and video 
materials used for the news programmes are mainly in-house productions of the 
reports, pictures and news gathered 
from VOA news offices in other countries and 
also from U. S. officials and other 
U. S. news agencies. Looking at the background of 
the editorial staff members indicates that some of them, such as Anoshiravan 
Kangarlou, have been working as a presenter or have been a member of editorial staff 
in NITV before the Islamic Revolution. Anoshiravan Kangarlou is one of the 
presenters of news and views programme and was working as a director in Iranian 
television before the revolution for several years. 
The channel assigns certain reporters to work in foreign countries using technical 
facilities and services provided by the VOA News-centre. 
4.12.1 Editorial Policies and Guidelines in VOA 
The establishing objectives and the description of the duties and 
responsibilities of each 
department within the channel, act as the basis for the editorial 
policy and operational guidelines. 
The document set forth by the Board of Governors 
stresses on several occasions 
that the main function of the channel is to serve the 
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United States image regionally and internationally. One of the main objectives of the 
channel is to launch a propaganda campaign against the regime in Iran. 
4.12.2 Implementing the Editorial Policies 
The mere organisational hierarchy of the channel generates measures that 
ensure the implementation of these guidelines and policies editorially. 
When dealing 
with Iran's news or news about 
the U. S., especially those of a political nature, the 
main sources of 
information are from the official VOA News-centre or other 
governmental sources. 
Any news items regarding the United States that may be aired 
on international news agencies are not used unless 
they are verified by VOA News- 
centre or another official source. 
Observation of the news content of the channel 
clearly shows that almost all news 
items about Iran, the U. S. government and the 
news about the 
U. S. 's relations with other countries are provided by either the U. S. 
government or other 
U. S. official sources. The channel's own resources of reporters 
and correspondents provide 
materials regarding Iran and all U. S. related activities that 
were not reported 
by the official sources. In short, for local and national materials 
international news sources are not relied upon. 
The list of objectives tends to 
define the role of the channel as yet another 
propagandist station 
for the U. S. government and the centralisation of editorial power 
ensures this 
function. The type of issues addressed and the handling of priorities in the 
channel reflect a move 
towards this propaganda, especially when local, social and 
political issues are addressed. 
For example, the channel usually interviews Iranian 
regime oppositions, presenting 
their opinions on issues such that they do not criticise 
U. S. government policy. 
In addition, some of the social programmes produced by the 
channel 
do not give way to analysts and public criticism of the U. S. government. In 
one of the roundtable 
discussion aired on the 11`h of June, 2004, the central theme of 
the programme was 
the funeral of late U. S. president Ronald Reagan. While the 
ceremony was 
broadcasted live, a call from Iran was cut on air because the caller 
expressed some criticisms 
against the programme and the United States. These kinds 
of incidents reveal 
that even mild criticisms are not tolerated. This also reflects the 
policy of the government 
founded media monopoly. 
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The strict editorial screening policy adopted and followed by the channel, together 
with the declared openness in handling different issues by the channel, reflect a 
double standard in dealing with different issues and a general official tendency to 
portray a total democratic image of the 
VOA throughout the world. On the other hand 
however, the limitations of such openness and freedom in speech are not well defined 
or declared. The propagandistic task of the channel 
is apparent in the considerable 
amount of programmes that are 
devoted to such a purpose. For example, observation 
of the channel programmes and their contents 
indicates several programmes praising 
the U. S. government's policies and projects. Some other programmes focused on the 
U. S. 's international activities. However, this propaganda task is not as obvious on 
regular days as 
it is during special occasions. The observation of the channel on the 
day before and the day after the funeral of Ronald Reagan, the former American 
president, indicated that channel did broadcast the President's funeral ceremony 
almost all day. 
In addition, almost all daily and weekly political and historical 
programmes were 
devoted to emphasising the late President's international role, 
especially in 
issues related to Iran. 
4.12.3 The Way it is on the Screen 
This channel produces and runs a nightly 30 minutes news broadcast at 19: 00 
GMT (21: 30 - 22: 00 in Iran), called Khabarha va Nazarha (News and Views), which 
features original news reports from Iran and the world along with analyses of issues 
and events, especial 
interest and cultural features. The channel also produces a weekly 
ninety-minute programme called 
Mize-Gerdi ba Shoma (Roundtable with You), 
which starts with a 
five-minute newscast, followed by a discussion among the host 
and studio guests where 
the Iranian audience can call in and discuss issues related to 
Iran. This programme 
is broadcasted every Friday. The political programmes about 
Iran are more critical and analytical rather 
than documentary in nature. Most of the 
programming material used 
by the channel is home produced. Sometimes pictures and 
editorial materials 
for news bulletins come from U. S. official sources and 
occasionally 
from international news agencies. The programmes presented on this 
channel are usually produced 
in the form of reports. 
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The kind of programming content presented on the VOA Persian News Channel is 
reflective of U. S. international policy and operation. Programmes dealing with 
regional or Iranian affairs also tend to reflect U. S. national attitudes and presentation. 
The main programme that reflects this attitude is `Fasle Digar', or New Chapter, 
which is mainly a weekly programme that targets the young audience in Iran, offering 
informative and entertaining programmes. A one-hour programme that broadcasts 
every Tuesdays at 20: 00 GMT (22: 30 - 23: 30 in Tehran Local Time) features 
different issues related to youth, such as sport, cars, American life, Hollywood, 
fashion, entertainment and reports on news and current events. Apart from this 
programme, other programmes also reflect the same character. They deal mainly with 
Iranian events from a U. S. government perspective and they rarely present opposition 
related coverage. 
The channel does not allocate any time for advertising or 
promotional materials. 
4.13 Discussion 
It seems that detaching or isolating news and entertainment mediums from the 
dominant political system is an unrealistic notion for most media idealists. Most 
media organisations 
have to abide by and respond to rules set forth by the political 
system in power. 
Different types of control are practiced. The extent of their 
limitations and allowed freedoms, however, vary according to the nature of the ruling 
political system. 
For decades and since the early introductions of broadcast media, the 
Iranian governments both before and after the revolution have considered and utilised 
television for propagandist purposes. 
The introduction of international satellite 
television to the country and the public exposure to other types of media systems, 
together with strong opposition groups outside 
Iran, have contributed to the expansion 
of exile satellite television 
abroad. 
A mixture of political and economic pressures 
dominates the editorial conducts of 
these channels. Although 
in each of the studied cases the political forces seem to be 
more influential 
in shaping the way the stations function and address issues, the 
patterns and styles of 
influence appear to act differently in each case. 
The first case, Jaam-e-Jam channel and 
its political owning power, continually claims 
complete detachment. 
Meanwhile, the channel's programme structure, its programme 
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contents and its practiced policies stress that the channel 
is being used by the pro- 
monarchist owning power to work alongside 
VOA to launch a propaganda campaign 
against the theocratic regime 
in Iran. 
The VOA TV channel for News represents the type where political influence 
obviously works towards the same 
traditional convention of using the medium to 
propagate the international 
interests of the U. S. government. In order to assess how 
the political forces and economic 
influences affect the editorial policies and conduct 
of these satellite stations, each of 
the elements that play a role in such an assessment 
need to be individually addressed. 
1- Addressing the Iranian Audience: 
Receiving entertainment and news transmission from a different country was 
an activity restricted 
to Radio until the 1990's. But within the country, television news 
has always been the domain of the 
local government. Jaam-e-Jam International first 
adventured the television news 
and products to contradict the government domination 
in 1982. All other exile Iranian satellite channels that were launched afterwards 
claimed to be nationalistic 
in both nature and content. The agendas of their satellite 
news bulletins and political 
programming have been reflective of the foreign policy 
and governmental news of 
the host country. 
The initiation of an all-news 
Persian satellite television station by VOA in the 
aftermath of student's protest 
in Iran, working along with Jaam-e-Jam and some other 
Iranian satellite channels, 
have drawn attention to the fact that an independent Iranian 
news medium 
is still far from being realised. The political and the financial powers 
behind these stations play a main role 
in sustaining their editorial policies and 
practices. Jaam-e-Jam, 
which is very sharp in its critics of the current regime in Iran, 
has its own set of limitations and 
boundaries. There have been no interviews with the 
religious-nationalist 
opposition and the station has never criticised U. S. political 
powers or activities, 
only stressing the U. S. 's soundness and positive role in the 
region. The 
VOA channel for news stands mainly as an American channel with the 
intention of bringing about a change 
in Iranian political power. One of its set 
objectives 
is to address a primarily Iranian audience, especially those who live inside 
the country. However, 
these two channels face the fact that their audience comes from 
different and even conflicting political 
backgrounds and orientations. However, not all 
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of the historical and current political turmoil in Iran is. being translated in these 
politically orientated channels. 
2- Democratisation of the Political Discourse: 
The main reason that a political-orientated channel can attract a large number 
of audience is that they practice a hypothetical and political free speech. However, 
some, Iranian satellite TV channels, 
in addition to replicating the technical, visual and 
programming styles of the American 
broadcasters, have passed the stage of free 
speech into sensational types of 
discussions. These programmes are one of the selling 
forces behind the channel. The amount of the advertising in Jaam-e-Jam International 
is rather high, and it seems that the more programme is controversial, the more 
sponsorship the channel gets. 
Apart from Jaam-e-Jam International, some other 
political-oriented channels, such as 
Channel One and NITV, have adopted the same 
open platform policy 
for similar `heated' discussions of political and current events. 
There are several discussion shows where controversial issues are discussed and 
audience participation 
is included. Most of these programmes deal with current. 
Iranian economic, social and political issues. 
The issue of democratisation of political discourse has emerged as a basic and 
important element in the development of the new Iranian satellite broadcast media. 
This kind of discussion was never practiced before. Therefore, the popularity of some 
of these channels comes 
from the fact that democratisation of speech inside Iranian 
communities 
has not been achieved traditionally. These types of programmes, even 
with a certain degree of 
freedom of speech, do open a closed window for Iranian 
viewers, providing them with what was originally 
lacking in the whole cultural and 
political system. 
3- Credibility and Popularity: 
The issue of the credibility of these new channels is still debatable and no 
proper studies 
have been conducted to evaluate such aspects. So far, channels have 
been measured or evaluated 
in terms of reception and popularity. The issue of 
credibility still needs 
to be evaluated. Traditional experiences of the Iranian audience 
with their national media 
have created a state of everlasting suspicion of the realities 
of the purposes 
behind the delivered messages. The obvious propaganda messages 
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and the continuous manipulation and negligence of news that affect the Iranian people 
are some of the reasons that 
led the Iranian audience develop a tradition of turning to 
international news sources for what they regard as `credible' news. Prior to satellite 
television, this role was played by Persian services of international radio stations, such 
as BBC, and Voice of 
America. 
Jaam-e-Jam has managed so far to be popular, a status that is reached primarily to the 
level of practiced democracy in their discussions and also due to the entertainment it 
offers. In the case of the 
VOA channel, its popularity and credibility has been very 
much overshadowed 
by its nature as a U. S. government-owned and operated channel. 
With such conditions, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for this channel to be 
considered by the 
Iranian audience as reliable and credible. 
4.14 Conclusion 
It might still be premature to judge the success or failure of Iranian satellite 
televisions. The political and cultural realities of 
Iran make these satellite channels 
stand out. 
However, it seems that the editorial operations of the two channels are 
influenced directly by the political orientation of their organisation and/or ownership. 
Editorial policies are applied differently according to the organisational structure and 
operational strategies of each 
channel. This can range from direct censorship that 
could extend to cutting programmes 
on air to the mildest option of simply appointing 
the right people 
in the right positions. In both cases, the two measures are being 
applied to guarantee complete 
adherence to policy and guidelines. 
The VOA channel operates within the 
boundaries set forth by the U. S. goverment, 
which is the 
indirect owner and operating power. Its policies and practices do not 
deny this fact; as they stress 
it as a service that mainly address Iranians and in doing 
so, it advocates and promotes 
the U. S. government's policies. VOA news content 
seems to be propagandist 
in nature. Holt believed that the basic purpose of the United 
States Information Agency 
(USIA), the parent agency of the VOA, is to `spread a 
proper image of 
the U. S. ', `express a point of view', or `to make the meaning of our 
actions unmistakably 
clear to citizens and leaders in other countries' (Holt, 1984, 
p. 44). Holt argues 
that the main purpose of the USIA was to affect the policy 
decisions of others in such a way 
that American foreign policy goals would be 
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achieved. The agency itself, of course, does not readily admit this, and substitutes 
such carefully constructed labels as `information effort' and `public diplomacy' for 
propaganda, but propaganda it remains. 
The case of Jaam-e-Jam is different. It is a private channel working from the United 
States, which should hypothetically provide it with more chances to operate openly 
without any governmental political influence. The reality is that the political and 
economic pressures have directly affected stations' activities. To avoid being 
economically crushed by political pressures, Jaam-e-Jam seems to have been working 
within the boundaries of the political realities of the host country. In doing so, the 
station does not seem to be keen on taking advantage of the amount of freedom 
offered to them by being both a private and an expatriate medium. 
The fast growing exile broadcast media transmitting news and entertainment to Iran 
has changed the entire media map in the country. The exile Iranian satellite channels 
reflect an example of the new realities of expatriate political culture, a culture that is 
torn between democratisation and control and between Westernisation and 
traditionalism. 
This chapter has examined the way that the satellite television stations under study are 
administrated, the style of their programmes, the production of news bulletins, and the 
methods that they adopt 
in their editorial work. This study is concerned with the fact 
that political goals are achieved through the use of language. Therefore, in order to 
critically assess their values and their attitudes, the next chapter deals with content 
analysis of news as the methodology of the 
investigation. 
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Chapter Five 
Content Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
As it was mentioned in chapter one, the cultural imperialism argument tends to 
overestimate the economic 
factors of global conglomerates and undermine the 
political power of the state 
in the process of cultural transfer. The theory does not 
seem to actively acknowledge 
the important role of political power as a force behind 
cultural imperialism since 
the power is never exerted only through military and 
technological control, 
but always through discursive control as well. In order to 
demonstrate the relationship between international politics and international satellite 
broadcasting and to demonstrate the active role played by the state in engaging in 
ideological warfare, this chapter will focus on the news programmes of the Jaam-e- 
Jam expatriate satellite television and the Voice of America and their relationship to 
propaganda. 
This chapter tries to examine the agenda and the attitudes of the 
programme contents of 
the two studied satellite channels. Content analysis, is 
conducted to ascertain 
the news agenda and types of production in both Jaam-e-Jam 
and VOA, and also 
to identify the main differences in news stories, and the way in 
which the bulletin and news periods are constructed, 
i. e. presenters, running sequence, 
duration, the stories and how they are covered in the two television stations. The 
emphasis is put on 
the location of a news story, its subject matter, source, duration, 
the type of visual material used and 
its main character. This will provide a basis for 
the discourse analysis 
in chapter six which examines the usage of language in 
recorded programmes 
and exposes the underlying ideologies which produce them. 
Chapter six focuses on talk and texts as 
`social practice', the way that particular 
ideologies are represented as 
`common sense' and `unquestionable' and the way that 
discursive practices could 
have major ideological effects, such as producing and 
reproducing unequal power 
relations between social classes, ethnic groups, etc. 
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Finally, to examine the degree of effect and success of these politically motivated 
satellite channels with respect to their target audience, in chapter seven, the results of 
the focus groups investigation will be presented and analysed. 
The content analysis classifications, categories, units and definitions: appendix 1 
5.2 The Research population and Sample Size 
The determination of the research population and the size of the sample are 
important elements in quantitative studies. This study is concerned with the news in 
the main television news 
bulletin on the VOA satellite television channel and the 
main news update 
in Jaam-e-Jam channel. These satellite television channels are both 
transmitted from the United 
States. The duration of the field work spanned one 
month, from 29/06/2004 
to 29/07/2004. 
Recording timetable for both VOA and Jaam-e-Jam: appendix 2 
Table 1 
Television Station Time of the Main Time of the Main 
News Bulletin News Bulletin 
(GMT) (Iran Time) 
VOA 6.30 p. m. GMT 9: 00 P. M. 
Jaam-e-Jam 5.30 p. m. GMT 8.00 p. m. 
T 
metable 
of the main news ouiieun for ootn v iA ana i aam-e-Jam 
5.2.1 Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis is the news story which represents an independent news 
unit in dealing with a 
specific and independent event completely detached from the 
previous story 
by a barrier. The barrier may be a change in the news presenter or the 
subject of the news. 
The second (1/3600th of an hour) was adopted as the unit of time 
for measuring the research variables. 
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5.2.2 Analysis Items 
To identify and compare the news agenda of the two channels the following 
was examined: 
- The place where the news story took place 
- The subject of news story 
- The sources of news 
- Duration of news 
- The type of visual material accompanied the news 
- The main character of the news story 
5.2.3 The Location of the News Story 
The geographical location where the news story occurred is classified into the 
following categories: 
a. Domestic: this includes all the events happening inside the country of 
which the station is transmitted from. 
b. Iran news: all the events happening inside the country. 
c. Islamic Countries: this includes the Arab countries and all the forty- 
five Islamic countries which are members of the Islamic Conference. 
d. Western Countries: including Canada, Australia, and all the East 
European countries and the former Soviet Union. 
e. Developing Countries: this includes the countries from Central and 
South America, Africa, South East Asia, India and China. 
f. Others 
5.2.4 The Subject of the News 
The news stories are classified into 14 subjects. These categories, which are 
based on Deutchmann classification (Stemple, 1981, Pp. 121-122), are as followed: 
1) Political, 
2) Military, 
3) Economic, 
4) Religious, 
5) Disasters, 
6) Accidents and crimes, 
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7) Education and culture, 
8) Sport, 
9) Humanities, 
10) Social services, 
11) Development, 
12) Community health and medicine, 
13) Arts, 
14) Sciences and innovations, 
15) Others 
5.2.5 The Sources of the News 
This is to define the mass and the quality of the material in each station. Since 
television news often contains visual materials that are accompanied by the reading 
material, this category was subdivided into two main sub-divisions as followed: 
Sources for the Reading Material 
1- Local (U. S. ) news agencies 
2- International news agencies 
3- Government/official sources 
4- Station's own resources 
5- Other 
Sources of the Visual Material 
1- U. S. television stations 
2- Other countries' television stations 
3- picture news agencies 
4- Other 
The sources of both real and visual materials were also classified into: 
a- Mentioned, where the sources of the news was mentioned by the newscaster, 
or in the case of visual material if there is a logo or written name 
accompanying the material 
b- Not mentioned, which applies to news where the sources is not mentioned 
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5.2.6 The Main Character in the News 
This category applies to the main character that the news story is based upon. 
This category was classified into six sub-divisions: 
I- The head of state, e. g. President, Prime Minister, etc. 
2- Government officials such as Ministers, and Ambassadors 
3- Prominent figures in the private sector including company owners and 
directors 
4- Corporate bodies, including government institutions 
5_ Artists, celebrities, athletes, etc. 
6_ Other 
5.3 Content Analysis of the Recorded Materials from VOA 
and Jaam-e-Jam News Programmes 
The content analysis methodology, which concentrates on the analysis of the 
content of the media message, 
is defined as `a research method by which to achieve a 
quantitative, organised and objective 
description of the content of the apparent means 
of communications' 
(Berelson, 1953, p. 18). Berelson emphasise the quantitative 
aspects of content analysis as well as objectivity. 
He also stresses organisation in the 
presentation of 
data and asserts that numerical records in themselves do not mean 
anything in most situations. 
The following analyses the content of the news bulletins, 
news periods and news related programmes 
in both VOA and Jaam-e-Jam satellite 
television channels. It 
includes a descriptive survey of the characteristics of the 
content of these media channels. 
In this study, content analysis 
is used to ascertain the news agenda and to identify the 
main similarities and 
differences in news stories and the way in which the bulletin is 
constructed, i. e. presenters, running 
sequence, duration, the stories and how they are 
covered on the two stations. 
This analysis also evaluates the programming contents in 
relation to political orientation. 
Special focus was given to the national orientation of 
the programmes and news 
items as well as the types of events or themes covered. The 
main purpose of these classifications and categorisations of content is to achieve a 
general view of 
how the news and programming agenda of these channels are set and 
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the kind of editorial pressures that have the most effect on them. What follows are the 
results of the analysis of the contents of news stories in the two studied channels 
(VOA and Jaam-e-Jam). The main news programmes were recorded over the period 
of one-month field work, commencing 29/06/04 and ending 29/07/04. For this content 
analysis, a composite week was 
designed, covering the period from June 29 until July 
5,2004. The schedules were developed to cover time stretches throughout the 
composite week in which samples 
from most feature, current affairs and news 
oriented programmes were 
included, in addition to the news bulletins and news briefs. 
The sample recordings were totalled at about 20 hours from each channel. All the 
programmes were recorded using a video 
tape recorder. 
The recording time table of the broadcasted programmes in VOA and Jaam-e- 
Jam during the composite week: appendix 2 
5.4 The Results 
5.4.1 Jaam-e-Jam Satellite Television 
The total number of news stories analysed was 108 items, broken down as 
follows: Tuesday (25), Wednesday (27), Thursday (17), Friday (16), and Monday 
(23). It should be mentioned that the programme is not broadcasted on Saturdays and 
Sundays. Total transmission time 
for the week was approximately 342 minutes 
(20.520 seconds). 
5.4.2 VOA Persian Television Service 
The total number of news stories covered during the week in question was 169 
items, broken down as follows: 
Tuesday (31), Wednesday (29), Thursday (21), Friday 
(22), Saturday (22), Sunday 
(19), and Monday (25). Total transmission time for the 
week was approximately 
210 minutes (12,600 seconds). 
Table 2 shows the number and 
duration of news stories in the study week. 
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Table 2 
Number and Duration of News Stories during the Week 
Day of the Jaam-e-Jam Television VOA Persian Service 
Week No. of news Duration No. of news Duration 
stories (minutes) stories (minutes) 
Tuesday 25 72.5 31 30.00 
29.06.04 
Wednesday 27 75.2 29 30.00 
30.06.04 
Thursday 17 60.0 21 30.00 
01.07.04 
Fri day 16 55.0 22 30.00- 
02.07.04 
Saturday - - 
22 30.00 
03.07.04 
Sunday - - 
19 30.00 
04.07.04 
Monday 23 90.0 25 30.00 
05.07.04 
Close examination of the above table shows that the largest number of news stories 
transmitted on VOA was 31 items on Tuesday the 29th of June, 2004 and the lowest 
number of items transmitted was 
19 items on Sunday the 4th of July, 2004. 
Table 2 shows that the number of news stories varies daily. The duration of the news 
period in Jaam-e-Jam varies whereas 
the duration of the main news bulletins in VOA 
are of fixed 
duration. The lowest number of news stories shown on Jaam-e-Jam 
channel was 21, shown on 
Thursday the 2°d of July over a period of 55 minutes. The 
largest number of news stories transmitted was 30 items on Wednesday the 30th of 
June, over a period of 75 minutes. Table 2 also indicates that although there was some 
variability in the number of news stories shown on VOA, the station maintained the 
duration of its news bulletins within set limits. This is something that Jaam-e-Jam has 
failed to do, which highlights the concept of news bulletins production and its attempt 
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to attracting audiences by selecting and stream lining the elements of news stories in a 
fast and concise way. 
5.4.3 The Gathering and Presentation of News in both Channels 
In order to analyse the style of presentation and the duration of time given to a 
specific news story and to see 
how the news bulletin and news period in both stations 
are collected, it was 
decided that one news story, which was on top of the news 
agenda in both stations 
during the composite week, would be selected and presented. 
During the fieldwork, and only one day after the transferring of sovereignty in Iraq, 
the NATO summit in Turkey and Bush's speech in Istanbul were on top the news 
agenda for both of the two stations. 
The content of this news story will be analysed to 
identify the above points. In addition, the language used in the text by the two 
channels will 
be presented and the similarities and the differences in the style and 
method of presentation will 
be discussed. In order to give a qualitative analysis of the 
content of this news 
item, the news story as it was presented in each channel will be 
reported, as the picture clips and visual material 
that accompanied this news item in 
each station will 
be discussed. 
5.4.4 Jaam-e-Jam Satellite Television 
The duration of this particular news item on Jaam-e-Jam was two-minutes and 
five-seconds. The news was read by the presenter from inside the studio, accompanied 
by slides and pictures of 
George Bush. 
News Presenter only: 
The neWS story in Persian: 
J1 c-6ju: L; 
I-sj AS 
A 91 
L. k vº'ý? ýýý'' 
""; u `'ý` `ý'a ýsý'° ý°'lS; cr'ý.?? ;ý ul . )tý, cl , 
jl ual: ý' uL, ýI cri 
-31 
tý. ýi -ytý 6- A-) as 
L; 
tA 
4L' c 
cSlo 
)sý+L*ýl 
4i.: Lo 119 }ýuý c3ý! " . iýl eýl'ý.. ul . fit sý U cn'I1ý 
"' crL", ° ýS; 
jacy l el JS u, Ll j :4 erlas I, L;. jj j1 
. ý'slzi.. ,ý cý'ýyýý csýý'L''Sý'ý cSýº r? 
j {? ý+ ýý ! c: 1ý. }ý ey 13.5_A "-; L i may, !' 
140 
.N of . s. 
ý c1LL.. LýI AS ý; sý WSQL y 15.1 ü.. l eß-A JL1441 CSC ý9 'S üiul 
ýLý jlýlsý y I, jT l, o "1S ü91ý Uä ýi. v: l L't ü3 jl ýlS }S e, l.. '., I y. i ýt J jl. o 
Conclusion: The presenter inside the studio (in Persi 
jyj, ja 'L 4a aý sA L AS I, Z..; 1 s3.5y6 eUl t. 1I_9 W,, S ` j't_ Cjt&> L; IA ýyö 9iu vý ý; ctl"si ,I 
'V ýI H4I Yc sa cr+ý 
The news story in English: 
President Bush, in a speech given at Galatasaray University after attending the NATO 
summit in Turkey, asserted that 
"although practicing democracy means religious 
negligence, it does not mean retreating some religions from their beliefs". He added 
that, "when I speak about the blessing of democracy, coarse videos and consumerism 
are not what I mean". 
He said that in countries like Iran and Syria some tired and discredited conservatives 
are trying to hold back the 
democratic will of the new generation. Bush also said that 
`in the past we tolerated tyranny in the Middle East and sacrificed liberty for stability, 
but it did not result in something positive. Bush added that the out come of our 
negligence and 
ignorance towards tyrannies and extremist regimes in the region has 
been far from positive and their hatred for America has grown deeper and the violence 
has spread until we saw the evidence of that in the streets of our cities'. 
Pictures of George Bush and the U. S. flag were shown repeatedly during the 
news reading. 
Conclusion: The presenter from inside studio 
Mr. president Bush has indicated that 'We must apologise to the world for supporting 
dictators'. 
5.4.5 VOA Satellite Channel 
The duration of the news story on VOA channel was two-minutes and ten- 
seconds in which slides of 
the Bush's speech at Galatasaray University were used, 
including the picture of NATO meeting in Turkey. The accompanying text was read 
by the presenter from inside the studio, which together with the slides, ran for three- 
minutes. During the reading 
of the text by the same presenter, video clips of George 
Bush were shown for thirty-seconds. This was followed by a picture report of the 
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NATO summit presented by the same presenter, which lasted for one and half 
minutes. The reports and the video clips broadcasted were all property of the station. 
The News Story: 
Presenter from inside the studio plus slides of George Bush and the NATO 
summit (in the original, Persian): 
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Voice and video clip of Bush, giving speech at Galatasaray University, Turkey: 
Presenter from inside the studio: 
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Presenter from inside the studio plus slides of George Bush and NATO summit, 
The news in English: 
In the second and the last day of the NATO summit, Istanbul witnessed the last 
speech given by George 
Bush just before leaving Istanbul for Washington. Bush, in 
his speech, which was given at 
Galatasaray University, said: `freedom is the future of 
the Middle East and of all humanity and that the Islamic countries need not fear the 
spread of democracy. Bush said, 
"When I speak of the blessing of democracy, violent 
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videos and commercialism are not what I have in mind. There is nothing incompatible 
between democratic values and high standards of decency. " 
Voice and clips of Bush's speech at Galatasaray University 
Presenter inside the studio: 
The news in English: 
Bush said that `the rise of democracy in Iraq, is bringing hope to reformers across the 
Middle East, and sending a very different message to Tehran and Damascus'. Bush 
praised Turkey as an example of an Islamic country with a democratic government 
that has been practicing freedom of religion. The president of the United States 
reiterated his backing of Turkey's 
desire to join the European Union, saying it was a 
crucial advance in the relations between the Islamic World and the West because 
Turkey is a part of both. 
5.4.6 Analysis 
The Slides: 
The main character of this news story is the U. S. president, George Bush, who 
is addressing issues directly related to Iran and the Middle East region. Both stations 
started with the picture and video clips of Bush and the U. S. flag, with the explanatory 
slides used afterwards. 
The prelude or opening part of the news item: 
The opening of the news item is usually read by the presenter inside the 
studio, together with the accompanying explanatory slides which normally appears at 
the top of the screen. Both the 
VOA and Jaam-e-Jam gave equal duration of time to 
the introductory part of the news 
item (twenty seconds) and used similar language for 
the text used in delivering the news 
item. The only difference between the two 
stations was the use of video clips. 
In delivering the news item, Jaam-e-Jam used only 
pictures of George 
Bush and the U. S. flag. VOA used slides and video clips of Bush's 
speech at Galatasaray 
University to accompany the text, which was read from inside 
the studio. There is also a similarity 
in the language used and the approach used by 
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both stations. Both used general terms to express the conflict in the region and both 
failed to analyse the news. 
The body of the news story: 
Both stations used picture and video reports after the introduction. The 
duration of the report for the two stations was between one and two minutes. The 
accompanying pictures and clips in the report were similar for the two stations, as 
both only showed Bush's pictures and video clips of his speech. It was noted that both 
stations used a rather positive reporting style towards U. S. foreign polic. On the day 
this news item was reported, and only a day after the transfer of sovereignty in Iraq, 
both stations in dealing with this controversial political issue, featured Bush's speech 
in Istanbul, pointing out the statements he made about the emergence of freedom and 
democracy in Iraq and the end of tyranny without any comments or criticisms of it 
and without any reference to the American bombing of Iraq, dead people, wounded 
children etc. Their policy towards 
dealing with this controversial issue and the Iraq's 
new interim government showed stimulating support and acceptance. Also, by 
projecting the U. S. as 
freedom-loving, devoted to the self-determination of freeing 
people from tyrannies and poverty and 
directing them towards democracy and 
prosperity, both stations ensured the 
United States a favourable position. 
The use of the natural voice of officials when quoting their statements was used by 
VOA in all the reports, as the Persian translation was composed as an accompanying 
voice to the report. The 
following section is the analysis of the content of the news 
stories in the two stations, which examines the 
location, subject and sources of the 
news stories. In addition to this, the 
duration of the story, the visual material 
accompanying the news stories and the main character of the news story will also be 
analysed. 
The Location of the News Stories: 
In order to demonstrate the international policy of both VOA and Jaam-e-Jam 
satellite channels and to examine the source for news stories in each station, the 
location of news, which deals with the geographical location of the news items, was 
investigated. The place where the news story took place is classified into: 
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a) National: this includes all the events taking place inside the country 
that the stations are broadcasting from, which in both cases is the 
United States. 
b) Iran: which includes all the events that happen inside the country 
c) Middle East and Islamic Countries 
d) War in Iraq 
e) Islamic Countries outside the Middle East 
f) Western Countries, including European countries, Canada, Japan, and 
Australia 
g) Third World Countries, including countries from Central and South 
America, Africa, South East Asia, India and China 
h) Other, which include any news items not falling in any of the above 
categones 
Table 3 shows the distributions of news stories by their geographical locations. 
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Table 3 
Distributions of News Stories by Geographical Location (Duration in Second) 
Location of VOA Jaam-e-Jam 
the News Number Duration Number Duration 
Item 
National (US 27 2063 9 660 
News) 
Iran 18 3250 27 2780 
War in Iraq 11 1911 9 585 
Israel and 6 753 
Palestine 
Middle East 13 465 1 40 
Countries 
Islamic 16 640 
_ 
Countries 
outside the 
Middle East 
Western 20 935 8 480 
Countries 
Third World 9 451 2 90 
Countries 
Other 8 779 2 180 
Middle East and Islamic countries news stories occupy a leading position in VOA, 
which indicates the priority 
in news bulletins on the composite week. This is followed 
by news stories about Iran, with 
duration time of 3250 seconds. The table also shows 
that news from Third World countries come last in the ranking, accounting for only 
nine stories with a collective 
duration of 451 seconds. VOA also devoted a staggering 
2063 seconds to the portrayal of American social life and the political views of 
government officials. 
In jaam-e-Jam station, Iran's news came first in the ranking with 27 news stories with 
duration of 2780 seconds. This is followed by news from Middle East and Islamic 
countries, with 10 news stories with the duration of 1225 seconds. What emerges is 
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that both stations devote a lot of their air time to Middle East conflicts, mostly war in 
Iraq and news about Iran. 
5.4.7 The Topics of the News Stories 
In this study, news stories are classified according to Stevenson and Shaw's 
subject classification as either: political, military (war in Iraq), economic, religious, 
accidents and disasters, education and culture, sports, humanities, social services, 
development, arts, and other. This classification was chosen for its suitability to news 
television in general and to VOA news bulletins in particular. In the political 
category, the news story is dealt with in an analytical form. This analysis may be 
presented in the form of 
historical backgrounds, assessment of current situations, 
debates between opposite opinions, or stating these opinions. This category includes 
current affairs news stories, commentary and 
debates, propaganda, and news review. 
Table 4 shows the topics of the news stories and their duration. 
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Table 4: Topics of News Stories (Duration in Seconds) 
Topics of VOA Jaam-e-Jam 
News International 
Number Duration Number Duration 
Political 18 3250 16 1325 
News: 
News about 
Iran 
6 753 
Israel and 
Palestine 
War in Iraq 
11 1911 9 585 
Other 33 1883 
Economic 
_ - 
2 50 
Religious 1 45 
Accidents & 5 90 1 105 
Disasters 
Education & 4 514 9 780 
Culture 
Humanitarian 8 301 2 300 
Sports 5 342 
_ 
Development 2 62 3 285 
Social 8 829 13 1765 
Services 
Arts 3 390 1 320 
Other 4 215 
Table 4 reveals that political issues occupied the leading position on both stations, 
with 58 news stories shown over the duration of 5886 seconds in VOA, and 33 stories 
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with the duration of 1865 seconds in Jaam-e-Jam Channel. This is followed by news 
about War in Iraq in second-place in both stations. From the above table it is quite 
clear that political news had the largest share of coverage in the news of the two 
stations, indicating the political nature of these stations. Looking more in depth at the 
table 4 reveals that with regards to political news, stories about Iran and war in Iraq 
were the most predominant in both stations, accounting for nearly two thirds of their 
coverage during the study week. During the fieldwork, the political situation in Iran 
was on top of the news agenda in both stations. 
In VOA, anti-Iranian regime propaganda was broadcasted throughout the study week, 
which was the week prier to the anniversary of student uprising in June 2003. During 
the study week, several live satellite interviews were conducted with different 
opposition leaders and top members about . democracy in Iran, the student 
demonstration in 2003 and the possibility of further demonstration on the day of the 
anniversary. This was 
followed by inside studio interviews with pro-US political 
activists. Among them was a round table with 
Prince Reza Pahlavi, analysing the 
outcome of the student riot and the possibility of 
further riots by students inside Iran. 
These interviews and analyses, which constituted more than 60% of all news about 
Iran, were presented on the main news bulletin everyday during the field work. This 
was followed by a promo 
featuring several leaders of opposition groups and slides of 
student demonstrations with the 
background audio advertising a programme called 
`Negahi Faratar' (a look beyond), a political roundtable about the future of democracy 
in Iran. This was to be broadcast on the day of the anniversary of student's uprising 
and was repeatedly 
broadcasted for 60 seconds against the pictures of student's 
demonstration and wounded people etc at least twice during every news bulletin. 
Another programme in VOA is a news analysis section called "the Washington's 
View, presenting U. S. foreign policy", which analyses current issues related to Iran, 
such as Iran's nuclear activities. 
It reflected the U. S. government's official policy and 
attitude in different subjects. 
The two stations were virtually identical in their 
coverage of situation 
in Iraq and Iran's nuclear activities. Both stations covered the 
situation in Iraq 
during the study week in depth. However, the study week was not 
during combat operations, but 
it did fall in the week surrounding battle and the 
transfer of Iraqi sovereignty. 
The war in Iraq accounted for more than one quarter of 
all stories and roughly a 
third of all air time in both stations. Apart from news related 
to Iran, the stories about war 
in Iraq were also more likely than other stories to be long 
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and in depth. Although VOA claimed to 
be objective and accurate in its coverage of 
war and the U. S. invasion of Iraq, it has 
been observed that it reflects and actually 
defends the government's position on Iraq, using many of the propaganda themes 
suggested by the Foreign Office 
in broadcasts. An incident that reflects this approach 
was the students' riots against 
Bush and his invasion of Iraq in the last day of the 
NATO summit in Turkey. The event got only minimal seconds of VOA coverage 
claiming that the riot was against the 
NATO summit. For this coverage certain 
precautions were taken; 
for example, the incident of the burning of the American flag 
during the demonstration was put on the report but lasted only one or two seconds to 
avoid stressing the public 
disagreement with the general foreign policy adopted by the 
U. S. government. The station totally ignored the demonstrations against the War in 
Iraq that took place all over the world. This provides further confirmation that 
international broadcasting media could be used to help a state create conditions for a 
favourable political position. 
The evidence offered by content analysis samples shows that the 
U. S. government and 
Bush's administration's viewpoint was presented and that the government's actions, 
especially in Iraq, are all explained within 
the agenda set by the government itself, 
without any criticism or analysis of 
U. S. policy in Iraq. VOA consistently projected 
the official line that the 
U. S. had invaded Iraq with the objective of destroying 
terrorists and of freeing Iraqi people 
from tyranny and directing them towards 
democracy. In much the same way, the station tried to persuade its Iranian audience 
that democracy, was an 
ideal that should be adopted. 
VOA, in its national coverage also made some points about supplementing official 
embassy warnings 
by the Foreign Office and the State Department's appeals to the 
U. S. nationals, advising them to 
leave areas considered dangerous in Iraq. The news 
about how U. 
S. diplomats' families had left Iraq and were given combat lessons, 
especially on 
how to use gun, along with images of the U. S. ambassador in Iraq 
during the combat practice, was repeatedly reported. However, the effect of such 
broadcasts can either be to serve to 
heighten tension in public eyes by anticipating 
what may not 
be inevitable, or providing the U. S. opposition propaganda with a 
pretext for launching a 
fresh campaign highlighting the imminent dangerous situation. 
Materials of the content analysis sample show that both stations represented a very 
positive attitude towards political 
issues concerning U. S. foreign policy, as the only 
difference emerged in their styles of presentation. Therefore, while there is an 
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agreement in terms of the subjects covered 
in the two stations, there are significant 
differences in the way the news is covered. For instance, if a story is covered in VOA 
and is analysed by an expert 
inside the studio, followed by direct link to the 
correspondent from the location of the event, 
Jaam-e-Jam television by contrast, 
would cover exactly the same story, 
but without mentioning the source of the news. 
Jaam-e-Jam was most oriented to entertainment and lifestyle. During the study week, 
2370 seconds of airtime in its news period programme was consumed by lifestyle, 
health trends, and pop music stories. 
5.4.8 Topics of News Stories by Geographical Location 
In order to examine the policy and news agenda in both stations, it was 
important to examine and analyse the subject of the news stories along with its 
location. Table 5 shows a very strong link between the topics of news stories and the 
geographical location of their 
happenings according to the station's policy. 
In the case of VOA, cultural and social and political news dominated the National 
(domestic) news, followed by arts and development issues. No emphasis is placed on 
economic, sports, religious and 
humanitarian topics locally. In reference to news 
about Iran, total 
dominance is given to political issues, with 18 stories reported over a 
time period of 3250 seconds. 
Apart from that there were only 4 news stories on social 
topics concerning Iran, with 
duration of 320 seconds. It is interesting to note that news 
about Iran is totally confined 
to political news. In the case of the Middle East and 
Islamic World and also Third World countries, political news were the most heavily 
exchanged news topics 
in VOA, followed by accidents and disasters. There was no 
coverage of other 
fields in the regions, apart from only 4 socio-political stories 
involving Middle East and Islamic countries. In dealing with issues related to Western 
countries, sports news stories came 
in the lead, with 5 Stories over a time period of 
342 seconds. 
Table 5 shows the topics of news stories 
by their geographical locations in VOA 
television station. It also shows 
the number of news stories in each category and their 
duration. 
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Table 5 
Zbpics of News Stories by Geographical 
Location- VOA Television 
of National Iran 
War in Iraq Israel and Middle Islamic Western Third Other 
Topics 
News Stories (U. S. 
Palestine East Countries Countries World 
News) Countries outside except the Countries 
Middle U. S. 
East 
NO D NO D NO D NO D NO D NO D NO D NO D No D 
political 10 
260 18 3250 11 1911 6 753 13 465 13 555 4 187 1 25 2 120 
25 
Economic _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 45 
Religious - - - - - - - - - - - 
Accidents & _ - - - - - - - - - 
2 40 
- - 
2 75 
- - 
Disasters 
Education 5 
448 _ 
1 180 1 90 
Culture 
35 4 241 
Humanitarian 5 342 
Sports 
DeVel0P 
- 
- - 
ment 
_ 
5 364 
Services 
295 - - - - - - - - - 
50 
- - Art s 
+ 
- 
385 2 118 6 166 2 4 2 
ether 
NO: Number of news stories 
D: Duration of each news story 
Looking more in depth at the top issues in VOA, it can be seen that during the week 
study political news were given 
the most priority in the main bulletin. A closer look at 
the above figures reveal that almost all of the 
issues from Iran, the Middle East and 
Islamic countries covered by VOA are political or politically related topics, which 
gives a clear 
indication that VOA television prefers not to cover other topics 
concerning the region. 
Also most of the issues addressed in the news bulletin deal 
with Muslim related 
issues. With more concentration on Iranian oriented issues, 33% 
of the recorded sample of news programmes 
dealt with Iran related issues, compared 
to 19.5% of the news stories which 
dealt with War in Iraq. 
Table 6 shows the topics of the news stories by their geographical locations in Jam-e- 
Jam satellite television, station. It also shows the number of news stories in each 
category and their 
duration 
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Table 6 
Topics of the News Stories by Geographical Location - Jaam-e-Jam Television 
opics of 
Jews Stories 
National 
(U. S. 
Iran War in 
Iraq 
Israel 
and 
Middle 
East 
Islamic 
Countries 
Western 
Countries 
Third 
World 
Other 
News) Palestine Countries outside except Countries 
Middle the U. S. 
East 
No D No D No D No D No D No D No D No D No D 
Political 3 
110 16 1325 9 585 6 420 
Economic 
-F- -30- -l 20 
Religious 
pccidenu & _ _ 
1 105 1 50 
Disasters 
Education & 3 
320 4 910 2 60 
Culture 
humanitarian - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Sports 
pevelopment 
-f3-O-- 4 640 1 40 l 45 
Services 
AAS - - 
2 385 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Other - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
NO Number of news stones 
D: Duration of each news story 
In the political field, the above table shows that greatest emphasis has 
been given to 
news from Iran, the 
Middle East and Islamic Countries. Economic, education and 
cultural stories centred on 
U. S. and Western Countries, whereas the Third World, 
Middle East and Islamic countries came with no story. Moreover, religious, 
humanitarian and development issues were not addressed at all, as shown in the table. 
The above figures also indicate a lack of variation in the topics covered, and more 
importantly, there is no logical sequence in the coverage of subjects and no 
comprehensive analysis of 
the issues involved. Additionally, there is a lack of 
emphasis on religious and sports 
topics. A close look at Tables 5 and 6 highlight that 
political and cultural news were 
the most predominant topics discussed in both 
stations. The coverage mainly concentrated on 
Iran, the Middle East and Islamic 
countries. Iraq was the centre of political news 
in both stations. The above table also 
shows that there 
is a conspicuous lack of coverage in sports, economic, religious, and 
development news stories in both stations. 
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5.4.9 Sources of News Stories 
In this study the sources of news stories have been divided into two categories: 
1) sources of reading materials, and 
2) sources of visual material that accompanied the 
news story. The source of news material was 
identified by its written name or logo, or 
sometimes, as 
it was mentioned by the newscaster. If none of these applied, the 
material source was classified as unknown. 
Table below shows the sources of both written and visual materials of VOA satellite 
television station. 
Table 7 
Sources of the News Story- VOA Television 
I- Sources of vv ritten 1 CRIJ 
Name of the Number Percentage 
Source 
Local News 1 1.6% 
Agencies 
Middle East News 6 10.4% 
Agencies 
International News 1 1.6% 
Agencies 
Others 0 _ 
Total 8 13.52% 
2- Sources of 
Visual Material 
Name of the Number Percentage 
Source 
Middle East 5 8.45% 
Televisions 
international 2 3.38% 
Televisions 
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Picture of News 0 
Agencies 
Other 0 
Total 7 11.83% 
Table 7 shows that out of 169 news stories, the sources of 16 stories were quoted. A 
closer look at Table 7 indicates that Middle East News Agencies occupy the top 
position among the known sources with 11 news items. However, examination of 
news material showed that VOA used Middle East sources (Al-Jazeera and Saudi 
Television) only to cover news about terrorist's activities and hostage-taking in the 
region. News from local broadcasting organisations and International news agencies 
were followed in the above table. 
In general, audiences were not told who the sources were. Basically, 86.48 per cent of 
the news stories studied contained anonymous sourcing and in contrast, less than a 
quarter of stories contained some level of transparent sourcing- two of them Middle 
East sources such as Al-Jazeera where the reporter not only identified the sources, but 
also attempted to explained the source's bias or relationship to the subject. 
Generally, the low number of known sources of visual and written materials could 
also highlight the 
fact that VOA used its own materials and is not dependent on a 
wide range of sources for its news. 
Table 8 shows the sources of written and visual news stories of Jam-e-Jam satellite 
television station. 
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Table 8 
Sources of News Stories- Jaam-e-Jam 
1- Sources of Written texts 
Name of the 
Source 
Number Percentage 
Local News 
Agencies 
3 3.24% 
Middles East News 
Agencies 
3 3.24% 
International News 
Agencies 
2 
- 
2.16% 
Others 0 
Total 8 8.64% 
2- Sources of Visual Material 
Name of the 
sources 
Middle East 
Agencies 
0 
Intemational 
Agencies 
Picture News 
Agencies 
3 
0 
3.24% 
Other 0 
Total 3 3.24% 
Roughly 91 per cent of all news stories observed from this station contained 
anonymous sources. 
Of the 108 news stories, Jaam-e-Jam television only 
acknowledged the sources of 
11 news stories in its news period programmes. In 
identifying the sources, there was some attempt by the station to describe the sources' 
level of knowledge or potential biases, especially when Iranian sources were 
mentioned. Only 
2 per cent of the news contained sources without some description of 
their relationship to the events. Table 8 also shows that international news agencies 
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came first with 5 news stories, followed by local and Middle East agencies, each with 
3 news stones. 
In general, Jaam-e-Jam seemed more likely to use blind anonymous sourcing without 
any description of who the source might 
be. 
5.4.10 Types of Visual Material Accompanying News Stories 
The types of visual materials, which accompany the news stories on the two 
stations, are shown 
in table 9. 
Table 9 
Types of Visual Material Accompanying the News Stories 
Types of VOA Jaam-e-Jam 
Materials Number Number 
Video 110 1 
Photographs 
Slides 
Maps 
69 
17 
66 
0 
Cartoons 0 0 
Illustrations 1 0 
Text 
A mixture 
16 
1 
0 
0 
Total 214 67 
Table 9 shows that 214 visual materials accompanied the news stories presented in 
VOA. The most used type of visual material by VOA was video with 110 reports. 
This is followed by photographic and slide materials, with 69 photo and slides. 
Illustration was used in one story and none of the stories used cartoons as visual aids. 
The total number of visual materials in Jaam-e-Jam was 67. Apart from one video 
clip, photos and slides were 
the only type of visual aid used by the station. It is been 
established that video materials are 
by far the most important form of visual aid, 
which has been used effectively only 
by VOA. In general, there are some differences 
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among the two stations in sourcing. Again, VOA reflected a more traditional or fact- 
heavy character as a U. S. News Agency, as it was more likely to run stories with semi 
or fully identified sources. 
5.4.11 The Main Character in the News Story 
The main character in the news story denotes the individual featured in the 
news item and the person at the centre of attention. The main character in the news 
story was classified 
into 6 categories: 
1) The head of state, which marks the highest figure in a state including 
Prime Minister, Head of State, the King, Queen etc. 
2) Government officials such as ministers, ambassadors, under-secretaries 
3) Private sector, which includes company owners, company directors, 
etc. 
4) Commoners such as artists, athletes, inventors, etc. 
5) Corporate bodies that refer to governmental institutions or any group, 
such as environmental groups 
6) Other 
Critics have argued that television news has become personalised or even 
`celebritised', causing journalists to build their stories more around people. To see if 
the VOA news content 
does the same, a content analysis of the protagonist in the 
news content was carried out. 
The material of content analysis shows that at least in 
the study week, the news apparently was not driven by events. 
Overall, around 78 per cent of news stories in VOA, and 47 per cent in Jaam-e-Jam, 
focused at least half of their content on a single personality or government official and 
28 percent of content shown on Jaam-e-Jam was built around institutions. Table 10 
shows the leading character 
in news stories in the two stations. More than 29 per cent 
of news stories 
in VOA were centred around a primary protagonist George Bush was 
this personality 15 per cent of the time. This was followed by the new Iraqi Prime 
Minister, capturing almost 10 per cent of news stories. Other primary protagonists that 
appeared in news stories 
in VOA during the study week were: Saddam with 4 news 
stories, Jordanian 
King with three news stories, Israeli Prime Minister and Indonesian 
president equally with three news stories each, the new Iraqi President with 2 news 
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stories, and Arafat appeared 
in 1 story. The Japanese Prime Minister, Argentinean 
president, and Malaysian Prime Minister are among the primary protagonists that 
appeared in news stories 
in VOA. In Jaam-e-Jam out of 12 news stories built around a 
primary protagonist, 
Saddam appeared in five stories. This was followed by George 
Bush with three stories, the new Iraqi Prime Minister, the Jordanian King, England's 
Royal Family and Prime Minister with one story each. Table 10 also shows that 
government officials occupied 
the top position in both VOA and Jaam-e-Jam stations, 
with a total number of 
54 in VOA and 33 in Jaam-e-Jam. In addition to this, corporate 
bodies came forth in both stations with 12 appearances in VOA and 26 in Jaam-e-Jam 
station. Table 
10 also indicates the over-emphasis of government officials and the 
head of state on the news in both channels. 
Table below shows the main character in the news story in both VOA and Jam-e-Jam 
satellite television stations. 
Table 10 
The Main Character in the News Story in both Stations 
VOA Jaam-e-Jam 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Head of State 42 29.81% 12 12.96% 
Government 54 49.28% 33 35.64% 
Officials 
Private Sector 26 11.42% 16 17.28% 
Officials 
Commoners 11 2.04% 9 9.72% 
Corporate 12 2.43% 26 28.08 
Bodies 
Other 24 8.85% 12 12.96% 
To sum up, VOA and Jaam-e-Jam seem to concentrate on the personalities rather than 
on the events. 
The examination of the contents of news stories in both stations shows 
that about two thirds of all stories were 
built around a single character or institution. 
The findings also show that President Bush was the main protagonist many times in 
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the news stories shown on VOA. Table 
10 shows that the number of news stories with 
reference to government officials or 
heads of state are by far the largest, accounting 
for 96 stories in VOA and 45 in Jaam-e-Jam television. Both stations seemed to build 
their political stories around government officials or politicians. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The results of the content analysis samples show that both VOA and Jaam-e- 
Jam stations emphasise on the news of government officials, institutions, political 
topics, and generally use anonymous sourcing. 
Political news had the largest share in 
the news of the two stations 
indicating the political orientation of the studied 
channels. In their coverage of 
Iraq's situation and Iraq's new interim government no 
debate was offered, no point of view was expressed and no oppositional opinion was 
aired. In Jaam-e-Jam economic, education and cultural stories were centred on 
U. S. 
and other 
Western countries, whereas the Third World, Middle East and Islamic 
countries cam with no stories 
in the above categories. 
During the field study from the 29th of July to the 5`h of July 2004, the Voice of 
America broadcasted news and analysis of the political situation in Iran, most of 
which were of 
four to six minutes in duration. The VOA Persian service was on air 
for just thirty minutes. Such a political broadcast was designed to attract listeners, 
form Iranian political opinion and perhaps stimulate some kind of action among its 
audience. In this way, 
VOA seems to be using people's dissatisfaction of their regime 
and seems to 
be trying to maintaining alliance relationships with the students' 
opposition 
lobby. Jaam-e-Jam, on the other hand, by offering a variety of programmes 
and entertainment, enticed 
an audience bored with the relentless preaching of their 
own TV and radio services. 
The following chapter will examine the usage of language 
in recorded programmes and expose the underlying 
ideologies which produce them. It 
will focuse on talk and 
texts as `social practice', the way that particular ideologies are 
represented as 
`common sense' and `unquestionable' and the way that discursive 
practices could 
have major ideological effects. 
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Chapter Six 
Discourse Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the representation of the news stories as well as the 
ideological functions which they may serve in the two television stations surveyed. It 
builds the case for the present discourse study by trying to discover deeper levels of 
meaning creation, which 
in traditional content analysis can not be analysed. This 
chapter adopts the approach of 
Critical Discourse Analysis which is a part of critical 
linguistics. It aims to analyse language in its social situation and the power derived 
from its manipulation. 
Parker argues that ideology should not be considered as a `thing having content, but 
rather, as 
describing relationships and effects in a particular place and historical 
period (Parker, 
1990). News events are made intelligible against a background of 
culturally shared 
knowledge and journalists apply their social schema strategically in 
the construction of news events. 
Although the models that journalists use for events 
are inherently 
biased in terms of underlying social representations, personal variations 
and deviations are not excluded 
(van Dijk, 1988). These manifest in contradicting 
discourses and therefore, `when ideas of progressive change are built into the 
contemporary political 
discourse, these dynamics are reflected in our everyday 
language' (Parker, 1987). 
For example, the relation between active and passive 
clauses or the absence of 
the agent in clauses expresses ideological choices. Although 
a linguistic 
form has many possible meanings, when it appears in the context of a 
systematically selected range of 
forms, the meaning of each form becomes more or 
less specified. However, selection 
is often merely reproduction of what the speaker 
has already learned (Kress, 
1985). Kress refers to the content-structure of texts as the 
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way in which events are portrayed causally. Events appear in a transactive form 
(arising directly out of an agents action and with a direct effect on a goal) or in a non- 
transactive form (arising as self-caused action or action that happens in an unspecific 
way). The mode chosen is related to the way in which the action is integrated into the 
speaker's ideological system and 
is related to a specific discourse. 
6.2 Approaches to the Study of News Media: Theoretical and 
1V4ethodological Issues 
Discourse Analytical Approach 
In discourse analysis, news text is the object of analysis. News discourse itself 
is a social and cognitive practice. It 
is said that negative reporting is produced by (the 
reproduction of) 
dominant ideologies that are encoded in the structures (that is, the 
content and style) of news 
texts (van Dijk, 1991). Critical discourse analysis focuses 
on the roles of 
ideology and power and their enactment and reproduction through 
discourse. It criticises the ways in which existing power inequalities and 
discrimination are maintained and reproduced through discourse. Discourse has not 
only pragmatic 
functions of persuasion and credibility enhancement, but also socio- 
political functions of 
legitimisation and control. 
6.3 Research Techniques 
In order to examine the structures and meanings of news, a detailed 
qualitative 
discourse analysis is needed. This approach allows for questions to be 
asked about the sorts of social 
identity, the versions of "self' and "other", that the 
media project 
(and about the cultural values that these projections entail) includes 
(van Leeuwen, 2000). In this thesis, in order to analyse the news, two approaches 
have been incorporated. The combination of content and discourse analysis is used as 
separate but complementary research methods. 
The previous chapter tried to examine 
the agenda and attitudes of the programme contents of the two studied satellite 
channels. Content analysis was conducted to ascertain the news agenda and type of 
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production in both Jaam-e-Jam and 
VOA, and also tries to identify the main 
differences in news stories and the way in which the bulletin and news periods are 
constructed, i. e. presenters, running sequence, 
duration, the stories and how they are 
covered on the two television stations. 
This chapter focuses on the language used in 
news programmes 
in both VOA and Jaam-e-Jam satellite channels. The following 
will address the theories that this research will 
draw upon during the process of 
analysis, and starts 
by defining the notion of discourse. The definition discussed here 
is drawn not only from linguistics but also from sociology and politics. 
6.4 Discourse 
Discourse is a term which is variably defined. Saussure asserts that `discourse 
is any linguistic sequence more extended than a sentence' (Saussure, 1959, quoted in 
Laclau, 1993, p. 432). At this level, language is not defined solely by grammatical 
rules. Instead of 
looking at it grammaticality, discourse is observed by its functional 
aspects as part of the communicative event 
(van Dijk, 1997, p. 2). Discourse is then 
seen as an `open system' 
that draws upon semiotic resources, such as text and 
grarnmatical rules, as well as other resources 
in its context (Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough, 1999, p. 19). This point out two aspects of discourse: its form, which is 
derived from grammatical rules, and its function, which is not necessarily defined by 
grammatical rules. 
Discourse studies are devoted to the investigation of the 
relationship between 
the form and function of language communication, with the 
issue of meaning at the centre (Renkema, 1993, p. 1). Instead of looking at the abstract 
or ideal language system or 
the form, it sets out to explore actual language use or the 
function of language (de Beaugrande, 1991, p. 265). Van Dijk proposes that discourse 
has three dimensions: language use, communication of belief and interaction in 
society (van 
Dijk, 1997, p. 2). This three dimensional analysis reconnects language 
with contextual reality, perceiving 
the latter as the precondition of discourse 
constitution 
(Ibid). Hence the hypothesis of discourse theory emerges: discourse is 
constituted by 
its society and, at the same time, is socially constitutive. Since 
discourse has its origin in society, it is not possible to analyse discourse without 
taking its context 
into account. Discourse theory, therefore, examines the larger 
structures of 
discourse, bringing into consideration the social life in which the 
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discourse takes place and the social practices which are related to it. Discourse theory 
examines the relationship 
between the two in order to explain how society influences 
on discourse and vice versa. 
Considering discourse as an `open system' implies that there are many elements 
relevant to the analysis of 
discourse. For this reason, discourse analysis emerges as a 
broad area consisting of many approaches which look at discourse from various 
angles, namely, pragmatics which studies 
the `acts' of signs (discourse); 
psycholinguistics which 
is dedicated to the exploration of people's cognitive 
processing; or socio-linguistics which 
finds correlations between social characteristics 
and discourse. It 
is not within the scope of this investigation to go into detail about 
every discourse analytical approach. 
This investigation will employ a framework 
which belongs to the critical 
discourse analysis approach. The following focuses on 
the review literature concerning critical 
discourse analysis. 
6.5 Critical Discourse 
The notion of discourse is employed across disciplines and takes on 
definitions which vary from one field to another. This thesis will limit the scope only 
to the definition of 
discourse in the linguistic sphere. Robert et al (1992) summarises 
definitions of discourse among linguistic perspectives into five categories: 
a. Language in its social context (Brown and Yule, 1983) 
b. Cohesion and coherence (Halliday and Hasan, 1976) 
c. Strategies for interpreting interactive signs and 
conversations (Gumperz, 1982) 
d. Linguistic unit larger than the level of sentence (Sinclair 
and Coulthard, 1975) 
e. Language as a means for social, political and economic 
values (Foucault, 1972) 
(Robert et al, 1992, p. 70) 
The heterogeneity of discourse definitions has arisen from diverse discursive 
approaches. 
These theories can be categorised into two groups: non-critical and 
critical approaches. 
According to Fairclough, the difference between the two groups 
lies in the scope of their analysis. Non-critical approaches aim at studying various 
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aspects of language as social 
interactions, critical approaches look further to uncover 
power and the 
ideological effects that discourse has on society (Fairclough and 
Wodak, 1997, p. 258). Returning to Robert et al's summary, it can be seen that a. -d. 
belong to non-critical approaches while e. represents the critical approach. Note that 
a. -d. are also 
incorporated into the critical theory. In the following section `critical' 
approaches will 
be discussed. 
6.6 Critical Linguistics 
This chapter draws mainly upon the critical linguistic approach. Therefore, it 
is the aim of this section to introduce the basic idea of critical linguistics (CL). 
Critical linguistics came into being in the late 1970's as a revolt against `uncritical 
and asocial' paradigms such as structural grammar 
(van Dijk, 2001, p. 352). Though 
the precursors of CL may 
be found in the Frankfurt School in the pre-war era, the 
theory formulates its main thesis 
in the work of Roger Fowler (Fowler et al) and 
Robert Hodge and Gunther Kress (Kress and Hodge 1979, Hodge and Kress 1988, 
1993). This critical theory of language is developed from social science theories that 
look at the issue of power, ideology, and social construction, namely that of Michel 
Foucault (1972), Jurgen Habermas (1979,1984), Pierre Bourdieu (1977,1991) and 
Antonio Gramsci (1971). It mainly argues that `discourse is part of and influenced by 
social structure and produced 
in social interaction' (van Dijk, 2001, p. 352). As part of 
the social structure, critical 
linguistics proposes that discourse, that is text and talk, 
may be used to reproduce or resist power abuse, 
dominance, and inequality in society 
(van Dijk, 2001, p. 352). The aim is to promote public awareness about this potential 
of discourse so that 
discourse users understand, and thus are able to resist the social 
inequality produced by text and talk (van Dijk, 2001, P. 352). 
This chapter will focus on the works which provide the basis for the critical discourse 
analysis framework used 
here, namely Fairclough's CDA. 
Basically, discourse is `a system integrated with speakers' knowledge of the world' 
that should be described `in 
linguistic, cognitive and social terms, along with the 
conditions under which speakers use 
it' (de Beaugrande, 1997, p. 40). This is the 
elemental basis of critical 
linguistics. This approach claims that it is not simply a 
method, but an autonomous 
domain with its own characteristic objects, phenomena, 
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theories, principle and methods (van Dijk, 1997, p. 32). Fundamentally, it believes that 
language has more than one dimension. To analyse discourse, its three dimensional 
aspects must be taken 
into consideration: language use, communication belief and 
interaction in socio-cultural contexts (van Dijk, 1997, p. 2). The study of discourse is 
situated at the 
junction of these three dimensions, as it provides an integrated 
description of them. Thus, it can be said that the study of discourse is, by its nature, 
multidisciplinary. 
At the centre of this study lies the issue of the meaning of discourse. This abstract 
meaning is referred to as semantic representations 
(van Dijk, 1997, p. 8). The notion 
signifies less concern 
for the rigid order and form of language and more for its 
meaning. Although 
discourse studies, to a certain extent, denounce the rigid rules of 
grammar, it still argues 
that the actual discourse, featuring breaches of the normative 
rules of appropriate 
discourse, does have some shared and strategies (van Dijk, 1997, 
p. 3 1). Based on this assumption of 
discourse the study's belief denotes that meaning 
is something `assigned' to 
it by discourse users. This, then, presupposes that there is a 
shared starting point 
that people use in making sense of communication (van Dijk, 
1997, p. 8). The approach proposes that in order to understand and interpret discourse, 
the mental component of 
discourse needs to be taken into consideration. Language 
users draw upon certain cognitive processes and representations when they 
communicate 
(Condor and Anataki, 1997). These processes and representations can 
be unique to each individual; this constitutes personal variation in language use. 
Meanwhile as member of a society, each language user has to draw upon some shared 
cognitive rules, values and norms, which enable mutual understanding. Therefore 
successful communication 
is assumed to involve both individual cognition and also 
socio-cultural cognition 
(van Dijk, 1997, p. 17). 
Basically the study of the properties of discourse takes into account complex, higher- 
level properties such as coherence relations between sentences, overall topics and 
schematic 
forms, as well as stylistic and rhetorical dimensions. Apart from structure, 
it suggests that one needs to 
look at the complex communicative event that embodies 
a social context, 
featuring participants as well as production and reception process in 
order to see the actual roles of 
discourse in social interaction. 
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6.7 Political Discourse: Hegemony and Social Antagonism 
To understand the role of human social cognitive processes in the production 
of discourse means that 
fundamentally, discourse users are more or less conscious of 
the production because discourse 
is produced in line with the context interpreted by 
human social cognition. The point that discourse is produced according to the context, 
such as the speaker's social position, situation or aim, 
indicates an assumption that 
discourse is goal-oriented; discourse users aim to produce discourse which is the most 
effective in pursuing 
their aim in that particular context. The generative power of 
discourse is now not only an inherent potential, it is also (consciously or 
unconsciously) 
`manoeuvred' as a tool to pursue the goal of discourse. It is then seen 
more or less 
like a cultural resource which can be used for personal gain. For that 
reason, it has 
become an area of contention; people are struggling to use discourse to 
represent their 
identities, identification or social relationships in pursuit of power. 
This area is a junction where 
discourse theory and social science meet politics. In 
discourse there is no one-to-one correlation between the signified and the signifier, 
and thus discourse 
is a system that can never be totally closed. Discourse users can 
then attempt to partially 
fix a signified and any of the possible signifiers available, 
whichever is most 
desirable to them. This partial fixing relation between the signified 
and signifier 
is called hegemony (Laclau, 1993, p. 21). Hegemony is the central 
interest of critical linguistics; the notion was originally coined by Gramsci (Gramsci, 
1971). It refers to the situation where the power of dominant group is 
integrated in 
laws, norms or habits by the use of discourse. Hegemony occurs when the signified 
can only present 
itself through what is classified as a `floating signifier' or an `empty 
signifier' 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985 quoted in Howarth et al, 2000, p. 8). Words such 
as `politics', 
democracy' or `justice' fall into this category. They provide a fertile 
ground for 
hegemonic discourse. 
According to Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985), the contention in discourse springs from an 
assumption that 
there is social antagonism. Social antagonism is the blockage of 
identity that occurs when people 
have competing identities. The identity of one 
prevents another 
from developing their identity to full (Howarth et al, 2000, p. 10). As 
discourse users adopt competing 
identities that are in conflict with one another, the 
discourse, which is the representation of their identity, is in conflict and competition 
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as well. As a result, the construction and experience of social antagonism are at the 
centre of Laclau and Mouffe's theory. 
6.8 Theoretical Framework 
This section discusses the theories that this investigation will primarily draw 
upon. This chapter uses 
Fairclough's critical discourse analysis. The theory, despite 
being a linguistic approach, is applied to the analysis of media and political discourse 
because it is considered to have the potential for an impact upon society. The 
framework primarily focuses on political discourse, such as, for example, 
Fairclough's study of the discourse of New Labour (Fairclough, 2000a). 
The next section starts with critical discourse analysis (CAD), a proclaimed 
transdisciplinary approach aiming to tackle unequal power relations. 
6.9 Critical Discourse Analysis 
Basically, the theoretical assumptions of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) are: 
a. verbal interaction presupposes structure in our knowledge base, for example, 
social structures, situational types, language codes 
b. actions can also reproduce structure 
From this assumption, it is apparent that the relationship between language and social 
structure is essentially 
dialectic. Texts are socio-culturally shaped as well as socio- 
culturally constitutive 
(Fairclough, 1995b, p. 34). The essence of this theoretical 
framework is presumably to be able render understanding of the processes of 
`naturalisation'. According to the assumptions, the processes can be summed up as 
follows: 
a. ideologies can become, more or less, naturalised and be seen as 
commonsensical rather than serving the interests of certain groups 
b. those naturalised ideologies then become the `knowledge base' and orderliness 
that interaction depends upon 
c. the orderliness of micro events is dependent on the higher orderliness of 
ideological consensus 
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According to Fairclough and Wodak (1997), in order to conduct research, there are 
eight principles of theory which have to be borne in mind: 
1. CDA addresses social problems 
The main focus of CDA is not the language itself or the use of it, but the partially 
linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures (Fairclough and 
Wodak, 1997, p. 271). In other words, CDA is interested in social issues, which are, 
to various degrees, the results or impacts of discourse. It aims to develop critical 
awareness of discursive strategies 
in the general public so that language will no longer 
be a tool manipulated by a powerful group of people to seek more power. 
2. Power relations are discourse 
CDA deals with the issue of language and power. It looks at how power relations are 
exercised and negotiated 
in discourse (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, p. 27). Apart 
from the issue of power in discourse, it also looks at the issue of power over 
discourse. CDA believes that the ability to control and change the rules of discursive 
practice, as well as the structures of the order of 
discourse, can be seen as a means to 
gain power. 
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture 
The relations between discourse and society/culture are dialectical. Discourse 
constitutes society and culture and 
is also constituted by them. According to this 
hypothesis, society is divided into three broad domains so that the impact of discourse 
can apparently be seen: representations of the world, social relations between people 
and people's social and personal 
identities (Fairclough, 1992). 
4. Discourse does ideological work 
By ideologies, CDA refers to particular ways of representing and constructing society. 
This produces unequal relations of power, domination and exploitation. Critical 
awareness emphasises 
the need to determine whether a particular type of discursive 
event does 
ideological work. In order to do so, the analysis of texts, how they are 
interpreted and received, and what social effects they have must be taken into 
account. 
5. Discourse as historical 
Discourse is inseparable from its context. The concept of context here also includes 
intertextuality and sociocultural knowledge. By stating discourse as historical, CDA 
points out the connections 
discourses have with one another. They are connected to 
those produced earlier as well as those produced synchronically and subsequently. 
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6. The link between text and society is mediated 
CDA is an attempt to make connections between socio-cultural structures and 
processes on the one hand, and properties of text on the other. These connections 
between text and society are complex and are therefore mediated by the order of 
discourse. 
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory 
CDA suggests that the process of understanding takes place against the background of 
emotions, attitudes and 
knowledge. In the process, text is deconstructed and 
embedded in its social conditions 
Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, p. 227). That is, when 
text is linked to the issue of ideologies and power. In order to detect this discrete 
process, CDA relies on scientific procedures to 
`denaturalise' it. It then concludes that 
interpretations and explanations are something dynamic and open to new context and 
information. 
8. Discourse is a form of social action 
CDA is a socially committed scientific paradigm. Its principal aim is to uncover 
opaqueness and power relations 
(Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, p. 279). 
CDA analysis is divided into two levels: verbal events or micro events and 
macrostructures such as society. 
CDA sees the latter as both the product of and 
conditions 
for the former. CDA rejects barriers between the study of the micro, of 
which the study of 
discourse is a part of, and the study of macro (Fairclough, 1995a, 
p. 28). CDA proposes 
`intertextual analysis' as a crucial mediator between the micro 
and the macro: the 
text and its context (Fairclough, 1997, p. 189). Intertextuality is 
situated at the 
borderline between discourse practice and text. The notion allows 
oscillation 
between the two levels. CDA is interested in the manipulation of discourse. 
It terms the manipulation of 
discourse `naturalised' ideology. By naturalised ideology, 
it means that language 
is used to win acceptance for S by presenting this view in a 
non-ideological way so 
that it is seen as a `common sense' or as given. The process of 
revealing the mechanism of manipulation 
is, therefore, called `denaturalisation'. `The 
process shows 
how social structures determine properties of discourse and how 
discourse determines social structures' (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 26). 
In order to unravel the discrete process of discourse manipulation, Fairclough 
suggests a framework 
that helps to indicate the impact of discourse in society and vice 
versa. The 
framework consists of three components: text, text 
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production/consumption and sociocultural practice. 
The three components are defined 
as follows: 
"Text may be written or oral, and oral texts may be just spoken (radio) or 
spoken and visual (television). By `discourse practice' I mean the processes of 
text production and text consumption. And by `sociocultural practice' I mean 
the social and cultural goings-on, which the communicative event is a part of' 
(Fairclough, 1995a, p. 57). 
According to the framework, discourse practice mediates between the textual and 
sociocultural practice. 
"Sociocultural practice indirectly shapes text by way of 
shaping the 
discourse practice" (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 60). 
Fairclough by looking at the interface between text and discourse practice, introduces 
intertextual analysis. According to critical linguists such as Kristeva and Barthes, 
discourse does not have a self-contained meaning (Fairclough, 1995; Allen, 2000). It 
takes on meaning in 
its own context. The meaning of discourse has historical as well 
as sociocultural qualities 
built into it. Language acquires its meaning in relation to 
outside forces and 
factors: context, previous texts and culture (Allen, 2000, p. 44). The 
inter-relational quality of discourse prevents it from being interpreted literally. This 
dependency relationship between meaning of discourse and its history and context is 
termed `intertextuality'. 
In this case, intertextual analysis is an attempt to find the 
traces of society in 
discourse and how discourse is designed to interact with society. 
For Fairclough, intertextuality is largely responsible for the heterogeneity of texts. 
The notion "entails a mode of analysis which highlights the diverse and often 
contradictory elements and 
threads which go to make up a text" (Fairclough, 1992, 
p. 102). The 
heterogeneity or the ambivalence of text refers to the presence of various 
meanings co-existing 
in any particular text. This coexistence makes it difficult to 
point out the meaning 
intended by S. "Intertextuality is perceived as the source of 
much of the 
heterogeneity/ambivalence of texts" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 105) because it 
refers to the 
inclusion of various other texts, such as the speech of others. 
Fairclough primarily defines 
intertextuality as the changing articulation of genres. For 
Fairclough, society not only manifests itself in the meaning of its discourse, but also 
through it form of 
discourse, such as its genre. Genre is a kind of text configured by 
the text type, which 
has been developed and conventionalised (Fairclough, 1995). 
Genre is the production of social life, as well as of the society within which the social 
interaction takes place (Fairclough, 2000b). He believes that text does not directly 
initiate genre; text can 
be manifested from complex mixed genres. The recurring 
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pattern of complex mixed genres occurs 
in the same order of discourse (Chouliaraki 
and Fairclough, 1999, p. 
59). These ordered sets of discursive practices are associated 
with particular social 
domains of institutions. The particular domain within which 
discourse takes place is termed its field of discourse (Bernstein, 1990). This existence 
of different genres 
in the same discourse is intertextuality. Intertextual analysis aims 
to describe the intertextual configuration of text. It uncovers how several text types 
may be drawn upon and combined simultaneously, as well as what social purposes 
that formulae of mixed genre may serve. News discourse is a field of discourse where 
there is evidence of intertextuality. It draws upon reported speech and employs a 
variety of genres demonstrated 
by use of different discourse-type choices. The choices 
indicate different genres. For example, a choice indicating a conversational genre 
appears in the 
form of reported speech. 
6.10 CDA Analytical Framework 
As it was mentioned before in discourse analysis, text is analysed in context 
and so words are analysed 
together with their specific syntactic and pragmatic 
functions. Discourse analysis is thus directed at meanings on the pragmatic level of 
communication underlying 
local and global semantic structures. Discourse analysis 
usually works with a checklist of analytical categories, which are divided into 
different levels of analysis. The analyst usually starts by writing up a "summary" 
(following specific rules of global meaning composition) of the text that it represents. 
Although discourse analysis does not allow for large amounts of text to be analysed, it 
is possible to use quantification to summarise the recurrence of particular discourse 
analytical 
indicators, such as topics, argumentation strategies or "topoi", syntactic 
choices for particular actions. 
A checklist may contain the following levels and 
elements of analysis: 
Global Semantics 
The production and processing of news texts is assumed to require cognitive 
operations, the activation of previous 
knowledge, and the updating of existing 
situation models and group- and event-schemata 
(van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983). 
Cognitive relevance is revealed in the physical organisation of news texts. The 
superstructure of news reports 
or news schema consists of a number of conventional 
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categories, which exhibit a special 
linear order as well as hierarchical organisation. 
Superstructures determine what content typically comes first, second, or last in a text 
(Van Dijk, 1988). Some basic elements in the analysis of the global semantic level 
could be: 
a. The topical organisation of news reports. 
b. The order and the prominence of topics within a single news story and among 
several stories. This may be relevant for an understanding of the ideological 
orientation of news stories and agendas. 
c. The connection of 
different thematic areas to the crime theme (entry, asylum, 
cities, poverty, unemployment, cultural difference) in causal explanation, to be 
derived from an analysis of coherence relations in text. For example, in a 
study on the Dutch press van Dijk noted that "crime and deviance may 
combine with cultural differences (in particular, treatment of wife and children 
in Islamic culture)" (van Dijk, 1988, p. 244). 
Local Semantics (Lexicalisation, Perspective, Implicature) 
a. An example could 
be the denominations used for immigrants and the traits 
attributed to them to depict them as different, so as to construct an image of, 
for example, racial violence, which obscures and stigmatises; 
b. The description (or picturing) of details (such as national origin, (religious) 
dress, accent, hairstyle, skin colour, or other phenotypical or cultural features) 
that are irrelevant for a description of the events or situation at hand, but 
supportive of prevailing stereotypes and/or prejudices about the described out- 
groups; 
C. The use of an abundant number of near-synonyms to describe the same group, 
issue or phenomenon (also called over-lexicalisation) as an indicator of the 
importance attributed to a specific trait or issue; 
d. The credibility of quoted speakers may be enhanced or lowered by the 
strategic use of verbs or adverbs with different presuppositions or other forms 
of implicitness. For example migrants, when quoted at all, tend to be assigned 
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lower credibility and less prominence than majority group speakers, whose 
credibility is more frequently enhanced and taken for granted. When 
presenting quotes, journalists may choose verbs, adverbs, or other style 
markers which reinforce negative stereotypes though the representation of the 
out-group as a threat and as not respecting "our" norms for civilised debate 
(Ter Wal, 1996). 
e. The journalist's perspective can be evaluated by considering how she/he 
positions her/himself with respect to the various actors involved in the 
discourse through the use of particular linguistic devices, for example those 
expressing distance vs. identification. Pronouns that can express so-called 
"relational meaning", for example, common belonging ("our traditions are 
threatened") are particularly important. Another example is the use of irony as 
a stylistic marker of distancing; 
f. The absence/presence of explanations that may impose an interpretative 
framework on the events either implicitly or explicitly; 
g. The ways in which responsibility is attributed/downplayed. In the analysis of 
explanations of crime, for example, a distinction can be made between 
circumstantial and personal attributions. The latter form involves a blaming- 
the-victim strategy, while the former may allow for an analysis of wider social 
problems and responsibilities (Van Leeuwen, 1995,1996). 
As it was mentioned before the approaches used in this chapter to analyse the 
recorded news 
texts is critical discourse analysis (CDA). "CDA sees discourse 
(language used in speech and writing) as a form of social practice" (Wodak, 1997, 
p. 173). Discourse 
is "socially consequential" meaning that it can both sustain and 
reproduce the status quo or 
it can transform it (Wodak, 1997, p. 173). Because 
discourse is a form of social practice, "it gives rise to important issues of power" 
(Ibid): 
Discursive practices may have major ideological effects; they can help 
produce and reproduce unequal power relations (between, for instance, social 
classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities) 
through the ways in which they represent things and position people. As a 
result, discourse may be racist or sexist and attempt to pass off assumptions 
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(often falsifying ones) about any aspect of social life as common sense" 
(Wodak, 1997, p. 173). 
Indeed, it is this focus on the relation of language to power that gives discourse 
analysis its critical dimension 
(Riggins, 1997, p. 2). Van Dijk concurs that the most 
crucial task of CDA 
"is to account for the relationships between discourse and social 
power" (van Dijk, 1996). 
"More specifically", he argues, "such an analysis should 
describe and explain how power abuse is enacted, reproduced or legitimised by the 
text and talk of dominant groups or institutions" (Riggins, 1997, p. 2). In other words, 
CDA provides a "description, explanation, and critique of the textual strategies that 
writers use to naturalise 
discourses that is to make discourses appear to be 
commonsense, apolitical statements" 
(Riggins, 1997, p. 2). This aspect of CDA is 
important because the ideological importance of speech and text and "the relations of 
power which underlie them are often unclear to people" 
(Wodak, 1997, p. 174). CDA 
thus "aims to make more visible these opaque aspects of discourse" (Wodak, 1997, 
p. 174). 
How are these hidden aspects of discourse uncovered? Wodak suggests an 
interdisciplinary approach that takes into account the historical context of the 
discourse (Wodak, 1989, p. xv). History is an important aspect of CDA because as 
Wodak writes, "social processes are dynamic, not static" (Wodak, 1989, p. xvi). 
Wodak argues that interdisciplinary research is necessary "because social phenomena 
are too complex to 
be dealt with adequately in only one field" (Wodak, 1989, p. xvi). 
The next step in CDA is "diagnosis". Diagnosis involves making "mechanisms of 
manipulation, 
discrimination, demagogy and propaganda explicit and transparent" 
(Wodak, 1989, p. xiv). However, here CDA becomes methodologically weak. While 
diagnosis is defined, any method on how diagnosis should proceed is not provided. 
Shore and Wright suggest using the process of "studying through: tracing the ways in 
which power creates webs and relations 
between actors, institutions and discourses 
across time and space" 
(Shore and Wright, 1997, p. 14). From this approach, the 
questions to 
be addressed are: "`Whose voices prevail? ' and `How their discourses are 
made authoritative? 
"' (Shore and Wright, 1997, p. 15). 
The process of `studying through' enables the researcher to uncover patterns in data. 
As Potter and Wetherall explain, patterns emerge in two forms: as differences in 
either content or 
form, or as consistencies (Potter and Wetherall, 1987, p. 168). 
Identifying how accounts or texts either share similar features or are different from 
175 
each other is the 
first phase in Potter and Wetherall's method of discourse analysis. 
The second phase involves analysing the function and consequence of language use. 
In this phase, the researcher forms hypotheses about the functions and effects of a 
particular discourse and searches 
for linguistic evidence (Potter and Wetherall, 1987, 
p. 168). 
The final process in CDA is interpretation (Wodak, 1989, p. xvi). Interpretation 
involves "understanding how and why reality is structured in such a way" (Wodak, 
1989, p. xiv). At the interpretation stage, "most critical discourse analysts take an 
explicit political stance, 
identifying with those who lack the institutional levers to 
produce counter 
discourses" (Riggins, 1997, p. 3). The goal of the analysts is that 
"their work will contribute to social emancipation" (Ibid). Does taking a critical 
approach mean that research 
is one-sided and hence less valid? It is true that every 
analyst might 
inject his or her own personal theory consciously or unconsciously into 
the work of application. The difference 
is that critical discourse analysts "state these 
values explicitly" 
(Wodak, 1989, p. xv). It must be remembered however, that CDA 
assumes that 
"all explanations are merely points of view", including one's own 
(Brown, 1998, p. 207). The goal is to be critical of "explanations that ignore 
alternative interpretations" 
(Brown, 1998, p. 207). As will be shown, both VOA and 
Jaam-e-Jam news discourse on Iraq's war has ignored alternative interpretations of 
war as anything other than 
the U. S. government's point of view. 
6.11 Political Language in News 
Edelman argues that to deal with the uncertainty that life holds, people often 
turn to religion and government 
"to cope with anxieties they cannot otherwise 
manage" (Edelman, 
1998, p. 131). It is easily recognised that religious language has 
the power to both "excite and mollify 
fears", but it is "seldom recognised that politics 
can do so as well" 
(Edelman, 1998, p. 131). But the language of politics is just as 
potent as the 
language of religion. In a setting where people turn to the government to 
deal with concerns of crime, terrorism and the economy, "linguistic cues evoke pre- 
structured beliefs regarding 
the nature and causes of public problems" (Edelman, 
1998, p. 131). People are susceptible to political language because it generally comes 
from "sources people want to believe are authoritative and competent enough to cope 
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with threats" (Edelman, 
1998, p. 132). Thus, while the beliefs we hold about 
controversial issues may 
be problematic, "they are likely to be accepted uncritically 
because they serve important functions for peoples' self-conceptions and justify their 
political roles" 
(Edelman, 1998, p. 132). 
Stability in discourses result because the rhetoric of both sides becomes 
institutionalised "minimising the chance of major shifts [in opinion] and leaving the 
regime wide discretion, 
for there will be anticipated support and opposition no matter 
what forms of action or 
inaction occur" (Edelman, 1998, pp. 18-19). This 
"linguistically generated process" of polarising concerned groups "gives the political 
process an appearance of 
dynamism and tension that rarely has any bearing upon its 
outcomes" (Edelman, 
1998, p. 20). 
Thus, Edelman argues that our social problems, and the subsequent response of the 
public to these problems, are constructed, or at 
least manipulated. But this 
construction 
is not always deliberate. In the case of public opinion, it usually "echoes 
the beliefs authorities deliberately or unconsciously engender by appealing to fears or 
hopes that are always prevalent" (Edelman, 1977, p. 50). What are the fears that 
continuously plague 
the public? According to Edelman, suspicions of the poor and 
unconventional are unconsciously close 
to the surface for many (Edelman, 1977, 
p. 50). This 
is evident when one considers "which kinds of observations of social 
problems readily come 
to attention and remain vivid and which kinds are seldom 
noticed" (Edelman, 
1977, p. 14). Political language becomes "especially vivid and 
memorable when the 
terms that denote depict a personified threat: an enemy, deviant, 
criminal or wastrel" 
(Edelman, 1977, p. 14). 
Edelman provides an interesting analysis of the political construction of enemies. He 
regards the construction of 
enemies as "a frequent and recurring form of political 
categorisation" 
that has some "striking characteristics" (Edelman, 1977, pp. 32-34). 
For example, the categorisation of enemies is often controversial as not everyone 
holds that the targeted groups are actually enemies. "The very fact that their 
categorisation 
is controversial seems to intensify the fears of those who do perceive 
them as threats, 
for their own rationality is at stake. Believe in the reality of this 
enemy becomes 
the test of their credibility and the touchstone of their self-esteem" 
(Edelman, 1977, pp. 32-34). In addition, those defined as enemies are usually a 
marginalized, 
"relatively powerless segment of the population" (Edelman, 1977, 
pp 32-34). 
Another characteristic of political enemies is that they "are thought to 
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operate through covert activities" 
(Ibid). Thus, while they may act and dress as 
normal citizens, 
"they are really engaging in secret subversion, dangerous to others 
and themselves" 
(Ibid). In this way, enemies are separated from "legitimate 
antagonists" who are 
depicted as openly hostile yet humanly equal opponents 
(Edelman, 1988, p. 67). 
Language is an important part in the construction of enemies. First of all, while 
"language ostensibly depicts its referent as the enemy, it is directed as well against 
people who 
fail to share its point of view" (Edelman, 1988, p. 73). In the construction 
of drug users as enemies, 
terms such as junkie or pusher "challenge the ideology of 
humanists and liberals and associate them with the named enemy" (Edelman, 1988, 
p. 74). This type of 
language creates polarisation. "By intensifying the debate it makes 
the issue more salient and attracts support and resources 
for both sides" (Edelman, 
1988, p. 74). 
Second, "the language of enmity erases reasonable calculation and perspective and 
overwhelms consciousness" 
(Edelman, 1988, p. 75). The result is a "loss of 
perspective" particularly concerning what measures should 
be taken against the 
enemy (Edelman, 
1988, p. 75). As Edelman argues, "for a time it was common in 
some American states 
to sentence people convicted of possession of small amounts of 
marijuana to prison 
for forty years, an action manifestly related to an assumption 
about the 
inherent evil in the person rather than to the harm that comes from smoking 
pot" (Edelman, 
1988, p. 75). 
Thus, the political construction of enemies provides linguistic cues which "engender 
intense emotion and punitiveness" (Edelman, 1977, p. 33). Enemies are regarded as 
such "a serious 
threat that their physical existence, their most characteristic ways of 
thought and feeling, or 
both must be exterminated or ruthlessly repressed" (Edelman, 
1977, p. 33). Often, the creation of enemies goes hand in hand with another political 
linguistic device: the national crisis. Edelman argues that the word "crisis" is perhaps 
the most powerful political 
term as it "connotes a threat or emergency people must 
face together... it suggests a need for unity and common sacrifices" (Edelman, 1977, 
p. 45). While crises are 
frequent occurrences, "it is politically necessary to accept each 
crisis as unique, unexpected 
[and] a blatant deviation from the usual state of affairs" 
(Edelman, 1977, p. 46). By perceiving each crisis as unique, we are less hesitant to 
make the sacrifices necessary 
to overcome it: 
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"The belief in a crisis relaxes resistance to governmental interferences with 
civil liberties and bolsters support for executive actions, including 
discouragement or suppression of criticism and governmental failure to 
respond to it. The recurrence of crises is bound to encourage less critical 
acceptance of governmental actions that would otherwise be resisted" 
(Edelman, 1977, pp. 48-49). 
Thus, the concept of crisis, particularly if it concerns the threat of enemies, is a 
powerful linguistic 
device. 
As it will be shown later, Iran's nuclear activity is portrayed to be an international 
crisis. The idea that 
Iran is about to produce nuclear missiles implies a threat of 
takeover of the enemy. The "crisis" of Iran's nuclear activity is especially powerful 
because it is a "condensation symbol" (Elwood, 1994, p. 4). As Elwood explains, 
condensation symbols are 
"names, words, phrases, or maxims that evoke discrete, 
vivid impressions 
in each listener's mind and also involve those listeners' most basic 
values" (Elwood, 
1994, p. 4). Thus, the word "crisis" gives the listener an impression 
of a serious threat and 
invokes heroic values such as self-sacrifice that should triumph 
at all costs. 
The representation of conflict 
in the media has given rise to a crises discourse. This 
study uses crises 
discourse to analyse the news stories. The media sensationalises 
crises when they can 
be reported as profoundly disturbing `normal' life and have an 
institutional context. Three sets of roles are characteristic of crisis reports. These are: 
perpetrators, objects/victims, and authorities 
(Bruck, 1992). The media 
sensationalisation of crises also 
involves a reporting technique, that Bruck (1992) 
calls `spectacularisation'. 
A spectacle is a social relation among people mediated by 
images. It allows readers to participate vicariously in the reported crises, whilst being 
protected by the assurance of 
being a distanced observer. And when readers are 
vicariously 
involved in the crises, reporters can subtly cast protagonists and 
antagonists. 
Stigmatisation of antagonists and labelling has been said to justify 
behaviour towards those 
labelled in a way which would otherwise be considered 
unacceptable. 
Gerbner (1992) points out that: 
"Stigma is a mark of disgrace which evokes disgraceful behaviour... 
classifying some people as criminals permits dealing with them in ways 
otherwise considered criminal... Proclaiming them enemies makes it 
legitimate to attack and kill them... Stigmatisation and demonisation isolate 
their targets and set them up to be victimised" (Gerbner, 1992, p. 97). 
In this case, `language is used to constitute status and roles which justify claims to 
power, and to stigmatise opposition 
forces as `deviant' assigning them to subservient 
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roles' (Fowler, 
1985). In media reports, `certain groups are defined as illegal to justify 
authorities in treating 
them as problems of justice' (van Dijk, 1987). Similarly, 
violence can be seen as a physical show of 
force which demonstrates who has power 
to impose what, on whom, and the circumstances under which this 
imposition can 
take place. It functions to 
designate winners versus losers, and victimisers versus 
victims. Violence 
in stories symbolises threats to human integrity and to the 
established order. 
Violent stories often demonstrate how in the process of restoring 
order, the threats are combated, and 
the (deviant) violators are victimised (Gerbner, 
1992). 
Another powerful linguistic 
device is the metaphor. Metaphor, according to Elwood, 
is important for two reasons. "First metaphors can evoke strong emotional responses 
in listeners. Second, metaphors provide both 
information and perspectives through 
which listeners can understand 
issues" (Elwood, 1994, p. 22). Thus, metaphors are 
more than just 
figurative language (Elwood, 1994, p. 22). "They constitute the ways to 
think about issues, they are 
the issues as people experience, feel, and believe them" 
(Elwood, 1994, p. 22). As 
it will be shown later, both studied television channels 
regarded the 
U. S. invasion of Iraq as a part of the war against terrorism. The linguistic 
importance of the `War on Terrorism' metaphor 
is important. For example, by using 
the metaphor of war to conceptualise 
the issue, politicians and policy makers can use 
the tools of war to advance 
their cause. One such tool is wartime propaganda and the 
manipulation of 
language to advance the goals of one side (Brekle, 1989, p. 83). The 
purpose of wartime propaganda 
is to rouse feelings, "feelings of fear or timidity, the 
will to win or the 
impulse to destroy" (Brekle, 1989, p. 83). These feelings are 
"evoked by particular groups 
in positions of power who are interested in the 
emergence or 
the continuance of a particular state of war" (Brekle, 1989, p. 83). Thus, 
wartime propaganda 
is "designed to control, not to inform" (Alexander, 1990, p. 61). 
While the war metaphor may 
hinder our ability to discuss the issue in an intelligent 
manner, other 
linguistic factors are equally important in determining how we 
conceptualise 
different issues. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how 
language shapes political action. 
I argue that in order to make the news text explicit 
we must understand 
the interplay between language and politics. 
When it comes to politics, the use of language is an important element in the creation 
of meaning. 
As Edelman argues, "the key tactic must always be the evocation of 
interpretations that legitimise 
favoured courses of action and threaten or reassure 
180 
people so as to encourage 
them to be supportive or to remain quiescent" (Edelman, 
1988, p-104). This type of language use is called "goal language", it is persuasive and 
it gives the public "a badge to wear" 
(Apthorpe, 1997, p. 44). Goal language helps to 
define the style or "gaze" of policies. As Shore and Wright argue, "it is an important 
aspect of how policy creates affect and effect' 
'(Shore and Wright, 1997, p. 21). 
The following is based on an analysis of recorded sample of news stories, which were 
broadcasted on VOA and Jaam-e-Jam International satellite television channels 
during the field study. The programme chosen for analysis in Jaam-e-Jam is a news 
and commentary programme called 
`Rooz va Shab' (Day and Night), which is a series 
of programmes 
devoted to projecting the station's thought and reflects its opinion on 
the issues of the day. 
The main news bulletins in VOA also were selected for this 
analysis. The news stories are 
analysed within a discourse analytic framework. The 
purpose of this analysis 
is to investigate the portrayed images and the language used 
in reporting the crises 
in both stations. Current news implicitly show U. S. political 
ideology and perpetuate some of the 
images, which VOA in particular adopts as 
American style, implicitly as news. The 
intention of this investigation is to, within a 
discourse analytical framework, make these 
images explicit to allow alternative ways 
of constructing crises situations portrayed 
in news. 
6.12 VOA, Persian Language Satellite Channel 
The result of content analysis shows overwhelming political news and political 
comments 
in both stations. The acute animosity that characterised Iranian-American 
relations after 
the theocratic regime seized power is clearly reflected in the 
propaganda 
disseminated by both sides. The important role of the VOA Persian 
service is to 
keep as clear an image of the U. S. as possible before the Iranian people, 
when the Iranian regime 
has portrayed the U. S. as the source of the greatest possible 
threat to Iran. 
The pattern of news in VOA during the field study reveals an 
extraordinary effort 
to get the U. S. 's viewpoint on the war on Iraq and Iranian events 
across to the 
Iranian people. However, this coverage has omitted a series of 
significant 
facts; the full scope of the U. S. military invasion and Iraqis demand for 
their withdrawal 
has been conveniently ignored. VOA in its broadcasts has failed to 
mention the gradual emergence 
of anti-U. S. sentiments throughout Iraq, leading their 
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audience to believe that the 
insurgents are nothing more than disgraceful terrorists and 
Al-Qaida agitators. 
Themes: 
The following themes have been identified in the way in which VOA 
television portrays crises in its news: 
1. Iran as a destructive threat to the world order and world peace. 
2. Portraying full support for U. S. foreign policy and U. S. 
occupation of Iraq 
3. Implicit support for the Israeli government in its oppression 
of Palestinians 
4. Portraying Palestinians as deviant warmongers 
5. Using television service as an instrument of America's 
diplomatic relations with the Iranian people, supporting and 
voicing the regime's oppositions both inside and outside the 
country, especially in regards to the student uprising 
6. Launching an implicit attack on Islamic ideology and 
misusing Islamic values for its own purposes 
A discussion of each of these themes through news stories follows. 
1. Iran as a destructive and a threat to the world order and world 
peace 
VOA in its coverage vividly demonstrates that it remains by and large 
consistent with 
the government's line and its policies. One clear example of this is the 
VOA's coverage of Iran's alleged nuclear activities. In the main news bulletin on the 
30th of June, 2004 VOA reported 
detailed news about Iran's nuclear activities. The 
news was reported 
in a commentary section called "The Washington's View; A 
Description of US Policy". 
Hence the title of this section already reflects the U. S. 
government's official 
policy. It should be noticed that during the study week, this was 
the only time that news about 
Iran's nuclear activities was reported. The news was 
combined with portraits 
of the U. S. 's views on the subject, tales of the devastating 
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impacts of Iran's nuclear activities on human society, and the terror that accompanies 
Iran's activities. In this broadcast, in which only the U. S. government's accounts of 
the event were given, Iran 
is portrayed as actively destructive and as a threat to world 
security, as reflected 
in the following news: 
The duration of news lasted for three minutes and twelve seconds. 
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The news in English: 
Iran has announced that it will reactivate the reproduction of `centrifuges' which 
are used 
in uranium enrichment. These `centrifuges' are main parts for 
producing 
Atomic weapons. 
The United States and other countries believe that Iran has concealed its 
development of nuclear weapons under the coverage of `using nuclear power to 
produce electricity'. 
John Bolton, the U. S. Foreign Secretary, regards Iran's 
actions as a means of 
dispute and disobedience and as a finger into the 
international community's eye. 
(VOA, 30 June 2004) 
It is interesting to note that evidence 
is omitted when John Bolton suggests that "Iran 
concealed 
its development of nuclear weapons under the coverage of using nuclear 
power to produce electricity". 
Although there is no evidence to back this up, the news 
implies the idea of Iran's activity as a threat. As stated earlier in this chapter, the idea 
that Iran's nuclear activities cause a 
threat to the world is an important image in 
prohibitionist 
discourse. It is an image that is seized by the government. Moreover, in 
the first part of the news, 
the superficial image given is that Iran has done the right 
thing in announcing 
its reactivation of the uranium enrichment process. However, 
there is a sting 
in the tail; it implies that the end product of this process is something 
that is the `main part 
in producing Atomic weapons'. The assumption of the high 
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potential danger of 
Iran's boycotts is implied in that the additional words `building 
atomic weapons' 
is newsworthy enough to hit the audience and shape their 
assumption of what 
is going on. This image of Iran as deceptive and destructive is 
exploited in conjunction with 
the international community. 
In the second part of the news the visual pattern between the two sentences is 
revealing. `The 
United States and other countries' are the main headings. In the 
second sentence, 
`John Bolton' is first. If one associates the word `believe' with other 
words, it suggests that 
U. S. policy is considered to be a worldwide belief. There is a 
suggestion that 
Iran, in its U. S. proposed concealment actions is active in causing the 
animosity, should 
take the blame. In the first sentence the phrase `the U. S. and other 
countries' is used, which could suggest 
that all constituencies of the world community 
are equally party 
to the decision, but that Iran, as an antagonist, is excluded. This 
portrays Iran, the antagonist, as 
being deviant from other countries and the rest of the 
world community. 
Effectively, this could stigmatise Iran through a divide and rule 
strategy. 
The news ends with a metaphor to 
illustrate a point. The use of figurative language 
signals causal register, especially 
when the metaphor compares official matters with 
something 
less than conventional. The metaphor (a finger into the international 
community's eye) 
is used to describe Iran's activities and implies that Iran has 
endangered the 
international community through its harmful and destructive action. 
As a result, this can stir up 
feelings of enmity towards Iran's government and, in the 
process, projects 
the U. S. as the international peacekeeper who cares for the public 
interest. The appearance of such 
informal style, marked by the use of metaphor 
within the context of 
news discourse creates incongruity and intertextuality. This 
informal language within the 
formal discourse creates a stark change in genre 
articulation. 
This `level one intertextuality' creates incongruity which is potentially 
humorous (Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough, 1999). Here also, the impression that `Iran 
challenges 
international authorities and therefore, is deviant', is intensified. This also 
can be seen 
in the following news report, where U. S. accusations of intimidation are 
reported. 
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News in English: 
Iran has not yet officially declared to have been involved in enriching uranium, a 
process that brings Iran even closer to developing a nuclear bomb. John Bolton 
said: 'however this can not 
be a reason to put our thoughts at ease, to me it is 
absolutely clear that 
Iran is not producing these "centrifuges" to decorate 
Iranian living rooms. (VOA, 30 June 2004) 
A sirnilar image is portrayed in this news report as well. In the second line the 
ambiguity of 'even closer' 
is effective. Using this phrase creates the impression that 
the process has definitely already been started. This impression is then contradicted 
with the words 'not 
been officially declared". Immediately, the U. S. takes on the 
status of a misjudged victim of 
Iran's criminal activities. The words 'it is not a reason 
to put thoughts at case' implies a relationship between Iran's refusing to be truthful 
and the U. S. 's 
lacking trust of Iran, which it rightfully should have. The sequential 
order serves to 
implicitly acknowledge the U. S. 's position and responsibility and then 
attributes this to 
Iran's wilful defiance of the U. S. and international communities. The 
news also uses sarcasm when 
it says: "Iran is not producing those centrifuges to 
decorate Iranian living roomsý'. This sarcasm can be explained as deductive logic in 
the form of an enthymeme. Enthymeme is a kind of argument which requires 
dialectical interaction between speaker and listener to complete its logic (van 
Ecrneren et al, 1997, p. 213). In here this sarcasm is used to imply that the U. S. is not 
niisleading the 
issue and implicitly suggests that even ordinary people should be able 
to understand the danger posed 
by Iran. 
News in Persian: 
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The news in 
IN4r. Dolton says: Iran still pursues a strategic decision to develop nuclear 
weapons. This must be treated as a threat to world peace and international 
security, which must addressed 
by the United Nations Security Council. 
john Bolton says: We can not let Iran, that is, the main international terrorist 
ally, be able to develop 
the most destructive weapons with the equipments, which 
allow them to reach to 
Europe, Central Asia, Middle East and beyond. (VOA, 30 
june 2004) 
In addition to the use of threatening language, VOA also employs what Edelman calls 
--slippery definitions" (Edelman, 1988, p. 109). VOA classifies Iran using very 
interesting terminology. In the above news, Iran is classified as a "threat to the world 
peace and international security". 
This ranking puts Iran in line with criminal 
activities. Moreover, 
in the first line, the words 'strategic' and 'decision to develop 
nuclear weapon' suggest planning and 
direction. A 'strategy' typically looks forward 
in direction. The use of the word 'strategic' also adds to the war metaphor. Strategy 
and strategic manoeuvres are part of war 
discourse, implying that one is 'outsmarting' 
an enemy. it suggests that a war 
is about to occur. While creating anxiety through the 
use of threatening 
language, it also assuages this anxiety by reassuring that the U. S. 
will alleviate this crisis. 
In symbolic terms, it encourages international solidarity and 
the coming together of the international community to fight the destruction attributed 
to Iran's action. Thus, by 
first presenting Iran as a universal threat and then using 
reassurance to 
invoke international solidarity, it can convert an essentially repressive 
campaign into an 
international movement in the public's mind. 
N40reover, besides presented within an image of being deceptive, Iran is also 
presented as 
destructive and disruptive of peace, stability and world security. The 
strong emotive connotations of 
'threat to international peace and security' makes Iran 
seem fanatical. 
Although no people are mentioned here, 'international' implies that 
the international community 
is the victim of Iran destructiveness. Iran is expressed as 
4; a chief supporter of 
international terrorist'. Such a label excludes an alternative 
image of Iran as demanding its right to use nuclear energy for civil purposes from 
those in international communities and leadership positions. Instead, an image is 
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constructed of Iran as 
destructive and intending to attack world civilisation and 
international authorities who are responsible for sustaining order in international 
community. 
The presentation of the above news demonstrates how, by a careful selection of the 
facts and the calculated way in which bulletin is constructed, institutions, political 
topics, institutions, political topics, 
VOA applies itself to a propaganda campaign 
against Iran that 
does not involve outright deceit. However, what was omitted from 
the script is just as significant as what was actually transmitted. While the VOA 
described Iran's nuclear activities from the U. S. government's official point of view, 
it fails to present the Iranian perspective to go along with John Bolton's discourse of 
the event. If this was 
done, one could clearly differentiate between the journalistic 
account of the news and 
the voice of the United States government, as personified by 
the VOA. The latter seems to 
be the case since the VOA uses the U. S. government 
official as the only source 
for reporting Iran's nuclear activities. Here, the attitude of 
the Bush Administration towards 
Iran is adopted by VOA, which directly involves 
American foreign policy towards Iran and uses the nuclear crisis to expose, weaken 
and isolate the present government 
in Iran, supporting the view for its eventual 
elimination and replacement 
by the friendly United States. Even if VOA's 
responsibility 
to the United States government is accepted, this application of using 
only U. S. government 
official sources in reporting the above matter is most 
questionable and requires 
justification. Such a broadcast is an indication of the type of 
the picture the VOA 
is prepared to present to its audience. The VOA did not mince its 
words when a 
U. S. -account of events is thought to be necessary and considered most 
effective 
by their standards. What is certain is that the Iranian nuclear crisis represents 
another crucial point 
in the history of international broadcasting. The episode is 
certainly characterised 
by familiar propaganda, rhetoric and continuous sparring of 
claims, counter-claims 
and threats that has been a feature of all crises in the age of 
mass communication. 
Here the objective of U. S. propaganda is to get the audience to 
accept the 
U. S. 's view of events, and as a subsidiary aim, to shake their faith in the 
regime of 
Iran. 
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2. Portraying a full support for the US foreign policy and US invasion 
of Iraq 
Looking at the VOA coverage of Iraq in depth shows that, the station has been 
engaged in a continuous and strenuous effort 
to defend the U. S. military intervention 
in Iraq. Voice of America broadcasts on Iraq reflects U. S. governmental policy, as the 
invasion of Iraq, which was aggression against another country, has never been called 
into question. In Iraq's scenario, VOA is seen to play as important a role during the 
invasion of Iraq, as it has been involved in psychological warfare operations since 
Iraqi and foreign opinion are essential 
in securing the success of the U. S. invasion. On 
the whole, VOA broadcast on 
Iraq seems to follow a rather predictable course. Most 
news is concerned with 
the alleged rapid-return to normality and stability which has 
been disrupted by a few remaining terrorists and Al-Qaida agents. Such reportage was 
combined with a propaganda attack on any resistance 
towards U. S. military action in 
Iraq and elaborates VOA's efforts to 
legitimise the U. S. 's decisions and actions. 
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The News in English: 
Today the warmongers under Zarghavils control freed three Turk hostages due 
to the fact they were Muslims. However, one report indicates the hostage takers 
murdered a U. S. army engineer. 
Today, AI-Jazeera television -station broadcasted a video report indicating that 
the three Turks that were taken hostage by the "Towhead & Jihad Movement" 
in Iraq had been freed. In statement read out by the hostage-takers, they 
explained that the release of the 
hostages was due to the demonstrations made 
against the Bush administration and 
the war in Iraq during the last few days. in 
another incident, a group of militants claims to have killed an American soldier, 
, Who they had in captivity 
for several months. Yesterday, Al-Jazeera teievision 
reported that 'Tim 
Maphin', a U. S. army engineer was shot dead by his hostage- 
takers. Meanwhile, only a day after the transfer of power to the new interim 
government, the 
Iraqi people showed great optimism towards their future and 
demanded that their new government restore the necessary security to their 
broken country. (VOA, 29 June 2004) 
1-Jere, what seem to be the matter for VOA is the appearance of objectivity when it is 
actually not objective at all. 
In other words, here credibility, balance and truth are 
used to sell a political message 
in much the same way one would use overt 
propaganda techniques. 
The word 'setizeh-jou' (warmonger) is used in the first 
sentence, which 
indicates that VOA propagandists had chosen their words with great 
care. This also 
indicates the level of their sophistication, for the Persian-speaking 
people of Iran, the 
term 'setizeh-jou' (warmonger) has a uniquely negative meaning 
that conjures up images of a 
hired insider enemy. Here, one can speculate about the 
effects of the words 
'warmongers' and 'U. S. army' being used in the first two 
sentences, which seems 
to be a tactic which relies on the readers' tendency to 
recOgnise the two parties 
juxtaposed to one another as being in opposition to each 
other, and to preserve authority, 
indirectly supporting the U. S. army as opposing to 
the deviant warmongers. 
Moreover, VOA declines to describe the crisis as an 
uprising, preferring 
instead to use a term such as warmongers to refer to the 
I 
oppositions. The word's unique political connotation detracts attention away from the 
real nature of the event and reinforces 
their characterisation as troublesome and war- 
lovers. The news also talks about the transfer of power to the new interim 
goverment. Here the reassuring claims of success (where it says: Iraqi people 
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showed great optimism towards their 
future) is interspersed with threatening language 
(about the warmongers kidnapping and killing people) used tQ justify the U. S. 's 
continuing occupation of Iraq. 
Also in the first few sentences of the above news, there is a dominant trend to present 
anti-Bush and anti-war 
demonstrators negatively with a suggestive remark of a direct 
link with the terrorists and demonstrators and also with the Muslim faith as well. 
Here, the emphasis on the release of hostages seems to be based on the correlation 
with their faith and nationality, and since the station had already reported anti-war 
protests in Turkey, they are therefore able to portray Muslim Turkish demonstrators 
as terrorist agents. Furthermore, the news says: 'Al-Jazeera television, reported that 
Tirn N4aphin, a U. S. army engineer, was shot dead by his hostage-takers'; This casts 
doubt on the AI-Jazeera as a chosen station by terrorists and also refers to the 
particular images and stories that this station 
broadcasts as a mouthpiece of terrorists, 
which implies that the station 
is involved in criminal activities. Then straight after 
this, it goes on about the killing of a U. S. soldier by militants, again using the same 
tactic of placing the U. S. soldier and warmongers juxtaposed in opposition and 
creating the two poles of good and evil, again reinforcing the suggestion that the U. S. 
soldier is a victim of those evil warmongers. 
What VOA has done here is it has 
disguised propaganda as news and information, which is something that Nicholas 
pronay has called 'propaganda with facts' (in Taylor, 1992, p. 19). The news ends up 
projecting a favourable picture of the 
U. S. in this situation. For example, VOA reports 
that: only a day after the transfer of power to the new interim government, Iraqi 
people showed great optimism 
towards their future, and demanded their new 
government restore the necessary security to their 
broken country'. Accordingly this 
broadcast asserts the total conformity and support from VOA towards the new Iraqi 
government without even questioning 
it in any way and also asserts that there is no 
resistance and that all of 
the people in Iraq are grateful to the United States. In other 
words, the U. S. 
invasion has been portrayed as having been valuable to Iraq and that 
r1ovv people are 
demanding the restoration of law and order such that the continuation 
of the U. S. occupation of 
Iraq is necessary and justified. Such a message however, 
does bare the risk of such an interpretation and therefore, does jeopardize the VOA's 
relationship with the 
Iranian audience, but at the same time portrays VOA as an 
instrument of U, S* Policy, 
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3. Implicit support for the Israeli government in its suppression of 
Palestinians 
Given its political and strategic implications, the VOA broadcast of the 
conflict was carefully worded, as 
it is clear to see the deliberation that must have gone 
into phrasing the following news. It starts by focusing primarily on the news story, yet 
at the same time, expresses sympathy 
for Israelis and provides justification for their 
actions. VOA coverage of 
Palestine and Israel conflict demonstrates a pro-Israel bias 
and illustrates 
how the VOA is directly involved in American policy towards 
Palestine. In the following news, VOA shows a tendency to replicate Israeli 
government officials' version of 
the events. 
The news in Persian: 
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The news in English: 
In another incident in the `Gaza Strip', hundreds of Palestinians went off in the 
street while attending 
the funeral of a man who they "claimed" to have been 
killed by Israeli's forces while watching the combat through his home's window. 
$owever, as the Israeli army spokesman says: the only bullet that was shot in 
that area was towards an armed warmonger who was trying to escape from 
Israeli forces. (VOA, 4 July 2004) 
In this news, Palestinians are portrayed to be disturbing and attacking authorities who 
are responsible 
for sustaining order in society. Here the image of the Palestinians' 
participation 
in a funeral is portrayed as destructive and disruptive of social stability, 
as their attempt 
is considered to be something which "goes off'. The potential danger 
of Palestinian 
is assumed in that the words `went off are newsworthy enough to be in 
the head sentence. 
The other Persian word which is used later in the news, namely, 
"Badeaa kardand" meaning `made accusations', also suggests that Palestinians are not 
truthful in their account of 
the event. Here, an image of Palestinians as projecting their 
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own untruthful side of story onto the Israeli army in an accusatory fashion is created. 
Simultaneously, another image of the Israeli army's imperviousness to the 
circumstance of killing a man 
is suggested. Therefore, immediately, the Israeli army 
takes on the status of a misjudged victim of the Palestinians accusations. Moreover, 
the sequential order serves to implicitly acknowledge the difficulties between 
Palestinians and Israelis, and attributes this to Palestinians wilful defiance of Israeli 
authority. 
4. Portraying Palestinians as deviant warmongers 
The news in Persian: 
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The news in English: 
In the Middle East, Palestinian warmongers, for the second day in a row, 
continue to fire missiles 
towards the south of Israel. Meanwhile, the Israeli army, 
in ail operation, tried to stop these attacks. Last night, Israeli forces with their 
tanks and armoured cars, surrounded the small town of 'Beit Hanon" in the 
north of the 
Gaza strip. This operation is in response to the Palestinian missile 
attacks that 
killed 12 Israelis. (VOA, 29 June 2004) 
The labelling of a group of Palestinians as 'warmongers' is problematic in itself. As 
F-delman argues, this labelling "serves the political function of extending authority 
over those not yet subject 
to if' (Edelman, 1988, p. 69). Thus, the term 'warmongers' 
and 'Palestinians' 
focuses the attention of the audience on the utility of preventative 
surveillance and control and 
diverts attention from the link between Israeli oppression 
and the Palestinians defending their land. Above all, the terms 'Palestinians and 
'wamiongers' imply that the Israeli forces can assert who is dangerous or poses a risk, 
'well as who should subsequently be controlled or subject to discipline. Moreover, as 
in this news report, the conflict between Palestinians (referred to as 'warmongers'), 
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and Israelis 
is said to continue, but no clear purpose or motivation behind the 
Palestinians actions supports the statement. Also, this image of the `Gaza Strip' as a 
dangerous, deviant place implicates Palestinians as being involved in criminal 
activities. Furthermore, 
by calling Palestinians as a body of `warmongers' that need to 
be forced by law to be obidient to society 
is created, and by this, VOA indirectly 
legitimises the Israeli suppression. Here the rejection of the Palestinians by VOA is 
expressed euphemistically, as 
its support for Israeli forces is expressed indirectly and 
indefinitely. An implication is that Palestinians (warmongers) are envisaged as 
antagonistic and 
destructive. In the same way, it appears that Israelis do not have 
much choice 
but to defend themselves and are even portrayed as the victim of 
Palestinians' criminal activities. 
The last sentence, which presents a picture of 
Palestinians totally surrounded and at the mercy of the 
Israelis, is an example of the 
VOA's tendency to polarise participants in a crisis and serves to remove power from 
the Palestinians as they are 
designated to a transgressor's role. In the last sentence, 
Palestinians are seen as simply objects of the 
Israelis' show of authority. The 
Palestinians, who are surrounded 
by Israeli missiles (as means of discipline and 
punishment), are stigmatised 
as deviant. This stigmatising excuses and justifies the 
Israeli army's punishment whilst warning 
Palestinians of the consequences of this 
type of deviance. 
5. Using television services as an instrument of America's diplomatic 
relations with 
Iranian people to support and voice the regime's 
opposition both 
inside and outside the country, especially in regards 
to the student uprising 
When it comes to politics, the use of language is an important element in the 
creation of meaning. 
As Edelman argues, "the key tactic must always be the evocation 
of interpretations 
that legitimise favored courses of action and threaten or reassure 
people so as to encourage 
them to be supportive or to remain quiescent" (Edelman, 
1988, p. 104). This type of 
language use is called "goal language" (Apthorpe, 1977, 
p. 44). It 
is persuasive, and as Shore and Wright argue, "It is an important aspect of 
how policy creates affect and effect" 
(Wright, 1997, p. 21). VOA news coverage of 
Iran shows a tendency 
to encourage Iranian people to rise up against their government 
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to a point where they would complain and protest and thus provide leverage to U. S. 
foreign policy objectives via the use of ideas with commercial and political sanctions. 
It seerns that although the U. S. has never stoped the use of economic and political 
, ssure 
to fight the theocratic regime, it becomes clearer that U. S. now prefer to pre 
focus on a psychological war via media. During the study week, VOA broadcasted a 
series of interviews with the regime's opposition everyday. 
In 10 to 15 minutes of 
duration, interviews addressed the student uprising and tried to encourage people to 
protest against the regime 
in the anniversary of students' demonstrations. Whether 
they were effective is questionable; many of the themes discussed by those expatriate 
oppositions must 
have gone above the head of ordinary Iranian people struggling to 
Sur-vive the harsh economic situation 
in Iran. Among the regime's oppositions, VOA 
however, put emphasis on the monarchy and broadcasted two hours roundtable with 
prince Reza Pahlavi to endorse the idea. Perhaps this clearly demonstrates the close 
relationship 
between VOA and U. S. foreign policy and their support for the 
Inonarchy. In this context, 
VOA can be viewed as having collaborated with the 
opposition to overthrow 
the regime. In the event of students' uprising, VOA along 
with the U. S. government, 
declared a readiness to support the Iranian people in their 
efforts to defeat the theocratic regime. 
VOA, in its broadcasts, concentrated more on 
assuring the 
Iranian people that the opinions of United States, and indeed of the 
world, stand vehemently against 
the regime's actions in regards to suppression of 
students. in this context, 
the observation of VOA during the study week indicates that 
the agency is almost completely 
devoted to U. S. officials and government policy in its 
coverage of news, especially news about 
Iran's nuclear activities and the students' 
uprising. 
VOA has continued to be consistently hostile towards the Iranian regime in 
their reporting of the above crisis and 
indirectly launched a call for rebellion on the 
anniversary of students' uprising. 
This crisis inside Iran, which was generated by the 
cornbined 
force of the student demonstrations and the way they were suppressed by 
the regirne, had an enormous 
impact on VOA and U. S. official policy. The close 
relationship 
between the U. S. government and VOA is illustrated by the fact that the 
agency contributed a series 
of reports and interviews about the crisis. Thus while 
VOA defends its own independence, its role as a tool of U. S. foreign policy remains. 
in a crisis of identity, where 
VOA's role as a source of news and information must be 
weighed against 
its obligations to government, the station shows strong tendency to 
follow the latter first and foremost. 
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To realise the U. S. political aspirations, the psychological warfare and propaganda 
targeting it, it should be noticed that in Iran government officials and media are torn 
apart by factional disputes, thus offering good opportunity for a disruptive U. S. 
propaganda effort. Furthermore, 
intellectuals, students and those who are politically 
conscious are considered particularly 
important since the government was not ready 
to respond to their demands. Propaganda could therefore serve to articulate their 
dernands and perhaps sow the seeds of future discontent. In addition to this, the 
widespread unrest among common people who are disappointed in Khatamils 
political and social reforms should 
be considered as a major target for U. S. 
propaganda. The premise of this rather sophisticated strategy is that U. S. has tried to 
exploit the fact that after almost a 
decade in power, promises made by Khatami's 
govenunent have 
failed to materialise. Propaganda output would therefore encourage 
discontent by comparing lifestyles in Iran and the West. By emphasising the rich, high 
standards of living, or 
the virtues of the capitalist system enjoyed by its society, 
Anierica as a means of combating theocratic dogma in the long run would prove 
counter-productive and the poor section of society could 
feel aggravated and more 
disillusioned with exploitative capitalism. Because the regime from the beginning was 
tainted as anti-American, portraying 
itself as a friend of the poor and preaching social, 
political and economic revolution 
to create equality, its credibility among its 
supporters would 
be destroyed. Hence propaganda emanating from the U. S. describes 
the uprising as a 'national salvation struggle' against tyranny and oppression. Every 
day, during the study week, the VOA news presenter read some messages claimed to 
be e-mails from people 
inside Iran, aiming to unveil the barbarous and cruel face of 
the regime to the population so that they can be aware of the regimes oppressive 
activities and 
direct them towards mass protests against the regime. However, such 
intensified propaganda against the regime in Iran and its alleged nuclear activities, 
with the VOA'S support of protestation and subversive activities in Iran, could also 
rnerely reflect 
its efforts to divert public attention away from the U. S. 's involvement 
ill Iraq. In other words, the U. S. recognised the need to intensify its anti-Iran 
propaganda 
if the success of its foreign policy is to be secured. A direct link between 
policy and propaganda 
is thereby established. The direct link between U. S. foreign 
policy and VOA 
is clearly presented in the following news. 
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The news in Persian: 
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The news in English: 
in a situation where insecurity is said to be one of the most important problems 
in Iraq at the moment, and they Iraqi people if they could, would try to leave the 
country, why then 
has Seyed Hussein Khomeinie, the Ayatollah Khomeinie's 45 
year old grandchild, come 
back to the country? In a telephone conversation 
froin Kazemein, he said that he came back to Iraq to make pilgrimage and to 
breathe in a liberated place. He says that in Iraq he feels much more free and 
secure than he did 
in Iran. (VOA, 30 June 2004) 
flere the news can be categorised linguistically into a form called 'prolepsis'. 
prolepsiS is an argument that denies the claim that is to be made, or attempts to 
dissociate him/her from the claim. 'It allows S to express their prejudice or negative 
comments while 
denying such articulation' (Lockyer and Pickering, 2001, p. 639). 
First it prevents S from threatening his/her own face while making negative 
comments; it makes the comments sounds unprejudiced and therefore S can maintain 
an appearance as rational and objective. 
Second, seen as a 'rational and ob ective' j 
remark, his/her criticism appears 
to be common knowledge, not ideological. In the 
above news, 
VOA's prolepsis can be categorised into the following pattern: 
Pattern: negativity + but + allegation 
In this form, VOA, by saying 
in the beginning that `insecurity is said to be one of the 
most important problem 
in Iraq', it implicitly suggests that under occupation Iraq is a 
secure and stable place. 
VOA, by using negativity, attempts to appear objective, and 
in fact, only mentions the negative point here in order to rule out any criticism 
towards Iraq's situation. 
In other words, VOA uses the prolepsis as a slipway to make 
an allegation about 
Iran under the regimes' exploitation and tyranny and claims that it 
therefore, is not a secure place. 
VOA here also uses the pattern of the adjacency pair: 
Question + Answer. It poses a question about why Khomeinie's grandson came to 
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Iraq. After this it proposes an answer to legitimise the point it wants to make. The 
question which 
is a simple `why' provokes the audience's curiosity in a certain area 
that they might not have considered 
before so that VOA can lead them to its desired 
conclusion. Moreover, 
the pattern between the two sentences is also revealing. `Going 
to Iraq, is the main topic 
in the first sentence. In the second sentence, `feeling free and 
secure' is the main topic. 
To associate `Iraq' with other words `freedom and security', 
is to make direct and strong suggestion that since Iraq was brought to this security 
and freedom 
by the U. S., if you want the same security and freedom, you should 
therefore let the U. S. come to 
free you. Here the occupied Iraq is portrayed as a place 
with established security and 
freedom, where even a high rank Iranian clergy who 
happen to be a close relative of 
late Khomeinie chooses to go and live there. In this, 
VOA tries to present Iran as chaotic and deviant place and the impression given is of a 
volatile environment, such 
that the U. S. -occupied Iraq is far more secure, free and a 
better place. In other words, VOA uses this opportunity to 
intensify the situation and 
represent 
it as a bankruptcy of a system which has practised to control its people 
under a theocratic regime. 
This however, clearly shows the propagandistic nature of 
VOA. In this news, VOA by 
ignoring the invasion of a country, the blowing up of 
factories and dropping bombs on women, children and the aged, presents a guarantee 
of democracy 
by freeing men and women from exploitation. This celebration of Iraqi 
invasion's achievements was concluded with the assertion that Iraq 
is a country that 
has been freed from totalitarianism and oppression of all kinds. In this news, VOA 
broadcasts a fact which 
has a substantial propaganda impact and uses to the favour of 
u. s. government policy. The 
following news demonstrates how U. S. propaganda 
targets the regime of 
Iran and actively encourages its people to rise up and overthrow 
the regime. 
The news in Persian: 
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The news in English: 
The 18th of Tir (8th of July, the anniversary of the student uprising), is again 
upon us, and again your calls and e-mails indicate of the sensitivity of these days. 
As we get closer to the 18 th of Tir, security forces have warned that any woman 
who does not cover her ankles will be whipped. The important thing is that as we 
get closer to this anniversary, Tehran has become more like an army fortress 
than a city. (VOA, 02 July 2004) 
In the above news, VOA's strategy is to stir up the audience's feelings so as to draw 
their attention to the point it tries to make, and that point is to get people to 
dernonstrate on the anniversary of student uprising. There is also evidence of 
categorisation by using social 
deixis. In the above news, VOA uses Gwe' to refer to 
the station and the Iranian people. The way that VOA refers to the Iranian government 
(the security forces) isolates it fiom the rest of people. 'The security forces' have 
becorne 'someone else' who does not belong to the same group as the people. At the 
same time, the pronoun 
'we' helps to consolidate the sense of group unity between the 
station and the people. 
It promotes a sense of unity which indirectly builds an 
antagonistic feeling towards those who 
do not belong to the group. In this case, the 
target is the Iranian government. This evidence of categorisation can be found in the 
news above, which also can 
be considered an emotional appeal to the audience, as 
, VOA seeks to stir the audiences' emotional involvement towards the issue. 
in addition, the impression given by this news is that although the authority structure 
of any society 
is intended to protect people from harm, this implies that they are 
destructive and cruel. A sense of people's, especially women's, vulnerability and need 
for protection against a criminal and murderous regime is created here, which makes 
it seem like a real danger and threat to the society. Here, VOA, through stigmatisation 
and demonising the regime, 
tries to isolate its target and set the regime up to be 
Victimised and 
destroyed. Moreover, by classifying the regime as criminal and by 
proclaiming them as 
the people's enemies, they legitimise attacking and killing them. 
In other words, it permits 
dealing with them in such a fashion that would otherwise be 
considered as criminal. 
Such overt incitement is combined with classic psychological 
warfare- These techniques can 
be considered as useful for two primary reasons: they 
are intended to throw 
the regime into a state of panic, while at the same time they are 
designed to generate popular support for opposition groups and encourage a general 
uprising against the regime. 
This also suggests that the U. S. recognises that although 
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its practical support to change the regime might 
be minimal, propaganda can continue 
to expose the regime by 
influencing Iranian opinion. The above news also indicates 
the fact that VOA is engaged 
in an elaborate scheme to manage Iranian public opinion 
just days before the anniversary of student uprising. This may of course provide the 
pretext for an exaggeration of 
the situation inside Iran. By these sorts of statements, 
VOA tries to make it easier for the U. S. to consolidate its own position in Iran by 
fostering hatred against the regime. However, if these allegations are not completely 
true and are part of psychological operations, then the station would suffer a loss of 
credibility since 
it could no longer be trusted. The station needs to determine the level 
of support necessary 
for a mass protest among all sections of society and to identify 
weak spots of the regime 
that could be exploited by propaganda. 
The news in Persian: 
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The news in English: 
It seems that as the 
2°d of Khordad (this date refers to Khatami's election and 
the reformist movement) 
is fading away, the 18th of Tir is gaining momentum. 
$owever, if people protest or even if they get prevented from protesting, it would 
not make any 
difference because the fact is that important days for people will 
remain important, even 
if people celebrate it in their heart and in silence. (VOA, 
02 July 2004) 
The above news shows that although U. S. propaganda desperately tried to provoke 
anti-regime reaction among people, seeing 
that nothing important happened, they now 
desperately try to play down its significance. The above news reflects a face-saving 
effort by VOA that characterised 
its propaganda at this time, rather than a genuine 
statement. 
However, VOA could claim that its broadcasts are viewed by an overwhelming 
number of Iranians. 
It is important to note that the size of an audience, actual or 
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potential, is not a sufficient criteria 
by which the effectiveness of propaganda can be 
judged; simply because broadcasts were heard or viewed does not mean that the 
messages they contained were absorbed and acted upon which 
is, after all, the true test 
of propaganda. 
6. Implicit attack on Islamic ideology and misusing Islamic values for 
its own purposes 
The news in Persian: 
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The news in English: 
What kind of moral and tradition is this that nothing has remained of it except 
hatred, betrayal, and dispersion?! What kind of religion is this which knows 
nothing than 
deceit, lies, and betrayal?! What kind of war is this in which its 
bullets, instead of the enemy, hit our youth's heart?! 
The above news can be categorised as an enthymeme because the conclusion is left 
for the audience to infer. The language here is bold and without redress. The outright 
insults and provocative language mentioned here clearly and directly attacks Islam. 
This news attempts to put down Islam by overtly attacking it with the hopes of 
making the point that 
Islamic ideology is devious and bad by nature. By saying that 
Islam is innately bad, its offensive attack on Islam is legitimised. VOA uses a 
metaphor in making 
these points. It compares Islamic ideology and practice to bullets 
that cause damage and 
harm to people. VOA presents its argument in the form of 
questions. By using questions, 
VOA can draw people's attention to the implicit point 
it is about to make. The questions generally work as an invitation for the audience to 
look at Islam critically. Here, VOA implicitly attacks Islam and portrays it as 
decisive, destructive and threatening to society. The strong emotive words associate 
Islam with fanatical behaviour and imply that the society which seeks to serve is the 
200 
victim of its destructiveness. The sequential order serves to implicitly acknowledge 
the appalling atrocity and then attributes this to Islam as an ideology and disgracefully 
makes it responsible for social oppression. It seems that U. S. propaganda for Iran 
intends to draw attention to signs of internal weakness within the country and blame 
Islam for ail this and therefore, destroy the myth of Islam as the new age salvation or 
in other words, 'killing two birds with one stone'. 
VOA concentrates its programming on the student uprising and the regime's 
oppression and has allowed a considerable amount of invective to be voiced in its 
commentaries. Moreover, although the above commentary was claimed to be an e- 
mail from someone in the audience, 
it reflects the views of the broadcaster and vividly 
demonstrates that the station remains by and large consistent with the U. S. 
government's line and 
its policies. This would not only encourage the overthrowing 
of the regime but also an attack on 
Islam at the same time. The pretext here is that 
such propaganda 
is an area expected to create an ideological battleground with Islam 
and is a dismissive of the claim that 
Western, and especially U. S., ideological 
propaganda does not exist. 
Western and U. S. propaganda against Islam does indeed 
exist. 
6.13 Jaam-e-Jam International Satellite Television 
After the 1997 Revolution in Iran, the United States found itself in a difficult 
situation. on one 
hand, it tried to use political and economic sanctions and possible 
r, ailitary activity against the regime, and at the same time it had to supplement 
political and economic activities to create a viable situation for the regime's 
opponents. News and 
information were therefore the most valued services, especially 
if indigenous propaganda could be obtained. The ultimate success and effectiveness of 
using media as an 
instrument of foreign policy is dependent on the ability to bridge 
the cultural gap through the understanding of traditions, family life, social practices 
and value systems. 
In this line, the U. S. government was directed towards the possibility of establishing 
a strictly Iranian 
broadcasting system which could: counter U. S. favourable 
propaganda in Iran and 
influence Iranian, as well as world opinion, and increase 
support for U. 
S. policies while exposing the subversive practices of the regime. In this 
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situation, Jaam-e-Jam International as the 
first ex-patriot Iranian satellite television 
came into existence. Despite the station's claim of it being objective, the channel, 
which is a supporter of the monarchy, an opponent of the regime and a strong 
supporter of United States, 
has been in line with the U. S. 's psychological warfare 
against the regime. This 
friendly policy towards the U. S. and its allies is taken to an 
extreme where Israel 
is concerned. The country is hardly ever mentioned. During the 
study week there was not a single mention of the country despite the conflict and 
bloodshed in Palestine and in the Gaza Strip at that time. 
]Equally as complex is the role assumed by the Jaam-Jam. Its work is too bound up 
with u. S. policy which, 
in turn, is subject to the psychological warfare of U. S. 
propaganda- Therefore, given 
its complexity, it would be impossible to trace the 
whole effects of U. S. propaganda and 
inf6rmation efforts together with a chronology 
of the events on Jaam-Jam 
international. The following is an overview of these efforts 
and focuses on a number of examples to 
illustrate the argument.. 
Themes 
The following themes have been identified from the way in which Jaam-e-Jam 
portrays events 
in its programmes: 
1. portraying support for the U. S. invasion of Iraq 
2. Being in line with U. S. foreign policy regarding Iran's nuclear activities 
3. Implicit support for U. S. foreign policy 
1. Portraying support for the U. S. invasion of Iran 
Jaam-e-Jam's coverage of war in Iraq indicates a tendency in its reporting to 
serve specific a political purpose, with the 
intention of possible justification and 
support for U. S. activities 
in Iraq. The justification for the U. S. invasion of Iraq was 
approved and was subject 
to neither scrutiny nor debate. It is important to notice that 
questionable acts are accepted only when the policy behind them is also accepted. 
During the study week, a considerable amount of air time was devoted to the news 
about Sadam's prosecution and 
his trial court. A striking example of this support was 
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presented in one of the 
live Day and Night programmes. In this programme, after 
reading and talking about 
the news of Saddam's trial court, the audiences were asked 
to call in and talk about what they thought to 
be the most appropriate punishment for a 
dictator such as Saddam. In this respect, a live call was terminated on air because the 
caller stressed that 
Bush should be prosecuted along with Saddam for his previous 
support of his regime. 
The following news and commentaries. illustrates the defensive 
policy that the station 
follows in its reporting. 
The news in Persian: 
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The news in English: 
The transfer of sovereignty to Iraq's new interim government took place two 
days earlier than planned. In this ceremony, the new Iraqi prime minister, after 
taking oath, explained his 
future plans for Iraq. Mr. Alavi in a televised speech 
promised to serve 
the Iraqi people regardless of their tribes and race and to re- 
build the country. 
]Presenter added: 
The transfer of power in Iraq took place two days earlier and we hope that such 
security and stability can 
be experienced all over the world. 
It is important to notice that 
during the study week, Iraq"s new interim government 
took centre stage when 
it came to news regarding Iraq. It seems that Jaam-e-Jam. only 
concentrated on returning 
the country to normality and stability, regardless of 
resistance, conflict and 
the killing of the Iraqi people. In other words, the station 
consciously refused 
to give an accurate picture of what was going on in Iraq. The 
prcsenter's commentary at 
the end also gives the impression that security and stability 
are the future of 
Iraq, which in turn is a result of the American occupation of Iraq. It 
also furthermore suggests 
that what applies to Iraq could also apply to some other 
countries as well, notably 
Iran. The station's presentation style suggests support for 
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the U. S. 's actions against Iraq, as it presents the occupied Iraq as a sovereign state. 
Recognition of this is also suggested by the fact that the station never criticises or 
even questions U. S. 
foreign policy even in the slightest. The commentary that was 
added by the presenter clearly states the station's policy and attitude towards the U. S. 
policy regarding Iraq. 
For example, the statement that "we hope such security and 
stability can be experienced all over the world", 
justifies the occupation and suggests 
that the U. S. occupation of Iraq has brought this stability and security to the country. 
The news in Persian: 
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Týe news in English: 
Iraq's neighbours have welcomed the beforehand transfer of power and stressed 
liope that this could put an end to violence in Iraq. Kuwait and Jordan, two of 
the U. S. 's strongest allies in the region, expressed that this would bring security 
and stability to the region. 
King Abdullah (king of Jordan), also stressed that 
now freedom and 
independence are the future for Iraq. 
parallel to the VOA's role in propaganda, the station tries to fashion the invasion of 
Iraq as liberating and democratic. Nevertheless, because the new Iraq interim 
, overnment 
has been criticised as being merely a puppet of the United States, the g 
station's propaganda 
has been constantly on the defensive and reactive rather than 
inspired. It seems that all the station's efforts are a means by which the objectives and 
progress of U. S. 
foreign policy could be projected. It also suggests that Jaam-e-Jam 
could niake a contribution 
in shaping Iran's public opinion and therefore, the station 
has been actually used as a channel that could assist U. S. diplomatic efforts. 
Jaarn-e-Jarn nevertheless, by only portraying the view points of some of the 
strongest U. S. allies 
in their support for the Iraqs interim government and nothing 
else, reflects its very positive policy towards the United States. In its support for 
American foreign policy it seems, of course, to have been more than just a little bit 
economic with the truth. 
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2. Being in line with the U. S. 's foreign policy regarding Iran's 
nuclear activities 
In dealing with Iran's nuclear crisis, a striking conformity in style and 
language with VOA is presented. Despite the different positions expressed on this 
matter, Jaam-e-Jam in this issue did stick to news and interpretations offered by U. S. 
officials. The following news reflects this conformity. 
The news in Persian: 
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The news in English: 
A U. S. government official expressed his concern about Iran's nuclear activities. 
IN4r Bolton the US secretary ... stressed his concern for Iran's alleged plan to re- 
activate its uranium enrichment programmes. Mr Bolton is discussing this 
matter with the U. S. 
European allies in England. (Jaam-e-Jam, 30 June 2004) 
Here jaam-e-Jam seems to present the events from the biased perspective of the U. S. 
government. 
In this issue, the station chooses to adopt and reflect the U. S. 
govcrnrnent's pos 
* 
ition because it is regarded as centralist. It is striking how Jaam-e- 
Jam and VOA covered the crisis in a similar fashion. Therefore, Jaam-e-Jami, in its 
coverage of Iran's nuclear crisis, could 
be faced with the fact that amongst the better 
educated, more opinionated, and perhaps potentially more influential sector of the 
audience, it would 
be very difficult to differentiate between the voice of United 
States, as personified by VOA, and Jaam-e-Jam. In line with the VOA, Jaam-e-Jam is 
trying to tell its Iranians audience that their government is a bad, inhuman and 
crirninal regime. 
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The news in Persian: 
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The news in English: 
Iran has announced that the country has decided to re-start its enrichment 
programmes from 
July 29 onwards. However, the United States, Germany and 
]France have expressed their anger and dissatisfaction over Iran's decision. In 
this respect, Mr. A]-Baradei has asserted that no political agreement will be 
considered to solve 
Iran's nuclear crisis. Mr. Al-Baradei also assured that there 
will be no compromising with 
Iran on this matter. 
Presenter added: 
-f hese pictures that are taken from some nuclear installation plants in Iran 
evidently indicate that 
Iran is engaged in nuclear activities. 
in this news, Jaam-e-Jam. assures its audience that the leaders of the free world follow 
Iran's destructive atomic plans extensively, and suggests that Iran is actively 
destructive and threatening. The language used in the above news constructs Iran's 
nuclear activity as such a 
threat, which in turn, implicitly confirms and supports the 
1U. S., s stance on this issue. It also portrays the dissatisfaction of the rest of the world 
with Iran and their 
deep concerns and frustration over Iran's criminal activities. Here 
Iran also has been presented as infcrior. This news also attempts to limit the 
framework in which Iran's nuclear issue can be discussed. Any argument that does 
not support the 
U, S, official point of view is deemed invalid. The station tries to 
insinuate awareness of Iran's role in a destructive plot against the world. Also the 
station, in order to reject 
Iran's claim about the peaceful use of nuclear power, 
broadcasted some pictures of Iran's strategic buildings and nuclear installations, 
claiming this to 
be evidence of Iran's criminal activities. In this way, and by 
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portraying Iran as dishonest and dangerous, the station certainly and deliberately 
fuelled anxiety over Iran's nuclear activities. In the above broadcast, Iran's nuclear 
installations were portrayed as a future means of exerting Iran's destructive plans and 
to justify U. S. efforts to stop Iran and to influence public opinion in favour of the 
United States. 
3. Implicit support for U. S. foreign policy 
The political taboos within a media organisation and its editorial policy could 
be identified when addressing any political or even historical issue. The political and 
financial powers behind the station play a significant role in the way that events are 
portrayed. It is 
important to notice that whenever there is a mention of U. S. foreign 
policy or activities the station stresses their soundness and positive role. The 
justification for invading Iraq, as it was discussed previously, was subject to neither 
criticism nor debate. 
This is extremely important for the purpose of this study to note 
that during the period covered by study week both VOA and Jaam-e-Jam's 
propaganda output were consistent on 
both Iran's domestic and the U. S. 's 
international policies, making involvement much easier to accept. 
During the study week, Bush's speech in Turkey was a frequent topic of discussion on 
the channel. Jam-e-Jam devoted considerable airtime to getting Bush's point of view 
across- The purpose of such commentaries, subject to similar criteria of other issues, 
was to reflect the 
U. S. 's opinion on the issues of the day. 
on the 111 of July 2004, Jaam-e-Jam International broadcasted news of Bush's speech 
in Turkey in which he reaffin-ned that the U. S. would continue to fight for freedom 
and democracy. 
This particular news was presented in the same traditional 
49propagandistic' style. Given its political and strategic implications, this news was 
broadcasted several times in Jaam-e-Jam, which in turn reveals the stations effort to 
get Bush's viewpoint across 
to the Iranian people. 
The news in Persian: 
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The news in zug-ai. 
President Bush, in his speech given in Turkey about the freedom of the people in 
the Middle East, said: 'democracy in the Middle East reflects its people. 
However, democracy in every country has its own structure, tradition, and 
opinion; there are certain commitments to 
its basic principles that do not change 
from place to place. 
lie condemns those, who in West with their ill-mannered perception, cause 
hatred and animosity between West and Islamic countries and added: 'when 
sonle in my country, 
in an ill-informed and insulting manner, say something bad 
about the Muslim 
faith, their words are heard abroad and do great harm to our 
cause in the Middle 
East. 
]3ush also indicated that in some countries like Iran and Syria, some discredited 
autocrats are trying 
to hold back the democratic will of a rising generation. 
Bush's speech in Turkey was greatly publicised. in both VOA and Jaam-e-Jam. 
Ilowever, the bits that the Jaam-e-Jam seems to concentrates on mostly indicate the 
station's tendency to mediate 
between the Iranian people and the U. S. government, 
trying to portray a very positive 
image of the United States. The above news, which is 
taken from Bush's speech, 
focuses on the U. S. 's alleged mediation efforts in solving 
the problems between Islamic countries and the United States. The bite taken from 
Bush's speech stresses these mediation efforts. Also, in the second part of the news, to 
conclude his 
broadcast, Bush addresses the people from Iran and Syria directly, 
assuring them that 
the U. S. is their friend, sharing both their aspirations for 
dernocracy and their sorrow for being oppressed by their totalitarian regimes. In sharp 
contrast to the earlier part of 
the broadcast, such attempts to achieve intimacy with the 
Iranian audience makes this propaganda and its accompanying threats more effective. 
Accordingly, broadcasting such clean and peace-loving image of the U. S. echoes a 
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theme of propaganda that tries to uphold the U. S. as a defender of Iran and its people. 
Moreover, it seems that in an effort to show its loyalty, the station is been too 
vociferous in its praise of the 
United States. However, for any Iranian audience 
resentful of what could 
be perceived as cultural imperialism, this could have a rather 
negative effect. 
The news in Persian: 
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The news in English: 
The presence of especial forces in Iranian towns has increased dramatically, 
especially in 
big cities. The Chief of Security Forces; Mohammad Bagher 
Ghalibaf, has announced that there is no link between these forces and anti-riot 
forces. He also, in a talk with Hamshahri newspaper, announced that they will 
, Vigorously 
fight the 'bad hejabi' (unveiling of women). 
Now this raises a question of why every summer the concept of women unveiling 
receives such controversy. 
After all, this Mr. Ghalibaf should know that he is one 
of the regime operators and 
that one day just like the Saddam officials, he will be 
prosecuted. 
The above news seems to be more like a compilation of allegations woven together in 
the, forrn of a narration. 
The station's allegations are not supported by any evidence. 
Not surprisingly, Jaam-e-Jarn like VOA, focuses its efforts on directing the audience's 
attention towards 
the alleged discrimination against women by the regime, which 
would appeal to public opinion 
inside Iran and abroad. The second part, which is a 
commentary, then uses 
the tried propagandist method of appealing to history, that this 
regime like 
Saddam's regime will one day, meet its doom. However, the station has 
been equally prepared to sweep the more questionable aspects of that same history 
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under the carpet when it suits 
its purpose. It demonstrates that this dissatisfaction has 
been the primary focus of attention for both broadcasting services in order to 
manipulate the audience's sensitivities 
by appealing to freedom and women's rights, 
and to strengthen and 
further anti-regime sentiments among people and direct these 
sentiments in the 
interests of the United States. In doing this, the dangers of a 
suppressive regime and the character of the autocratic state are stressed. 
The objective 
of such a broadcast 
is to demonise the regime and harness opinion against its actions 
towards women, particularly among the influential intellectual sections of society. 
This could also indicate an underlined attack on Islamic rules and believes. To 
supplement such propaganda, 
the station blankets the country with its commentary 
about the student uprising and targets the regime's 
hard-line approach towards 
women, hoping that 
it would generate more rebellion within the country. This has 
been used alongside the maximum exploitation of the virtually alleged occupation of 
Iran's cities by the regime's anti-riot forces, to the highest political level. The news 
ends with a commentary 
that makes a comparison between Iran's regime and 
Saddam's destroyed regime, which appears to be directly engaged in promoting the 
Ij. S. 1's invasion of Iraq. In this respect, this reporting style could be seen as having 
served the VOA and 
thus, by extension, the propagandistic efforts of the U. S. 
government. 
6.14 Conclusion 
The discourse analysis demonstrates the role of VOA in explaining and 
justifying U. S. Policy, in addition to frequently operating as an instrument of 
psychological warfare. 
VOA, by using discourse, tries to "influence the text and talk 
in such a way that, as a result, the 
knowledge, attitudes, norms, values and ideologies 
of recipients are - more or 
less indirectly - affected in the interest of the" [US 
government] 
(van Dijk, 1996, p. 85). VOA's use of language, including the use of 
thernatic structures 
(Iran is destructive/Iran's nuclear activities subvert international 
security) creates a 
discourse of anxiety. The station both arouses and assuages this 
anxiety through rhetorical 
constructions that blur reality. As Edelman argues, public 
officials and policy makers are not 
"helpless boats at the mercy of currents and 
passing storms, 
for officials help stir up the currents that move them" (Edelman, 
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1977, p. 5 1). Through discourse, VOA tries to "build cognitive structures" (Edelman, 
1977, p. 51). In this way, it would be able "to shape mass opinion and then only 
reflect it" (Edelman, 1977, p. 51). 
Saul argues that it is "an obsession with the true versus the false [that] leads us to 
artificial solutions as reassuring as the old certainty that the world was flat" (Saul, 
1992, p. 17). Thus, by invoking concepts such as 'War on Terrorism" and IranIs 
destructive nuclear ambitions, the politicians are able to "focus on the alleged 
weakness and pathology of the 
individuals, while diverting attention away from their 
pathological social and economic environments" 
(Edelman, 1977, p. 27). 
As it was discussed before, the cultural imperialism argument does not seem to 
actively acknowledge the 
important role of political power as a force behind the 
cultural imperialism since the power 
is never exerted only through military and 
technological control, but always through discursive control as well. The discourse 
analysis demonstrates that 
during the period under examination, both VOA and Jaam- 
e-JaM in their objectives, applications and approach 
have been similar, as both have 
used a positive approach towards 
U. S. foreign policies and have implicitly defended 
it. The above analysis shows that both stations have been located within the overall 
propaganda strategy 
during the studied period, which in turn, shows the relationship 
of both stations to the shaping, 
implementation, and projection of U. S. foreign policy. 
The analysis has tried to demonstrate the relationship between international politics 
and international media 
broadcasting. It demonstrates how U. S. foreign policy has 
been augmented by the use of satellite television broadcasting, which in turn has made 
invaluable contribution to its policy. Furthermore, they have also acted as an 
important channel of diplomacy, as the events of the Iranian nuclear crisis and 
student's uprising confirm. 
These events were political events, motivated by political 
circumstances and shaped 
by politicians and statesmen who made their decisions 
independently of the media. These decisions were then reflected in the policies and 
output of the studied 
broadcasting stations. This was practiced by information and 
propaganda transmitted 
by the stations, which selected and manipulated the facts to be 
used. in this context, 
the direct result of the propaganda is cultural imperialism, which 
functions as a part of an ideological war. However, in order to gain an understanding 
of how the 
U. S. Is policies and its intentions have been received and interpreted in the 
target country, a focus group study has been conducted. The next chapter will 
comprehensively study 
the Iranian audience to understand the audience's interaction 
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in a process in which the media messages are interpreted. The following chapter is the 
result of the focus group discussions. 
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Chapter Seven 
Focus groups Investigation 
7.1 Introduction 
As it was mentioned in chapter one, the cultural imperialism theory does not 
acknowledge the concept of 
the active media audience and does not explain the 
resistance towards the media contents within 
dependent societies. In regards to media 
power, the cultural 
imperialism argument offers an almost omnipotent view of the 
rnedia that cannot 
be thoroughly justified. What it offers in terms of the media! s power 
to affect cultural change 
is a dominance and transmission-based model, which seems 
to fail to theorise the power of audiences to creatively subvert the power of global 
rnedia. what makes sense 
in regard to certain aspects of the debate, such as the 
conglomeration of ownership, reutilised production, and 
formatted content, does not 
apply in terms of 
the audience and effects. Adopting such a dominant image of the 
rnedia creates an environment 
of co-dependency (to borrow from the realm of popular 
psychology) that casts 
the audiences as the victims of an all-powcrful media system 
and its messages. 
Even assuming the homogenisation of media messages due to 
concentrated ownership and 
Western bias, cultural imperialism denies the power of 
the audience to interpret the message and to read the possible encoded meaning. This 
chapter, by undertaking 
focus group investigations, examines the audience's 
interaction in a process in which the media messages are interpreted. 
The last two chapters focused on the Jaam-e-Jam expatriate satellite television and the 
, Voice of America and their relationship to propaganda, as well as the way this 
cornbination works as 
an instrument of cultural imperialism. Their examination of 
propaganda as a purposeful 
and ideological method of influence highlights the 
relationship 
between journalism and propaganda. In this way cultural imperialism can 
be considered the end result of propaganda. However, the ability of propaganda to 
actually change 
beliefs, attitudes and value systems is questionable since the 
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manipulation of opinions, attitudes and understanding 
is not easily quantified. What is 
certain is that to be effective, the targeted audience must first be vulnerable to a 
message - either positive about the source or negative about the target - such as, for 
example, by being politically alienated 
from a particular regime. This in turn 
motivates them to seek out foreign propaganda which reinforces their convictions. As 
it was discussed in chapter three, the regime's direct efforts to implement its 
ideological and political perception through media and television programmes, along 
with the strict control and censorship that apply to the news content, are among the 
main factors that have 
driven Iranian people towards obtaining foreign news and 
cultural products via satellite. 
This effort by the regime seems to work as an internal 
factor which has accelerated the process of cultural imperialism. 
As mentioned before, the main purpose of propaganda is to change beliefs, attitudes 
and affect the value system of their audiences. The aim of this chapter is to examine 
how the content of broadcasts is interpreted by their target audience. The following 
section examines the theories of mass media effects 
in light of the active audience's 
perspective and analyses the contradictory 
dynamics of reconstruction, adoption and 
resistance of international media. 
This provides a basis for the focus groups that 
investigate the potential effects of satellite programming in Iran. 
7.2 Cross-Cultural Media Impacts on Their Audiences 
With the advance of communication technology, it seems that we have 
reached a different era 
in which all aspects and forms of the media, especially audio- 
visual media, perform a crucial role 
in giving a totally new dimension to the 
possibility for interchange of 
ideas and information between people. This, in turn, 
affects the socio-economic 
life, politics, cultures, national systems and international 
relationships that 
have emerged as a result of the communication revolution, which 
has been the dominant technological development of the second half of the 20th 
century. 
The notion that the media representations shape the perception of the audience is 
fundamental to the work of many scholars who investigated bow people from other 
societies in South 
America, Asia, and Africa are represented in the media of North 
America and Europe. Media representations are seen as a link in a circular chain. 
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They both reflect and reinforce existing patterns of power. Edward Said, in his book 
10rientalism', argues that Western scholars' understanding of the Middle East and 
India are constructed in ways that support the West's vision of itself and justify 
Western control of these areas (Said, 1978). Other scholars have expanded on Said's 
work by further investigating mass media portrayals of the Middle East, such as Nadel 
in 1997, and also by applying similar models to Western portrayals of the culture of 
Africa, South and Central America, and East Asia, which are presented in the works 
of Torgovnick in 1990, Shome 1996, and Heung 1997. Shohat and Stain for instance 
argue that: 
"Western media tend to portray people of Africa, Asia, and Central America 
as childlike, instinctual, and close to nature. The suggestion of the 
irresponsibility of individuals from these regions can be seen to justify the 
West's attempts to exercise control over these areas of the world. Furthermore, 
these kinds of portrayals allow for the role of the White, male European or 
North American as conqueror or sense-maker. The heroic European or North 
American Who saves or rules over peoples of other regions is common figure 
in films and advienture novels created in the West but set outside it" (Shohat 
and Stan', 1994, in Hall 2001). 
Experimental researchers have found evidence that, at least in certain circumstances, 
inedia representations can shape 
international audiences, perceptions of the societies 
that the media come from. Most of these works deal with the impact of exported U. S. 
television programming promoting U. S. popular culture and foreign policy. Several 
studies have found that exposure to 
U. S. programmes is associated with developing a 
perception of the 
United States which is connected with the content of American 
programming. 
Some of the active audience theorists, such as Liebes and len Ang 
(I qg5), conducted research to evaluate the domestic audience's response to a popular 
television programme called 
"Dallas". Liebes studied four groups of Israeli viewers 
and found that people's 
interpretation of Dallas was in accordance to their own values 
and was also according 
to their specific background. Ien Ang also supported this 
finding through her study of the impact of Dallas on foreign viewers. She, like Liebes, 
by applying the active audience 
frame of analysis, tried to question the existence of 
cultural imperialism. 
However, Schiller (1989), in his book (Culture, Inc. ) responds to 
these kinds of criticisms 
by arguing that: 
"Assuredly, this was a finding most agreeable to the producers [of American 
media content] and one that sharply rebuffed the worriers who championed a 
new international information order. How heartening to the cultural message 
makers to learn that cultural imperialism does not exist! Each audience 
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receives and makes its own message ... the transfer of cultural values is a 
complex matter. It is not a one-shot hypodermic inoculation of individual plots 
and character representations. It involves the much more difficult to measure 
acceptance of deep-structured meanings that may not even be explicitly stated. 
Can the transfer, for example, of acquisitive or consumerist perspectives be 
simply quantified? " (Schiller, 1989, p. 149) 
in this light it seems that the relationship 
between the media messages, its audiences 
and its meaning 
is complex and by no means can the media be assumed to be simply a 
vehicle for brainwashing audiences. 
In recent years, a great deal of interest has been 
noted in audience research 
for mass media. Much of this interest could be accounted 
for by the question of the role of the media 
in relation to certain behaviours. However, 
increasing interest has been shown 
in a more functional approach to the use of mass 
media. The primary objective of 
these investigations has been the consumption 
patterns of the audience members. 
For so-called "effects" research, the basic model 
consists of relatively passive 
viewers whose dispositions are either maintained, 
displaced, or heightened through 
interaction with the media, which often leads to the 
seemingly contradictory predictions 
concerning the effect of the media. 
3Barly analyses of the media 
have placed great powers over their audiences to mould 
opinions, 
beliefs and attitudes as well as shaping their audience's behaviour. Media 
were assumed to 
be a 'needle' that 'injected! messages into their audiences, and 
influenced them directly. 
In this case, the opinions and attitudes of the message are 
supposed to work as a 
drug injected into a vein (Kraus and Davis, 1976, P. 115). 
13 erkowitz (1969) also claimed 
that the witnessing of behaviours enacted in the media 
serves as a cue 
for provoking similar types of behaviour (assuming a certain amount 
of prior arousal exists). 
While the basis for such effects studies are the contents of the 
media and the psychological 
state of the audience member, the conscious motivations 
of the consumer 
in actually turning to the particular content or medium are ignored. In 
addition to this, 
functions' research has a two-level approach: on the macro-level - the 
sociologically oriented 
study of the media's role in socio-cultural that it maintains; 
and on the micro-level - 
the 'uses and gratifications' tradition. 
, type of 
functions research which focuses on the macro level of analysis, has taken 'rile 
many forms. 
The research on diffusion of innovation analyses the impact of the 
arrival of mass media 
in developing countries and its influence on modernisation in 
both social and technological 
terms (Rogers, 1969, Frey, 1973). Also, the studies of 
political socialisation, 
such as Adoni's study in 1976 of media use among Israeli 
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adolescents, and Katz's study 
in 1971 on the role of the media in political campaigns 
can be noted. In addition to the early 
formational empirical work, there are more 
theoretical studies of people such as those conducted by Wright (1960), and Merton 
(1957), which try to conceptualise the functions of mass communication media in 
society. The common point uniting 
these divergent approaches is the treatment of the 
media as social institutions exerting an 
influence on society as a whole or on sections 
of that society. In this type of research, 
the cultivation theory provides a framework to 
analyse the influence of the mass media. 
Cultivation research focuses on "television 
as a socialising agent". 
In this view, television influences the perception of images 
about the real world. 
As Gerbner (1990) pointed out, the relationship between images 
in the media, the amount of television exposure, and the viewer's beliefs in the 
reliability and reality of 
that message is the primary importance in the possible 
influence of the media. Zaharopoulos in 1997 studied the relationship between 
television viewing of U. S. programs and the perception that Greek high-school 
students' hold of 
U. S. cultural values. He found that those students who watch U. S. 
programmes more 
frequently tend to have more positive perceptions of the character 
of 1j. S. citizens. 
Tan, Li and Simpson, in 1986, studied Taiwanese and Mexican students. Tan and 
Suarchavarat also studied Thai students in 1988. The results of these two 
investigations indicated that American television is the major source of social 
stereotypes about 
Americans. In 1980, Hawkins and Pingree reported that Australian 
children who were 
heavy viewers held television-like beliefs about the world. 
N4oreover, in 1988, Kang and Morgan investigated the relationship between U. S. 
programmes and the attitudes of college students 
in Korea. Differences were found 
between males and females. Females who viewed U. S. television were associated 
with more liberal attitudes about general roles and family values. Among males, 
greater exposure to 
U. S. television was associated with hostility towards the U. S. and 
protectiveness of 
Korean culture. In addition to that, Morgan and Shanahan in 1991 
studied the relationship 
between television and the development of political attitudes 
in Argentine adolescents. They found that heavy television viewers were more likely 
lito agree that people should obey authority, to approve of limits on freedom of 
speech, and to think 
that it is someone's own fault if he or she is poor" (Morgan and 
Shanahan, 1999, P. 88). 
Another type of media studies is the use and gratification research, which focuses on 
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active audience members whose media use 
is assumed to be purposeful and directed 
towards gratification. The uses and gratifications approach seeks to integrate media 
usage into a meaningful pattern consistent with a person's general 
lifestyle. Most of 
these works however, have focused on a single cultural orientation, usually 
concentrating on a 
limited number of either social, demographic, or psychological 
factors and attempting to measure their influence on media use and gratiflcation, such 
as Rosengren's and 
Windahl's work in 1972. The analysis of the studies conducted by 
Elmasmar and Hunter in 1993 indicated that the effect of foreign television on 
domestic viewers was not strong. The research that employed the cultivation theory to 
study the influence of 
U. S. media on perceptions of foreign audiences reported 
differences between males and females, and heavy and light viewers. The studies 
indicated that heavy viewers tended to have more positive perceptions about 
Americans' wealth and living conditions and stressed that male audiences often had 
more negative perceptions than 
females. 
As it was mentioned before, the relationship between the media messages, audiences, 
and meaning 
is complex and by no means can the media be assumed to be simply a 
vehicle for brainwashing 
the audiences. There has been some evidence indicating the 
possibility of resistance 
to media message by their audiences, which in turn indicates 
the power of the people to think and behave as active subjects rather than passive 
objects. For 
instance, Hunter, in his study of the Los Angeles riots, views the 
audience's opposition 
to the assumptions embedded in the news as: "either 
constituting meaningful acts of resistance 
in their own rights, or contributing to a 
consciousness necessary 
for meaningful social action at some later point in time" 
(flunter, 1997, P. 162). It seems that although recent audience research and debates 
focused on individuals as active subjects, this activity is conditional. Crotea and 
Haynes (2000) point out that: 
"Although audiences arc active, their activity is still subjected to a variety of 
structural constraints. The media messages, themselves, matter because they 
make some interoperations more likely than others. The cultural tools that 
audiences bring to the interpretation of media are not uniform; different people 
from different social locations will not have the same resources at their 
command. By ordering the distribution of cultural tools, social structure serves 
as a constraint on the process of meaning making" (Crotea, Hoynes, 2000, 
P. 293). 
In this respect, some cultural 
imperialism critics such as John Tomlinson also critidise 
the cultural imperialism 
thesis for its inability to recognise the creative power of 
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audiences to resist the domination of global media. Tomlinson argues. that the effects 
of media messages are mediated by other modes of cultural experience, by the people 
who use them, and by the purpose for which they are used (Tomlinson, 1991). The 
following study, by undertaking focus group investigations, examines the audience's 
interaction in a process in which the media messages are interpreted in the light of 
active audience's perspective. It attempts to study the potential effects of satellite 
programming in Iran. It tries to 
draw a picture of the current cultural situation in Iran, 
and the reasons for viewing satellite televisions by the people. It specifically tries to 
point out the cultural and social problems that competing ideology and politics of the 
state may pose for people, therefore creating more desire among them to watch 
material different from that on Iranian TV. It examines the effects of the studied 
satellite televisions and the 
impact of their propaganda on their Iranian audience. 
7.3 Methodology Applied 
For a single investigator, in a limited period of time, a practical method to 
obtain great deal of 
information is to use an interview where the individuals can be 
asked their opinions, questioned about their attitudes towards satellite channels and 
their evaluations and perceptions about the cultural impacts of satellite viewing. 
Within the research available for studying the mass media, a focus group discussion 
under qualitative research methods 
is one of the most effective ways to provide 
inforrnation about why people think or feel the way they do. It also allows for group 
interaction and provides great insights about opinions that are held within the society. 
]For this investigation, non-directive interview with open-ended questions were used 
in order to allow individuals to respond without setting boundaries or providing clues 
for potential response categories. The focus group interview not only helps to produce 
qualitative data that provide 
insights into the attitudes of interviewees, but will also 
provide an environment 
in which disclosure is encouraged. Moreover, it can be 
suggested that 
focus group results are valid in terms of being used carefully for an 
issue, which is suitable for focus group inquiry. Also, as focus groups are similar to 
other social science measurement procedures, its validity therefore depends not only 
on the procedures used 
but also on context. Krueger, argued that: 
"Validity is the degree to which the procedure really measures what is 
proposing to measure ... The cynic can argue that nothing is valid. 
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Measurements or assessments of the human condition can be distorted 
intentionally or unintentionally. Typically, focus groups have high face 
validity, which is due in large part to the believability of comments from 
participants. People open up in focus groups and share insights that may not be 
available from individual interviews, questionnaires, or other data 
sources"(Krueger, 1994, PP. 31-32). 
In this study, which attempts to analyse the cross-cultural impacts of the 
conimunication technology and 
in this case, satellite viewing, using focus group 
discussion seems to be one of the most effective ways to provide some insights into 
attitudes of participants as 
it tries to examine the reality of life in Iran. It also allows 
the individuals to respond with their own words without setting boundaries. 
Furthermore, a focus group interview gives the participants greater freedom to answer 
as they answer 
in a way that suits their interpretation. In this kind of analysis of 
people's perceptions and attitudes, which relies primarily on verbal responses to 
irripute value orientations, individuals can articulate their meanings and represent their 
own behaviour. 
The assumption of underlying questions which allow the respondent 
to structure their answer 
is that respondents will interpret them in terms of their own 
values and reveal their own priorities. 
For example, when asked in the first wave of 
focus group interviews if they did like satellite programmes, some people were quick 
to reply that they were not after news and political programmes, and some other said 
that they only liked films and music shows, or that they were not the 
kind of people to 
watch unrestrained programmes. 
This suggests that they regarded satellite 
programmes not as a means of 
informative, educative or anyhow elevating, but for 
entertainment and a way 
to escape the reality of their lives. A simple 'yes' or 'no' to 
the question would not 
facilitate such insights. In this analysis, differences in 
communication and verbal responses may 
be of critical importance to the values that 
are implicit or explicit 
in relevancies that are being conveyed to the listener. 
Communication involves the representation of ideas in particular symbols-lexis and 
granunar, but 
it also represents a particular structuring of experience that is reflected 
in what is vcrbalised. 
This study uses the encoding-decoding model to analyse the focus groups results 
which as a structured model 
does facilitate identification of different orientations 
towards the interpretation of responses and the audience's perception of the media 
messages. 
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7.4 Encoding-Decoding Model 
This model, as a semiotic approach, has been used to understand the 
audience's response to media texts. David Morley studied audiences of an early 
evening news programme and argued in his paper (The Nationwide audience) that 
audiences actively decoded meanings from a media text. Morley is one of the first to 
empirically test Hall's model of the encoding-decoding theory. Stuart Hall's model of 
encoding-decoding suggests that meanings are encoded by the producer into the 
media text, and the audiences decode the meaning from the text. This theory 
acknowledges that there 
is a preferred meaning in the text, which is the meaning made 
by the producer. This meaning is encoded by the codes and conventions of the 
particular medium to 
hide the texts' own ideological construction. The audiences then 
read, listen or watch the media text and interpret the message. The audience's 
interpretation is dependent on a number of frameworks outside the text. These include 
socio-economic 
frameworks such as class, gender, age, education and ethnicity. They 
include the individual's past experiences and also include previous knowledge and 
experience of the medium. 
The theory takes into account the individual members of the audience and realises that 
there is a preferred meaning in the text, but also places emphasis on the audience in 
the process of constructing a meaning. The theory acknowledges that the meaning 
made by the audience 
is affected by various other factors, including socio-economic 
framework and past experiences. In other words, the producer (encoder) frames or 
encodes the text 
in a certain way, while the readers decode it differently according to 
their own background, socio-cultural situation and frames of interpretation. (McQuail, 
1994). Hall (1980) argues that the meaning of the text is located somewhere between 
its producer and the reader. This meaning however, is neither a fixed concept nor a 
totally uncertain 1polysemy' (Fiske, 1987). According to this, the meaning exists in a 
certain position which 
is the balancing point in the process of the dynamics of encoder 
and decoder and 
is the result of tension between encoder's dominant intention and 
decoder's reading strategy. 
Hall proposes three major reading strategies for the types of audience decoding; 
preferred reading, oppositional reading and negotiated reading. According to this, the 
audience member assumes 
the 'preferred or dominant' position when they recognise 
and agree with the 
full-preferred meaning offered by the media text. The oppositional 
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position is established when the audience member understands the preferred meaning, 
but disagrees with it due to their own set of attitudes and beliefs. The negotiated 
position is established when the audience member opposes or 
has to adapt the 
preferred meaning. The classification of 
focus groups' responses into the above 
categories is felt to 
facilitate reliable discrimination. The response is readily 
identifiable because it is limited to the characteristics contained within the definition. 
This study uses the encoding-decoding model to analyse the focus groups results. 
N4orcover, because people do have an ideological belief system to draw upon, 
especially in discussing cultural products, 
therefore, for the purposes of this focus 
groups investigation, three 
basic categories of ideological patterns (secular, extremists 
and Islamic protestant) were created. 
This could facilitate identification of different 
orientations towards the 
interpretation of responses and perception of the media 
messages among Iranian audiences. 
These basic categories of value positions could 
typify Iranian audiences as created from ideas grounded in what people said in the 
focus groups. The following examines the existence of these ideological concepts that 
are crucial factors 
in the infrastructure of Iranian society. 
Basically, analysing cultural products leads to the point of cultural relevance. The 
term culture brings 
forth many different interpretations and carries varying 
connotations. In analysing 
the socio-cultural influences of satellite television in Iran, 
the meaning of culture therefore needs to 
be addressed. According to Cai (1994), 
culture is "a group of 
inhabitations of a geographical region under a single 
government with a primary 
language". Da Silva defines culture as "... the set of values 
and beliefs through which members of a social 
formation explain their experience, 
express their artistic creativity, and motivate society as a whole to act" 
(da Silva, 
1986, P-90)- While the former places emphasis on the people who make up a culture, 
the latter focuses on the shared systems and actions of a group of people. Based on the 
above definitions, 
the operational definition of culture for this research is a group of 
inhabitants living in a geographic area under a single government with a primary 
language. The inhabitants possess shared systems which may be transmitted across 
generations by means of verbal and nonverbal communication. The members of a 
given culture are perceived 
by outsiders to maintain a common identity and/or 
solidarity upheld 
by these shared systems. The shared systems may include world 
views, processes of cognition, 
behavioural patterns, social structures, media 
influences and motivational resources (Cai, 1997). 
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Rosengren (1985) stipulated that the central focus of any culture is its values. 
Communication plays an essential role in how values are learned and shared within a 
culture. From interpersonal communication to mass media, the 
dissemination of 
information is vital in understanding the relationship between a culture and its society. 
The imposition of one culture's values system on another is a primary concern in the 
cross-cultural flow research. 
Smythe reported that cultivation is the purpose of a 
social system, while television 
's function is the propagation of perceptions of social 
reality. "... the TV 
'world' reflects... [and] changes the 'real" world ... the cultural 
products of all 
kinds in the 'real' world are equally to be understood as propaganda 
for the social system which produces them" (Smythe, in Nordenstreng and Varis, 
1973, p. 50). The cultural imperialism theory postulates that cultural invasion leads to 
a change in the symbolic meanings of a society along 
three dimensions (Lee, 1980; 
Wells, 1972). The symbolic meanings are structures of "taste, values, and preferences, 
views about the society, 
human relations, and life" (Lee, 1980, p. 104). Exposure to 
information about the 'outside world' via media vehicles, particularly television, 
creates rising aspirations. 
Consumers become frustrated when these expectations and 
aspirations are umnet. 
Imported television programming brings. with it consumer 
products that (1) are economically unsuitable 
to developing countries; (2) damage 
various domestic 
industries; and (3) "create a 'conspicuous consumption' pattern" 
(Lee, 1980, p. 104-105). In this respect Iran can be considered as a culture of 
conspicuous consumption and economic 
disparity. Almost all of the products 
advertised on satellite channels are 
imported from other countries to Iran. Under such 
terms, ) satellite 
television would most likely cause further disparity between different 
sections of society, especially 
between those who have and those who do not. 
N4oreover, in a wider context of society, satellite broadcasting in Iran under socio- 
cultural terms, 
has brought serious cultural tensions and struggles which seem to be 
deeply ideological. 
Basically, broadcasting involves the representation of cultural products. Cultural 
production also always 
involves values. And because it involves values it is bound to 
involve an 'ideological struggle' about what is right and what is wrong. To understand 
this 'ideological struggle' that 
broadcasting is caught up in, it seems necessary to 
identify and understand the values of its audiences. In other words, to understand 
those cultural tensions, 
it is necessary to examine how and where these tension points 
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come about. The theme of this 
investigation is been to provide an empirical analysis 
of such media effects on 
Iranian audiences. 
The infrastructure of the society in Iran is complex; it can be divided along some 
different, overlapping lines. In today's infrastructure of the socio-cultural reality of 
Iran, the ideology is perhaps one of the most important dividing lines in the society. 
The focus group results indicate that respondents' opinions were divided on the issue 
raised in the interviews 
based on the individual's own values, and the individual's 
values appeared to link to their 
ideological background rather than their educational 
background or sex. To understand the 'cultural tensions' that satellite broadcasting 
has brought into Iranian society, it is necessary to examine the values of those that it 
speaks to. Where, 
in other words, are these values are rooted? To answer this question 
it was necessary to create a conceptual framework that could explain the roots of the 
values that this investigation appeared to 
detect. As a starting point, an examination of 
the dividing ideological patterns in the society in discussing the cultural issues that 
broadcasting presents seems necessary. In addressing the ideology, van Dijk defines it 
as -the basis of the social representations shared 
by members of a group, [allowing] 
group members to organise 
the multitude of social beliefs about what is the case, good 
or bad, right or wrong, 
for them, and to act accordingly" (van Dijk, 1998, p. 8). In this 
respect, people 
do have an embracing ideological belief system to draw upon, 
especially in discussing cultural products. 
In considering the latter, three basic categories of ideological patterns were identified. 
These basic categories of value positions could typify Iranian audiences in terms of 
ideas grounded in what people in the focus groups had to say. The three basic 
categories of value positions 
that were identified according to people's comments in 
focus group were; secularist, Islamic Protestants, and Islamic extremist. As many of 
the questions asked did directly utilise these concepts, therefore, those categories were 
used to organise some of 
the questions and to categorise people's responses. It was 
shown that 
in ternis of people's perception and values, these three categories, 
although they are conceptual constructions, 
did have an empirical reality. It is because 
people operate within a set of values, which were encompassed 
by those ideologies. It 
should be noted that extremist, protestant and secular respondants might change 
positions depending on 
the issues being addressed. If these concepts are seen as a 
personality trait, one would not accept much movement on 
different issues. But 
because the above concepts refer more to sets of beliefs, therefore, there might be 
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movements in position when 
individuals confront cultural and moral issues in 
practice. 
It must be stated that the existence of these ideological concepts are crucial factors in 
the infrastructure of Iranian society, and thus, they were not generated abstractly and 
then imposed on the subject material. The development of the concepts, extremist, 
protestant and secular, 
had gown out of genuine existences that was necessary to 
considered and encountered 
in the focus groups interviews. The three basic categories 
of value positions were 
held to be: secularist (with rather preferred reading strategy), 
Islamic Protestants (with negotiated decoding position), and Islamic extremist (with 
oppositional reading strategy). 
What follows here is an outline of the three basic 
ideological models which form the basic set of orientation to the politico-cultural 
questions in terins of their perception construed 
in terms of socio-political effects of 
cultural products. 
Outlining the contours of such models makes for analytical clarity 
and clearly maps onto the positions articulated 
in the focus group interviews. 
The three main substantially different models could underline people's perceptions of 
the nature, role and effects of broadcasting media in Iran. Firstly, the secular model 
takes the primary function of 
broadcasting to ensure that peoples' basic needs, are 
narrowly construed, and that actual preferences are met regardless of the nature of the 
media products. 
This is because, in the secular model, the sole importance is to 
protect people's political 
freedom, which ensures that people are free to lead their 
lives as they so choose. In this model, Iran is considered to be from a medieval 
religious theocratic state, which 
in order to progress, needs to cut away from all 
religious boundaries. 
Hence, in here religious values are to be kept strictly separate 
from political values in terms of the state. In this concept media are there to provide 
news, information and entertainment 
that are shaped according to whatever they wish 
to watch regardless of the possible cultural and political impacts that they may have 
on their audiences. 
It is not the job of the state or any institution to determine what 
people should watch, nor should people's 
interests be shaped or guided. In this 
conception, the substantive religious, and socio-cultural commitments of the 
regulators should 
be kept distinct from, and not interfere with the (satellite) 
broadcasting programmes that are designed to meet viewers choices. Of course, in 
Iran there is a huge difference between the state's broadcasting service and satellite 
broadcasting where people have enonnous choices. In such a model, broadcasting 
regulation, if required at all, can only 
be justified in order to protect or maximise 
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viewers-) autonomy through ensuring the viewers'. 
freedom of choice. Of course, a 
secular viewer is certainly opposed to and challenges the state's monopolies that tend 
to diminish the viewers' choice by banning the satellite programming available to 
people. This perception 
is not concerned with programme content except in a very 
thin, limited sense. For the secular, the right to privacy is fundamental, and therefore 
the state's control is considered as an intrusion into privacy, which clearly undermines 
their rights as citizens. Thus, where the state is failing to act just and fair manner and 
abuse their position 
for their own interests, for a secular then, foreign cultural 
invasion into their privacy through satellite programming is justified. Moreover, the 
secular can admit that although, 
Western cultural products, violence and pomographic 
programmes might 
be morally dubious, this is no reason to even regulate what people 
watch in the first place. 
For, according to them, and with regards to the lack of 
religious believes, they 
have the right to choose how to lead their lives, and this 
includes the right to be mistaken or immoral or adopt a pro-Western culture and its 
lifestyle. The recent history of Iran indicates that secularism was often not 
experienced as a 
liberating movement, but as an assault upon people's faith. 
Throughout history, modernisation and secularism coincided with a process that was 
copied from the 
West, bringing Westernisation and cultural imperialism with it as 
well. For example, Reza 
Shah (the father of late Shah of Iran), used to send soldiers 
into the street with bayonets to force women to take their veils off. It seems that the 
rise of extremist 
ideology in Iran was the direct result of such aggressive activities. 
Conversely, although the extremist concept which is the ideology of the ruling class in 
Iran, agrees that the primary function of the media is to Islamise the country and move 
Iran back to its roots, traditions and culture, which is of course according to the ruling 
class interests, 
it is limited to their biased perception of Islam. And this comes with 
the ignorance of the pre-Islamic culture of Iran which is deeply rooted into the 
nationalist sentiments of 
Iranian. The purpose of the state, according to this model, is 
to protect and promote the conditions required to cultivate and promote the ruling 
class version of religious, political, and cultural values. Therefore, media 
broadcasting 
should ensure that 
broadcasting practices and programmes inform and educate people 
on the right kind of 
beliefs, and religious values that do not contradict their values. In 
this concept, the media 
have a duty to serve the people's preferences only where those 
preferences conform 
to or promote the ruling class position; otherwise, such 
broadcasting service should not be allowed. In this model, the total control and 
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monopoly of the media broadcasting are in the hands of the state to ensure that 
informative, educative, cultural, social and religious perceptions of people are guided 
and shaped by theocratic requirements. The extremists agree that intrusions into 
privacy are justified on the grounds that moral and social behaviour, if are 
unacceptable and against their own sets of religious principles, should be exposed. 
According to this model it is the state's job to regulate and control society to promote 
the social and religious virtues required to lead a pure life, and thus, nothing is as a 
matter of principle, outside the 
jurisdiction of the state. 
To preclude certain kinds of programming on the grounds that they are obscene in 
some way is dependent upon a moral 
judgment, and thus on this *view obscenity 
provides grounds 
for censorship. However, in Iran, the state not only banned the 
sexual content of programming and 
heavily modified many non-explicit programmes, 
but different socio-political and even Islamic views that contradict the state's views, 
are also subject to censorship and are 
heavily regulated or banned. For example, a 
speech by Aghaiari that was 
in June 2002, where he attacked "traditional Islam" (the 
extremist view point that 
is held by the theocratic regime), cost him a death sentence. 
In this model, individuals are divided into two categories: they are either an insider or 
an outsider. This portrays the 
doctrine of the clerical regime; you are either with us or 
against us, there 
is no middle ground in this concept, and not much room for 
democracy. 
According to the Protestant view, the media should put people in a situation whereby 
they can make informed choices about which political representatives they wish to 
elect, which social or 
foreign policies to support or protest at and what the current 
Socio-economic trends are, which affect their 
lives (these standpoints clearly appeared 
in the decoding mode among negotiated reading sample). The protestant conception 
of the function of 
broadcasting is to provide people with the information required to 
function in society and to provide programmes which speak to people's interests. 
However, the moral and social commitments of the regulator are necessary in order to 
produce and broadcast 
the programmes that are designed to meet people's cultural and 
socio-political needs. 
But any regulation of this sort, in this view, inevitably gives rise 
to the question concerning whether values, tastes and conception are being imposed 
illegitimately upon others. 
on such model, public broadcasting clearly has certain duties to serve and cater to the 
interests and preferences of the individuals and the public, and not of a certain group. 
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The broadcasting system should be property construed as having a remit to broadcast 
to and for the public at large. Thus, the general public's needs and preferences should 
drive the programming schedules and content, not a particular group with particular 
interests. In this view, broadcasting media should not be under the control of the 
government or monopolies. 
The broadcasting system therefore, should work 
independently from the state and from any particular political or ideological group. In 
this view, broadcasting regulation should be concerned with programme content in 
terms of its indecency, offensiveness or immorality. In this view, although society is 
considered to be a 
base for the individuals within it to develop and flourish as social 
beings, it also acknowledges its individuals' right to privacy. Thus, it would not 
accept that intrusion 
into privacy is justified on the grounds of unacceptable moral or 
social behaviour unless, of course 
it jeopardises society as a whole or its national 
interests. 
The Protestant perception (which is rooted in ideas of some of the Islamic 
intellectuals such as Ali Shariati) argues that in Islam there has never been a class of 
the clergy, and all these titles, which were created as recently as 50 to 60 years ago 
are imitated from the 
Christianity and church hierarchy. Therefore, all the divisions 
and the hierarchies they 
have created, such as Ayatollah and even the Vellayat-e- 
Faghih, are Catholic and not Islamic. According to this view, Islam should be rescued 
from the clergy. The extremist ideas imposed by the theocratic regime on Iranian 
society are based on the perception of clergies and not on Islam itself The Protestant 
view points out that many perceptions and personal 
ideas were added to Islam by the 
clergy that were merely 
historical additions and not part of the religion itself. In this 
respect, the concept of clergy 
itself is a contemporary phenomenon and that Shiite 
Islam as it has been used by clergies misguided. 
Shariati (1933-1977) is among the first to fight this attitude. He called for the 
separation of 
Islam (core Islam) from the clerical interpretation, something that he 
called traditional 
Islam. In this model, Shiite Islam can be a modem and democratic 
ideology. It is argued that current Shiite Islam is the creation of clergy and is 
comprised of cleric 
interpretation and is according to their thinking, which is 
inflexible and incompatible. Aghajari, one of the protestant activists, in his speech at 
Ijamadan University that led to his arrest three years ago, pointed out that: 
"The way in which the religious scholars of previous generations understood 
and interpreted Islam is not Islam. It was their interpretation of Islam; however 
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just as they had the right to interpret the Koran in their way, we have the same 
right. Their interpretation of Islam is not an article of faith for us" (Aghaiari, 
2002). 
With this respect, Shariati argues that "the interpretation of Koran does not only 
belong to religious leaders, people can have their own interpretation of Koran, it is not 
a crime as the clergies claim 
it to be. In doing so, the clergies want to keep people in 
the dark so that they can gain total control and power of monopoly"' (Aghajari, 2002). 
Shariati rejects the institution of Mada-e Taqlid in extremist religious ideology and 
argues that this brings eternal slavery since people are supposed to act 
like brainless 
followers who always must follow the master. In terms of human rights, this view 
agrees that all people 
have inalienable rights and are free to express their opinion. He 
contradictorily stated that women and men 
have equal rights in Islam, and Maija-e 
Taqlid's opinion on this matter or any other matters does not represent Islam. This 
view presents Islam a progressive 
ideology that respects the rights of all regardless; 
the religion, believes, race or gender, and perceives people to be free to be whatever 
they want to be. Shariati called 
for Islamic humanism and expressed the need for both 
religious culture and community culture to work alongside each other 
in the society. 
The concepts of secular, Islamic Protestant and extremist are the three fundamentally 
different and conflicting perceived ideologies that shape and guide peoples' socio- 
cultural, political, and religious perceptions and values 
in Iran. The essential thrust of 
this chapter has been to 
draw out just what people's fundamental values are and to 
understand, in relation to those models, 
just where people tend to fall. Basically, 
social changes can 
be cast in many ways. The development of this Western secular 
culture consequent on catering 
to the entertainment needs of the Iranian audiences is 
something that 
is not been met by the indigenous media and its mass delivery of 
Western cultural products through satellite television. The existence of cultural 
differences in any society always offers the possibility of conflict. 
"What cannot be overlooked here is that while culture was seen to involve ideological 
and moral questions, 
the regulation of culture, as both a value in itself and as valuable 
in practice, became extremely problematic. The regulation of culture will undoubtedly 
become increasingly technically difficult with the development of advanced 
cornmunication technologies, 
but this does not seem to be the central problem. The 
real problem 
in Iran seems to be the authority and the measurement under which 
regulation has taken place. 
The introduction of these new technologies has led to the 
increased availability of foreign shows to many Iranians. Several pertinent questions 
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arise regarding the impact of the trans-border 
flow of mostly American and Western 
prograrnining on their Iranian audiences via satellite. Does access to satellite correlate 
with a preference for American and Western programming? Does this vary according 
to different programme content type? Does watching satellite television versus state 
television lead to more pro-American attitudes? Does it lead to different perceptions 
of reality? Essentially, what are the current preferences 
in Iranian audience viewer- 
ship since the inception of satellite television? 
This investigation attempts to answer these questions. The primary purpose of this 
investigation is to examine the potential impact of satellite television on the culture of 
Iran. it attempts to revise the cultural imperialism paradigm in the light of the active 
audience perspective. 
This investigation has employed textual analysis and in-depth 
interviews as the major research methods. In order to disclose the preferred meaning 
coded by the encoders 
(VOA and Jaarn-e-Jarn satellite channels), textual analysis of 
the two news orientated programmes was conducted. Previously the results of content 
and discourse analysis provided original 
data and revealed the encoded meaning and 
the agenda of both stations. The following is the results of focus groups interviews. In 
this case study, all the interviews took place in two cities of Iran, Tehran and Karaj, 
and lasted between two and two and 
half hours, facilitating insight into many facets of 
individual's attitudes. 
7.5 The schedule of the focus groups investigation 
The schedule consists of two parts and nine sections: 
Part One 
- General questions about 
the family 
The reason for obtaining satellite TV 
Assessing satellite programming 
State's policy and punishments regarding obtaining satellite 
Cultural and ideological patterns surrounding satellite programming 
politics and democracy in Iran 
Part Two 
- Audience's response 
to studied satellite channels 
- The main sources of news among the studied sample 
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Decoding strategies of studied programmes among the sample 
7.6 The Sample 
For the purpose of this research a focus group guide was conducted. Open- 
ended questions were given to the participants so they could provide their own 
answers to the questions. In asking open-ended questions, the interviewer may have 
been instructed to probe more information as needed. Data was collected in between 
the two hour to two hour and a half focus group session. The researcher began the 
focus group by addressing the purpose of this study, explaining the rights and 
obligations of participants, and then expressing appreciation towards participants. 
The protection of the subjects' identities is the primary concern in the protection of 
participants in this research. 
Regarding the potential problem of confidentiality 
associated with focus group studies, and due to the nature of snowball sample (that 
one person refers to another, the group members may know each other), the 
researcher strongly assured the participants that the study is confidential and the 
inforrnation discussed in the focus group would not be revealed to anyone. The 
transcription of the data identified participants ominously and did not include any 
identifying information. Research results were reported in the aggregate, with care 
taken to ensure that no participant could be identified. 
In constructing the sample, the researcher was interested in the elite city opinion, as 
this is an important group in generating social changes. Moreover, this is a key group 
of people that the government needs to control in order to maintain power. Results of 
the analysis of the focus group interviews with the above sample might not be 
generalised to the whole population. The sample is not a representation of the 
population, and cannot therefore 
be generalised to larger populations, but it is felt that 
sinall scale intensive studies of selected samples and the results of the analysis of the 
interviews that are undertaken from the sample provide data which affords sharp 
contrasts and which 
facilitates insight into qualitative differences, which might not be 
ernerge from random samples. 
The study is not therefore, attempting to make ethnic 
generalisations, 
but to examine characteristics of the thoughts and attitudes in the 
sample group, which come 
ftom a developing country. Although some studies and 
surveys may have produced correlations of certain indices of the effects of the 
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international media on people's thoughts, perceptions and behaviour, it still may seem 
to be impossible to cover all the relevant variables by examining representative 
sequences of interaction 
between the medium of communication and people. 
1-jowever, through open questions it is hoped that the mixed and contradictory aspects 
of media influence on people 
in the context of cultural imperialism and its outcome in 
a complex situation will 
be explored. 
This study is concemed with the perception and attitudes which emerge from focus 
group interviews. It arises 
directly from the mass media research programmes 
concerned with investigating the 
impacts of the emergence of new media technologies 
on public opinion. The 
findings from the focus groups are based on 20 group 
discussions, each of which lasted up to two hours and were carried out in two waves. 
The first set of 11 groups took place in January-February of 2004 and the second set 
of 9 groups was conducted 
in January 2005. In order to ensure the representativeness 
of the sample, a selection was adopted. 
The groups were chosen from different social 
backgrounds which cover the bulk of the population. However, the focus was put on 
the elite city opinion, as this is a key group of people that could generate social 
change which therefore the government 
has to control in order to maintain power. 
Also, a selection criteria within these groups were used to ensure a wide spread 
variety of ages and occupations. 
For the first wave of interviews, these criteria were 
also placed to ensure that there was a spread of 
families with children living with their 
parents at home, those without children 
living at home, and, of course, those who 
have never had children. The criteria also included people and families who had 
satellite television. 
The first wave of focus groups consisted of 11 groups in all. The primary function 
was to explore why and 
how often people watch satellite television and to find out 
their preferences, and how they view the state's prohibition of satellite viewing. The 
second wave, which consisted of 
9 groups, was used to explore people's opinion 
about the news contents 
in VOA and on the news and issues that were analysed in 
both the content and discourse analysis parts. Given that all data requires 
interpretation, it was decided that it would be very useful to present the some of the 
news materials used 
in the content and discourse analysis to the second set of focus 
groups, not only to 
be used as points of discussion, but to see how the participants 
would respond to these news reports and how they would interpret the broadcasting 
stations that report them. 
The two recorded news materials from VOA, were shown to 
232 
all the groups in the second wave of interviews. The recorded materials were from 
the VOA main news bulletins on the 29th and 3& of June 2004. The first chosen news 
story was about the statements made by the grandson of Khomeinie, the late leader of 
Islamic Republic, in a telephone interview with VOA (which was discussed and 
analysed in previous chapter), and the second one was a televised-report about Iraq's 
situation after the U. S. invasion. The 
focus groups were held in Tehran and Karaj. In 
the group, both the researcher and participants had the opportunity to interact in the 
natural human setting that would allow them to express their living experiences that 
are related to the research's purpose. 
For the sample recruitment (which is the process of gathering the group together in 
the same place at the same time), this study uses snowball technique. To apply this 
technique, as Lindlof states, is to find a contact who knows the target group. He or she 
might be willing to pass along the names of parishioners who would be willing to 
participate. Getting referrals 
from others, or through word of mouth, is a good means 
of gathering a sample. 
If one person is interested, she or he may be able to provide 
names of other potential participants. 
This type of recruiting is known as the snowball 
technique (Lindlof, 1995). For this investigation 'snowball' sample was applied for 
Iranian subject recruitment. The subjects were asked to have their friends and 
acquaintances that were appropriate 
for the study to call the researcher. When they 
called, the researcher explained the study to them, verified their age and gender, and 
invited them to the focus group. At the beginning of the focus group, the subjects 
were informed about the purpose of the research and their rights and obligations as 
subjects. Participants were 
informed orally that they may withdraw at any time during 
the interview. They were also told about the extent of their obligation, the purpose of 
the study, and its outcome. It was explained to them that their participation is 
confidential and that the researcher would not divulge any information from the focus 
group. 
7.7 Analysis of the Data 
This analysis is concemed with several kinds of data and procedures for 
coding each group. 
Data was collected from the total of 94 Iranian people that 
participated in 20 
focus group interviews, which were hold in two waves. 
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The people from first stage, which consisted of 11 focus groups, were classified as 
urban nuclear families 
from Tehran and Karaj, from different age groups and holding 
different professions, from university lecturer to retired army officer. 
Stage One 
own Parent/s 
Age Group Children Profession 
Tehran Couple 30-44 2 boys aged 8- Self-employed 
14 
Karai Couple 39-42 2 boys aged 8- Self-employed 
16 
K. arai Couple 
34-45 1 girl aged 12 Dentist', 
Tehran Couple 30-35 No children Both: 
computer 
engineer 
working in a 
private 
company 
Karaj Couple 36-42 1 girl and 1 Man: 
boy aged 10- Businessman 
17 Wife: 
Hairdresser 
Karaj -ý Couple 47-54 3 girls and, 2 Clerk 
boys aged 15- 
23 
Tehran Couple 32-41 1 boy and 1 Working in a 
girl aged 3-12 private 
company 
Tehran Single parent 60 1 boy living Oxford 
with his father educated 
aged 15 doctor, 
manager in the 
ministry of 
agriculture 
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Karaj Couple 50-62 2 girls and I 
boy aged 23- 
31 
Retired army 
officer 
Karaj Couple 33-37 1 girls and I Bank manager 
boys aged 2-15 
raj Couple 
27-35 1 girl aged 10 Mechanic 
engineer 
working in a 
private 
company 
The people from second stage, which consisted of 9 focus groups, were classified as 
urban professionals 
from Tehran and Karaj, from different age groups and holding 
different professions. 
Stage 2 
ToWn Sex Age Occupation 
Group 
Tehran 3 women and 4 22-49 Student, lab assistant, 
men University lecturer, 
Tehran 2 women and 3 21-53 Student, clerk, teacher, 
men University lecturer 
Karaj 2 women and 3 26-47 Housewife, engineer, doctor, 
men self-employed 
Tehran 6 women 25-44 Clerk, working in educational 
section 
Karaj 2 women and 4 
-23-64 Student, housewife, self. 
men employed 
Tehran 3 women and 2 21-55 Student, teacher, lecturer 
men 
Tehran I women and 4 22-60 Student, expert, one with PhD 
men in social sciences 
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Tehran 3 women and 4 23-52 Student, one with PhD in 
men laboratory sciences, clerk 
Tehran 2 women and 4 35-49 Teacher, student, housewife, 
men businessmen, 
Also the educational experiences of the sample ranged from school students to 
doctorate in different field of studies. All focus group interviews were tape-recorded 
and then transcribed as completely as possible. The researcher has carefully followed 
participants' responses in order to separate different themes in their answers. Themes 
were categorised based on the participants' responses. The researcher then coded all 
the issues that participants had addressed. The themes were then placed in categories 
of responses. This study uses the encoding-decoding model to analyse the focus 
groups results, which as a structured model, does facilitate identification of different 
orientations towards the interpretation of responses and the audience's perception of 
the media messages. 
7.8 Hypothesis of the Investigation 
As mentioned previously, this investigation attempts to study the potential 
effects of satellite programming in Iran under the revision of the active audience 
paradigm. Significant 
differences were identified between the parents (aged 35 and 
over) and their children 
(aged 13 to 23) throughout the period of study. Significant 
differences were found in their attitudes and behaviour. These differences were 
associated with the purposes 
for which the responses were given, and reflected 
differences in attitudes and perceptions that the younger sample attached to the 
various questions asked. 
As significant differences emerged from the responses of 
studied sample based on their attitude analyses, this investigation therefore, is more 
concerned with the analysis of aspects of the social environments and the role played 
by the studied satellite televisions and the kind of imperialistic influence for their 
Iranian audiences which produce these differences. It also analyses the significant 
differences in attitudes, perception and behaviour that these media have produced 
among their audiences. 
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it is hypothesised that in a country such as Iran, cultural imperialism as an expression 
of a secular ethics which contradicts one's religious norms and 
beliefs would cause a 
serious conflict within the society. 
The second hypothesis is based on the premise that 
the youth not only watch more television, but rely on the medium as their primary 
source for news and entertainment. 
It is hypothesised then that a generational gap is 
accruing in the society. 
The followings present the results of the analyses made from 
the data which emerged. 
7.9 Focus Group Findings 
The followings present the results of the analyses made from the emergent 
data, which are analysed according to the encoding-decoding model. 
Initially, it might seem that little can be gained from categorising the responses of the 
Sarnple when asked some general questions 
in the interviews. The question, 'What do 
you think about 
American society, and American popular culture? ' was a general 
question open to wide 
interpretation. It is interesting to note how such an open 
question was 
interpreted, entailed different meanings and elicited different modes of 
reading. Although 
this analysis cannot register how the individuals think, it can 
categorise what 
is represented in the response, the content and format of the reply. 
Significant differences emerged from responses given to the above question among 
the sample. The most common responses given to the above question from people 
aged 13 to 22 were: 
'It is OK. I like it. ' On the other hand responses given to the same 
question from people of 
23 and above were different as they were somehow more 
critical in their assessments. 
The last comment was followed up by asking: 'What do think about U. S. foreign 
policy?, 9 out of 
13 people in 13-22 aged group were agree with the policy. Again the 
responses given to 
the question by people aged 23 and over were significantly 
different and the immediate response given was: 'It is wrong. ' The following section 
of the analysis sought 
initially to examine the differences that emerged between the 
responses of the 
19 focus groups. It focused upon the following questions: 
1. Do differences emerge in the range of aspects of the medium of 
communication and, if so, what significance could lie in sample's 
responses? 
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2. Do differences emerge in the way that participants organise their 
response and if so, can the differences be organised in a way such that 
how people responded to the question could be categorised according 
to their ideological background and the degree of media influences? 
-fbese questions, especially the first one, relate partly to the possible 
influence of mass 
media on their audiences and 
the role of audiences to participate actively in 
interpreting events. 
According to the data collected in the interviews, and based on the 
enCoding-decoding model and according 
to the criteria set for focus group research 
(namely: people's acceptance or rejection of US popular culture, people's responses 
to uS propaganda and foreign policy, and people's support or opposition to 
Iranian 
government), were categorised as 
followed: 
i. Preferred reading: where the decoder fully gasps on the core 
intention of the encoder and accepts the preferred meaning 
embedded in the message and interpret it within the frame of the 
dominant code. In this study, participants with explicitly positive 
and agreeable attitudes towards U. S. popular culture, lifestyle and 
foreign policy are categorised under this section. 
Negotiated reading: where decoder accepts or agrees with some 
aspects of the dominant meaning, but rejects or alters others. In this 
study, all the participants who consciously rejected U. S. foreign 
policy but accepted its popular culture, lifestyle, or some other 
social aspects of its society such as democracy and social welfare 
are categorised here. 
iii. Oppoitional reading: where the decoder may read the encoded 
message subversively and reject the dominant meaning. Thus, 
those participants that rejected both U. S. popular culture and 
foreign policy and support the theocratic regime are classified here. 
Moreover, because people do have an embracing ideological belief system to draw 
upon, especially 
in discussing cultural products, three basic categories of ideological 
patterns were therefore created. 
These basic categories of value positions that might 
typify the Iranian audiences 
from ideas grounded in what people in the focus groups 
said. Indeed, given 
the complexity of the whole issue of values and the addressing of 
attitudinal questions, not 
to have operated conceptually from the outset would have 
resulted in the collection of meaningless 
information. The three basic categories of 
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value positions were held to be: secularist (with rather preferred reading strategy), 
Islamic Protestants (with negotiated decoding position), and Islamic extremist (with 
oppositional reading strategy). 
Table 3 
The sample's General Position within Reading Strategy framework 
Total Sample Preferred reading Negotiated reading Oppositional 
Reading 
94 9 79 6 
Considerable variations and significant differences in answers occurred among the 
sarnples' responses which are as follows. 
1. Both the preferred and oppositional readings are stratified. 
7.10 Preferred Reading 
In this category the decoder is capable of not only grasping the core intention 
of the encoder and preferred meaning embedded in the text correctly, but agrees with 
it. For example, a 20 year old woman after viewing news clips of VOA about Iraq, 
when asked to give her opinion about the news she said: 
in Persian: 
I 0_ýA j 0-14 L; 
_)44 
L; 
L; 
l L31-)c 
6'11 AS L: Wl Cyi Z4jýj L; j , A. 
S 
L; 3ýý 
". 33JI. 3 
jr, English: 
What the VOA wanted to say is that Iraq is a much better place now than it was 
before, now people have democracy and freedom. 
She added then: 
In Persian: 
e 
I-) Lý-ý cyý 
IA' 4L; 
-' 
A'j 
tjl-l 
jj-. A 1_) 
&. JIJAIAL; t+jUjS Jt4-LI 01 
cA 
I accept the news that satellite channels broadcast and I think they are more likely to 
portray the truth than state media. 
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Another female participant in this group after watching the news said: 
In Persian: 
A_S AL<-ý L; 14LLS 
Aq L; 
l J 
L; j I AS 
-A. 1 AS )A I G&L;. A L; C.; j J. 3 A. 4 j A2 
AS, 
in English: 
I think VOA, in comparision to other stations, tries to be more impartial. It tells the 
news story and lets people judge for themselves. In this news story, VOA tries to 
shovv that there is no problem 
in Iraq and that everything is going normally there and 
to say that the Americans are working there and that the people have no problem. 
These participants are typical decoders who carried out the preferred reading. They 
both caught the dominant intention and preferred meaning advocated by the decoder, 
and expressed it clearly and accurately. 
Furthermore, she agreed with this core point 
frorn a standpoint near to that of the encoder's. At the core level, the communication 
between encoder and decoder is accomplished by a genuine kind of "preferred 
reading7'. Furthermore, 
in this category and in the examination of the statements made 
by the participants to the focus groups, what can be seen is an appreciation of how the 
portrayed social world operates, and 
in terms of perception and behaviour, the media 
is seen as an important 
influence. Among the whole focus group sample, few people 
considered to hold preferred reading strategy. From the total of 94 people that 
participated in the 
19 focus groups interviews, only 9 people (2 male and 7 female, 
aged between 15 to 
22), fell into this category. However it is important to note that 
from the total of 13 people aged 13-22, nine people held the preferred reading 
position. The table 
below shows the number of people in each reading position, in the 
above age group. 
Table 4 
Tlje total number Preferred reading Ne-gotiated reading OpposiTional 
of people aged 
13- reading 
22 among the 
sample 
13 9 4 0 
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These results indicate the orientation of the teenagers and young adult to evaluate the 
U. S. cultural and political issues in rather positive terms. 
The above people were asked 'What type of programmes would you watch most on 
satelliteT The reply 
from this group was: 'entertainment programmes, films and 
j, nusic'. One girl said: 
In Persian: 
- f: Lý &J uJA-)-T LS4.4ii C, - 
In English: 
I watch music and American 
films. 
Another female participant replied: 
in Persian: 
j-;. Lýý Co t-35ýý -LL* jý L; ýA .. 113t 
F*40 Lsm. -)j j . 3. 
J 
-A. 41 
In English: 
I only watch American channels, especially 
MTV. It broadcasts nice music from my 
favourite pop stars such as Madonna, Jennifer Lopez, and Britney Spears'. 
it was picked up by her sister: 
In pcrsian: 
'44 
-ýp 
jb LALýja Ls4 . As e35-Lr, 4 
oL5,31 
-) 
L; j 
In English: 
q watch Eminem on MTV, 
I like him a lot. I also watch American channels and those 
Iranian expatriate ones. 
This tendency towards U. S. cultural products, especially towards films and pop 
rnusic, appears to 
be a pervasive trait among young people that hold a more secular 
view of Iranian society, which 
has affected and transformed the social pattern, cultural 
and social identity of a particularly younger generation 
in Iran. 
This group was asked: 'What do you think of U. S. foreign policy? ' The general 
responses from this category were either: 
'I have not thought about that. ' Or 'I do not 
think that it is wrong. ' For example, one of the male participants (aged 21) said: 
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In Persian: 
L%l- L"I LAL -ýJ-l 
L L-j- 
L5.1.5ý Lt. A4 
. t4 . 
LJý4_). T eA C)Tj J_.! 
S Jý 143-a 
j -1,15 cli 
li 1413 
-'A 
IJLS- 
L)tj-A 
ýj a3sý.; - JI-S L., % aj. ) 
A4 AS L, 
3t-: sl -1,;. (.; 
IA_3ý- 14 ILI& 
in English: 
In my opinion, the world is like a jungle and the U. S. is the lion of this jungle. 
Because it has the power, it wants to conquer the world and make the world one 
country, the United States. But that is not wrong, and this is different from all the anti- 
humanitarian acts that some people accuse the United States of engaging in. 
participants were asked 'What did they think of American society and its cultureT 
NVhen asked this question a 15 year old girl said: 
In Persian: 
ý 
5, 
L; Aj ;- jj-t. ) 
&3A 
ejlA_41 - ZJ-11 LOU' ý2 
$ýi j 
jji ýý ji IA J-14ji 14 _Al 
Jja 
_ýj 
)JUI L; jLt. 
ý-- tA 
" at,: J=U 
A_S A 
_)j 
Ij 
jjj?. aL.. k; _ I 
In ]English: 
I like its culture and accept it. There is nothing wrong with it, and I don't reject it. I 
know that it contradicts our cultural values but I accept it anyway from the beginning. 
According to what I can see on satellite televisions, American society is very nice and 
it attracts me. I like its culture and prefer it to Iranian culture. 
Another girl (aged 19) from a different focus group interview, when asked about 
Arnerican culture answered: 
jr, Pcrsian: 
CJU" ýl a,. W AS Ij A 
- AL-A 
_ý L5jj- 
tdýj AS ý&ý , <3j 
In English: 
I like what I've seen and I accept the culture. They take it easy in life and I think they 
are more successful. 
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This was picked up by her sister (aged 17): 
in Persian: 
L ?. A.. A f,! ý JU i-Z L, 
9 
-%1_3_9 IS IA I q-; j ci *j li 
JJ jL 1ý31 
In English: 
I like it, and I'd love to go and live there. ' She continued: 'I know that everywhere 
you go, you get good and bad but generally speaking, I highly approve of American 
society and like the culture. 
The comments made by young males in this reading position were similar. 
These comments were made by young male and female, aged 13-22, none of whom 
had ever been to United States or any other foreign country. The above group was 
asked 'How do you get their information about the raised issuesT The response from 
both male and female was: 'satellite television. " Therefore, the differences in 
evaluations, which emerged 
in the focus groups discussions, could perhaps partially 
be explained by the image and attitudes that the media mediates to society, since so 
rnuch of the information that people have about the world is provided by the media. 
For example, one of the female participants (aged 18) in this group while speaking 
about American society said: 
In Persian: 
4 . 011, .4 -'Uj Adjl- j 1: 1-1 A, -L--. ý. Jý4 Cjj 
In English: 
It is a prosperous society. People are wealthy and happy. 
Then she cmphasised that her perception about United States was based on the 
Arncrican fllms- She then added: 
In Persian: 
4 
5LjJLAJ e» 
In Fnglish: 
I love them and I am usually deeply touched by them. 
As it is clear for a teenager who's never been abroad, the media can work as a 
window to the unknown world. They present people with a rather biased picture of the 
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world. It is interesting here that religion 
is rolled into a discussion of culture and 
society when religious 
ideology itself leads to certain cultural values. In this group, in 
which almost all the participants hold a secular ideology, religion is taken as a 
rnetaphor for social malaise. 
It has come to symbolically represent that which is seen 
as wrong in countries 
like Iran and as an obstacle preventing Iran from joining the 
rnodern world. And there was, according to these people, much to object to. For 
example, one of the 
female participants, aged 19, stated: 
In Persian: 
_)j_3 . 
IA 
6 t4 (: ul 193 
In English: 
In our society there are so many problems and there are many things that have been 
irnposed upon us. Me being a Muslim has not been by choice, it is because of my 
parents, they were Muslim so 
it makes me Muslim too. 
some of them seemed to be very much influenced by the staggering 3 hour daily 
programme on Jaam-e-Jarn 
International on promoting Christianity. When they were 
asked, what they 
did think of that programme', a young girl aged 18, said: 
in Persian: 
. 1.1 L; 
U- 
?A ji Lrb-j 
C, - L; 
Iy 4 Ul-, -1 jb*,,. LLA bjijA A AS jj 
bjý_j. ý AS 1_) L, 
ýA A_-t3_)j IA eýg 
,. L; 
A 
JJAA J3 
e'ljj 
I_j ýýl 
A-?. j ýj 
1 *1 &4 . eja 
jj4 ýLZ 
in English: 
After watching satellite programmes, especially those from the United States and 
Europe, it has come to my attention to question Islam and to criticise it, and I know 
that it is not only me and that many other young people feel the same. I have watched 
the programmes about Christianity on satellite and I have no problem with that and I 
accept them completely. 
I also have read Bible as well, and I believe in Jesus. 
To support the above girl's statement, another member added: 
in Persian: 
r. 
ý CJA 4ljl AU LSU 'LAU J. 1 )I A14 AS &. Ut lf5j 
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I ja j U41.3 
LYL .3)! 
ý4a J4.11 
bjýja AS 143T 
J-1 D-lj& (-"I' ?A CJ14%4-" ýJ ýl i 
In English: 
It has happened a lot that after watching satellite programmes, I have criticised Islam. 
I do not accept the comments about other religions such as Christianity that are stated 
in our religious book. I have read their 
books and have been talking about them and I 
know that what Islam says about Christianity is not correct. 
Another female participant aged 17, said: 
In Persian: 
e"A 
In English: 
without any doubt, I completely accept what they say about Christianity and Jesus on 
satellite television. 
When asked how she did find out what Islam says about Christianity, she simply said: 
,I have learned about it from satellite'. Almost all of the participants in this group 
mentioned 'satellite television' as the only or the main source of 
information for 
learning about the above issue. They particularly mentioned the Jaam-e-Jarn channel 
and its 3 hours a 
day programme promoting Christianity as their main source. What 
happened here is an illustrative of how young people with little or no background 
knowledge of an issue, would establish facts from what they receive from the media. 
-vVhat is seen here is indeed a classic case of cultural imperialism where being 
in-, posed to such an aggressive cultural and ideological programme has led to changes 
in how they perceive Islam. In this group, the idea of secularism holds that the 
purpose of the state and regulation 
is to protect and promote the freedom required for 
people to lead their 
lives how they choose. Thus, religion and social values should not 
be the concerns of broadcasters, as people have the right to do what is immoral as 
long as they do not infringe upon the basic rights of others. 
Following the comments already quoted, acceptance and approval of raised issues and 
very high evaluation 
that were made by this group, which was consisted of teenagers 
and young adults, seemed 
to stem from the images that are portrayed by satellite 
televisions. The above responses clearly show how these young people consider 
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satellite television as their main source of 
information. The information gained from 
the interviews of people ftom this category highlights that the media can and does 
shape people's views, and therefore 
influences behaviour, especially those involving 
subjects that viewers are unfamiliar with or 
know little about. The answers given by 
the sample of this category show the different images and views towards their 
evaluation of American society, 
its popular culture and its foreign policy from other 
participants in negotiated and oppositional readings. 
It is important to notice that none 
of the respondents 
in this group had been to the United States or any European 
countries, therefore, their views are mostly 
based on what is portrayed by their 
preferred media. The answers given 
by respondents from this category clearly reflect 
the acceptance towards encoders' dominant intention and shows how the media are 
used to act as an agency of social control 
in transmitting their views of the world. 
people, in this, seem to agree that the primary function of broadcasting is to ensure 
that people's basic need are narrowly construed and actual preferences are met 
regardless of the nature of the media products. 
This is because according to their 
secular belief, the sole 
importance is to protect people's political freedom which 
ensures that people are 
free to lead their lives as they choose. In this view, cutting 
away from all religious 
boundaries is of the utmost importance. Hence, in here, 
religious values are to 
be kept strictly separate from political values in terms of state. 
In this concept, media are there to provide news, information and entertainment that 
are shaped according to whatever they wish to watch regardless of the possible 
cultural and political 
impacts that they may have on their audiences. It is not the job 
of the state or any 
institution to determine what people should watch, nor should 
people's interests 
be shaped or guided. In this conception, the substantive religious, 
and socio-cultural commitments of the regulators should be 
kept distinct from, and 
not interfere with, the 
(satellite) broadcasting programmes that are designed to meet 
viewers choices. 
Of course, in Iran there is a huge difference between state's 
broadcasting service and satellite broadcasting where people have enormous choices. 
on such a model, broadcasting regulation, if required at all, can only be justified in 
order to protect or maximise viewers' autonomy through ensuring viewers' freedom 
of choice. of course, a secular 
is certainly opposed to and challenges the state's 
rnonopolies that tend 
to diminish the viewer's choice by banning available satellite 
programming. This perception 
is not concerned with programme content except in a 
very thin, limited sense. 
For people in this category, the right to privacy is 
246 
fundamental, and therefore the state's control is considered as intrusion into privacy, 
which clearly undermines their right as citizens. 
Thus, where the state fails to act in a 
just and fair manner, and where abuse their position for their own interests, for a 
secular then, foreign cultural 
invasion of privacy through satellite programming is 
justified. 
7.11 Negotiated Reading 
In the model proposed by Hall, negotiated reading is among the three major 
strategies, where the 
decoders accept some aspects of the dominant meaning but reject 
and alter others. The 
data obtained from focus group interviews shows that from the 
total of the 94 people participated in the 19 focus group interviews, 79 people fell into 
this category. In this group, all the participants consciously rejected U. S. foreign 
policy but had a tendency to accept 
its popular culture, lifestyle, or some other social 
aspects of its society such as 
democracy and social welfare. 
Reasons for Satellite Viewing and their Preferred Programmes 
it was decided to begin the discussion by asking a general question to provide some 
grounds for the questions that 
followed. The participants were asked: 'Why did you 
decide to get satellite television? ' The main and dominant response was 'To be 
entertained': 'The state's 
TV is so boring, and the programmes are not satisfactory'. 
So immediate was this response that the participants were questioned: 'What , 
kinds of 
programmes do you watch most on satellite? ' Back came the reply: 'Mostlyfilms and 
njusic'. A male Doctor also added: 
In Persian: 
In English: 
For news and information, the state's news is biased and therefore, it is hard to find 
the truth. 
This group gave the boring and biased nature of the state's TV programmes and news 
as a major reason 
for the huge rise in satellite viewing. 
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Conunenting on this last statement, someone said: 
Tn -persian: 
-LtI4 -IU (.; 
IA 
-, 
LJ. 5 
9. 
ý 
C)t: 
Lj AS Ull L,! WJA 
CJUI - 41A 1 
. 114 
ljýý 
-4 -1 ý3-" -31JI .,. I& lj: lý 
AU5ýCý U. 
6 C IA bZAj-: L L, 
4, 
ýý L; J-) 
bLI-A J)l 
_)L; 
- 
-p 
J-13 
eA e-l_, - 
Lýý eA 
ILLý eA )1_31qj AIS 
1.1p Z,, ! L. JA j . 
1131j-: L4 IA 
. 
11&L; A5 L 
_. 
A! 
- -ýjqýtý4 )JI. J 
in English: 
If the state's TV produces cheerful programmes with different varieties then people 
would not go for satellite. People want songs, people want music, and they want pop 
niusic. This Persian music that is produced and broadcasted from Los Angeles is 
nothing but an imitation of Western music. Singers like 'Aref and others copy from 
Western music and because people have no other choices and they buy their music 
from black market. Why doesn't the state create a situation where Iranian music can 
develop where those singers are free to sing in Iran? Ný%en watching satellite, people 
may not be after politics. They only want to watch a film and be entertained, but the 
politics comes along with this entertainment, it comes within satellite programmes. 
Another woman responded: 
In Persian: 
J. ii t& A-<4 k"bj jl; & (-, A tu rA 1-) L;. lta ju j -). i j (r-"l jýi (DI-jul Ji týI 
" 
In English: 
There are too many national religious mourning days in Iran and during those days the 
state TV has absolutely nothing on except wailing and lamentation throughout all its 
channels- 
This was pickcd up by another member: 
In Persian: 
- Ilg ý-4 -, ýu jý ý-4 L. ü, i .4 -'r, Lg". 3 
4-, 4 
-:, 
1, 
In English: 
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eople do not have any entertainment to fill their time. Every other few months there 
rnight be a music concert and that's about it. 
What people appeared to say in the above interviews is that if they were satisfied with 
the state-run television programmes and if their needs and wants were met, they 
would not turn to the black market to supply cultural products. Also, since they have 
paid for the satellite service then the onus is on them to decide the value of the 
content. And this decision ought not to involve the interests of others. Here, thus the 
existence of desire for cultural products is the determining factor in deciding this 
cultural exposure. Moreover, respondents put forward various reasons in arguing for 
how the state's prohibition of satellite has increased the desire among people to obtain 
a satellite dish and view the programmes. 
Cultural and Ideological Values Portrayed by Satellite 
The last comments were made by a woman aged 34, who had two children aged 9-14 
living at home together with her husband. She was asked then: 'How long did they 
have satellite television? ' She replied: 
fn- -persian: 
-j1,2 bj-, ti 4AU ig - täls tli 1-) a- 
In English: 
We have had it for quite some time, but now we have decided to cut it off. 
When asked 'Why', she said: 
in Persian: 
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In English: 
It is due to immoral nature of some of Western satellite channels that we have decided 
to cut it off. Even in PMC, Persian Music Channel, which broadcasts equal amounts 
of Iranian and Western music, there are a lot of erotic and immoral scenes, especially 
in their Western music. Therefore, we decided to block this channel. We have two 
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os and we do not want them to be exposed to such immoral and impious 
programmes. Moreover, on the Persian language satellite channels, all they do is try to 
justify and inculcate U. S. foreign policy. 
The above woman was saying that she was affronted by the rather sexual nature 
portrayed on screen in Western songs and objected to the contamination of a channel 
that she would watch by inclusion of such scenes. Her rights, therefore, were breached 
on two ways. She had a right not to have her values assaulted and she had a right to 
enjoy nice Persian music that she could enjoy. The infringements of rights as an 
assault on values as a focus of concern came particularly to the fore in the negotiated 
and oppositional discussion groups where people had either complained about the 
things that they had seen on satellite, or had felt so strongly about them that they cut 
off the satellite or blocked so many satellite channels. 
Moreover, in the above statement, her reason for cutting off the satellite was 
particularly moral. What she 
is at pains to illustrate, however, is that the individual is 
not a prisoner of circumstances, that the individual has free will and can choose for 
her or himself how to actively response. In short, this asserts that the individual is a 
n1oral being and she/he can act based on her or hi -s 
ideological and political believes. 
It will be seen later, however, that people consider an individual's moral, cultural and 
ideological structure and attitudes to be very important in accounting for anti-cultural 
and unsociable acts, and hold the media accountable for distributing and encouraging 
dispositions favourable to such behaviours. She finished by saying that all the Persian 
language satellite channels had an agenda designed to promote the acceptability of 
1j. S. foreign policy. She was not alone in her position and other people also supported 
her in her position that there is an agenda in those expatriate satellite channels which 
is being pushed. 
The idea of an agenda 'being pushed' is one way of viewing the inclusion of views 
and lifestyle that are not considered indigenous and can produce drama through moral 
contention. Another 
is to view the inclusion of such material as the loosening of the 
ideological, cultural and moral authority structure of social life, where one culture and 
lifestyle has a claim to superiority such that the representation of Western culture and 
lifestyle and Western behaviours is not only possible, but enforced too. This would 
especially apply to expatriate satellite programmes claiming to be Iranian, but are in 
essence promoting American culture and lifestyle. The re-structuring of Iranian 
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television with the rise of Iranian expatriate satellite televisions supporting U. S. 
foreign policy and its popular culture have encouraged the pushing forward of the 
boundaries of what is considered acceptable. 
A 29 year old engineer, in his comments about Iranian expatriate televisions added: 
In Persian: 
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In English: 
Those channels have nothing, all the films and serials that they broadcast belong to 
pre-revolution era, and they all 
have an underlying political agenda in which we are 
not interested. 
We only watch music on these channels, which is only produced on 
these channels. However, I could not even call them Iranian music. Some of them are 
only good for nothing. 
There is also that entertaining pop music that is popular among 
young people. 
His wife continued: 
In Persian: 
14 J, )il eA U-2-T L)J L , ý'AAS L. 
ýJt4" 
LýA L ja 
In English: 
-Among the expatriate Iranian music, there are a few talented artists such as Siavash 
Ghorneshi that make valuable music. I really like his music'. 
Another woman regarding the Iranian expatriate satellite channels added: 
In Persian: 
A4 45,1 
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in English: 
1 don't like their political programmes, they are either Monarchist or pro-United 
States. I like their medical discussions or mediation programmes. 
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A man added: 
Tn-persian: 
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In English: 
I think it all goes down to how we use it. Satellite can be very good in obtaining the 
up-to-date information and can be beneficial for everybody in whatever taste they 
rnay have. However, I should stress that there are some problematic channels which 
can have negative effects even on Western families. But, that does not give the state 
permission to ban satellite. If we are talking about democracy people should be free, 
they should have choice. 
The above comments were followed up by asking about the cultural and ideological 
values that they thought satellite programmes portray. A female engineer aged 26 
said: 
Persian: 
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11, English: 
They are inconsistent with Iranian cultural values. There is a direct contradiction 
between our culture and satellite programmes. We see this contradiction and we have 
a problern with that, 
but still I think that some degree of freedom is good. For 
exarnple, when I see the old Persian films on Iranian satellite channels, I can see that 
women's roles are so low in these films, they don't have anything to say. 
One of the other male participants in this group who had two children said: 
fn--Pcrsian: 
JUIS I-j 1- L114 411 LA4 jý 
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In English: 
We change the channel at once or turn the TV off if the programme is not culturally 
or morally suited or contains scenes of nudity. It 
is because I believe that children are 
so impressionable and are 
influenced by their environment and by what they watch. I 
know some parents who take the satellite remote control with them when they go out. 
They do not leave their children home alone with the satellite remote. 
The above statements indicate the indication of how the social world operates, and in 
ternIS of cultural and ideological deviation and immoral behaviour, the media is seen 
as rnajor influence. These responses are not alone in their view, as the focus group 
sample clearly shows many people considered the 
influence of television as a major 
cause of the current social crises. 
This is because, in examining daily existence, 
people are experiencing 
how the satellite channels are responsible for what which 
they witness in terms of culturally immoral behaviour. However, with some 
exception, they cannot 
imagine themselves influenced in such a way, but they can see 
other people, especially children and youngsters, 
being influenced. The importance of 
this is that if people do establish a link between the media and behaviour then this 
necessarily structures their attitudes towards regulationAn this respect, a woman, 
aged under 50, who 
had four children aged 17-24 living at home, said: - 
Persian: 
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In English: 
There are some programmes that are harmful. They cause so many problems such as 
behaviour deviation among youngsters and discrepancy between parents and their 
children. I do not watch such programmes and I do not let my children to watch them 
either. I actively control what can 
be seen on satellite and because of this control, I 
think I have been successful. 
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The above statement shows concerns about the media, but what is interesting is that in 
a society like Iran, people do not 
focus on one of the most traditional of concerns: 
violence in the media promoting real life violence. It seems that here the protection of 
children could be used as a cover for what was really in their thoughts, the protection 
of their own cultural and religious values. 
What is seen, in effect, is a much wider 
concern for the infringement of people's values. That is, the showing of material that 
goes against the values of people and their sense of 
decency. 
Following the above comments quoting that the media was responsible for some of 
the social crises, the whole group was asked: 'But do you think there is anything else 
behind itT the responses given were further from the imitative effects model of 
television: 'The way that they were brought up as well', a participant said. Here then 
is the recognition of the power of the real world to shape who and what we are. 
Personal influences were seen just as strong as mediated influences in determining 
behaviour. 
flowever, another man commented: 
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In English: 
I see that even the children of those religious authorities who had been in contact with 
satellite, somehow their attitudes and perceptions became closer to Western beliefs 
and very different to that of their 
families and parents, which has caused conflict 
arnong the families and within society. This shows the effect of satellite on the 
younger generation. 
-F]his was picked up by another member, a 55 year old engineer man: 
In Persian: 
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In English: 
I totally agree with Dr ... and this acceptance of satellite and the effects that satellite 
have had on people from different social classes and different age and cultural 
backgrounds are a real problem. People over 40 and those with religious or nationalist 
backgrounds are those who often criticise satellite rather than accept it, but in case of 
younger generation as Dr ... stated earlier, satellite has been very influential. 
The above statements show how in Iran, the explosion of available satellite channels 
and the arrival of new delivery systems and the exposure of youth and children to 
these mostly American cultural products, has brought conflict to Iranian society and 
has created a gap between generations. 
A. nother man added: 
------------ 7- 
in Persian: 
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In English: 
Now I think the attitudinal differences between young Iranian and Western values and 
perception have been eroded. But, it was not like that in the past. 
He continued: 
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In English: 
I am not saying that all the problems we have come down to satellite, some of them 
are the production of our society, but many of them are the direct effect of satellite 
viewing. For example, I have been living in 'Vanak' for 20 years, but nowadays when 
1 drive down the streets of 'Vanak' to go home and I see these young people dressed 
in obscene clothes, I feel so ashamed to even look at them. I put my head down. 
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There is little point documenting similar comments made in the interviews. The main 
point to extract is that whether or not one has had experience of these crises first hand, 
or has been witnessing them in the society, the satellite was held as being primarily 
responsible for these problems. The question about satellite effects was asked in other 
focus groups. A man, aged 37, said: 
n Persian: 
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In English: 
The unrestrained programmes and sexual content of some of the satellite channels 
contradict our culture and condemn our religion. They have caused a division of 
culture among people. However, there are channels that you can choose from, from 
nature shows to scientific and medical programmes. We had access to around 756 
satellite channels but we blocked 320 of them. They were completely against our 
culture and values. Now, I am not so much worried about my children if they happen 
to get hold of TV remote. 
A well educated man from another focus group said: 
in Persian: 
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In English: 
At the moment you can see that young girls and boys do not listen to their parents, 
they have no faith nor believe in anything. 
These people view satellite television as a medium that can influence peoples' lives. 
Yet this man and other people in the following discussion did consider that the 
portrayal of Western culture and values on satellite was responsible for the cultural 
crisis in society and the gap between parents and their children. This has let to the 
next question on 'How influential do you think satellite is? ' 
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Cultural and Social Effects of Satellite Viewing 
The above statements showed that, although people were affronted and against 
some of the satellite programme contents, they could not bring themselves to approve 
of an out-right ban on satellite viewing because, and this came out at several points in 
the course of focus group discussions, they saw themselves as democratic and in their 
c 16 ep. de-Mocratic point of view, people should have freedom of II- 
, rhe interview was followed up by asking, 'How inJ7uential do you think satellite is! $ 
The most dominant response was 
Tery influential'. 
A nian said: 
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In English: 
Satellite is very influential, especially among uneducated and poor families. They 
have neither the technical ability to block or delete those unsuitable channels so that 
their children do not have access to them, nor do they have the insight to recognise the 
negative effects it may have on their families. You can see its effects on their choices 
of clothing or in case of women, in their change of appearance and use of make up. 
They do exactly what they see on satellite. For example, e if in a programme they see a 
certain woman putting on certain clothes and make up, then the next day they put on 
the same clothes and make up and go out in the street. We had a neighbour once, and 
every morning, just by looking at their daughter and from her choice of clothes and 
rnake up, we could tell which satellite channels she had been watching the night 
before. That family became very problematic especially with their anti-social 
behaviour, and when they moved out it was such a relief for everyone. 
He was asked 'What is the link between poverty and satelliteT to which he replied: 
It is the cheapest means of entertainment. 
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The above statement also shows the recognition of the power of education and 
knowledge as a strong element against this cultural trend. What is seen here is an 
appreciation of the structure of people's 
lives that promotes certain behaviours. The 
high level of effect of Western cultural products in Iran was partly attributed to, as the 
above man said, to 6social 
deprivation'. Thus, if social deprivation was playing as 
important a role in how people react to these cultural products as one would expect, a 
greater level of effects would surface wherever social 
deprivation occurred, for 
example, in the south. This appears to 
be a classic use of correlation as causation. In 
fact, these respondents did not use correlation to establish causation. What they 
demonstrated was a rather sophisticated understanding of causation. The constant 
occurrence of three variables offered the starting point 
for examining why those 
variables should always appear together, and then used theory to establish causation, 
in this case, what being uneducated and lees privileged meant in terms of access to 
entertainment materials and cultural products. 
The above man was comparing the 
degree of influence of satellite on families with different levels of education and 
social class. Then, 
because satellite influence was uneven between families with a 
reasonably high 
level of education and wealth and those without, he ruled out the 
satellite as independent variable. Of course, 
his reasoning was never expressed in such 
a way, but the conclusion 
he reached by this intellectual process was that one had to 
look further to find all the determining variables in the process of cultural effect. The 
cultural effects of satellite, 
for him, must take into account the type of person who 
consumes these cultural products. 
Following the discussion about satellite's influence another man said: 
In Persian: 
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In English: 
The cultural effect of satellite viewing on society has been even much greater than 
what the satellite programme makers might have thought. It has got to a stage that has 
almost brought the government to 
its knees. And that is cultural invasion. I am not 
saying that the government 
is a good government, as I for one, am opposed to it, but 
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F-this cultural invasion is destroying our cultural roots and our identity. 
A young man said: 
Persian: 
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In English: 
This process of cultural invasion has changed people's attitudes and behaviour on so 
n-jany different levels. For example, my wife used to wear the "Chadoe' but now she 
wears the scarf and who knows, one day our children might not even believe in the 
--iiijab- at all. In third world countries people can see the threat of this cultural 
invasion but are unable to stand against it. 
A woman aged 28, from another focus group said: 
In Persian: 
0LJtjJJ4LALcJJ4i&4LcJJ4L 
in English: 
Well, viewing satellite has had an impact on me. For example, in the way I dress or 
the way I do my hair, especially in the way I do my make up. 
'On your make up style too', her husband added. 
Imrnediately following this comment the husband said: 
In Persian: 
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in English: 
Watching satellite without any doubt has a huge effect, especially in the long run. No 
rnatter how resistant you might be at first, in the end it affects you, one way or 
another. We have become very different compared to our parents in terms of cultural 
and ideological beliefs and this gap I think will be much greater between us and our 
children. 
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His wife then added: 
In Persian: 
, 
a. t, u 
4- tpba-A, C, -, Ii IA I--, - jl-Az L, 
4- JL-j 
- cuml 
In English: 
it is because these effects are much greater on children and youngsters than people in 
our age group and above. 
As one the men aged 54 said: 
--------- -- 7- 
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In English: 
People, especially youngsters, usually watch shows and entertainment programmes, 
and also because of the language, most of them do not have a correct understanding of 
them. This is bad because now they think that the world is a night club; it is only the 
singing and dancing. 
A woman who had two teenagers from another focus group said: 
_____7 _. 
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In English: 
Watching satellite has created a situation where our younger generation thinks the 
West is like a 'Utopia'. With the things they wear our younger generation thinks that 
they should wear such undignified clothes. And when you go to the West, you see that 
even they would not dress in such way. Our younger generation with extreme make 
up and hair-do try to show off, but if we could give them indigenous fashion', 
something according to our culture, they would not have to go after such extreme 
things from satellite. 
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What her statement captures is that satellite programmes, because of their moral base, 
tend to engage viewers in debates about contemporary culture and act as a 
commentary on social relations. It is felt to be a general concern among some of the 
participants in all focus groups that what is seen on satellite might be taken as real life 
by those who view it, especially the younger generation. The point to express here is 
that in examining the woman's quote, one should notice the use of the word, 
"should" 'should wear such undignified clothes' because they saw it on satellite. And 
as she also said, 'would not have to go after such extreme things from satellite'. What 
she is actually saying here is that cultural projections tell people not only about the 
world, but inform them as to how they 'should' live their lives. In other words, this 
Western cultural projection through satellite has changed their attitudes and therefore 
their behaviour. This seems to be a clear manifestation of cultural imperialism, which 
as the above woman pointed out, can be traced in the choices of clothes, make up and 
hair-do among the younger generation. 
Another woman who had children also added: 
In Persian' 
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in English: 
What our young people do is imitate from satellite programmes. The kind of Western 
clothes that these "street girls" wear and everything else is copied from satellite. I 
have children of my own and if there is a programme that is not morally suitable or 
where the actors or presenters are not dressed properly I change the channel 
immediately because I believe in this age children are very much influenced by 
television and the environment. But generally speaking, our younger generation has 
become unruly and I am worried about them. 
what was obvious in course of the focus group discussions is that adults were aware 
that exposure to satellite cultural products has led to a huge difference in values 
between generations. What the above exchange between the participants show is that 
their ideological, national cultural and moral values were no longer held dominant in 
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today's society. The new and powerful definers of culture and morality as shaped by 
satellite programmes distribute contradictory values to their lifestyle and ideological 
or national cultural beliefs. 
The more examination that was done on what people were saying about social 
conduct, the more became apparent that major emphasis was put on an individual's 
performance as leamt behaviour, and that this behaviour was mainly learned from 
satellite television. The term 'learned behaviour' 
is used here to include learning how 
to behave by examples set by media and learning of cultural and moral codes that are 
brought into it, which has been in conflict with the sets of ideological and cultural 
values that structure judgments about behaviour in a society like Iran. Whether it is 
the unrestrained sexual behaviour or the inclusion of Western cultural and ideological 
values, such programmes have opened a door for cultural tension in the society. The 
exposure to such cultural products has given way to a different range of lifestyles and 
culture that threaten the existence of Iranian culture and have created social and 
cultural differentiation, as well as a generational gap and therefore, have provided 
grounds for cultural conflict. 
The State's Policy and Punishment 
in trying to establish what rights people attributed to the state in regulating 
cultural consumption, people were asked: 'What do you think of state's policy and 
punishment on viewing satellite? ' Interestingly enough, all the people from this group 
(negotiated) were against the state's policy and its punishment regarding satellite, as 
they thought this has even encouraged more people to obtain and view satellite. It is 
interesting that the idea of cable TV emerged later in this discussion. A man from the 
very first focus group said: 
In Persian: 
44,11 jlýý JLS al AS ý; A aaLu 
laia't IQ a ?AU -lj-&. Lýj ja q 
It, English: 
There was a time that the government was very strict about it. But now, even they 
have realised how wrong they were and how people got hungrier for it. 
In another focus group a woman said: 
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In Persian: 
. )_)Ij b .5 
%S &-.. j 
IA A-. 4j e 
j 0-) t4j j 
11 CA51 ciz, jjjý jAU LDU3JI, -IýJ Clý L;, -), 
ý Jj. j e-Ajl 
jAIA bjýJ. 3 
ý a! S, AUJ-)ý -14- J-A Ja I-) --It L; tA bj 
In English: 
The government is making lots of money from these fines. They raid your homes and 
confiscate it but a few days later they are selling them in the black market. 
The fact is that the material of the satellite channels might offend quite a lot of Iranian 
people, but those viewing satellite have deliberately exposed themselves to it and they 
do it by the method of the black market. That is, they have paid for it as a specialised 
contract between them and the supplier from black market. %at is happening 
therefore is a hidden arrangement in the consumption of culture and with this, a shift 
in social responsibilities for the management of culture. 
Her husband added: 
Pcrsian: 
uw. eaj- e! 5ýS- _)5-i 
Cý- 
1,01 ks 4.1, tla Ij 
. ea 
&. . 
*11 A. S eA a 
ýý - -111 
$_L; 
_ - &Q 
JS C'91 ý"i IAZ 
L)ýý 
In English: 
I am against this policy, I think the government wants to control people and force 
people to see what they want or are allowed to see. They dictate to people who they 
are and what they are allowed to do. I think watching satellite is a kind of act to 
oppose the government. 
The above participant argues that 'the state prohibition of satellite viewing means that 
in this society we are treated like children who can not decide for themselves and do 
not know what is right and what is wrong'. As it is clear from the above statement, the 
state's prohibition has 
been thought to undermine the individual's rights and has taken 
away the individual's freedom of choice. 
A mother of four said: 
in Persian: 
-OLAU . -Aý J., 
U 
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In English: 
The state's punishments and bans on satellite have not been effective. When we 
decided to get satellite we thought of its positive side. The government's ban on 
satellite is not acceptable and I'd say why it should be banned? And since we do not 
travel abroad and we can not be there, the satellite can be a good medium for us to 
find out about what is going on in the outside world and to know about the latest 
technological advances. The state has not been successful with its policy and I do not 
think it ever will. 
A young girl from another focus group also said: 
Persian: 
_)jj 
L; )ý-. EA 
4 jA. i & ji t. 4.3 
In English: 
The state's policy regarding satellite is completely irrational. They can't force us to 
accept anything. It won't work, not in Iran and not anywhere else. 
Another participant added: 
in Persian: 
OJI OLO L; -J 
Z-4;, CJY 1A . 1ý ALI 'L i. ýa J. 5 
L; IL AS AIIS Ca_j_) CJU-1 ýpl 31 C.: jU I 
IA-3143 J_ 
L, 
ýA 
*ALU 
In English: 
The government, in terms of confiscating satellite dishes, has failed. Now if you look 
at the roof tops, you see that almost every house has a dish. The government should 
allow the idea of cable TV and also try to change the production of the state's TV 
according to the people's needs instead. 
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The above statements show what authority people were prepared to give to the state in 
controlling what they watch. What 
is interesting about their responses and attitude is 
that they reject the issue of the moral right of the state to interfere in what people 
watch, since the state does not provide people with any alternatives. 
It is clear now 
although the above people, as Iranians and as 
Muslims, would find many things on 
satellite offensive, they still considered themselves as 
being decent, and being decent 
means to be democratic and recognise people's right of 
freedom of choice. From an 
ideological point of view, people in this category seem to mostly fall in the Islamic 
Protestantism category. For them to express the protestant conception of the function 
of broadcasting is for them to say that the moral and social commitments of the 
broadcasters are necessary in order to protect and support the indigenous culture of 
the country and broadcast the programmes that are designed according to the 
requirements of the society. According to the Protestant view, the media should put 
people in a situation whereby they can make 
informed choices about which political 
representatives they wish to elect, which social or 
foreign policies to support or 
protest at, and what the current socio-economic trends are which affect their 
lives 
(these standpoints clearly appeared in the decoding mode among the negotiated 
reading sample). To express the 
Protestant conception of the function of broadcasting 
is to provide people with the information required to function in society and to 
provide programmes which speak to people's 
interests. However, the moral and social 
commitments of the regulator are necessary 
in order to produce and broadcast the 
, rammes 
that are designed to meet people's cultural and socio-political needs. But prog 
any regulation of this sort, 
for this view, inevitably gives rise to the question 
concerning whose values, tastes and conception are 
being imposed illegitimately upon 
others. In such a model, public broadcasting clearly has certain 
duties to serve and 
cater to the interests and preferences of the individuals and the public and not to a 
certain group. The 
broadcasting system should be properly construed as having a 
remit to broadcast to and 
for the public at large. Thus, the general public's needs and 
preferences should 
drive the programming schedules and content, not a particular 
group with particular 
interests. According to what people stressed in this category, 
broadcasting media should not be under the control of the government or monopolies. 
The broadcasting system therefore, should work independently from the state and any 
particular political or 
ideological group. In this view, broadcasting regulation should 
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be concerned with programme content in tenns of its indecency, offensiveness or 
immorality. 
American Society and its Popular Culture 
The interview then was moved towards a discussion about American society 
and its popular culture. The sample was asked 'What do you think of American 
popular culture and American society? ' 
A woman said: 
In Persian: 
- 4: wl cjljýl j -)14 j. I c:. 1ý4j . 13ja! 
in English: 
American culture and ideology is very different from ours, but I accept some elements 
of it. And as far as I see on satellite television, American people live in a society with 
a high level of security and prosperity and welfare and with lower crime rate 
compared to Iran. 
The above response shows how the content of the media and the images provided by 
them can shape the audiences' perception towards the outside world. Oliveto (1994) 
stated that 'television viewers, particularly young people, have certain images of life 
in the United States which try to emulate such a lifestyle'. This false image which is 
not based on reality came to crash for the next participant when she actually visited 
the United States. She said: 
in Persian: 
A-4 -U L)j 
L- AS ?.. I 9k; A Jý k4 5A 
_X; 
A A. 4 j3jj 
t+At_3j CjT 1-1, J- A 41- Lýbj 
L4 JJ 14 AS 4L; - tdrj jai 
In English: 
Before my trip to United States I used to think that I could be happy there. But when I 
went there I realised that American society is a consumer society, it is a vain society. 
But I like the level of freedom they have and the fact that they are free to dress as they 
wish. 
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A man aged 38 said: 
In Persian: 
L; 
J-, )41 AS f: ý Jýi j 
LpIJ 
In English: 
I do accept the American culture and I do not reject it. Based on what I see on TV I 
think that American society is a good society and I admire the level of freedom they 
have in their society. 
The same question was asked in another focus group, a woman said: 
In Persian: 
J51 6- eJ-13 LJJIl 
-) 
CJT D-j -ý3 L; 
J-ýj 4 
LJ 
IA 
Lj -Ij 
j4j; 
ý 
alA A-1.11 J.! ýIA A L: pl. j 
-)44 "1.,.: 
L ex., i 1A Wlj- 
in English: 
I do not accept the unrestrained aspects of Western culture and I think our culture and 
life style is much better. In the West, when children get to a certain age they easily 
move out and the parents also easily let go of them, but here we still have a very close 
relationship with our children and I think it is better this way. 
rnan said: 
Iri Persian: 
ejý LVA 
Uji- 
in English: 
I do accept some of its cultural values and reject those that, compared to our culture, 
are too controversial. 
one of the other participants said: 
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In Persian: 
4 A! 
ý &. Ila CýA 
CZ1 U t. U J. 3 
ju 
ýPl AS 
L, 
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!, 
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In English: 
I do criticise some of the Western cultural values, and I do believe that we should not 
accept everything that see or read. Personally, I analyse whatever I see or read and 
sometimes I accept some part of it and criticise or reject the rest. I think that 
American society has a great level of freedom, but at the same time I think it is the 
society of extremes and that American people are the most simple-minded and most 
credulous of them all. 
I 
A female participant from another focus group about U. S. culture said: 
in Persian: 
- Lol L, J, 
q ýpo j ? 5i-x; - 
6 ? ýS- C4--. A l-) (54-A Lfg-"Ij '-4 
" C)- j a-0 
ý)A 
ýj1: 
1-11 (:. ý- 
jr, English: 
In cultural terms, I prefer some of American cultural values to our culture but at the 
sarne time I reject some of them as well. They take it easy in life and I like that easy 
going approach very much. I used to wear the "Chador"' (a traditional Islamic 
covering for women) up until I finished high school and I found that a real struggle 
and I do prefer the Western way of life. 
A woman in this group added: 
in Persian: 
'; ý A4 IA 
&A 
ja CIJ 15V. 
L; J-)' L): 
ý, Oj Lfý Lsi-A L;. '- -54 
1.1i Cjj L-5,4 J.. Or- Aq AULý. ý (ý- A 
Ili English: 
I think in Western culture the individual has much more value than they do in our 
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culture. And as a woman, I feel that 
in American society, women can move up and 
Inake good progress in their professions, whereas 
in Iran, in a place that I used to 
work, I was told that as a woman my progess would be quite limited. 
Amother woman aged 2 1, in response to the above comment said: 
In Persian: 
is 1-i A 
j.. _31 
IJA A--- a,, 4 
_)3 
a-- ou-1-o' 44 qj 
A 
-4s- -)ý -ý4j 
t, % -., j C; --ý 
in English: 
I do accept Western culture, except its unrestrained behaviour; I think they have an 
easygoing approach 
in life and in my opinion, the way they let children move out at 
early age is better, as 
it will help them to be more successful later in life. 
The cultural imperialism theory postulates that cultural invasion leads to a change in 
the symbolic meaning of a society along three dimensions (Lee, 1980; Wells, 1972). 
The symbolic meanings are structures of "taste, values, and preferences, views about 
the society, human relations, and life" (Lee, 1980, p. 104). The above response 
confirms Lee's assumption and 
indicates a shift towards Western cultural norms as 
the above individual prefers the Western way of childrearing rather than the 
traditional way. 
The last few responses show how people accepted and admired at least some elements 
of American society and 
its popular culture. The imposition of one culture's value 
system on another 
is a primary concern in the rhetoric on the cross-cultural flow of 
the media. Smythe (1973) reported that cultivation is the purpose of a social system, 
while television's function 
is the propagation of perceptions of social reality. 66 ... the 
TV world' reflects ... 
[and] changes the "real' world ... the cultural products of all 
kinds in the real' world are equally to be understood as propaganda for the social 
system which produces 
them" (cited in Nordenstreng and Varis, 1973, p. 50). As it is 
clear from the above responses, the 
TV 'world' of foreign programming alters the 
perceived reality of receiving audiences. 
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American Foreign Policy 
The people were asked then, 'How would you assess U. S. foreign policy? I 
A woman said: 
in Persian: 
05ý, ý L; -)Is -)4 
(sli4i -)-,. ksý- LAu I-) . 
AaJA aja 'S Iwl 5ý4 Ljý-,, j 
IA 
A. 3 tc: ýl LA a, I* 0--, ý- 
In English: 
I think the United States as the world's superpower does absolutely everything and 
anything to get what it wants. All the U. S. does is according to its own interests and 
advantages and does not care about us or any other country. 
Amother Woman added: 
Persian: 
cA d, 1< -) 
U LLb L-3 6(Zä. ý3 bi. ' ii, U, 1 
in English: 
reject its foreign policies. They are totally unacceptable and are only according to 
their own interests. The U. S. buys our oil with a price that is almost next to nothing 
and tries to get our academically gifted people on board. 
A nian aged 37 said: 
In Persian: 
A. S eallý 'a 'Jý 'i'ý 
a4 t4,. ýj C C! "ja I L31, -L- 
51ý_, 
L, 
ýLW JU-11 cý- Dw, -31 
jl-)r- 
?, a->- C. LLIa L<, j -1 AS )_o 
L)II. 1 
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tA 
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Ij 
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.1 . 
J-T 
-Y 
i 
In English: 
think its policy is right, except the war, as I strongly oppose to it. For example, in 
Iraq they killed thousands of Iraqi people. I do not approve the U. S. military invasion 
of Iraq and I don't think that the United States cares for people in the Middle East, nor 
Third World countries, nor anywhere else in the world. The U. S. invaded Iraq purely 
for its own interests. 
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In the above statement it is very important to notice that although the decoder 
expresses a semi agreement towards U. S. foreign policy, he affirms that the U. S. 
should not have invaded Iraq and that the U. S. could not change the internal political 
direction of any country by force. Therefore, the new Iraqi government, although it 
claims to be anti-tyrannical, has been imposed on the Iraqi people by the United 
States. Thus Iraq is seen as a new colony for the United States. 
A male participant from another focus group interview also was asked: 'What do you 
think about American foreign policy? ' to which he replied: 
in Persian: 
Aj Cj A! j 
U. 4 
+ Aj U,,,, Aj ý: A. 
_6j 
"C -4 
16JU L-SJL 5 -%-ý_)Al 
I A_S Lj 
J. 2 -)h3 LZU 
j ji L-0 teLý, 3 . L" L; 
l 3 Uý (: -. "l tý_LU -t 
'4,3 1 1. 
-9 
j. 
al4k; A L; L&Jj: A j 141 
In English: 
The United States is only pursuing its own interests. The invasion of Iraq by the 
united States and England was not to free the Iraqi people from a tyranny. They do 
not have human intentions; all they are after is gaining power and control, and in 
pursuing their own interests, Iraqi people might only accidentally benefit from this 
invasion. The main target of this invasion is oil, power and domination. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the U. S. became the world superpower and is now 
bullying all the other countries, even Europe. 
Another man added: 
in Persian: 
j Aq 9.. 
Al 
-4 CUl 
Lv 
_9 L, 
9-! Aji eA AL<-4- "SL"l aJ-; ' aýý J'a 
-31 
lj 
Iii L, 
ýAl- 
0 'A"I JU41 fý4 
In English: 
I reject U. S. foreign policy, especially with regards to all the killing and violence in 
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r q. I believe what is going on here is a new age colonisation. The U. S. cultural 
invasion was not effective enough in some parts of the world and now the U. S. is 
using both methods of cultural and military invasion. 
In the above statements, the U. S. is identified as a source of greatest possible threat to 
the world. U. S. propaganda just before and during the Iraqi war desperately tried to 
influence public opinion into believing that its in interest military invasion of Iraq, 
(the second oil richest country in the world) was the fight for freedom and democracy. 
However, the above statement and other responses demonstrate that the message that 
the broadcasting stations desperately tried to get across was not absorbed among their 
audiences, which is, after all, the true test of propaganda. It seems that the 
repercussions of such policies have damaged the U. S. 's image. As it is seen in the 
above statement, the U. S. is described as a warmonger, a big bully and an 
imperialist that does everything and anything 'in pursuing its own interests'. 
A rnale participant from another focus group about U. S. foreign policy also said: 
in Persian: 
A j 
45Lj 
L; jA LýA L: lWjý 
Uj.. 
). 
T 
2-4- L; A 
4 
ý. && A-? J-)1.1 
III English: 
p, egarding U. S. foreign policy, I think that United States is acting like a bully, and by 
using violence tries to impose its unjust view on the world. 
Another man said: 
In Persian: 
-; ý, 
14 1 
-LIJ 
j ja C, -, ks ais to-) jj Ll' -ý*A LS 
-. 1414 C. %A 
In English: 
, The United States is trying to propound that the U. S. must have the last word in 
every global matter and the whole world must be under its supremacy and rule. 
A male student from another group regarding the US foreign policy said: 
Persian: 
tA -5-4 Jjlr- C.; j jj.,: 
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In English: 
Now and after the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States is trying to present 
itself as a saviour, and with help of the media, which it has the total control over, it 
can do whatever it wants. I am not saying that there is no freedom in the United 
States. There may be some degree of freedom, and even inside the America there 
rnight be some people who question the government's policy. I think there are some 
degrees of transparency. I do not deny the economic and scientific advances of the 
United States but the thing is, the U. S. is using these advantages to present itself as a 
world saviour and wants to be the world superpower, and since it somehow got rid of 
its rival Soviet Union, is now working towards its own and Zionist interests. 
The above responses illustrate the different feelings and perceptions that all these 
people hold towards American culture and foreign policy. Although the above people 
had accepted or admired some aspects of American culture and society, they 
absolutely dislike its foreign policy, particularly with regards to the invasion of Iraq. 
Their attitude towards U. S. policy was a generalised statement with no attempt to 
justify or interpret its performance as being fair or just. In spite of U. S. cultural 
imperialism and its aggressive propaganda, it seems that the United States has a much 
diffilcult road ahead if it wants to win the hearts and minds of the'people. The above 
responses offer a concrete 
illustration of quoted criticisms of U. S. foreign policy by 
active audiences who, 
despite its cultural appeal and continuos propaganda efforts, 
resist its foreign policy. Although the U. S. propagandist programmes are based, in 
part, on the assumption that U. S. popular culture and display of America's material 
success would impress 
Iranian audiences and persuade them to agree with its foreign 
policy, the above results 
indicate otherwise. 
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people's Response to VOA 
People's response to VOA was examined in the second set of focus groups, 
and although covering some of the same ground as the first set of focus groups, 
tended to concentrate on how people responded to VOA and its propaganda. 
The second wave of groups was used to explore people's opinions and assessment of 
the two news stories from VOA and examine how successful the U. S. has been in its 
propaganda activities. The results of the content and discourse analysis confirm that 
the way in which VOA uses propaganda and political language serves the interests of 
U. S. foreign policy. The results from the content and discourse analysis show how 
VOA is engaged in an elaborate scheme to manage Iranian public opinion and score 
its foreign policy's success, especially concerning the Iraqi war. These attempts also 
provided the pretext for an exaggeration of the situation inside Iran. Therefore, it was 
decided that some of the recorded news materials from VOA would be shown to all 
the groups in the second set of focus group interviews not only to be used as points of 
discussion, but to also see how the participants would respond to the news and how 
they would interpret the broadcasting station that reports them. As mentioned earlier, 
the chosen news stories were about the comments made by Hussein Khomeinie, the 
grandson of the late leader of the Islamic Republic, and a report about Iraq's situation 
after the U. S. military operation. 
After watching the news materials participants were asked their opinion and 
interpretation of the news. From the very first group a man said: 
in Persian: 
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in English: 
Here they are trying to justify something and obviously have a target and a hidden 
agenda. The news about Khomeini's grandson is trying to convey that there is a split 
within the government in such a way that even someone who could have a rather 
convenient life in Iran would say: "I'd rather be a street seller in Kazemein (a holy 
city in Iraq)". These are all to say that the U. S. invasion of Iraq has brought real 
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F-democracY tO the country. I 
The above statement is a typical example of conscious reading where the decoder is 
clearly aware of the existence of the encoder's 
dominant intention. Here the decoder 
has forwardly examined and questioned the decoder's intended meaning and has 
successfully analysed why the 
decoder had set such an underlying message as he says: 
"They want to say that the military invasion of Iraq has brought real democracy to the 
country, and that is what this news is trying to convey". In this case, and in the 
process of such an exploration of 
decoder and encoder's standpoints, communication 
and dynamics between them 
become much more complicated and profound rather 
than simply persuasive 
All the people in the negotiated group were highly critical of the government and the 
state's TV news coverage, especially about Iraq. At the same time, almost all of the 
sample's responses to the 
VOA and the way that the station covered the Iraqi war 
illustrated a mutual critical feeling and perception towards its news coverage, which 
was considered to be 'according to the United States's interest, supporting U. S. 
foreign policy and portraying a favourable picture of the U. S. government'. 
For example a participant in this group said: 
Persian: 
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In English: 
This is the first time that I've heard his voice (Khomeini's grandson) and I can not tell 
if it really is his voice or not, and generally speaking, hearing a voice or seeing a 
picture of somebody does not mean that the news is true. In Western countries, with 
all the technologies that they possess, there is a tendency to change the news 
according to their interests and this news (referring to the news about Khomeini's 
grandson), even if it is true, is a personal opinion that Iranian people do not believe. 
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At the moment, Iraq is in such a harsh situation with all the fighting and insecurity 
that is going on. I do not even want to go anywhere near Iraq, let alone live there. This 
news is onlyjustifying the U. S. 's invasion of Iraq and is in support of U. S. interests. 
In the above statement, there is a strong sense of suspicion about the first news 
(Khomeini's grandson), which is commonly shared among the whole sample. Here, 
this sense of distrust is not only expressed towards VOA but towards all Western 
media as well. This is extremely important to note; during the period covered by this 
chapter, Western and American media output and propaganda were consistent on 
making U. S. involvement in Iraq much easier to accept. Therefore, the above viewer 
accused the Western media of changing the nature of the events and manipulating 
them according to their interests. In the above statement, VOA is identified as trying 
to justify American policy. 
A young woman, regarding the news that she had watched, said: 
----------- ; -- 
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In English: 
Personally I am not interested in politics and I watch news inattentively. In the news 
about Khomeini's grandson, I don't know if it was his voice or not, but if it was, it 
says that the situation in Iraq is getting better. About the next news (Iraq's situation), 
although I can not say the news is completely true, I feel that Iraqs situation is better 
than before. 
The above statement shows a typical negotiated reading where the decoder is totally 
focused on her feelings and understanding. In the above statement, although the 
decoder partly rejects the news, there is no tension in her reading process and this lack 
of tension seems to make the reading an easy process. 
Another male in this group said: 
In Persian: 
5- AS VS 
. ý.: 
S , ýj ?, -Jj e. -ga Lý" j 1-4" ja 
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In English: 
In the news about Iraq, all I could see was peace and security. It tries to convey that 
after the U. S. invasion, Iraq 
has become a peaceful and secure place. But when I see 
the pictures of bombardments and of dead people that the other TV stations broadcast, 
I can see that VOA is lying here and is trying to hide the truth. This station only tries 
to justify the U. S. invasion of Iraq and to convey that the U. S. invasion of Iraq has 
changed the face of country and 
has turned it to such a peaceful and nice place. 
lJowever, in Iran all of the state's TV channels broadcast pictures of killing and 
f1ghting, and 1, as a viewer, can see that both stations' news are biased in accordance 
with their supported government policies. 
A University lecturer from another group said: 
In Persian: 
A-S 1_) el-IS _), 
% 143Tj "11, 
. L; 
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XA 
Lý C4 . 1,; a Owl &4 _)LI 
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in English: 
Generally speaking I think all of the media are dependent on a supporting body and 
tend to portray the news in the way that they want and according to their interests. In 
my opinion, both news broadcasted by VOA are far from the truth and portray 
animosity towards the Iranian regime. In the news about Khomeini's grandson, they 
tried to magnify the problem and because I've never heard his voice before, I can not 
tell if it is his real voice and that the news is genuine. Therefore I can not accept nor 
reject it. In the news about Iraq, all I could see was peace, security and marching, 
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whereas it failed to show the other side of matter which is bombardments, killings and 
plundering. However, the media output inside Iran is far from truth as well. 
A young male student said: 
Irl Persian: 
A 
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in English: 
I am doubtful towards Khomeini's grandson. I do not know his voice or picture and I 
think that only some parts of this news is correct. And I know that every government, 
in order to legitimise and justify its policy, usually makes up some reasons and 
explanations to sway public opinion. 
About Iraq's news and all the peace and security that was broadcasted, I should say 
that I do not believe and accept it totally, as I do not believe the state's TV image of 
Iraq, which tries to convince us there is nothing going on in Iraq but fighting and 
nioaning. 
Another man said: 
Persian: 
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In English: 
If this news (Khomeini's grandson) is true, which I doubt it is, they just want to say 
that the situation in Iran is worse than it is in Iraq and we all know that is not the case. 
The living conditions of the people in the occupied Iraq is going from bad to worse 
because the occupiers are only after their own interests, and even if we see some sort 
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of peace show on TV, it either may not be permanent or they are not showing the full 
extent of conflict. Voice of America is definitely biased, and there is no doubt about 
that. However the media inside Iran are not ideal either. 
A woman from this group said: 
In Persian: 
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In English: 
I do not believe the reports that they broadcast about Iraq at all because I know for 
sure that in an occupied country there is not any peace and security, as the occupiers 
can do absolutely everything and anything and nobody can say anything. Also, there 
is no social or political security in Iraq, and even if they show quiet and peaceful 
streets, it does not change anything because they definitely do not broadcast anything 
about the conflict. 
The above statement was picked up by another participant who added: 
In Persian: 
--ýJS JU2i jV 
_q tiu. ->ei -u 
t631 a5 ýý ýký to, iý L>ý, zu k; -. 3 ütts 1, ) t131 Lý_q ý%3 1,5 
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in English: 
About the situation in Iraq, even the most ignorant people know what is going on 
there and how the United States has occupied this country and how people are dying 
but nobody cares for them. The occupiers are only after their own interests and benefit 
and do not care for these poor people. 
Another woman from this group added: 
in Persian: 
ýWr, j L; 
JZ_ý. - ZA A-1 fA U., 
Aý Jt4--0i Lv-ý L; 
41-j 
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In English: 
I am not interested in politics and I have to say that I do not trust any news agency. 
do not watch news and perhaps the reason for this is that I believe none of them. I 
know that politics is a game and the things they say on TV have been designed. And if 
there is a war it is not a real war, it is only a show put on by a few people that plan for 
the whole world and try to programme and control the world's events in the way that 
they want. There is a conspiracy going on and that is why I do not watch the news, 
because I know it is only a game. 
In the above statements, both VOA and state's TV news are considered to be 
manipulative, government-controlled and biased. In here the viewers consciously 
recognise the underlying agenda and the way that viewers are being tricked into a 
psychological mind game that tries to influence and direct the viewers' opinion 
towards their desired conclusion. It seems that VOA, by ignoring the truth about the 
conflict and by not showing the picture of the devastation, has damaged its own 
credibility in a way that the state propaganda has been able to use this American 
dissernblance as ammunition for its own propaganda. However, the viewer also has 
rejected the state's propaganda for the simple reason that it did not reveal the whole 
truth. 
The above view is commonly shared amongst the sample and in fact, seems to be the 
most dominant view about VOA. The following statements clearly demonstrate the 
above fact. The last two statements assume a polarisation between the media coverage 
and public opinion. It is in the context of this assumed polarisation that the media are 
believed to be government-controlled and thus people feel betrayed by them. In the 
above statements, although the pattern might not be clear, the situation being referred 
to could signify resistance to dominant intentions and preferred meaning advocated by 
both VOA the state's media and express it clearly and accurately, as one of the 
participants mentioned that 'they are trying to justify their supported government's 
action and policy'. In here however, the decoders are able to catch the core preferred 
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meaning and show some resistance towards it, but they do not reject it completely. 
They, according to their own background experience and knowledge, tend to accept 
some part of it. 
A man from another focus group said: 
Persian: 
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In English: 
The news broadcasted by Voice Of America is not the true version of events and is 
deceitful and biased in favour of the home country of the station. This dependency 
and bias was very clear in the second news report (news about Iraq). In the first news 
report (Khomeini's grandson), they clearly tried to instruct something here and it 
seems that ramming a political view down the audiences' throat is the station's policy. 
The above man voiced his objection against VOA for pushing an agenda that is 
, rammed down people's throat'. The idea of an agenda 'being pushed' is been 
stressed by other people too. Whether it is the inclusion of U. S. political views and the 
portrayal of support for U. S. foreign policy or the inclusion of Western cultural 
modes, they are massively criticised by the sample. 
The above statement shows that not telling the whole truth about the conflict has 
backfired on VOA and how the devastating nature of the Iraqi war, supported by the 
revealing and graphic television footage from other stations (such as Al-Jazeera and 
the state's news), have demonstrated the devastating part of the U. S. 's involvement in 
Iraq. In these circumstances VOA was forced to confront one of the principal 
challenges facing propagandists operating in war-time conditions. For the VOA to 
ensure that its own credibility remains untarnished, it needed to report all aspects of 
the conflict, good and bad, at a time when more and more Iraqi civilians are being 
killed everyday. Instead, VOA showed that it was obligated by its responsibility to the 
U. S. government to explain and justify American policy. Therefore, as it is expressed 
in the above statement, VOA is seen as working alongside the U. S. government and 
according to its interests. 
Another woman from this group said: 
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Persian: 
3 uu-pj 5. ý 1A.. 0 
u4, 
In English: 
There was a time when VOA news and its Political analysis were popular among the 
people. But after a while, and after watching its news and analysis, people especially 
those who follow and watch news regularly, have lost interest in VOA and do not take 
any notice of it. 
The above responses indicate that VOA, by supporting and justifying American 
policy and by ignoring the 
devastating part of the conflict, has lost its credibility 
arriong its Iranian audience. The sample's responses offer complexity in their 
perspective on interpreting the news and on their judgments of VOA's performance. 
The responses show that people were highly objective and considered the qualities 
and accuracy of the VOA news in relationship to their own perspective and to the 
circumstances. 
The sample responses demonstrate how U. S. propaganda and its effort to create a 
favourable opinion, especially in support of the Iraqi war, has failed. For the duration 
of Iraq's war, VOA found itself having to compete with contradictory reports that 
were broadcast not only by the Iranian regime's media, but also by some other 
stations in the region. The controversial and shocking images of Iraq's war that 
characterised the output of these stations meant that VOA itself, surreptitiously a part 
of the psychological operations, had suffered a loss of credibility since it could no 
longer be trusted by its Iranian audiences. 
Such propaganda activities by VOA of course have its limits, and these limitations 
are based on a number of facts already discussed, including being much too economic 
with the truth and their failure to sufficiently understand and adopt to Iranian society. 
perhaps a conclusion that can be drawn from this is that if the VOA was less 
propagandistic and softened their hard-line, it would not have lost its credibility. The 
diplomatic role carried out by VOA to ensure that the government's foreign policy 
would be executed and understood world-wide is well identified amongst the Iranian 
sample, as VOA is considered as a propagandist agency and as the voice of the U. S. 
government. 
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7.12 oppositional Reading 
oppositional reading is the most profound and seems to be met by the 
strongest resistance from decoders. In this category, the 
decoder is capable of 
grasping the core intention of the encoder and the preferred meaning embedded 
in the 
text correctly and interprets it in an oppositional way. 
The data obtained from the focus group investigation shows that of the total of the 94 
people that participated in the 19 
focus groups interviews, only 6 people were 
oppositional readers. In this group, all the participants consciously rejected U. S. 
foreign policy and its popular culture, lifestyle, or any other social aspects of its 
society and supported the government and its policies. 
Government Policy and Punishment 
A 50 year old participant, about the statc's rcgulations and punishmcnt towards 
satellite, said: 
In Persian: 
al , I. -AL, -I 
ý&:, ý 
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In English: 
We can not say that the state's policy is wrong. I believe that those who are in charge 
definately have their reasons to adopt such a policy. I do not know what is going on in 
the courts, in prisons or in juvenal detentions everyday, but I am absolutely sure that 
the government has put this entire problem together and has decided to adopt this 
policy for a good reason. 
Comments in this group indicate the ideology that colours people's perception 
towards the media and the role of the government in controlling them. People in this 
group seem to believe that the purpose of the state and its regulations is to maintain 
and cultivate the character of its citizens, including the moral and social virtues 
required for them to lead their lives. In this respect, as the above statement shows, 
regulation should be directed by the right religious values. The state should shape and 
guide people's choices and characters towards what is good for them, which is 
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retuning to their Islamic roots and traditions. According to them, it is the state's job to 
regulate and control society to promote the social and religious virtues required to 
lead a pure life, and thus nothing, as a matter of principle, remains outside the 
jurisdiction of the state. 
American Culture and Ideology 
woman said: 
In Persian: 
AS j ýJ. 13 
jj# 
-! A 
In English: 
I do not accept American culture and I reject its ideology, as according to what I've 
seen or heard it is not even pleasant. I believe that American culture is not the 
superior culture and that their freedom is only limited to unrestrained behaviour and 
activities. 
Another participant said: 
persian: 
_) 
j3 
L; j LIIUA 
In English: 
I do not approve of the Western culture and lifestyle, which are in contradiction with 
our iranian culture. I can see that this has had such negative effects on our families 
and on our society. 
The above statements show the extremely low and negative evaluation of Western 
culture by the people in this group. This idea is a representation of the extremist 
philosophy. This concept, which is the ideology of the ruling authority in Iran, agrees 
that the primary function of the media is to Islamise the country, and move Iran back 
to its roots, traditions and culture, which is of course, according to the state's interests 
and is limited to their perception of Islam- And this is with the ignorance of the pre- 
Islamic culture of Iran, which is deeply rooted into the nationalist sentiments of 
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Iranians. Under this perception, the purpose of the state is to protect and promote the 
conditions required to cultivate and promote the ruling class's version of religious, 
political, and cultural values. They agree that intrusions into privacy are justified on 
the grounds that moral and social behaviour, if unacceptable and against their own 
sets of religious principles, should be exposed. To preclude certain kinds of 
programming on the grounds that they are obscene in some way is dependent upon a 
rnoral judgment. Thus, through this view, obscenity provides grounds for censorship. 
ILJ. S. Foreign Policy 
A participant said: 
in Persian: 
j 
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in English: 
It is clear that the United States is an aggressor and a trespasser. You can see that 
there has been bloodshed in countries such as Afghanistan or anywhere else that the 
U. S. has set foot in. It would have been acceptable if the United States would have 
given mental help to other countries, but as we can see, the U. S. is only extorting and 
bullying other countries. 
The above statemcnt shows very strong criticism towards U. S. foreign policy, which 
is directly in agreement with the state's political position and propaganda. In the 
above statement, the U. S. is shown as destructive and as the ultimate threat to world 
peace and also to all of humanity. In the above statement, the participant demonises 
the U. S. and accuses it of being an aggressor and trespasser. However, this view could 
account for all the oppositional forces against the state. In this perception, individuals 
are divided into two categories, as they are either insider or outsiders and in this case, 
the state can suppress and punish them. This perhaps portrays the doctrine of the 
clerical regime; you are either with us or against us, there is no middle ground in this 
concept, and no room for democracy. 
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Responses to VOA 
A young student regarding the VOA news said: 
In Persian: 
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In English: 
About the news on Khomeini's grandson, I think that because he is a religious figure 
he went to that Holy city to bring an Islamic Revolution to Iraq, as his grandfather did 
in Iran years ago, but VOA has tampered the news and has turned it completely 
around. 
Another student, after viewing news clips of VOA about Iraq, when she was asked to 
give her opinion about the news she said: 
in Persian: 
A4 
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In Fnglish: 
In rny opinion, if the VOA had broadcasted the fighting and conflicts, all those things 
that they tried to ram down people's throats would have been more believable. The 
truth is that although there might be a few quiet spots there, the Iraqi people are 
suffering now. The thing is that people's condition under 'Saddam's' regime was not 
good at all, but I believe that it was better than the situation that they are in at the 
rnoment. 
Another participant from this group said: 
In persian: 
-ot JS u-s P" s ts-l u4i. 
J, 3 
in, qL" L; 
I 
%A.. . '. 
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In English: 
I am very suspicious about the news on Khomeini's grandson and I think that his 
voice has been imitated and that it was not him speaking. In this news it was stated 
that there is no freedom in Iran but this is not true. In Iran we have freedom, 
especially for government officials. I believe that VOA only wanted to say that the 
situation in invaded Iraq is better than it is in Iran, but we understand and can see the 
hidden agenda. Moreover, even if this news is true I still disagree with what he said 
and I believe that he has made a mistake by going to the U. S. -invaded Iraq and it 
shows that even Khomeini's grandson would make this mistake. 
Another woman said: 
Persian: 
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In English: 
I think it is unbelievable for someone like him (Khomeini's grandson) to contact the 
U. S. and put his own family under such scrutiny and say that the 'Khomeini's name is 
a heavy burden for me. I do not think that he would say something like that and in 
such explicitness say that he is concerned for the safety of his own family and for the 
people of his country. I do not think that this news is true and in my opinion, it is 
made up. 
A fernale participant from a different focus group said: 
n persian: 
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In English: 
The news that was broadcasted by VOA clearly shows a favourable bias towards the 
United States and explicit support for the U. S. government's policy. In the news about 
Khomeini's grandson, I would have believed it if they had shown a film of him, but 
seeing as it was only a picture and a background voice, I think that it is false and that 
they have imitated his voice. I like Khomeinie and I like his grandson too and we 
would never tolerate any disrespect towards them. There might be some problems in 
the country, but no one can say that she/he does not like Khomeinie. We like him. 
Another participant when asked about the VOA news coverage said: 
Fn -Persian: 
- 4: 4,1 
In English: 
Obviously there are some hidden agendas behind VOA news. Its news coverage 
shows a favourable bias towards U. S. government policy. 
A woman from this group said: 
n Persian: 
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In English: 
Generally, I think that the news broadcasted by VOA and other Western stations are 
not the true version of events. I think these stations mix the news with lies and their 
stations policices and hidden agendas and magnify the problems that we may have 
inside the country and use them in their favour. 
Another participant added: 
in Persian: 
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In English: 
The U. S. 's policy is the policy of deception and betrayal. For example, in Iraq we are 
witnessing the repetition of the same process that brought 'Saddarn' to power some 
years ago. At that time when the United States brought him to power, and when they 
saw that he was of no use to them any longer, they decided to change their puppet, 
and in doing so, labelled him as treasonous to his own people, and because the Iraqi 
people were not pleased with him they were happy to see them get rid of him. 
However, the truth is that the U. S. has deceived people. They told people that they 
wanted to change their condition for better. However, it is clear that by replacing an 
old puppet with a new one, people would gain nothing, and due to the war, they might 
even end up in a worser situation than before. 
The above statements show such strong resistance in their oppositional interpretation, 
which is directly against the encoding meaning. The above statements also show that 
people in this category appeared to be rather defensive in their standpoints and more 
innovative and critical. In the responses, VOA is considered to be a U. S. government- 
controlled station, which only tries to justify and support U. S. foreign policy. And 
because the VOA is propagandistic and hard-line, it therefore, has no credibility. 
Through their perception, media broadcasting should ensure that broadcasting 
practices and programmes inform and educate people on the right kind of beliefs and 
religious values that do not contradict their beliefs. In this concept the media has a 
duty to serve people's preferences only where those preferences conform to or 
prornote the ruling class's position; otherwise, such broadcasting service should not 
be allowed. People in this category, as it can be seen in their comments, believe in the 
total control and monopoly of the state's media broadcasting to ensure that 
informative, educative, cultural, social and religious perceptions of people are guided 
and shaped by theocratic requirements. 
289 
7.13 Conclusion 
The focus group results indicate that Iranian people prefer domestic 
programmes to those of foreign programmes. The findings also reveal that when 
people had the opportunity to choose between Western programmes and domestically 
produced ones, the majority chose indigenous programming because of the cultural 
relevance of the material. However, they stated that regarding the dull and boring 
state-produced programmes and the biased nature of its news broadcasting, they were 
left with no choice but to turn to the programmes available via new distribution 
systems, such as satellite. 
This chapter has been concerned with the responses and reactions of audiences 
towards Western values, modes and news coverage, which are conveyed to them 
through satellite televisions. The focus group findings demonstrate how people 
actively interpreted the media messages. The results show that most people, although 
accepted some aspects of American culture, rejected its foreign policy. 
It is recognised that the effect of the media is perhaps a difficult content for 
identifying their influences because the culture and ideas that the media try to convey 
are interpreted by audiences with different personal experiences and socio-ideological 
backgrounds. The focus groups results indicate that respondents' opinions were 
divided on the issues raised in the interviews and were based on the individual's own 
values. These individual values appeared to be linked to their ideological beliefs 
rather than educational background or sex. 
As advancing technologies allow more channels to become accessible, imports or in 
case of Iran, the flow of these cultural products via advanced communication 
technologies, especially through satellite televisions, will most likely remain available 
one way or another. It is very important to note that the way in which people react to 
the media's message is very much according to the given set of cultural codes and 
values, as well as the socio-economic and political variations that dominate their 
society. These contributing factors vary from one culture to another and affect the 
way that people react to a given message. This makes the media's effects far more 
complex than can possibly be generalised through a simple model. 
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Conclusion 
The main objective of this thesis was to revise the cultural imperialism thesis 
through a case study so that it is applicable to the current situation and contemporary 
arguments. This ambition 
has been 
-achieved 
by interweaving the subject on two 
levels. First, this study reviewed the cultural imperialism theory in the light of active 
audience's perspective and analysed the mixed and contradictory dynamics of 
reconstruction, adoption and resistance of 
international media. Second, this study has 
looked at the Iranian expatriate and Persian language satellite televisions and has 
isolated and examined the activities of Voice of America and Jaarn-e-Jam. 
Intemational. 
This study tried to revise the cultural imperialism theory and identify its weaknesses 
and limitations and identify the areas that could be developed within its infrastructure. 
It examined the notion of cultural imperialism, and through a critical review of the 
notion, demonstrated that international relations are still based on inequality and 
dependence rather than interconnectedness and interdependendence. However, the 
outcome of this uneven balance, according to the cultural imperialism thesis, is 
homogenisation of culture. In this respect, the cultural imperialism argument seems to 
ignore the complexity of the processes of culture and fails to explain the anti- 
imperialism movements, local dynamics and resistance within dependent societies. 
This study, by examining the process of cultural imperialism through the emergence 
of modernity and advent of capitalism in Iran, demonstrated the local dynamics and 
resistance of the Iranian people. This was verified in the anti-imperialism movements 
throughout the history of Iran. It demonstrated how Iran has been engaged with the 
West and cultural imperialism throughout its history, and how people have resisted 
Western cultural and political domination. 
This study established that the process of cultural transfer is much more complicated 
than the cultural imperialism argument credits. What the imperialist argument seems 
to ignore is that apart from the external factors, there are internal elements that can 
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determine the role and structure of television in a country and among them are: socio- 
political structure, economic system, 
historical background, and ideological and 
cultural environment. In an attempt to understand the complexity of the argument, this 
investigation analysed the historical emergence and the contemporary phase of 
television in Iran. It demonstrated that blaming the West and the U. S. alone for the 
spread of Western culture in Iran leads one to 
fall in an easy category of traditional 
cultural imperialism. The regime's 
direct efforts to implement its ideological and 
political perception through television programmes, along with the strict control and 
censorship that apply to the content of news, are among the main 
factors that have 
driven people towards obtaining foreign news and cultural products via satellite. This 
effort by the regime seems to work as internal 
factor which has accelerated the 
process of cultural imperialism 
in Iran. 
This thesis also identified that the cultural imperialism thesis appears to place too 
much emphasis on the economic factors and underestimates the role of political power 
in the process of cultural imperialism. The argument does not actively acknowledge 
the important role of political power as a force behind cultural imperialism since the 
power is never exerted only through military and technological control, but always 
through discursive control as well. In order to present the relationship between 
international politics and international media broadcasting, this study has examined 
the activities of two of the Persian language channels broadcasting from the United 
States; VOA and Jaani-e-Jam. International. It has assessed and analysed the 
underlying agenda, the attitude, and the encoded messages of these stations through a 
combination of content and discourse analysis. The results of the content analysis 
sample showed that both VOA and Jaam-e-Jam. stations were highly political and 
propagandistic in their news coverage. Also, the results of discourse analyses 
demonstrated that during the period under examination, both VOA and Jaam-e-Jam. in 
their objectives, applications and approach were similar, as both used a positive 
approach towards the U. S. government and its foreign policies. The analyses showed 
that both stations were located within the overall propaganda and psychological 
warfare strategy during the studied period. This demonstrated how a state's political 
intentions have been augmented by the use of satellite television broadcasting, making 
an invaluable contribution to its policy. 
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Another objective of this thesis was to examine the cultural imperialism theory in the 
light of the active audience's perspective. This study confirms that in regards to the 
media power, the cultural imperialism argument offers an almost omnipotent view of 
the media that cannot be thoroughly justified. What it offers in terms of the media's 
power to affect cultural change is a dominance and transmission-based model, which 
seems to fail to theorise the power of audiences to creatively subvert the power of 
global media. What makes sense in regard to certain aspects of the debate, such as the 
conglomeration of ownership, reutilised production, and possibly formatted content, 
does not apply in terms of the audience and effects. Even assuming the 
homogenisation of media messages due to concentrated ownership and Western bias, 
cultural imperialism denies the power of the audience to interpret the message and 
read the possible encoded meaning. This study, by undertaking focus group 
investigations, tried to investigate and empirically examine the audience's interaction 
in a process in which media messages are interpreted. The primary purpose of the 
focus group investigation was to examine the cultural impacts of satellite television 
programmes and their possible effects on their Iranian audiences. It was concerned 
with the responses and reactions of audiences towards Western values and modes and 
news coverage that are being conveyed to them through satellite televisions (Jaam-e- 
jam and VOA). The focus group findings demonstrated that people actively 
interpreted the media messages. The data obtained from focus group interviews 
demonstrated that the majority of participants (79 out of 94), although consciously 
rejected U. S. foreign policy, had a tendency to accept its popular culture, lifestyle, or 
some other social aspects of its society, such as democracy and social welfare. 
Therefore, it seems that in spite of U. S. cultural imperialism and its propaganda, the 
responses offer illustration of quoted criticisms of U. S. foreign policy by active 
audiences who despite the U. S. 's cultuial appeal and continuos propagandist efforts, 
resist its foreign policy. 
This study rccognises that the effect of the media is perhaps a difficult content in 
which to locate their influence because the culture and ideas that media try to convey 
are interpreted by the audiences with different personal experiences and socio- 
ideological backgrounds. The focus group investigation showed that respondents' 
opinions were divided on the issue raised in the interviews and were based on the 
individual's own values, which in turn appeared to be linked to their ideological 
beliefs rather than educational background or sex. 
293 
Significant differences were identified between parents and their teenage children 
throughout the focus groups investigation. The focus group results indicated a 
tendency of teenagers and young adults to evaluate U. S. culture and policy rather 
positively. The answers given by the sample of this category showed a very high 
evaluation of American society, its popular culture and its foreign policy. What is 
evident from people's comments in focus group interviews is that current cultural 
flows produce both cultural homogeneity and socio-cultural conflicts, which is 
demonstrated in social and cultural conflicts and a generational gap in Iran. This 
socio-cultural conflict emerges as a result of the penetration of cultural imperialism. 
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Appendix 1: 
Content Analysis Classifications, Categories, Units and Deflnitions 
Definition of Categories and Units of Analysis: 
News*. 
This main classification would include the news segments broadcast under 
whichever category. The main categories here are: news briefs, main news bulletins, 
and news related programmes. 
News Briefs: 
Usually these are news segments broadcast every day before the main news 
bulletin. The duration of these seginents range between 3 to 6 minutes, during which a 
quick run through of the day's events and main news stories are presented in brief 
without any reports. Sometimes they would be accompanied by some picture inserts 
with LVO (Live Voice Over). 
Main News Bulletins: 
These are lengthy news segments (between 25 to 30 minutes long). The 
bulletins present more detailed news, accompanied by reports and, in certain 
occasions a studio interview with an analyst or a political activist. This category is 
strictly applied to the VOA news service. VOA runs a daily bulletin. 
News Update: 
This is applicable only to Jaam-e-Jam International and is equivalent to the 
main news bulletin in VOA. Since the 27 Ih of June when the station cancelled its daily 
main news bulletin, a different system of news presentation has been used as news 
update, which would include segments including field reports on some selected news, 
business updates, and sports news. They would also include a segment presenting 
pictures of events running with their original sounds and without a vocal commentary 
on them. In Jaam-e-Jain International these updates are broadcast every day, except 
for Sundays. 
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Leading News items: 
These would include the first three items of the news brief or bulletin and the 
first item in the case of the main news bulletin and the first report in the news updates 
case. The choice of these items in particular is to examine the priority news items in 
the channels in relation to the countries involved as well as the main themes stressed 
in the news agenda. This category includes six different sub-categories for that effect: 
item orientation: 
This would analyse the item orientation in relation to the region or country 
presented. 
A national news item would be related to the origin country of the station (in both 
cases the United States). 
An Iranian related item is a news item that deals with the country or and issue related 
to the country. 
Items under the Middle East deal with mainly the Arab Israeli conflict, and will also 
include Turkey. 
Islamic countries include Pakistan, all Arab countries ... etc. These are grouped as such 
since an Iranian audience would usually associate themselves with the Middle East 
and Islamic countries in general. 
The War in Iraq is a unit by itself because during the time of the study it was on top of 
the news agenda all over the world, and also because of its nature which makes it item 
of importance to the Iranian audience. 
international items would include any other news items not related to the above 
mentioned classifications. In this case, the name(s) of the country(s) will be 
mentioned so that at the end of the analysis there would be some kind of an 
assessment to which countries received most attention. 
Item Duration: 
This sub-category is meant to examine the time devoted to such items and how 
would the item's duration (if ever) differ depending on the orientation of the news 
items and its theme. It is grouped under three main levels: from 30 seconds to one 
minute, and between one and two minutes, between two and three minutes, and more 
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than three minutes in duration. This would show the importance of certain issues 
compared to other subjects and in related to the overall time of the bulletins. 
Source: 
This sub-category is to define the sources of news whether they are 
international news agencies, station's own resources including field reporters and 
stringers, or officials in the form of interviews or anonymous sources. 
Style of Presentation: 
This would complement the previous sub-category because it would either 
include units of analysis such as presenter only, presenter and LVO, in-house or field 
reports, or a live/studio interview. This would present the degree of analysis and 
opinions, presentation offered without bulletins. 
Type of News: 
This would include the kind of issues considered as priority items, being 
internal news of the country discussed, Iran's relations with other countries, or 
intemational issues in general. 
Theme of News: 
This sub-category analyses the type of news that also are considered on top of 
the news agenda, including protocol news, conflicts and disasters, general political 
issues, economic, social or any other category. 
News Oriented Programmes: 
This is the second main classification. It would include programmes that deal 
with issues in an analytical form. This analysis could be presented in form of 
historical backgrounds, assessment of current situations, debates between opposite 
opinions, or simply stating these opinions. This category will include current affairs 
programmes, commentary and debates programmes, press reviews, or documentaries. 
Sub-categories and levels of analysis under this category are similar to those of the 
news category. However, there are few more additions: frequency of broadcast (daily, 
weekly, monthly ... etc. ), sources of news (purchased or local production or mixture of 
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both). These added sub-categories are included to correspond to the nature of 
programmes as being different from that of news and to stress the analytical nature of 
programmes when applicable. 
Features Programmes: 
This classification covers all the light feature programmes including films and 
talk shows. The choice of this category is to assess the features agenda set by the 
stations and whether they do correspond to the fact that they are Iranian channels or if 
there are other factors that would determine their choices. Usually editorial and 
managerial policies of channels do not specify certain means of handling features and 
entertainment programmes however, it would be important to know how these items 
are being chosen in terms of their orientation and the way they are presented. 
Advertising and Promotions: 
This main classification would assess the economic orientations of the 
channel, especially so in the case of private channels. Types, frequency, and 
nationality of advertising, can help in assessing the financial orientations of the 
channel and how it would affect the station's handling certain issues and topics 
(whether political or economic). The promos are thought of here as propaganda items 
for the channel, its programmes, or other countries. Promos are used as fillers most of 
the time, but the degree of concentration or repetition would indicate affiliations and 
orientations. 
NEWS 
i. News 
a. Brief 
c. Main Bulletin 
d. News Period 
2. Leading News items (first 3 items + first item after the break) 
2.1. Item orientation 
a. NationaV U. S. news 
b. Iranian news 
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c. Middle East and Islamic nations 
d. War in Iraq 
e. International news 
2.2. Duration 
a. 30-60 seconds 
b. 60-120 seconds 
c. more than 2 minutes 
2.3. Style of Presentation 
a. Presenter only 
b. Presenter + LVO (news insert) 
c. Report 
d. Presenter + live/studio interview 
2.4. Source 
a. News Agencies 
b. Station's own resources 
c. Government and/or official sources 
d. Other (e. g. interviews) 
2.5. Type of news item 
a. U. S. Internal/local/national 
b. Iran's relations with other countries 
c. International relations with Iran 
d. international news 
2.6. Theme of news item 
a. Protocol 
b. Conflicts/disasters/ ... etc. 
c. Political 
d. Economic 
e. Sports 
f Social 
g. Other 
News Oriented Programmes 
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1. Type of Programme 
a. Current Affairs 
b. Documentaries 
C. Commentary/Debate 
d. Press reviews 
e. Other (including business and sports) 
2. Frequency of Broadcast 
a. Daily 
b. Weekly 
c. Bi-weekly 
d. Bi-monthly 
e. Monthly 
3. Sources 
a. Purchased materials 
b. Local production 
c. Mixture of both 
4. Style of Broadcast 
a. Live/satellite transmission 
b. Pre-recorded 
c. Both 
5. Style of Presentation 
a. Narration 
b. Presenter(s) + reports 
C. Presenter(s) + guests 
d. Straight forward interview(s) 
e. Mixture of styles 
6. Issues Presented 
a. Political 
b. Economic 
c. Sports 
d. Others 
Regions and Countries of Interest 
b. National/ U. S. news 
c. News about Iran 
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d. The Middle East and Islamic nations 
e. War in Iraq 
f International 
7. Themes Presented 
a. Conflicts 
b. Historical accounts 
c. Iran-international relations 
d. Middle East conflicts 
e. Islamic countries' related issues 
f. other (enviromnent/development/naturaI disasters... etc. ) 
Advertising and Promos 
Advertising 
2. Average of advertising within a broadcasting hour 
a. News hour 
b. Programme hour 
3. Frequency of advertising 
4. Nationality of advertising (if available) 
5. Programmes' sponsorship 
6. Availability and percentage 
7. Type of programmes 
8. Nationality of sponsor (if known) 
Promos 
1. Availability and frequency 
2. Purpose of promos 
3. For the channel 
4. For countries 
5. For programmes 
6. For daily/weekly schedules 
7. Messages portrayed 
8. Fillers (frequency, types and styles) 
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Appendix 2: 
RECORDING TIME TABLE 
VOA 
Day Programmed 
Monday (5-7- Main news bulletin 
04) 
Tuesday (29-6- News and Views + Next Chapter 
04) 
Wednesday Main news bulletin + Roundtable (especial 
(7-7-04) 
ý 
programme about student uprising) 
Thursday (1-7- News and views 
04) 
Friday (2-7-04) Main news bulletin + Roundtable 
Saturday (3-7- News and views 
04) 
Sunday (4-7- Main news bulletin 
04) 
Jaam-e-Jam International 
Day 
-- 
Programmed 
Monday((28-6- Stop sign 
04) 
Tuesday (29-6- Yarane Azadeh 
04) 
Wednesday (30- Kelisaych khanegiyeh Iranian (Iranian home 
6-04) church) + Day and Night (news update) 
Thursday (1 -7- Porchoneh + Day and Night (news update) 
04) 
Friday (2-7-04) Wave TV + Aahanghaye darkhasti 
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Saturday (3-7- World of sport 
04) 
Sunday (4-7-U4) Day and Night (news update) + Kelisayeh 
Khanegiyeh Iranian 
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